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This is and was, of course, a crazy project, an intellectual odyssey in the waters of 
social science and organization science. These waters, as so many other waters, are 
filled with Scyllas and Charybdises, Sirens and Cyclopes. The odyssey was largely 
motivated by my desire to increase my own understanding of the evercontinuing 
(philosophical) debates concerning the nature, aim and possibilities of social science. 
Most clearly these issues are exemplified by the often intense debates concerning 
methodology, the notions of explanation versus understanding, nomothetic versus 
idiographic research or quantitative versus qualitative research designs. Although the 
dichotomy of "the two cultures" today clearly is a simplification it may still be argued 
that something like the two inhabit and characterize the world of social science. 
People management is an interesting specific topic within the bounds of social science 
and organization science for several reasons. It has a fairly long history. Therefore the 
contours of problems and possibilities begin to become more visible. The topic thus 
allows and invites some more general reflection and commentary concerning theory, 
operationalization and methodology. HRM is also a clearly important topic in terms of 
its individual (existential), organizational (performance) and societal (ethical) 
consequences. The attempt to arrive at some understanding of our possibilities to find 
generalizable evidence for such consequences drove me further and further into the 
macro- and micro-landscapes of social science and organization science. 
The inevitable lack of profound expertise in all the areas covered in this work is 
hopefully compensated by the general picture of social scientific research that it tries 
to show. Whatever else this work represents, it seeks to exemplify a kind of 
beginning, being far from an end. 
I am naturally indebted and grateful to a lot of people and institutions for having, in 
one way or another, contributed to this thesis.  
I am deeply indebted to all the organizations and employees who agreed to participate 
in the empirical study. My most sincere gratitude also goes to the providers of 
financial support for this research project: Svenska kulturfonden, The Academy of 
Finland, The Department of Management and Organization at the Swedish School of 
Economics and Business Administration, The Foundation of Economic Education, 
The Foundation of Ella and Georg Ehrnrooth, The Foundation of Marcus Wallenberg, 
The Foundation of the Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration 
and The Foundation of Waldemar von Frenckell. 
I also want to express my deep gratitude to my pre-examiners, Professor David Guest 
from King’s College, London and Associate Professor Ingemar Torbiörn from 
Stockholm University who provided me with relevant critical comments. Based on 
their efforts I tried to clarify several aspects of the thesis. 
I am also particularly grateful to my supervisor Professor Ingmar Björkman who lured 
me into organization studies. I thank him for the tremendous amount of academic 
freedom he has provided. He has also been very helpful in giving feedback on general 
issues such as the structure of the thesis and "tone of argumentation" as well as in 
discussions on countless more specific issues. I am also very grateful to both Klaus 
Harju and Akseli Virtanen who constantly indicated to me the bourgeois nature of my 
  
research project. They provided me with a "forum" within the community of 
organization studies in Helsinki where I could continue to pursue my interest in 
philosophy and its relation to science. In fact, they offered a good excuse (for myself) 
to defend a certain understanding of this relation. I shared many reflections with 
Patrick Furu and I am particularly grateful for all the discussions we had on the nature 
of statistical analyses, many of which concerned structural equation modeling. Also 
his general computer literacy helped me out more than one time. Professor Johan 
Fellman, Susanna Taimitarha and in particular Professor Gunnar Rosenqvist were 
very kind in having the patience to reflect upon my questions concerning statistical 
methodology and inference. It must be emphasized that none of them bear any 
responsibility for the interpretations I made of my discussions with them. Professor 
Esko Leskinen, who introduced me to structural equation modeling, also deserves a 
special thanks. Ulf Sonnerstam was terrific in locating and providing me with many 
articles and books which I could not find in libraries in Helsinki or in any of the 
available internet databanks. Barbara Cavonius did a great editorial job and eventually 
saw to it that the thesis was taken out of my computer and sent to the publisher. I 
thank her for that and take full responsibility for all the remaining errors.  
I have naturally profited from numerous discussions with colleagues both from the 
Department of Management and Organization at Hanken as well as with people 
outside it. I am grateful to all of them. In general, I want to thank all former and 
current people at the Department of Management and Organization for the atmosphere 
which made me enjoy my doctoral studies at Hanken. My sincere gratitude extends to 
scholars in general who persist in their curiosity and struggle to increase human 
understanding. Scholarly activity is a group activity par excellence. Without the 
efforts of others one would miss the stimulating and enabling silent conversations that 
scientific books and articles most often provoke in the process of doing research.  
Nevertheless, my deepest gratitude goes to Nina who (almost without complaint...) 
bore with my workaholic periods during the writing of this thesis. During the time of 
my postgraduate studies she has also given me the greatest joys and motivators in my 
life, Sarah and Joshua. Since their birth, I have never been given much chance to 
escape the joys and frustrations that come from spending a lot of time with small 
children. This time has been immensely rewarding and, I am sure, not without a great 
impact on this thesis. 






"[T]he emperor of organizational performance studies is for the most part 
naked...A steady flow of studies making questionable interpretations of 
performance evidence continues...Academic researchers become not only the 
courtiers of a naked emperor but also keepers of a sacred faith in scientific 
method and systematic inference…conflicts between these two perspectives are 
often “solved” by separating the two contexts....In a schizophrenic tour de 
force, the demands of the roles of consultant and teacher are disassociated from 
the demands of the role of researcher...The dilemma of scholarship is twofold: 
First, it involves finding a route between a course that is precipitous in 
destroying vital elements of community built on social myths and intuitive 
knowledge and a coarse that is precipitious in corrupting the integrity of 
scholarship. Second, it involves finding a conception of knowledge that does 
not discourage its pursuit, that holds out the possibility of augmenting 
knowledge through systematic scholarship...The simultaneous embrace of the 
possibility of knowledge and the difficulty of achieving it can be a form of 
wisdom that sustains inquiry and scepticism in healthy confrontation.” (March 
and Sutton, 1997, pp. 702-704). 
In this thesis we walk on thin ice. We will devote us to the issue of performance effects while trying to 
preserve a balance between “pleasing the emperor” and the “risks involved in confirming his 
nakedness” (ibid., p. 704). 
“There are voices saying that problematizing what one does is not a good way 
of institutionalizing it, that attracting attention to the process, inevitably 
exposing its messiness and lack of a priori criteria is the last thing a dicipline in 
need of legitimation wants” (Czarniawska, 1999, p. 18).  
Such voices may be right, at least in the short run. This thesis is however based on the conviction that 
conducting studies in this or any other field of research which do not problematize themselves is 
seriously misleading.  
"If reputations and institutions are to be maintained by proclaiming insights into 
history and the discovery of routes to sustained performance advantage, then it 
may become inordinately natural to characterize the niceties of inferential 
clarity as dispensable scholastic pretense. The tendency of many articles with a 
wide range of ideological, methodological, and diciplinary prejudices to 
subordinate issues of inference ambiguity to issues of practical 
recommendations may be a symptom of that danger. A second danger is that the 
terrors of claiming unjustifiable knowledge will drive us from empirical 
discourse into the relatively safe activities of proving theorems, contemplating 
concundrums, and writing poetry (March and Sutton, 1997, p. 704). 
We claim that the problems discussed by March and Sutton are not limited to pursuits to explain 
"variation in performance or effectiveness" (ibid., p. 698). Academic standards in terms of inferences 
made in articles, published in the best scientific journals in the field, can often be questioned. In fact, 
the very nature of the basis and standards of inference are debated. We argue that researchers in 
organization science face a more general predicament in terms of a state of affairs in which it is very 
difficult not to be  
"driven both to proclaim standards of inferential discourse and to collaborate in 
subverting them in practice” (ibid., p. 703).  
This state of affairs is one of complexity, difficult to control, as well as often changing landscapes in 
terms of the object(s) of study. In this thesis an attempt is made to approach a part of this landscape at a 
time when it has been acknowledged that 
“organization studies, and indeed much of social science, is experiencing 
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Most of us live a considerable part of our lives in organizations. How people are 
managed in such organizations is thus intrinsically interesting. But as people 
management is also increasingly being viewed as highly important for organizational 
performance, it is all the more interesting. Lately it has been argued repeatedly that 
how organizations manage their workforce is taking the central stage in relation to 
more traditional sources of competitiveness (Pfeffer, 1994, 1996; Youndt and Wright, 
1996; Becker et al., 1997; Ulrich, 1998). In some distinction to earlier similar 
propositions, such propositions today claim a foundation in recent developments of 
strategic and general organizational theory in the form of the resource based view 
(Barney, 1991; Storey, 1995, pp. 3-4; Hiltrop et al., 1995). However, the issue of 
importance of the specific ideas associated with the notion of human resource 
management (HRM) still needs much specified theorizing and relevant empirical 
evidence. The debate concerning its consequences is arguably still largely 
characterized by a great deal of rhetorics coming from different interest groups 
(Legge, 1995b).  
In addition to a range of specific problems and weaknesses related to theory, concepts 
and constructs, operationalizations and empirical research, the pursuit of knowledge 
concerning the importance of HRM faces many general problems which characterize 
most social sciences. The following is an attempt, on the one hand to further the 
discussion on the importance of HRM and, on the other hand, to explore 
characteristics of social science as exemplified by research on potential effects of 
HRM. 
1.1 BACKGROUND AND FOCUS 
"The novelty of HRM…lies in the specification of a particular … 
approach, based on a combination of behavioral science theory and 
techniques with a recognition of the need for strategic integration not only 
among the HRM policy goals but between HRM and business goals. In 
short it is the integration of behavioral science and business strategy 
[which] is to provide a distinctive HRM path to competitive advantage. 
The appeal of HRM lies not only in [a] new, if challenging integrative 
model but in its timeliness. [HRM is about] the importance of values, 
culture and leadership for success in industry. It is American, optimistic, 
apparently humanistic and also superficially simple" (Guest, 1990, p. 379). 
These views about the timeliness of HRM were expressed in 1990. Later Guest has 
argued that “[r]ecent attention in popular management writing appears to give more 
priority to…re-engineering than to HRM” (1995, p. 125). Nevertheless, from the US, 
HRM has spread so that  
“Strategic human resource management has emerged as a …major 
paradigm among scholars and practitioners in many parts of the world” 
(Dyer and Reeves, 1995, p. 656).  
HRM is beginning to have its specific history, both of theorizing and empirical 
research. This specific history is, however, not a history of cumulative agreed upon 
insights and findings. The general history of HRM, which is the history of thinking 
about the management of employee performance, can be traced back at least to the 




term ‘HRM’ was introduced in 1965 (Berglund and Löwstedt, 1996). The seminal 
texts of the notion of HRM are however mostly located in the mid 1980s. (For short 
reviews of these, see Boxall, 1992; 1993).  
Apart from the important purposes to understand the macro-politics (Blyton and 
Turnbull, 1992; Legge, 1995) and the micro-politics (Ferris et al., 1999; Ferris and 
Judge, 1991; Townley, 1994) of HRM there are at least two basic mainstream goals 
which have occupied researchers interested in HRM. 
(1) One goal is to explain why certain HRM activities are found in certain contexts 
and organizations (Wright and McMahan, 1992). This includes attempts to explain 
variaton in these activities in terms of organizational strategies (Chadwick and 
Cappelli, 1999, p. 2). Boxall (1993, p. 657) gives a list of what can be said about our 
knowledge of the determinants of HR strategies. He concludes that “The progress is 
mainly in terms of clarification of the conceptual problems and indicating the 
complexity of them” (ibid., p.658). Arguably no breakthroughs or milestones have 
been achieved since the time of this judgement1. One thing which is apparent in 
Wright et al.’s (1992) synopsis of explanatory theories with reference to HRM is the 
small amount of cited works where these theories have been put to use empirically. 
Arguably, at least as long as we lack convincing contextualized evidence of effects of 
HRM, the potential explanations of the form and content of organizations' HRM 
policies/practices are going to be highly diverse. A priori, in this situation fashion 
explanations (Abrahamson, 1996; Rövik, 1996), institutional explanations (Tolbert 
and Zucker, 1996) or garbage can models – “solutions looking for issues to which 
they might be the answer” (Cohen et al., 1972, p. 2) - would have the most face 
validity.  
(2) Another goal has been to provide evidence for systematic effects of combinations 
of HRM practices on employees, organizational performance, and financial 
performance (Guest, 1997; Dyer and Reeves, 1995; Becker and Gerhard, 1996; Ferris 
et al., 1999). Stewart has recently rhetorically argued that the HRM department should 
be abolished because 
"[The human resources department] spend[s] 80% of their time on routine 
administrative tasks. Nearly every function of this department can be 
performed more expertly for less by others. Chances are its leaders are 
unable to describe their contribution to value added except in trendy, 
unquantifiable, and wannabe terms...” (1996, p. 105)2.  
Regardless of the truth of these claims, the bulk of mainstream research on HRM-
performance links have only marginally dealt with the explicit role of the HR 
department. The main question in this line of research has instead been whether and 
how certain forms of HRM significantly influences organizational performance and/or 
other outcomes regardless of who is responsible for HRM (inside or outside the focal 
organizations).  
                                               
1 For a somewhat more recent study on the causes of adoption of HRM practices, see Frits and 
MacDuffie (1996).  




To date there has been a range of empirical studies suggesting a positive relationship 
between HRM and different dimensions of organizational performance (Huselid and 
Becker, 1998). This is the line of research which our study is intended to contribute 
to. With reference to this line of research Ferris et al. argue that "as we view the 
published work in this area, we are simultaneously excited and troubled, frustrated yet 
optimistic, and encouraged but cautious" (1998, p. 236). While sharing much of this 
ambivalence, in our opinion there is however more reason to be frustrated than 
optimistic. In the next chapter we will briefly describe the main challenges involved 
in any attempt to contribute to this line of research. 
1.2 CHALLENGES  
The effects of HRM practices are extremely difficult to offer convincing empirical 
evidence for because of the complexity involved. Even if it might seem plausible that 
HRM will affect employee and organizational performance, the research community 
cannot yet claim to have established scientifically convincing evidence of such a fact. 
In particular, although there is some (fragmentary) evidence of a relationship between 
HRM and organizational performance, we have little or no evidence of  how (by what 
mechanisms) HRM might have such an effect. We know even less about how 
different contexts might affect these issues (Becker and Gerhardt, 1996). When 
claiming that we do not have knowledge of these issues, we mean that the research 
community has not yet produced such evidence which a larger part of the research 
community would agree upon (see e.g. Wood, 1999).  
Hence, there is ample work left for researchers who think it is possible to offer 
generalizable explanations of variation in organizational performance in terms of how 
companies treat their workforce. Such researchers assume we can find empirical 
evidence for at least temporally agreed upon statistical nomological relationships 
between some relevant and meaningful level of abstraction of HRM and some 
relevant organizational phenomena which this HRM tends to give rise to3. There are 
at least three major challenges that the research community has to meet in order to 
produce such explanations. 
(1) Theoretical development is the first and arguably the main challenge in research 
on HRM and its effects on performance (Ferris et al., 1999; Guest, 1997; Gerhardt and 
Becker, 1996). Guest (1997) offers an informed discussion of the study of 
performance effects of HRM. He argues that what is really needed is a more 
sophisticated theory of how HRM affects firm performance with specifications of 
intermediate outcomes at different levels. Becker and Gerhardt consider it important 
also to focus on contextual issues (1996, p. 792). We argue that in order for empirical 
research to be convincing researchers also need to more carefully consider and 
develop the framework of important control variables. This would force researchers to 
develop theory and delimit that which is to fall under the concept of HRM and that 
                                               
3 There are of course few ceteris paribus conditions which are satisfied for very long in social science 
given any plausible and convincing evidence for an effect of something on something which is desired 
by more people or organizations than in practice can achieve it (Numagami, 1998). However, relative 
laws can still apply even if “successful” relative laws might become impossible to corroborate. In this 
respect the difference between social science/organization science and biology, or even molecular 




which is not. In this work, we will try to explore such a theorization by specifically 
addressing the question of by what mechanisms HRM potentially influences 
organizational performance.  
(2) Empirical research in this field is important. In addition to theoretical 
underdevelopment, much of the debate on HRM simply suffers from too little focused 
empirical testing of what has conceptually been claimed and argued. Mueller has 
outlined the tradition of human resource management (or personnel 
management/business administration at large) as an applied science which should 
offer practical help. In Germany, he argues, the overwhelming part of the HRM 
related literature is prescriptive and ”normally unsupported by empirical evidence” 
(Muller, 1999, p.470). This is likely to be an adequate statement also concerning other 
countries (Boxall, 1994, p. 60; Guest, 1990, pp. 380-381). In order to increase the 
credibility of this prescriptive HRM discourse, academics have during the last decade 
engaged in more rigorous activities of justification through empirical evidence. 
However, as we shall argue in detail, this is no easy endeavour. 
The first and second challenges are inextricably related. Only theorizing without an 
ongoing careful empirical testing produces speculation and empty prescriptiveness. 
Empirical testing without connecting to and attempting theoretical development is 
blind. As Boxall puts it, "[p]ersonnel management literature seems to have been a 
classical case of the 'blind leading the blind'" (Boxall, 1992, p. 60). Guest argues that 
“[P]erhaps it is only when the empirical data begin to emerge that we realize how 
important the theory is” (1997, p. 263). We will therefore devote effort to conduct an 
empirical study which connects to the theorizing we offer. 
(3) The third major challenge arguably concerns operationalizations (Ferris et al, 
1999, p. 393; Wright and Sherman, 1999, p. 68). This a general and serious problem 
of research in organization science (McKinley and Mone, 1998; Pfeffer, 1993). 
Theorizations and definitions without operationalizations do not allow for focused 
agreed upon empirical testing. With specific reference to the HRM literature it has 
been argued that "[p]rior work on the measurement of High Performance Work 
Practices is extremely limited" (Huselid, 1995, p. 645). Thus, research would also 
need to focus on contributing to the development of a contextually sensitive 
standardized set of measures of the HRM practices (Becker and Gerhardt, 1996, p. 
793). This should ideally be done on a level of abstraction which allows application in 
different contexts but nevertheless capture substantive and relevant features of these 
phenomena. Any such standards of measurement can and should continuously be 
criticized and developed. Some standardization of measures is however needed in 
order to get the research community focused on even discussing the same issues 
(Gerhardt and Becker, p. 793) and thus to enable fruitful disagreement. This concerns 
as much researchers who take a positive view on HRM as it concerns those taking a 
critical one. In fact, there are many open questions also with reference to most 
moderating/mediating and dependent variables, which might be included in an HRM 
theorization of organizational performance. We will try to give due emphasis to the 
issues of measurement /operationalization4. 
                                               
4 After the writing of this thesis at least one more effort to concisely discuss the problems and prospects 




Considering the amount of work left to do at least with reference to the first and third 
challenges the arguments for the need of longitudinal research as well as in depth case 
studies in this field of research are rather compelling (Lundy, 1994, pp. 710-712; 
Boxall, 1993, p. 651, 658). However, there is also a clear need in the midst of a faire 
amount of current rhetorics to try to test some of the fundamental claims as to why 
and how HRM might work. In short, we believe it is important to try to formulate and 
empirically test “the very idea of HRM”5.  
Pfeffer argued that what is vital for any field of science is “the agreement that certain 
methods, certain sequences and programs of study, and certain research questions will 
advance training and knowledge” (1993, p.600).In other words, consensus is arguably 
vital for the production of knowledge6. In any case, unless the ground work related to 
the above three challenges can gradually be carried out researchers are unlikely to 
make much progress. Developments and some consensus concerning these challenges 
would also enable and encourage more replication studies which are clearly needed 
(Becker and Gerhardt, 1996, p. 781; 793)7. However, while a certain consensus seems 
important we also agree with Willmott, who emphasizes the idea that “theory 
development occurs through a struggle to identify and address anomalies” (1993, pp. 
706-707).  
In short, a dialectic between consensus and dispute supposedly has to be an ongoing 
part of any science. Giddens argues that “[s]cience depends, not on the inductive 
accumulation of proof, but on the methodological principle of doubt” (Giddens, 1991, 
p. 21). We would argue that it depends on both convincing evidence and doubt 
(compare Putnam, 1974/1991), in addition to a host of other things such as curiosity, 
commitment to a hypothesis, etc. etc. Just as science may be argued to depend on 
many things rather than any one thing, it can also be argued that science is better seen 
as having many goals rather than any one fixed goal. We will try to explicate a 
                                                                                                                                      
many of the problems that we try to develop, flesh out, emphasize, and thus put in more detailed 
perspective. 
5 The idea of HRM can obviously be interpreted in many ways. By the notion ‘the very idea of HRM’ 
we do not claim an essentialist definition of it. We use it to refer to our interpretation of HRM. This 
interpretation is largely based on claims made by proponents of HRM. For general critiques of 
essentialism, see Hallett (1991) or Wheeler (2000). It is quite conceivable that “the very idea of HRM” 
might always need different conceptualizations of HRM practices and outcomes in different contexts. 
This is also likely to be dependent on the level of abstraction we choose for a formulation of this idea 
or theorization. However, the very idea of HRM based upon the current literature, should arguably at 
least include the fact that HRM concerns the contribution that positive attributes of the workforce can 
make to organizational prosperity. Thus, in line with this HRM should have some identifiable outcomes 
at the level of such attributes of the workforce which in turn should have an influence at the level of 
organizational performance.  
6 The debate around this issue has been one of the more intense debates in organizational science 
(Clegg and Hardy, 1996). It can be argued that consensus is not only important for the production of 
knowledge. Rorty argues in many of his publications (1980; 1991a; 1991b, 1998, 2000) that some such 
consensus in fact is the only criterion of knowledge we should use. We will return to these issues 
below. 
7 The low number of replications is a more general problem in organizational science. Hubbard, Vetter 




position which argues that in order to make sense of science we do not need to 
attempt any interpretative imposition of any one overarching fixed goal of science 
(Fine, 1984, p.61; ibid., 1986, pp. 171-177; Rorty, 1995, pp. 297-298). We can still 
suggest that any scientific undertaking should be understood as asking the audience 
"Do you agree with these results? Why?/Why not?" and being sensitive to the answers 
in terms of critical examinations of the justification of the results. Thus, we will adopt 
and try to explicate the position that “the only sense in which science is exemplary is 
that it is a model of human solidarity” (Rorty, 1991 d, p. 39)8.  
1.3 DEFINING HRM 
It seems plausible that different types of HRM approaches can have very different 
effects. What we try to conceptualize, operationalize and study are consequences of 
what we will call 'strategic soft HRM'9. The general and simple ideal of soft HRM, as 
we conceive it, can be presented with Walton’s words:  
The new HRM model is composed of policies that promote mutuality – 
mutual goals, mutual influence, mutual respect, mutual rewards, mutual 
responsibility. The theory is that policies of mutuality will elicit 
commitment, which in turn will yield both better economic performance 
and greater human development" (1985b, p. 64) 
The “apparent humanism” of HRM is clear in Walton’s characterization. However, if 
we instead of “and greater human development” write “through greater human 
development”, we are arguably closer to a realistic balance between organizational 
performance requirements and an ethics of employee welfare. This also more clearly 
brings out the potentially important strategic aspect of HRM. Further, questions of 
humanism and human development are far from being straightforward. Thus, one 
general (philosophical) question is whether soft HRM would in principle be beneficial 
for both employees and employers regardless of what the (manifest) attitudes of 
representatives of these two constituencies indicate10. A second and more limited 
                                               
8 Note that this does not imply that science is necessarily committed to any specific and fixed focus or 
outcome of solidarity. It rather only suggests that science is a model of solidarity in the sense of being 
attentive to the rules of the game and understanding the importance both of agreeing upon them and the 
possibility of questioning them. We will come back to a discussion of what the rules of science can be 
understood to involve and depend upon. 
9 For a discussion of the distinction between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ (strategic) HRM, see Legge (1995, pp. 
66-67) and Truss and Gratton (1997). The latter argue that “[t]he hard model is based on notions of 
tight strategic control, and an economic model of man...while the soft model is based on control 
through commitment...[B]ecause these assumptions are so divergent, they cannot both properly be 
incorporated within a single model of human resource management” (1997, p. 53). They also claim that 
“they are founded on opposing assumptions regarding human nature and, consequently, the legitimacy 
of managerial control strategies (ibid., p. 58). However, we will try to defend a potentially fruitful 
combination of these two strands arguing that (philosophical) assumptions about human nature are 
“ornamentations” and that the legitimacy of any HRM does not turn on such assumptions. We will 
argue that the legitimacy of any HRM should be viewed as a multidimensional ethical-political-
pragmatical question rather than being dependent on notoriously problematic definitions of “human 
nature”. 
10 “The suspicion...is simple, although double: what if human beings, in humanism’s sense, were in the 
process of, constrained into, becoming inhuman (that’s the first part)? And (the second part), what if 




question is to what extent and in what contexts employees want what HRM has to 
offer11. A third question is in what organizational contexts (power relations, 
competitive pressures, type of employees, content of work, etc) such a theory is likely 
to yield what it promises. In any case, to empirically study HRM and its potential 
consequences we need to be more specific about its character. 
Our notion of 'strategic soft HRM' can somewhat more explicitly (initially) be 
characterized by the following definition of HRM supplied by Storey:  
Human resource management is a distinctive approach to employment 
management which seeks to achieve competitive advantage through the 
strategic deployment of a highly committed and capable workforce, using 
an integrated array of cultural, structural and personnel techniques (Storey, 
1995, p. 5). 
However, researchers have not been able to theoretically specify, much less agree 
about what this ”distinctive” exactly means or could mean12. HRM is an intensively 
debated field of research in that researchers take very different positions concerning 
the potential glories of it. This divergence can to a large degree be attributed to the 
lack of agreement on what specificly HRM’s ”distinctive approach” is understood to 
be. Some criticism is ethical and even existential (Townley, 1994; Legge, 1995; 
Keenoy and Anthony, 1992). Some point to conceptual problems and contradictions 
in theories and applications of HRM (Boxall, 1993, 1996; Dyer and Reeves, 1995; 
Legge, 1995, Noon, 1992).  
The general concept of HRM is potentially conceptually problematic in several ways. 
Some of these problems appear in the potential conflicts between HRM viewed as 
'soft' ('closed', 'best practices', 'developmental-humanism') versus 'hard' ('strategic', 
'open', 'utilitarian-instrumentalism'), notions such as commitment versus flexible 
organizations, practices focusing on individuals versus teams, assumptions of unitarist 
ideals versus pluralist (political) realities of organizations, “new ways of old” control 
                                                                                                                                      
in Janssens and Steyaert (1999, p. 375). They elaborate that “[t]he first kind of inhumanity is the 
inhumanity of the system, or ‘development’, the goal of all science and technology in today’s world; 
the second, as Lyotard puts it, is the inhumanity of our social conditioning: the pressure to conform to 
prescribed modes of behavior that is placed on all of us as we pass from childhood to adulthood” 
(Janssens and Steyaert, 1999, pp. 375-376). The issues related to HRM, as well as to research on HRM, 
are unquestionably related to both of these wide-ranging questions. Below we will reflect upon 
somewhat more concrete socio-ethical issues which have been explicitly related to HRM.  
11 Argyris (1998), for example, argues that often managers do not really want to empower their 
subordinates and also that the latter often do not really want empowerment. In this thesis the 
assumption is that empowerment is desirable and that it has positive consequences. 
12 Some scholars use the term 'High Performance Work Practices' (HPWS) without making any explicit 
distinction with reference to HRM. Wood (1999) elaborates on the possible distinctions between 
'HRM', 'SHRM' (Strategic Human Resource Management), 'HPWS' (High Performance Work 
Practices) and the related 'HCM' (High Commitment Management), 'HIM' (High Involvement 
Management) and 'HPM' (High Performance Management). In order to emphasize the attempt to 





versus fundamentally new attitudes of management13. In addition there has been what 
one may call a clear domination of an American ethnocentric perspective in HRM 
writing (Brewster, 1995). In fact HRM has been seen as “a contemporary 
manifestation of the American Dream” (Guest, 1990, p. 377).  
Despite the potential conflicts, the goal of (part of) the research community is to 
achieve a theory of how HRM potentially affects organizational performance (Becker 
and Gerhardt, 1996; Becker and Huselid, 1998; Guest, 1987, 1997). In order to 
attempt to approach such a theoretical goal, we still face the problem of specifying our 
definition of HRM. As stated in Storey’s definition cited above, HRM seems to 
include almost anything which goes on in an organization. This seems unfruitful as a 
starting point14. Instead, to the extent that scholars can come to agree or fruitfully 
disagree on consequences related to a more limited explicit definition of HRM we 
might then extend the concept to include other processes applied in the management 
of organizations15. The definitional problem and the consequential lack of knowledge 
related to HRM has been astutely stated by critiques of HRM. However, some of 
these critiques argue that HRM feeds on not being defined. Keenoy has argued that  
“despite mounting evidence of conceptual fragmentation, empirical 
incoherence and theoretical vacuity, HRMism has gone from strength to 
strength. In short, the more researchers have undermined the normative, 
prescriptive and descriptive integrity of HRMism, the stronger it gets” 
(1999, p. 1).  
Keenoy continues that we should  
“[re-imagine] HRMism through the metaphor of the hologram – as a fluid, 
multifaceted and intrinsically ambiguous phenomenon” (1999, pp. 1-2). 
“[H]olograms underline the point that what we see also varies according to 
where we, quite literally, stand” (ibid., p. 11). 
Some critiques argue not only that HRM feeds on not being defined but that it would 
die if it were.  
“[O]nce we seek to explain HRM, to subject it to any analysis or criticism, 
it ceases to function as intended. Its purpose is to transform, to inspire, to 
motivate, and above all to create a new ‘reality’…To explain it is to 
destroy it” (Keenoy and Anthony, 1992, p. 238).  
                                               
13 For some general reflections upon these dilemmas of HRM, see Mabey and Salaman (1995, p. 473) 
and Steyaert and Janssens (1999, p. 185) and for reflections upon the distance and conflict between 
HRM ideals and “reality”, see Mabey and Salaman (1995, p.481). 
14 Keenoy (1999, p. 3 and in particular footnote 5, p. 19) gives a bleak description of the proliferated 
use of the concept HRM. To some extent this proliferation is the consequence of a lack of any exact 
definition.  
15 Rather than continuing to offer very broad definitions and conceptual frameworks the research 
community would need to get down to more concrete work related to explicit and limited definitions. 
However, as Snell, Youndt, and Wright acknowledge, “[p]roviding a blueprint for integrative research 
is a far less difficult task than dealing with the operational and logistical hurdles that such an area of 




In a similar vain Noon tells us that  
“Belief in HRM is not based upon deconstructing theory or looking for 
proof, but on faith” (1992, p. 27). 
However, Keenoy, Anthony and Noon offer us at least as much rhetorics, although in 
the opposite direction, as many proponents of HRM. If HRM shall ever (at least 
partly) escape the rhetorical battleground, and either be accepted as a sound and 
strategically important management approach or perhaps partly be laid to rest as an 
“American dream”, academics have to put as specific and empirically relevant 
versions of HRM to as rigourous empirical tests as possible.  
Nevertheless,  the situation might arguably be worse than suggested by Keenoy 
(above) who implies that the hologram of HRM produces many but clear pictures of 
the phenomenon. What could perhaps be said is that the empirical evidence and 
conceptual aspects of HRM produce a broken hologram. In this study we try to 
(re)construct one image of this broken hologram and put it to an empirical test. We 
suggest the following more restrictive definition of our subject of research. 
Definition: Human resource management is an approach to employment 
management which seeks to achieve competitive advantage through the 
strategic development of a capable and motivated workforce, using an 
integrated array of generic human resource management techniques. 
Corollary1: The term 'generic human resource management techniques' refers 
to the apparently straightforward activities and principles listed below:  
Adequate selection processes. Ideal goal: the employment of motivated and 
technically, psychologically, socially competent employees.  
Adequate socialization processes. Ideal goal: employees should get to 
know the organization, its history, its philosophy, its people and its 
strategy. 
Adequate performance appraisal processes: Ideal goal: employees should 
know and agree about what they have done, should do and why 
Adequate development processes. Ideal goal: employees should be further 
developed on topics and by means they view as relevant. 
Adequate communication processes. Ideal goal: employees should feel that 
they are given adequate and sufficient information. 
Adequate compensation and general benefits. Ideal goal: employees should 
feel that they are sufficiently and meaningfully rewarded. 
Adequate employment security: Ideal goal: employees should feel security 
in their employment relationship16 
                                               
16 In addition, employees should feel that they can take important decicions on how they are going 
about doing their job (autonomy) and that they are meaningfully involved in organizational issues of 




We will use the term 'the sophistication of the HRM system' to refer to the degree to 
which an HRM system is characterized by these features. Although we specify the 
generic HRM practices included in an HRM system, the definitions of these practices 
are still very loose. Corollary 1 only specifies the simple and apparently 
straigtforward goals of the HRM practices in terms explicitly referring more or less 
only to "soft" HRM. Essentially the reason for our loose definitions is that researchers 
do not agree on what specific practices most effectively fulfill these goals and that 
organizations are bound to utilize somewhat different more specific means to achieve 
any of the goals. Thus, we suggest that whatever more specific forms these practices 
take, a theorization of "soft" HRM claims that to the extent that these goals can be 
achieved, they should have a number of positive consequencies17.  
It has been argued that certain general properties of the HRM practices influence their 
effectiveness. More specifically, the internal and external integration of these 
practices have been viewed as important for how well they will contribute to 
organizational performance (Mabey and Salaman, 1995, p. 448; Becker and Huselid, 
1998, pp. 55-56; Huselid, 1995, pp. 642-643; Ichniowski et al., 1997, pp. 4-5).  
Corollary 2: The term 'integrated' in our definition above refers to internal fit 
which we define as:  
Internal fit: The HRM practices should support one another in producing 
consistent kinds of competence, behavior and attitudes 
Corollary 3: The term 'strategic' in our definition above explicitly refers to 
external or strategic fit which we define as:  
External fit: The HRM practices should support competencies, behavior 
and attitudes which are important for the achievement of strategic business 
goals 
The term 'strategic soft HRM' refers to the suggestion, elaborated upon below, that the 
strategic integration of the HRM system will influence the sophistication of the HRM 
system. 
It has further been claimed that persistence in applying and developing HRM 
practices (Mueller, 1996) are important determinants of a well functioning HRM 
approach. In addition we will briefly also pursue the question whether HRM 
competences (Huselid et al., 1997) influence the propensity of organizations to exhibit 
a high degree of sophistication of the HRM system. These latter factors, persistence 
and HR professionalism, will thus largely based on the literature be hypothesized to 
influence the quality of the HRM system.  
                                                                                                                                      
conceptualize these elements of HRM as informal psychological consequences of the above mentioned 
HRM practices. 
17 A real difficulty concerns the operationalizations of the practices so defined. However, already these 
open definitions have implications for the operationalizations. In general, definitions without 
operationalizations only come half way of telling the reader what one is “really” talking about. We will 




The general assumption of strategic soft HRM proposed in this work is that employee 
performance constitute one of the most important resources of at least some 
organizations. It is further assumed that there is a set of ethically sound human 
resource management practices, consistent with the above HRM principles and 
integrational aspects, through which the management of this resource can be made 
effective. By ‘ethically sound’ we simply mean practices which are appreciated by the 
employees. By this notion we do not e.g. refer to organizational justice. There are 
many aspects of justice representing general moral requirements or imperatives which 
in our interpretation should not, or at least need not really be part of the core of a 
HRM theorization of organizational performance. We consider the idea of strategic 
soft HRM to represent something over and above these aspects18.  
We will deal with the complex aspects of theorization, conceptualization and 
operationalization in more detail later on.  
1.4 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
Becker and Gerhardt emphasize the need for  
“synthesizing and organizating existing conceptual work into a more 
coherent theory with a greater number of specific, testable propositions” 
(1996, p. 791).  
This study represents an attempt to achieve such a synthesis (and partial re-
conceptualization). The two more specific aims of this study can thus be formulated 
as the attempts to (1) develop and justify a theorization of HRM's potential influence 
on organizational performance largely on the basis of Guest (1997), with specific 
attention paid to potential explanatory mechanisms, and (2)  empirically explore the 
adequacy of this conceptualization/theorization.  
In so doing we try to be sensitive to the alleged tendency of many articles to 
"subordinate issues of inference ambiguity to issues of practical recommendations" 
(March and Sutton, 1997, p. 704). This is for example attempted by including more 
control variables than has been the standard in prior research as well as by discussing 
the many theoretical, methodological and conceptual difficulties involved both in this 
research project and organization studies at large. We also try not to proceed 
"blissfully unaware of the post-empiricist philosophical debates" (Willmott, 1997, p. 
322).  
In fact, research in social science can more generally be seen as being "in a state of 
epistemological turmoil" (McKinley and Mone, 1998, p. 169). With explicit reference 
to research on HRM it has been said that  
“[t]he normative character of the models and techniques, the continual 
hammering on human values without any sort of of ethical or philosophical 
research, and the lack of a self-reflexive character - these are all mildly 
                                               
18 It is however clear that perceptions of justice may vary greatly between organizations and employees 
and that they may influence both perceptions of the HRM system as well as other performance 
outcomes. In pursuing the influence of the sophistication of the HRM system as defined above it is thus 




suicidal traits, progressively reducing HRM’s foundation and credibility. 
Currently, questions of HRM’s future and the way it is conceived as a 
theoretical domain are being raised” (Steyaert and Janssens, 1999, p. 181). 
Therefore we pursue the two goals above while trying to “situate” HRM, i.e. trying to 
give a fairly comprehensive view of the wider complexity of questions related to 
(research on) it.  
Thus, a third and more general aim of the thesis is also to (3) develop and convey an 
understanding of the epistemological-theoretical-ethical complexity involved in 
research on HRM and its potential outcomes. 
In this sense we are also going to explore HRM research as an example of a social 
science. In attempting to arrive at a reasonably simple model of HRM’s influence on 
organizational performance, researchers in HRM inevitably face a complicated set of 
questions related both to epistemology and ethics. The (mainstream) HRM discourse 
generally scores high on all “criteria for deciding when to conduct ideological 
analysis of social theory” identified by Alvesson (1991, pp. 211-214). We will at least 
try to avoid the “pseudo objective style” and the “absence of self reflection” (ibid., p. 
213) 19. We agree on the importance to  
“problematize and challenge the moral integrity or humanity…of those 
who, convinced of the epistemological soundness of their research, are 
disinclined to reflect upon its ethico-political significance” (Willmott, 
1997, p. 257).  
There are generally many reasons for a social scientist to be sceptical with reference 
to the "epistemological soundness of their research". We will try to consider this issue 
in some more detail as well as reflect upon the "ethico-political" situatedness of our 
research. The reflection upon both epistemological and ethical-political dimensions 
seems important as it is claimed that  
“[s]elfconscious empirical-analytic science, founded upon an informed 
choice between competing methodologies of knowledge production, is the 
exception rather than the rule” (Willmott, 1997, p. 336).  
In this thesis we will try to situate and justify our methodological choices and 
commitments. From the point of view of the author this dissertation concerns as much 
the development of an understanding of (the complexity of) social scientific research 
as it concerns the development of and testing a theorization of HRM. The overrall 
                                               
19 Linguistic studies of the impact of different uses of language have indicated that “socially desirable 
ingroup behaviors and undesirable outgroup behaviors are expressed at a high level of abstraction (i.e. 
enduring and stable), whereas socially undesirable ingroup behaviors and desirable outgroup behaviors 
are encoded at a low level of abstraction (i.e. context-specific and unstable). This bias is significant in 
that it may maintain and perpetuate stereotypes, ingroup favoritism...” (Leets, 2000, p. 343, referring to 
Maas and Arcuri, 1996). Some sort of analogous phenomenon is arguably often taking place with 
reference to scientific research communities. In this thesis we will try to adequately consider issues of 
context-specificity and the unstable. Thus, we will discuss problems and open questions in some detail 
more or less as we go along instead of, as arguably often is the case, avoiding problematic issues until 
the end where they are (usually) briefly mentioned as limitations of studies. The latter method, we feel, 
often rhetorically gives a wrong picture of the complexity of research attempts, in particular as more or 




purpose of'this exploratory and interrogative study is thus to try to combine an 
understanding and discussion of the larger epistemological-ethical terrain with an 
attempt to empirically study one understanding of the phenomenon of HRM and its 
consequences. In fact, the current state of affairs seems to dictate such a dual concern.  
Any research on HRM is, implicitly or explicitly, involved in the "epistemological 
turmoil" (McKinley and Mone, 1998, p. 169). However, we will argue that this is a 
state of affairs which we should neither conceive of as one that will soon be overcome 
nor as one due to any "devastating" philosophically grounded consequences. It is 
simply a reflection of the complicated nature of social science in combination with the 
still fairly vague nature of most attempts to get a grip on the complex objects of 
research involved. As a consequence most, if not all, scientific claims to knowledge in 
organization science have to be treated with considerable circumspection. 
In addition to what has already been said above, it should also already here be noted 
that the empirical part of this research project is clearly limited in that it explicitly 
concerns the questions of how knowledge intensive organizations in highly 
industrialized countries within the capitalist system as well as employees within such 
organizations may be influenced by HRM. 
1.5 SOME REMARKS ON THE CONTEXT OF HRM  
With reference to HRM Legge has argued that  
What evidence we have is of a patchy implementation of practices 
designed to achieve flexibility, quality and commitment, often constrained 
by the contradictions inherent in enacting these slippery concepts, and 
motivated more by the opportunities afforded by high levels of 
unemployment and the constraints of recession and enhanced competition, 
than by any long-term strategic considerations (p. 47)... the ‘soft’ 
normative model of HRM appears as a mirage, retreating into a receding 
horizon” (1995, p. 339)20.  
Boxall also claims that  
“[t]he overwhelming judgement of commentators, both academic and 
practitioner, is that HRM’s position on the ‘strategic agenda’ of senior 
management is lower than it ought to be” (1996, p. 69).  
Also Frits and MacDuffie note that  
“from the perspective of economic rationality, one should expect high-
involvement work practices to be widely used. Yet many argue that 
imitation, learning, and diffusion of these practices have been slow and 
sporadic” (1996, p. 424).  
In general there was at least during the early 1990s a tendency in many countries to 
engage in large divestments of personnel as organizations confronted exceedingly 
competitive markets Legge (1995, pp. 76-91 and 328-339). Legge discusses primarily 
Anglo-American countries but tendencies to cut personnel were also observable in 
                                               




many (other) European countries, including the Nordic countries. Boxall reasons 
along the same lines when claiming that  
”[t]he ‘big picture’ from the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s suggests 
that managers in the Anglo-American environment have been consumed 
with the problem of survival in more competitive product markets.” 
(Boxall, 1996, p. 68).  
Boxall makes the point that  
“[s]urvival anxiety has generated a new tranche of isomorphic HR 
practices: initiatives such as delayering, rightsizing and increasingly 
contingent forms of employment” (ibid., p. 69).  
For these reasons we have, for the empirical part of this study, chosen a population of 
organizations (i.e. the consultancy industry) where on average we would expect the 
context of HRM more closely favoring the conceptual ideal. This is arguably due to 
the structure and character of employees as well as the competition for employees in 
the industries represented in our sample. MacDuffie has argued that there are 
necessary conditions for an HRM-performance link. According to him these involve 
that  
“employees possess knowledge and skills the managers 
lack[;]…employees are motivated to apply this skill and knowledge 
through discretionary effort [;]…the firm’s business or production strategy 
can only be achieved when employees contribute such discretionary effort” 
(1995, p. 199)21. 
Such conditions would seem to potentially be satisfied, if anywhere, in a “knowledge 
intensive” organizational context such as the consultancy industry22. There is also 
some empirical justification for this. Becker et al. (1997) showed some evidence for 
the fact that what they call “high performance strategies” are most prevalent in 
dominantly knowledge intensive contexts, in their sample represented by financial 
services organizations. 
We will thus try to conduct a test of whether firms in fact currently are able to achieve 
competitive advantages through HRM in a context where HRM should matter most. 
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
In chapter 2 we dive into the intense debates in organization science concerning 
epistemology, ontology and methodology. Here we will explain our general 
epistemological and ontological commitments. This chapter is also an attempt to 
                                               
21 Guest has somewhat similarly argued that “[e]ven in those contexts where market conditions are 
favourable making it desirable in theory, it may not be feasible in practice” (1989, p. 50). Guest 
suggests that the following conditions have to be met: strong corporate leadership, strategic vision, 
technological/production feasibility, employee/industrial relations feasibility and innovative personnel 
departments (ibid.). 
22 It may be noted that “[t]he notion of ...knowledge-intensive as a base for identifying a group of 




situate, problematize and justify the general possibilities of quantitative research 
methodologies in organizational/social research. We will also consider the debate on 
incommensurability. Some scholars have argued that incommensurability has far 
reaching consequences with reference to the possibilities of organizational researchers 
to engage in rational debate. The problem of incommensurability is arguably often 
used as a modern way of stating a highly relativistic nature of knowledge. 
Storey argues that  
“the concept of HRM has been, and remains, highly controversial [and that 
there] are three main reasons for this. These reasons stem from questions 
of meaning, fact [and] values” (1995, p. 4-5).  
In chapters 3-6 we will try to discuss all these aspects23. Chapter 3 begins by situating 
HRM historically and then considers the more general meaning of HRM as it may be 
understood against the backdrop of mainstream HRM theorizing. Here we develop 
our notion of HRM. Chapter 4 presents a focused discussion and critique of the 
(background) theory which is most often referred to in the current mainstream 
literature on HRM. Chapter 5 deals with critique in terms of ethico-political aspects 
related to (research on) HRM. Chapter 6 critically evaluates earlier empirical evidence 
of the influence of HRM.  
In chapter 7 we present a general outline of the model which we try empirically to 
provide evidence for. In this chapter we also present our main hypotheses. In the three 
latter parts of this chapter we deal with some more specific issues related to our 
theorization and methodological aspects of empirically testing it.  
Chapter 8 presents the sample, data, control variables as well as operationalizations 
and validations of the constructs involved in the empirical test of the suggested model. 
Chapter 9 presents the results of our hypotheses testing. Finally, chapter 10 presents a 
summary of the thesis and general conclusions. 
                                               
23 By the notion of ‘fact’ Storey (1995) refers to organizations' adoption of something which can be 




2 ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
There are several attitudes researchers take towards specific research attempts as well 
as, more problematically, towards the scientific enterprise in general in terms of 
epistemology, ontology and methodology. If there would be large scale agreement on 
issues related to research on HRM (or social science at large) there would be much 
less need to dwell on these matters. But there is not. In fact as already noted, to the 
contrary it is generally acknowledged that  
“organization studies, and indeed much of social science, is experiencing 
dramatic epistemological turmoil” (McKinley and Mone, 1998, p. 169).  
The HRM discourse is inextricably involved in this turmoil. Any researcher implicitly 
or explicitly faces a set of meta-level questions to which many different answers have 
been suggested. How one is to conduct research in organization science, the 
possibilities, status and justification of such research, and the interpretation of the 
results of such research, are heavily debated topics. As a researcher in the field we 
therefore feel a need to work through our epistemological-ontological understanding 
of organizational research, and more specifically of the present study. It has for 
example been argued generally that  
“[T]he contested terrain mapped out by constructivism/relativism and 
positivism/objectivism continues to haunt the study of organizations” 
(Reed, 1996, p. 46).  
We will argue for a view which suggests that this philosophical metalevel terrain, in 
terms of contests where universal arguments are looked for, is rather misplaced or at 
least unfruitful and unnecessary. In short the argument is that as a contest these issues 
concern problems  
“whose employment has proved to lead nowhere, proved to be of more 
trouble than they were worth” (Rorty, 1998b, p. 45). 
In a similar vein, this chapter will also suggest that a priori and universal arguments 
about agency versus structure and individualism versus collectivism (Reed, 1996, pp. 
46-47) are rather unfruitful. This follows from the argumentation below that there is 
no interesting a priori determinable necessary and/or universal (philosophical) 
epistemology or ontology relevant for empirical science.  
On this view, the only relevant contest(s) relate to the fruitfulness of explanations. 
What is then a fruitful explanation? What is a fruitful research problem? On the view 
to be explicated these questions always also relate to the specific fields of research, 
and even more specifically to individual research questions within such fields. But 
they always also tend to to relate to larger ethical-political-pragmatical debates. The 
suggestion is that by avoiding the somewhat stale universal a priori (metalevel) 
debates, researchers can engage in debating more specific issues more relevant to their 
research areas. On the other hand, this very chapter is an example of continuing the 
metalevel debates. We are careful all along to argue that the only thing we or any of 




Quite contrary to the suggestion offered in this chapter, there seems to be a tendency 
among organizational researchers to feel the need to dive into the deep and often 
muddy waters of philosophy. Such a tendency is exemplifed by Burrell’s argument 
that 
“sooner or later organization studies must enter an area where only the 
foolhardy dare to tread – the place where philosophy and social science 
meet” (Burrell, 1994, p. 15).  
Thus, we want to paint one picture of this “area” and try to situate our thesis with 
reference to it. However, the attempt to combine a philosophical discourse and a 
social scientific one is “open...to none without criticism” (ibid., p. 15). In our attempt 
we lean mostly on the writing of Rorty whose general suggestions related to ontology, 
epistemology and methodology we (think we) accept. Apart from occational 
references (e.g. Czarniawska, 1995; 1999; Tsoukas, 1998; Weaver and Gioia, 1994), 
Rorty has not figured much in the writings of organizational scholars. Thus, 
explicating his thinking has some independent interest.  
The general aim and upshot of this excursion into philosophy is to suggest two things. 
First, there is no given “place” where social science and philosophy meet. Second, to 
the extent that the views we try to explicate can be accepted, they indicate that a field 
of empirical science should primarily debate problems and justify research attempts 
based on the history and perceived possibilities of informed trials and errors in terms 
of empirical research and empirical theories. Such trials and errors can be inspired by 
anything, including philosophical texts. However, on the view to be explicated the 
latter can provide no priviledged basis for justifying or critizing any empirical 
research attempts.  
We want to emphasize that all the arguments in this section are subject to continuing 
controversy within philosophy24. In general, it seems problematical to use philosophy 
or arguments by particular philosophers as some kind of “higher” authorization (or 
critique) of empirical research approaches. On any topic of philosophical reflection, 
there is bound to be a whole range of differing and even contradictory views. 
Admittedly, empirical scientist’s arguments on “philosophical”  
“topics are [often] punctuated by stale philosophical clichés which 
the…participants have stumbled across in their reading” (Rorty, 1980, p. 
393).  
We will try, as briefly as possible, to give a justification of our commitments as well 
as what we are not committed to (although we are potentially guilty as accused 
above). This will thus, perhaps somewhat paradoxically be done by basically arguing, 
with Rorty, for the therapeutic suggestion that empirical science does not have 
philosophical presuppositions. The only sense in which it has such presuppositions, is 
in the “trivial” sense that it always operates within a certain language which is always 
                                               
24 For some sympathetic reflections on the problems and challenges of different philosophical 
positions, attitudes and schools of thought, and arguably somewhat more low voiced reflections than 
Rorty’s, see Wallgren (1996). For critical debates about Rorty’s writings, see Malakowsky (1990), 




potentially open-ended and problematical. A short hand for Rorty’s suggestion is the 
following:  
“To drop the notion of the philosopher as knowing something about 
knowing which nobody else knows so well would be to drop the notion 
that his voice always has an overriding claim on the attention of the other 
participants in the conversation… Philosophers often do have interesting 
views upon such questions, and their professional training as philosophers 
is often a necessary condition for their having the views they do...[but] we 
should no longer take seriously the notion of philosophy as providing 
“foundations” or “justifications” for the rest of the culture, or as 
adjudicating quaestiones juris about the proper domains of other 
diciplines” (Rorty, 1980. pp. 392-394)25. 
One of the essential features of Rorty’s thinking is the rejection of “the 
correspondence theory of truth” (1998a, pp. 1-5; 1998b; 1998c) together with the 
acceptance of the indeterminacy of (necessary) meaning and (necessary) reference 
(Rorty, 1980, pp. 257-311). Epistemology and ontology on this view become 
contingent. The anti-representationalism he suggests means that we can view 
ourselves as  
“in touch with reality in all areas of culture – ethics as well as physics, 
literary criticism as well as biology – in a sense of “in touch with” which 
does not mean “representing reasonably accurately” but simply “caused by 
and causing”” (1991a, p. 9). 
On the same lines, Fine argues that reference to some more substantial relationship 
between our knowledge and the world seems to be little other than “a desk-thumping, 
foot-stamping shout of “Really!” “ (Fine, 1984a, p. 97).  
There are some similarities between “continental philosophy” and the “analytic 
philosophy” which Rorty’s thinking more or less represents or at least grew out of:  
“The radical break which both Davidson [“analytical”] and Derrida 
[“continental”] make is to work out the consequences of denying 
essentialism and objective necessities across the board” (Wheeler, 2000b, 
pp. 23-24).  
Although Rorty describes himself as an underlaborer and popularizer (1998, pp. 8-9), 
the above mentioned work is also what Rorty is engaged in26. The consequences of 
                                               
25 For some general short overviews of Rorty’s work, see Rorty (1998a; 1991a; 1991b) and Brandom 
(2000b). Rorty is very aware of the problem of his engagement, i.e. philosophically arguing for the end 
of philosophy (as it has largely been conceived of at least since Kant) (Rorty, 1980, pp. 357-394). Thus 
he is not trying to prove a universal philosophical thesis, rather he is suggesting an attitude. In doing 
this he only tries to sketch a dynamic of the philosophical tradition (ibid., 1980) and points to 
(arguably) rather devastating limitations that different approaches in the philosophical tradition 
(arguably) tend to have been faced with and are being faced with. 
26 Others describe him in other terms. Wallgren for example, although adopting a critical stance, argues 
that Rorty "is probably the most influential and innovative proponent of the relativist withdrawal from 
the never-ending adventure of philosophy” (1996, p. 193). However, we will argue that Rorty's attempt 
at a withdrawal does not involve any classical argument for relativism. Rather it involves a suggestion 
of abandoning the whole debate on relativism versus objectivism because of its futility. We will also 




Rorty’s interpretation of knowledge and language, science and truth etc are not 
necessarily felt at all in the daily work on empirical research. It merely means that we 
to some extent would debate somewhat different questions, but mainly simply that we 
would describe what we are doing in different terms. By suggestion, this would be in 
terms which do not involve the kind of aporias, self-referential paradoxes and 
question beggings which our traditional representationalist talk of any form, 
objectivist or relativist, has involved (when taken seriously and ad notam by 
philosophers) and which have driven forward the epistemological-metaphysical 
tradition of philosophy.  
What this (self-)understanding can do is to sensitize us to the question of whether we 
have a good language with which to describe phenomena and what this language 
does27. It means that there is no way to avoid the fact that the language we choose, or 
are led to describe phenomena with, is intertwined with ethical and political questions. 
This is all the more true for social science in particular due to its subject matter and 
because it does not have the kind of success stories to lean back on as does natural 
science. This (self-) understanding means that the only way to judge the adequacy of a 
language (or an explanation) is to evaluate the pragmatic usefulness of it (it can 
always e.g. be partly intra-scientific), what it enables us to do, what it does and to 
whom, and what we should be doing as scientists. There are however no easy and 
straightforward ways to judge this. There is no neutral language. We will elaborate on 
these issues below and discuss some arguments about research in HRM and 
organizational science in relation to which this (self-) understanding arguably has 
some bearing. 
2.1.1 HRM research accused 
"From an epistemological perspective then, the argument that HRM - at 
least in terms of its normative model - is essentially modernist, rests on its 
adherence to a positivistic epistemology and to the values of rationality and 
performativity" (Legge, 1995, p. 311).  
As an introduction, we will briefly below discuss the issues of performativity, 
positivism, and rationality in turn. 
Performativity. Any human action can be viewed as including utility or 
performativity from some perspective for somebody, be it e.g. only the utility 
(advantage) of not having to be utile in some specific sense. The HRM discourse 
clearly adheres to a certain notion of performativity which organizations in todays 
world of global capitalism seem forced to adhere to. A general critique of 
performativity per se should not be directed so much at the discourse of HRM as at 
the general capitalist system in which HRM arguably is but an “underlaborer”. The 
more specific assumptions and consequences of performativity involved in the HRM 
practice and literature can on the other hand fruitfully be debated within this literature. 
                                                                                                                                      
philosophical position which would in principle no longer be "open to the challenge [of what Wallgren 
calls] transformative philosophy" (ibid., p. 197). 





But such debates should holistically address ethical-political-pragmatical aspects of 
this issue. 
Positivism. We will argue that the mainstream idea of HRM can very well live 
without a general adherence to positivist epistemology. There are two elements in 
Legge’s “accusation” related to positivism. The first is  
“Positivism, with its realist ontology....aims at discovering what is really 
going on ‘out there’” (ibid., p. 308).  
We will argue that this is neither a justifiable nor a necessary assumption for 
mainstream HRM research. The second is that  
“Positivism...seeks to explain and predict what happens in the social world 
by searching for regularities and causal relationships between constituent 
elements” (ibid., p. 308).  
We will argue that there is nothing in principle wrong with this. Rorty suggests that 
there is no good reason to generally adhere to any “traditional” a priori epistemology. 
But everyone, at any given point in time will have to adhere to some rules in order to 
get something done. The scientific enterprise is completely dependent on some such 
rules. We will return to a suggested understanding of these rules. 
Rationality. The accusation related to rationality is somewhat more difficult to get a 
grip on. Most of us adhere to some kind of rationality as there is generally some 
purpose we are trying to fulfill and most of us generally tend to reflect both on the 
purposes and on how to achieve those purposes.  
There are, however, clearly many theoretical notions of rationality (Townley, 1999, 
pp. 290-295). It is possible to distinguish, as always, between a definition of what 
rationality is and the criteria for counting something as rational. But here we are 
involved in similar problems as with the notion of truth. One solution is not to 
distinguish between the two more than in the sense Rorty distinguishes between what 
truth is and the criteria for truth (1998a, pp. 1-5). The consequence is that rationality 
per se does not have any explanatory power. ‘Rational to us’ would be dependent on 
the same sort of justificatory process as ‘true for us’ is.  
“[W]e have no criterion of truth other than justification, and...justification 
and betterness-to-believe will always be as relative to audiences (and to 
ranges of truth candidates) as is goodness to purposes and rightness to 
situations...there is no such thing as belief being justified sans phrase – 
justified once and for all –...” (ibid., p. 2).  
The analogies Rorty uses in this citation implies that he is committed to the claim that 
there is no such thing as an action being justified sans phrase – rational once and for 
all. This view has as a consequence that at least any form of instrumental rationality 
per se is always only good for potentially limited and debatable empirical explanatory 
purposes. There are however some (very) general things which according to Rorty’s 
suggestion contributes to rationality.  
(1) “In one sense, ...to be rational is to be methodical: that is, to have 




Even more fundamentally this kind of rationality is described by Rorty as “the ability 
to cope with the environment by adjusting one’s reactions to environmental stimuli in 
complex and delicate ways” (1998f, p. 186).  
(2) There is a second sense of rational which we are all responsible for and involves 
the setting of goals (“other than mere survival”) and  
“establishes an evaluative hierarchy rather than simply adjusting means to 
taken-for granted ends” (ibid., p. 186).  
(3) There is a third sense of rational, which we also all arguably should adhere to.  
“In this sense the word means something like “sane” or “reasonable” rather 
than “methodical”. It names some moral virtues: tolerance, respect for the 
opinions of those around one, willingness to listen, reliance on persuasion 
rather than force...On this construction, to be rational is simply to discuss 
any topic – religious, literary, or scientific – in a way which eschews 
dogmatism, defensiveness, and righteous indig[n]ation” (1991g, p. 37). 
[Rationality in this sense involves] “a willingness to alter one’s own habits 
– not only to get more of what one previously wanted but to reshape 
oneself into a different sort of person” (1998f, pp. 186-187).  
The third is arguably the most difficult form of rationality to adopt. Rorty’s way of 
understanding science, scientific language, knowledge, truth etc means that we should 
always (try to) be rational in all three senses, rather than e.g. only the first, because his  
“understanding  is an attempt to blur ... distinctions between objective and 
the subjective and between fact and value” (1991g, p. 38).  
More objective and limited conceptions of (methodical) rationality arguably rest on 
such distinctions28. Thus on this view there can be no autonomous pure form of 
universal instrumental rationality upon which “the model so prevalent in 
organizational literature is built on” according to Townley (1999, p. 292). This 
critique has to be distinguished from the fact that certain assumptions about rationality 
may offer the best available explanations of contingent human behavior. The point is 
that even though nobody can fulfill any ideal rationality, there is not much point in 
criticizing rationality per se. All forms of rationality are constantly negotiated. 
Although representing distinct aspects of rationality, the fruitfulness of the second and 
third aspects of rationality are bound to be dependent on the first and vice versa. 
It seems to us that adherence to these loose conceptualizations of rationality is not 
only unobjectionable, but recommendable. Mainstream empirical research on 
organizational consequences of HRM seem not necessarily to be dependent on any 
further nor necessarily locked into an adherence to any more restrictive “rationality”. 
As we shall see, our general approach to the conceptualization of HRM in thesis is 
intended to be at least partly sensitive to both instrumental and discursive forms of 
rationality. It is on the one hand intended to take into consideration both the 
perspective of managers (“organizations”) and general employees. On the other hand 
it is intended to be discursively rational in the sense of being sensitive to many voices 
critical towards HRM. Referring to MacIntyre (1983), Townley argues that  
                                               




“[p]ractical reason is constituted by one’s membership of and integration 
into a particular social institution, which defines substance, obligations and 
duties. It is informed by, and itself informs, the practices of some distinct 
form of social order and it is qua member of such a social order that 
someone exercises practical reason…In practical reasoning the 
identification of relevant particular elements of a situation cannot be rule 
governed. Evaluative judgement has an indispensable role” (Townley, 
1999, p. 293). 
The conceptualization of HRM developed in this thesis at least to some extent 
incorporates the relevance of organizational rationality as practical reason in the sense 
of incorporating the indispensable role of evaluative judgement from members of a 
social institution. At the same time, what is sought in this thesis through its empirical 
analyses are some guidelines for relevant “practical reasoning”.  
Apart from advancing the above discussed three “accusations” directed towards 
mainstream HRM (research), and related to the notion of rationality, Legge also 
claims that  
"Latour argues that the process of scientific discovery resembles 
‘organized persuasion’, persuasion that utilises 'literary inscriptions' and is 
engaged in by actors who build 'networks of association' that tie in other 
actors" (Legge, 1995, pp. 317-318).  
We will argue that this is in principle quite compatible with any kind of scientific 
enterprise. The word "scientific discovery" is used here apparently because Legge 
considers it sufficient for her attempts to debunk "the discovery of HRM". Long ago, 
still safely within the traditional modernist framework, it was stated that the process 
of discovery and process of justification are fundamentally different. The former, it 
was claimed, does not have more than heuristic rules while the latter is the heart of 
science where we have exact rules. However, it is arguably more correct to say that  
“[t]here are maxims for discovery and maxims for testing: the idea that 
correct ideas just come from the sky, while the methods for testing them 
are highly rigid and predermined, is one of the worst legacies of the 
Wienna Circle” (Putnam, 1974/1991, p. 134).  
The proposition Legge attributes to Latour can be acccepted even if one would replace 
“scientific discovery” with “scientific justification”. Rules or maxims (either of 
discovery or of justification) are not given to us from above but they remain 
instrumentally important. For the development of knowledge the maxims and their 
“organized persuasive” re-negotiation remain the quintessentially important aspect of 
scientific activity. 
In the next sections we try to further “deconstruct” the force, as a critique of 
mainstream HRM research, of both of Legge’s claims above, i.e. the former 
concerning the nature of mainstream research on HRM as well as the latter about the 
nature of scientific activity. We will later engage in the more specific justification of 
our conceptualization of HRM and our general research approach. In this chapter we 
try to pave the way for this justification basically by debunking universal 
consequences of philosophical divisions/distinctions. In fact, as already indicated, in 
explaining the general nature of our epistemological and ontological commitments we 
will try to “deconstruct” the universal force of any a priori/philosophical critique or 





2.2.1 A priori ontologies 
In general, researchers often seem to adopt universal basic attitudes towards reality. 
Some researchers adopt a social constructionist point of view of reality29 often 
interpreting it to (necessarily) imply some form of qualitative methodology. For some 
alternative interpretations of social constructionism, see Jorgen Sandberg (1999). 
Some researchers adopt a postmodern attitude. For a fairly balanced review of the 
impact of postmodernism on organization studies, see Calás and Smircich (1999). 
Some researchers adopt a realist view of the world often arguing that it has essential 
methodological implications (Tsoukas, 1989; Tsang and Kwan, 1999). 
2.2.1.1 Postmodernism30 
What has become known as postmodernism, sometimes connected to a (self-
referentially problematic) “method” of deconstruction (Derrida, 1990, p. 141) has no 
doubt bearings on philosophy, a discourse with a history of totalizing ambitions. 
According to Rorty, deconstruction as a general method of reading texts 
”requires two different straight persons: a macho professional philosopher 
who is insulted by the suggestion that he has submitted to a textual 
exigency, and a naive producer of literature (or empirical science) whose 
jaw drops when she learns that her work has been supported by 
philosophical oppositions” (Rorty, 1991d, pp. 86).  
This is perhaps a somewhat harsh claim. However, many “postmodern” arguments 
related to deconstructive readings of empirical scientific contributions addressing 
“silenced” issues or “binary oppositions” (e.g. Calás and Schmircich, 1991) seem in 
most cases a somewhat needless rhetoric. We seem in most cases to cope with 
relevant shortcomings of empirical texts by traditional critique. In any case, it may be 
argued that regardless of motives, intentions or “purely theoretical” implications of 
deconstructive exercises, the consequences of any deconstructive critique of empirical 
texts, to the extent that such critique tends to have any empirical relevance at all, are 
always “modernist” in the sense that it opens up dialogues on conceptual distinctions 
we make.  
Admittedly one essential and complicated task that the “deconstructive movement” 
laboured with, is the attempt to escape Hegelian dialectics. In fact, this has arguably 
characterized much of French philosophy since  
“the generation of the three H´s...[i.e.] Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger” was 
followed by the generation of “the experts of doubt...Marx, Nietzsche and 
Freud” (Descombe, 1987, p. 17; my translation from Swedish).  
                                               
29 A usual reference is Berger and Luckmann (1966). Sometimes it is Kuhn as in Cannella and 
Paetzold (1994, p. 332).  
30 'Postmodernism' is an overladen and problematical term. What we refer to will become more clear in 




As Foucalt said in his installation lecture at Collège de France: “Our epoque tries, 
sometimes through logic or epistemology, sometimes through Marx or Nietzsche, to 
escape Hegel” (Descombes, 1987, p. 26; my translation from Swedish). Also Deleuze, 
in his “Difference and Repetition” from 1968 argued that  
“[a]ll these signs [Heidegger´s “ontological difference”, “structuralism”, 
“le nouveau roman”, etc] can be attributed to a general anti-hegelianism. 
Difference and repetition have substituted the identical and the negative, 
identitity and contradiction” (cited in Descombes, 1987, p. 25; my 
translation from Swedish).  
A “deconstructionist” might thus be dissatisfied with any “modern” implications of 
deconstructive readings/writings.  
However, Hegelian metaphysics might be repudiated (or left to its own) also within a 
Rortyan neo-pragmatism. The metaphysics of Hegelian dialectics can be considered to 
have little to do with the empirical movement and evolution of concepts. In fact, in his 
foreword to the Swedish translation of Descombes´ book, Carlshamre argues that  
“The disadvantage [of the relative isolation of French philosophy] ...is that 
the French development is late in relation to the Anglo-Saxon, where the 
critique of the epistemological “fundamentalism” had become generally 
acknowledged before the respective French discussion got started. Because 
Derrida and Foucault, for example, do not give the slightest hint of having 
read Wittgenstein, Quine, Kuhn or any of the other leading exponents of 
this critique, it is often difficult to judge if they say anything over and 
above the already well-known, or if they only have not noticed that they 
break doors which are already wide open” (Carlshamre, 1987, p. 12).  
However, Carlshamre notices (ibid., p. 12) the same point which is brought forward 
by Wheeler, i.e. that there is also an advantage with the relative isolations of French 
and Anglo-Saxon philosophy. With reference to his analyses of Derrida and 
Davidson, Wheeler argues that  
“[m]ost importantly, that these philosophers reach similar conclusions 
from their different backgrounds indicates that they are getting something 
right. The consequences of there being no magic language, no language of 
self-interpreting marks, seem to be forced by some structure that is not 
peculiar to either analytic philosophy or the continental tradition” (2000d, 
p. 57).  
The notion “right” here should not be read as “true to reality”. Although Wheeler e.g. 
interprets Derrida and Davidson as agreeing on many topics, he also argues for some 
interesting differences between them (Wheeler, 2000a, pp. 4-8), mainly in that  
“the issue between Derrida and Davidson becomes...whether philosophical 
theories are central or marginal to the concepts we use to “make sense of” 
the world” (ibid., p. 8).  
While Derrida, according to Wheeler, assumes the former to be true, we consider, 
arguably together with Rorty, that at least epistemological (metaphysical or anti-




concepts we need to make sense of the empirical pursuit of knowledge31. As already 
noted, the Rortyan view we defend problematizes, and suggests a way out of, a certain 
self-understanding which sees it as compelling to justify either the objective 
groundedness or necessary objective groundlessness of human knowledge. A Rortyan 
neo-pragmatism simply suggests such projects are unfruitful and unnecessary. In this 
sense Rorty’s program has also been described as having a very ambitious cultural 
relevance in being continuous with the enlightenment project (Brandom, 2000b, p. xi). 
The debate concerning both the enlightenment project as well as Rorty’s position in it 
continues (see Rorty, 2000a; 2000b and Habermas 2000).  
From a Rortyan “point of view”, the (regressive) potential for (anti-enlightenment) 
deconstructionist metaphysics (and self-referential traps) lie in universal 
“explanations” of why the ungroundedness of human knowledge is necessarily the 
case (Rorty, 1991d, p. 93; 102). Derrida is in danger of facing such a problem to the 
extent that he (is tempted to) claim “The attempt to formulate a unique, total, closed 
vocabulary will necessarily...” (Rorty, 1991d, p. 93). However, Derrida is at least 
trying to avoid such claims, in fact he has argued that “no completeness is possible for 
undecidability” (1990, p. 116). However, he almost immediately continues that “the 
effect of ...[undecidability] is precisely to render all totalizations, fulfillment, 
plenitude impossible” (ibid., p. 116). Thus he seems at least in danger of stepping into 
a metaphysical/self-referential trap by saying too much. He tries, however, to rescue 
himself from such traps by the notions of “différance,...mark, 
...supplement,...iterability” which “are not entirely words or concepts” (ibid., p. 117). 
Whether he always succeeds or not is up for debate. He basically argues that e.g.  
“iterability..., like all the concepts that form or deform themselves in its 
wake, is an ideal concept, to be sure, but also the concept that marks the 
essential and ideal limit of all pure idealizations, the ideal concept of the 
limit of all idealization, and not the concept of nonideality (since it is also 
the concept of the possibility of ideality)” (ibid., p. 119).  
Whether we are only convinced by such hyperboles or equally convinced by the 
Wittgensteinian/pragmatist arguments or suggestions (not entirely straightforward 
either) “that there is no theoretical barrier to an endless sequence of 
recontextualizations” (Rorty, 1991, p. 125) seems a matter of personal attitude. But 
maybe not only. The latter arguments are perhaps more related to negative 
conclusions concerning attempts to achieve closure than positive arguments about 
such openness. This is in a sense acknowledged by Derrida. “Différance is not 
indeterminacy...it “is” in itself nothing outside different determinations...[it] is neither 
negativity nor nothingness (as indeterminacy would be)” (1990, p. 149)32.  
                                               
31 We have to distinguish between epistemological and political/pragmatical influences. Although e.g. 
Rorty is dubious regarding "the political relevance" of deconstruction (1998, p. 310), 
postmodernism/deconstruction has arguably at least stimulated much empirical research, i.e. given it 
new directions in terms of objects of research. Such stimulation is unproblematic and epistemologically 
and ontologically neutral. On the view to be defended in this chapter, epistemological and ontological 
issues are contingent outcomes, partly of empirical research so stimulated.  
32 However, indeterminacy is arguably not metaphysical nothingness but rather a contextually argued 




Thus, Derrida prefers the term ‘undecidability’ to ‘indeterminacy’. According to 
Derrida, “undecidability is always a determinate oscillation between possibilities (for 
example, of meaning, but also of acts). These possibilities are themselves highly 
determined in strictly defined situations...They are pragmatically determined” 
(Derrida, 1990, p. 148). A Rortyan pragmatist would agree that e.g. definitions should 
be viewed as pragmatically determined. However, the notion of “highly determinate 
in strictly defined situations” seems to be but a tautology. Whether “highly 
determined” and “pragmatically determined” denote the same thing seems disputable. 
In any case, analytical philosophy has arguably explicitly problematized (only) the 
very notion of a priori determinable definitions (Quine, 1951). In Wheeler’s 
interpretation, compatible with the above,  
“[the analytical philosopher] Davidson does not want to use “undecidable” 
because of its connection with incompleteness proofs; [while] Derrida does 
not want to use “indeterminate” because it implies fuzziness” (Wheeler, 
2000e, p. 222).  
However, when Derrida claims that “[t]here would be no indecision or double bind 
were it not between determined (semantical, ethical, political) poles...” he seems 
(paradoxically concerning Derrida) to simplify things. Perhaps due to a “double bind” 
with reference to Hegelian dialectics? We do not see why there could not, indeed 
would not be (in most cases at least potentially) indeterminate indecision between an 
indeterminate amount of possibilities. The very difference between undecidability and 
indeterminacy seems to us indeterminate/undecidable. Perhaps any distinction 
between these uses of ‘indeterminacy’ and ‘undecidability’ is best seen as related to a 
different emphasis in terms of a contextually argued ‘negative’ versus a contextually 
argued ‘positive’ openness. When either of these forms of arguments for an openness 
becomes completely non-contextualized/non-particular, i.e. universal they become 
metaphysical.  According to the general view we try to explicate, any argued universal 
necessary consequences of deconstructive arguments should only be dealt with on a 
case by case basis (compare Rorty, 1971, p. 14). 
Although we tend to reject any universal necessary consequences of deconstructive 
arguments, some things which are said (or written) about, concepts, theories or 
empirical results might fruitfully be the subject of deconstructive critique. However,  
“[t]he mere possibility of modeling texts on themselves does not provide 
much motivation for doing so. A way of looking at texts is ultimately 
justified by the illumination and understanding that results. It seems clear 
that, for some texts, treating them as metaphysics produces illumination 
and explication otherwise not to be had” (Wheeler, 2000c, p. 54).  
“Sometimes it is argued that the concept of pomo [postmodernism] may 
sensitize us for new developments in society and culture. It may, however, 
also oversensitize us” (Alvesson, 1995, p. 1069).  
The importance of a state of disbelief is emphasized by Calás and Smircich (1999, p. 
657) in connection to their defense of postmodernism. However, the state of disbelief, 
we argue, should strike anyone carefully reading organizational texts even without 
any explicit deconstructive moves. More traditional “non-deconstructive” critique 
may often compel researchers to more substantial thinking than simply pointing to 
inevitable dichotomies and ambiguities in any discourse which suggests some actions 




“Derridean ideas about the undecidability or uncontrollability of meaning” (Legge, p. 
312) to inspire and develop research on HRM. But inspiration to do empirical 
research/empirical theorizing is arguably the most we can gain from 
deconstructions/reading deconstructive analyses. This is because whereas we might 
think 
“that words like “différance” and “iterability” signify infrastructures – 
structures which it is Derrida’s great achievement to have unearthed – [we 
can see] these notions as merely abbreviations for the familiar Peircean-
Wittgensteinian anti-Cartesian thesis that meaning is a function of context, 
and that there is no theoretical barrier to an endless sequence of 
recontextualizations” (Rorty, 1991f, p. 125).  
We can thus also from a different perspective, that of anglo-saxon analytical 
philosophy, fully accept a claim that  
“the “theoretical duty” of every theoretician ... is also an “ethical –political 
duty”…” (Derrida, 1990, p. 135).  
For us the implication of a Rortyan pragmatism is the same. For a Rortyan pragmatist 
everything turns on (often surely very complex and ambiguous) ethical-political-
pragmatical questions. It is arguably in face of this complexity that Rorty moves 
“everything over from epistemology and metaphysics to cultural politics” (Rorty, 
1998c, p. 57).  
We clearly need continuous reflection upon important assumptions e.g. of HRM and 
the HRM literature. Such reflection is bound to involve reflection on the capitalist 
system and the notion of man, i.e. reflection of the broadest nature about our culture. 
But deconstructive arguments per se can arguably not in themselves justify an 
epistemic critique e.g. of current mainstream HRM research. Assumptions and 
arguments can be debated, but to show that they can be deconstructed does not in 
itself bite. Deconstructions would justify such critique only if e.g. “any binary 
opposition were dubious just because it is binary” (Rorty, 1991e, p. 111).  
”First, that a discourse has been deconstructed does not immediately show 
that it is defective...Second, that a discourse has been deconstructed does 
not show that it is unusable as a practical device...An important issue is at 
stake here: Many of those reacting to deconstruction´s theses, including 
some who regard themselves as convinced by deconstruction, take 
deconstruction to show a fatal inadequacy in the distinction or discourse. 
But such an evaluation presupposes the very standards that deconstruction 
has shown to be unreasonable, because unfullfillable. That is, to suppose 
that a disourse that is not governed by a magic language is unusable is to 
accept an important part of the logocentric picture” (Wheeler, 2000e, p. 
228)33. 
Mainstream HRM research does not, according to our interpretation of Rorty’s 
general claim concerning empirical sciences (1998d, p. 64), have specific 
philosophical foundations. It rests upon a set of ethical-political-pragmatical cultural 
                                               
33 For another discussion about the limitations of deconstructive reading/writing, see Heiskala (1997, 




values which are not essentially dependent on a philosophical/metaphysical 
foundation. However, it goes (almost) without saying that the HRM discourse 
contains a great deal of rhetoric (Legge, pp. 312-314) which leaves many questions 
open.  
We will continue to explicate and distinguish our understanding of ontology and 
epistemology which is not totalizing and accepts in principle indeterminacy of 
meaning and reference (Wheeler, 2000b; 2000c) but which lets us get on with 
empirical social science to the extent that we find it useful at all. The possibility of (in 
particular quantitative) empirical social science is largely a question of the contingent 
possibility, utility and legitimacy of reducing complexity. In the understanding we try 
to explicate, these questions again, at any point in time, are questions of overarching 
values, pragmatical judgements about the fruitfulness of available or attainable 
conceptualizations, (informed) trials and errors, and general negotiated norms of 
justification for empirical claims to knowledge. 
2.2.1.2 Social constructionism  
When researchers say they adopt a view of reality as socially constructed, what do 
they mean? What can they legitimately mean? Do we know what reality is like when 
not constructed? If not, how can we then in any interesting universal sense distinguish 
between the two? Of course, our view of reality is always also likely to be socially 
constructed but this does not mean that we can say that reality is (completely) socially 
constructed.  
This is a subtle but arguably important issue within the field of philosophy. The 
problem common to philosophers  
“from Parmenides to A. J. Ayer, is that they are continually tempted to say, 
‘The conditions making an expression intelligible are…’, despite the fact 
that that proposition itself does not fulfill the conditions it lists” (Rorty, 
1991d, p. 91).  
As an epistemological and/or ontological doctrine the social constructionist point of 
view potentially faces a similar problem to the extent that it assumes a point of 
reference from which the claim could be justified which is outside the social 
construction of reality.  
In fact, whether the constructionist faces a self-referential problem depends on 
whether she/he offers an uninteresting and trivially true argument or an interesting but 
self referentially contradictory argument. An example of the former would be: ‘As 
humans are social animals who live in linguistic communities which they develop and 
change through interaction, everything they do has a social aspect to it, including the 
claims to knowledge and their perceptions of reality’. An example of the latter would 
be: ‘Reality is (completely) socially constructed’. The self referential contradiction in 




able to stand back and step into a position which is not so constructed. But this is 
contradicted by the claim itself34. 
We view “social constructionism” as a heuristic point of view on social phenomena 
and as such it is less relevant for this particular study. By ‘heuristic’ we mean that this 
perspective guide researchers to look for how human beings in interaction come to 
agree or disagree on phenomena.  
Below we indirectly try further to justify the argument that social constructionism is 
not relevant as any kind of “foundation”, or “first philosophy” (Heiskala, 1997, p. 
332). In particular, it has no universal consequences for studies on what human beings 
agree upon, think or how they and organizations are influenced by existing (more or 
less transient) social phenomena. The social construction of knowledge, action, 
institutions etc. might also be taken to necessarily imply the impossibility of 
quantitative research methodologies generating spatially and/or temporally 
generalizable knowledge. However, although stability is a contingent (empirical) 
phenomenon we would live in complete chaos if there would be no stability (which 
does not mean identity) in any actions, interpretations and meanings. Contingent 
stability is acknowledged also by Derrida (1988, pp. 150-151)35. In line with this, 
Kaplan argues that  
“What we need for knowledge is not permanence but persistence, not the 
absolutely unchanging but rather changes sufficiently slow or limited for 
patterns to be recognizable” (Kaplan, 1964, p. 167). 
We can understand and study such potential stabilities as “coagulations of ...codes, 
frames and projects” (Heiskala, 1997, p. 327). Thus what we do in this thesis is 
assuming 
“a stationary cross-sectional standpoint reflecting the rules, resources, and 
practices, that influence (without determining) the actions of agents at [a] 
given time...[such] rules, resources and practices constitute the [assumed] 
social structures that form the arena and tools of social action [at any one 
point in time]” (Weaver and Gioia, 1994, pp. 579-580).  
This is naturally only one possible course of inquiry. Thereby our research  
“temporarily ignores [part of] intentionality by treating it as fixed: social 
phenomena are [thus] treated as having fixed structures of meaning whose 
interrelations can be measured” (ibid., p. 581). 
                                               
34 However, this is thus not to deny the more or less evident empirical fact, which is contingent rather 
than necessary, and varies as to its negative or positive influences on the adequacy of empirical 
knowledge, that social scientific knowledge can always also be characterized as socially constructed 
(compare e.g. Mizruchi and Fein, 1999). 
35 “I have never put such concepts as truth, reference, and the stability of interpretative contexts 
radically into question” if “putting radically into question” means contesting that there are and that 
there should be truth, reference, and stable contexts of interpretation” (ibid., p. 150). There is, however, 
also always a need to “account for this stability” and/or criticize it (ibid., p. 151). Such things can be 
done e.g. from a social constructionist perspective but it can also be done through quantitative 




2.2.1.3 Realism  
There are also problems with arguments for an objective reality with a corresponding 
realist epistemology. Such arguments tend always to be question begging (Rorty, 
1991c, p. 24; Fine, 1984a, 1984b, 1986). One traditional way to arrive at some sort of 
objectivity are by means of transcendental arguments. They also always tend to 
assume a point of reference outside the domain of possible experience or language 
they themselves dictate.  
Transcendental arguments can be understood as a “search for non-causal conditions of 
possibility” (Rorty, 1991f, p. 124), a universal necessary scheme in some form which 
would be capable of refuting the epistemic sceptic. Rorty has argued that we should 
not try to refute the idea of such a scheme by universal arguments. Instead, any such 
arguments must be dealt with on a case by case basis (Rorty, 1971, p. 14). However, 
Davidson has in fact argued against the very idea of a conceptual scheme. Rorty 
argues that "Davidson...seems to have found a transcendental argument to end all 
transcendental arguments" (Rorty, 1979, p. 78), that Davidson has provided "the most 
effective recent argument against the possibility of transcendental philosophy" (ibid., 
p. 99). However, as nothing a priori seems to hinder us from learning a completely 
different untranslatable language-game in the way children learn a language, i.e. since 
nothing hinders us to "get the hang of a new language-game" (Rorty, 1980, p. 356), 
Davidson should be understood as having provided only an argument applicable 
against the a priori intelligibility of any suggested alternative conceptual scheme. 
Also in the 1979 article Rorty agrees with the view that "[t]here is no general 
argument against the scheme-content distinction" (1979, p. 99). This is thus 
compatible with Rorty's earlier argument that transcendetal arguments must be dealt 
with on a case by case basis. Further, neither Rorty, nor Davidson in Rorty's 
interpretation, can in the last instance refute either the sceptic or the realist by 
exhibiting the meaninglessness or impossibility of the transcendental (non-epistemic) 
terms they use. Largely the issue concerns the question of allocating burdens of proof 
between a pragmatist and a philosophical sceptic/relativist on the one hand, and 
between a pragmatist and a realist, on the other hand (Rorty, 1980, p. 310-311). 
Rorty’s suggestions amount to abandoning the attempt to a priori “prove” either the 
necessarily objective or necessarily relative nature of any conceptual scheme with 
reference to specifically philosophical notions of "'true' and 'real' and 'correct 
representation of reality'" (ibid., p. 308). 
There are however other (non-transcendental) arguments for realism. Fine offers a 
critique (and overview) of the perhaps most natural kind of arguments for realism, 
moving from the success of (natural) science “to the necessity for a realist account of 
its practice” (1984a, p. 84). We have to remember that philosophy has mostly been 
concerned with proving a priori necessary, objective, language related or completely 
acontextual truths. There is naturally nothing in Fine’s (or any other philosophers 
arguments) which makes it intellectually impossible for us to live with the  
“hypothesis that our accepted scientific theories are approximately true, 
where “being approximately true” is taken to be an extratheoretical relation 
between theories and the world” (ibid, p. 86).  
However, the annoying thing with living with this hypothesis is that it is a 




because it assumes what it is trying to establish as an empirical hypothesis. As Fine 
notes,  
“[s]urely anyone serious about the issue of realism, and with an open mind 
about it, would have to behave inconsistently if he were to accept the 
realist move [from the success of natural science] as satisfactory” (ibid., p. 
86).  
The inconsistency alludes to the fact that  
“the issue over realism is precicely the issue as to whether we should 
believe in the reality of those individuals, properties, relations, processes 
and so forth, used in well-supported explanatory hypotheses” (ibid., p. 86).  
2.2.2 Summary: a priori ontologies 
The above arguments amount to a suggestion that there is little to be gained in 
empirical science (or philosophy) by universal philosophical defences or universal 
critiques of a priori ontologies, epistemologies and conceptual schemes. They amount 
to a suggestion that all totalizing ontologies (or epistemologies) as well as totalizing 
critiques of such ontologies (or epistemologies) tend to face problems of self-
referentiality and/or question begging.  
Most importantly from our perspective, Rorty argues that 
“[p]hilosophical views are just not tied very closely either to observation 
and experiment or to practice…to the extent that such views are in fact 
optional, social practices do not have philosophical presuppositions. The 
philosophical propositions said to be presuppositional turn out to be 
rhetorical ornaments of practice rather than foundations of practice” 
(1998d, p. 64). 
To say that empirical sciences do not have philosophical presuppositions is not to say 
that they might not have presuppositions which can be (philosophically) analyzed and 
debated. Interesting issues are often discussed in philosophy and to the extent that 
they are more broadly relevant, they are often debated in other fora also (e.g. what is 
just and what is not just). But any “philosophical”arguments, in the sense of universal, 
non-contingent, a priori views e.g. on what justice is, or what language is, or what 
reality is, or what knowledge is, or what human beings are, or what organizations or 
HRM are, are not according to Rorty to be seen as “presuppositions of social 
practices”. This is because  
“we generally have much more confidence [or disconfidence] in the 
practice in question than in any of its possible philosophical justifications 
[or critiques]” (ibid., p. 64).  
But note that Rorty is not saying that this is necessarily the case. This argument 
connects to Rorty’s metaphilosophical critique of the idea of philosophy as providing 




foundations, for science or culture at large. In summary, Rorty abandons the idea of 
philosophy as the highest adjudicator of ontological conflicts36.  
2.2.3 HRM and the ontology of the employee 
An example of a different standpoint closely related to HRM is Hancock who argues 
that there are philosophical presuppositions “which underpin classical conceptions 
and models of employee motivation” (1999, p. 155).  
“[B]y accepting HRM as essentially dualistic in terms of its ‘hard’ and 
‘soft’ dimensions...[we are] at the same time failing to grasp its practical 
unity, a unity underpinned paradoxically, by a dualistic model of the world. 
This is the same dualistic ontology which has underpinned all previous 
managerial interventions into the domain of the human subject; and is the 
one which continues to determine the function of HRM as a set of 
practices. On the one hand, HRM is employed to provide an objectivized 
account of the human employee...by relying on positivistic techniques for 
determining optimum methods of analysis and behavioral prediction..., and 
on the other to continue the assault on alienation through the use of a 
repertoire of cultural technologies which are designed to reconstitute the 
subjectivity of employees through an environment which, once again, 
offers the promise of subjective autonomy” (Hancock, 1999, p. 163).  
We argue that there is no need, within mainstream HRM (research), even implicitly to 
adopt a universal “dualistic ontology” once the universal distinctions betweeen 
subject and object, reasons and causes are rejected37.  
Steyaert also argues that HRM is (problematically) assuming autonomous (cartesian) 
subjects “transparent and in self-control” (1998, p. 2). Instead he argues for a 
conceptualization of the subject as one of becoming,  
“as a meeting point of relations, ...as confronted with one’s own 
strangeness, and...as talking from multiple voices” (ibid., p 1; pp. 7-11).  
When we claim that empirical science or social practices (e.g. HRM and/or research 
on HRM) do not have philosophical (ontological or epistemological) presuppositions, 
we mean the following. We give up the idea that philosophy or literature or anything 
else could provide us with a (given) necessary framework which an empirical science 
or a social practice cannot “violate”, which sets the limits and possibilities open to 
such practices. We can always discuss what empirical presuppositions a scientific 
activity or other social practice makes or involves. But such a discussion/critique will 
always involve a complex context of empirical processes in terms of the fruitfulness 
of their means and ends.  
We thus agree with Rorty that philosophical apriori arguments about ontology or 
epistemology, e.g. the ones above by Hancock and Steyaert, turn out to be “rhetorical 
                                               
36 The highest priest for Rorty is not philosophy but democracy and liberal ideals. He does not hide this 
ethnocentric standpoint, rather he tries to justify it (1991a; 1991f; 1991g). 
37 For all we know, reasons may be causes and the subjective may in principle be objective. This is one 




ornamentations...rather than foundations” (Rorty, 1998, p. 64) of social practices or 
their critiques. Thus, we argue that current HRM (mainstream research) does not 
necessarily involve a philosophically controversial assumption in terms of an 
autonomous (Cartesian) subject, nor a problematical dualistic notion of the subject. 
They simply involve a set of differing (but not necessarily contradictory) contextual 
empirical assumptions about the fruitfulness and legitimacy of certain approaches and 
practices. Empirical science can, with the help of theory, try to provide evidence for 
the (un)fruitfulness of any such empirical assumptions. 
It seems however clear, but philosophically uncontroversial, that HRM in some sense 
is  
“a cultural construction comprised of a series of metaphors which 
constitute a ‘new reality’. HRM reflects an attempt to redefine both the 
meaning of work and the way individual employees relate to their 
employers” (Keenoy and Anthony, 1992, p. 234, cited in Hancock, 1999, 
p. 163).  
As any more or less intentional sets of practices through which human beings try to 
influence other human beings, HRM inevitably  
“represents a nexus of diciplinary practices which are designed to 
reconstitute the working subject through a combination of procedural and 
cultural technologies of power” (Hancock, 1999, p. 164)38.  
It seems to us that critizing the principle of trying to influence (constitute) human 
behavior is futile. The more interesting and difficult questions concern what these 
power/knowledge structures are, what drives them and in particular what they 
accomplish.  
Townley has offered some critical points of views on HRM which are related to the 
structure of power/knowledge. However, we consider a specific critique of the 
following kind to be simply ornamentational and in this sense impotent:  
“To be effective personnel practices must become less ‘subjective’ and 
more ‘accurate’. A Foucauldian analysis rejects this presentation” 
(Townley, 1994, p. 83),  
or 
“[HRM] assumes the existence of an alienated individual whose potential 
lies repressed, waiting to be unleashed or self-actualized when his or her 
true nature is uncovered. A Foucauldian conception of the subject 
emphasizes the constitutive role of practices in forming an identity” (ibid., 
p. 109).  
Such critique is impotent because, even if some talk about HRM might assume such 
un-Foucauldian phenomena, we do not have to understand HRM practices as doing 
this. The HRM context could be described and understood in accordance with the 
above Foucauldian conceptions and nevertheless continue to be practiced exactly as it 
                                               




is today. In other words, these assumptions/presuppositions ascribed to HRM, and the 
contrasting assumptions, can be characterized as ornamentations of (a critique of) the 
social practices of HRM, rather than foundations upon which HRM in any crucial way 
depends.  
However, Townley also presents some less philosophical general points of views 
which we view as more relevant. What would seem to be needed is a more substantial 
discussion on the (pragmatical-ethical-political) limits of e.g. HRM practices. This 
should be a discussion which tries to describe and explain any conceivable rejectable 
assumptions and consequences in much more concrete terms. It should be a discussion 
which hermeneutically tries to understand the demands on different stakeholders and 
preferably back up any arguments by empirical evidence. Townley discusses one 
study which perhaps fulfills these goals, but interestingly she admits that “it is not a 
Foucauldian analysis” (ibid., p. 142). Townley notes the importance of “bringing to 
light domains of hitherto unrecognized knowledge” (ibid., p. 151). She argues that  
“[r]ather than knowledge providing the potential for a basis of social 
consensus on meaning and interpretation, it enables those who use it to 
minimize their contact with that which is represented... [what is important] 
is the  rediscovery and revalorization of experience” (ibid., pp. 154-155).  
Here we (at least superficially) agree with Townley. We will try to design a study 
which is (at least partly) sensitive to this experience, which hypothesizes that this 
experience is important and matters in terms of the very effectiveness of HRM. We 
also to some extent agree with Townley on the related issue in terms of her claim that 
“[r]ather than meaning being universal it has to be seen as relative, contextual and 
multiple” (ibid., p. 161). Also this is something our theorization and 
operationalization will try to be partly sensitive to. However, our study is also 
sensitive to the fact that there may be more general contingently more or less stable 
meanings and to the fact that we would also need knowledge of such meanings. The 
existence of any more generalizable meanings cannot be known a priori. It is clear 
that at least from an ethical standpoint we should also engage in qualitative studies 
which can describe and explain the experience of employees in even more sensitive 
terms, taking into account “the importance of difference” (ibid., pp. 156-157). Further, 
our study is also based on the hypothesis, which we find to be at the center of the 
rhetorics of HRM, that practices which seek “to eliminate oppressive and dominant 
behavior, and opposes intitutionalized dominance and subordination...” (ibid., p. 161) 
is relevant to consider for organizations from a purely economical point of view. Even 
if elimination is arguably impossible, in particular in the sense that power/knowledge 
always also is involved in dominance, at least continuous amelioration should be the 
objective.  
In short, our study is an attempt to begin to test the hypothesis that the ethical question 
of how organizations and managers conduct themselves in their relations (among 
other things through the HRM practices) to employees (cf. ibid., p. 164) matters also 
in economical terms. It is fully possible that it does not. This would not preclude a 
less economically fruitful and more purely ethical and political critique of HRM but 
such a critique would arguably be less powerful. 
Our theorization/conceptualizations/operationalizations/methodology will not be 




the employee or the social world. The question of whether “[t]he social has itself now 
imploded upon itself beyond the reach of meaningful human intervention” (Hancock, 
1999, p. 167) is an empirical question. With reference to HRM, Hancock argues that it 
may have and refers to Baudrillard. The latter may have interesting 
comments/arguments and views on this topic but they still remain just that. “The 
world we have created has become too complex, too unpredictable” (ibid., p. 169). 
Well maybe, maybe not. Maybe it always has been. 
2.2.4 Conclusion: a suggested attitude towards ontology 
Rorty has argued that  
“Our identification with our community – our society, our political 
tradition, our intellectual heritage – is heightened when we see this 
community as ours rather than nature’s, shaped rather than found, one 
among many which men have made” (1982, p. 166).  
This sounds like social constructionism but note that it only suggests some advantages 
with such a perspective. With reference to philosophical distinctions, Rorty argues, 
“[f]or pragmatists, the question should always be “What use is it?” rather 
than “Is it real?”. Criticism of other philosophers’ distinctions and 
problematics should charge relative inutility..., [i.e. concerning] 
distinctions whose employment has proved to lead nowhere, proved to be 
more trouble than they were worth,... rather than “meaningfulness” or 
“illusion” or “incoherence” (Rory, 1998c, p. 45). 
For us, universal arguments with reference to social constructionism, relativism, 
positivism, instrumentalism39, realism, objectivism or subjectivism in any form, are 
examples of what Fine (1986) calls “unnatural attitudes”. We subscribe to Fine’s 
suggestion of the Natural Ontological Attitude (NOA). 
“NOA, as such, has no specific ontological commitments. It has only an 
attitude to recommend: namely, to look and see as openly as one can what 
it is reasonable to believe in, and then to go with the belief and 
commitment that emerges[40]...In particular, NOA encourages us to take 
seriously the idea that what the scientific enterprise has to offer is actually 
sufficient to satisfy our philosophical needs[41]. It urges us to explore what 
happens philosophically when we approach science with trust, and openly; 
i.e. without rigid attachments to philosophical schools and ideas, and 
without intentions for attaching science to some ready-made philosophical 
engine” (1986, p. 176-177). 
                                               
39 Rortyan neo-pragmatism could be argued to be nothing else than a form of instrumentalism. 
However, the crucial difference is that Rortyan neo-pragmatism is trying to avoid interpreting "science 
in accordance with a set of prior, extra-scientific commitments...[as well as to avoid] the presupposition 
that science is the sort of enterprise that requires and/or permits of a general interpretation" (Fine, 1986, 
p. 171). 
40 This of course entails critical thinking and a general critical attitude. 
41 What is referred to here are our epistemological needs in terms of justifying empirical scientific 
claims. There are naturally a host of existential/normative/aestethical “philosophical” needs to describe 




This naturally allows all the room in the world for conceptual innovations and 
different perspectives. It thus in no way inhibits the challenging of the current (social) 
order. In social science there are more reasons to try to approach science openly than 
with trust, but this cannot and need not on this view be ultimately justified with 
philosophical arguments. It has more to do with what purposes we think are 
worthwhile to fulfill (which can very well be informed or inspired by philosophical or 
normative arguments), pragmatical judgements about what would be the best ways to 
do this and the more detailed status of current knowledge about such ways. 
In summary, Rorty draws the following conclusions from the history of philosophical 
reflection on ontology and epistemology, and the oscillation between objectivity and 
subjectivity, between realism and relativism, dogmatism and scepticism: 
“[M]y strategy for escaping the self-referential difficulties into which “the 
Relativist” keeps getting himself is to move everything over from 
epistemology and metaphysics to cultural politics” (Rorty, 1998c, p. 57).  
By “cultural politics” Rorty means that  
“There is no way for human beings to get beyond their own practices 
except by dreaming up better practices [including HRM practices or 
scientific practices], and no way to judge these new practices better except 
by reference to their various advantages [respectively various 
disadvantages] for various human purposes” (1998e, pp. 127-128).  
At least with reference to our pursuit of empirical knowledge, philosophical ontology 
can arguably be seen as utilizing a vocabulary “which might have proven to be of 
value but in fact did not” (Rorty, 1998c, p. 45). Rorty's point of view is that  
“metaphysically active inquirers…take seriously such bad, unpragmatic 
questions as “subjective or objective?”, “made or found?”, “ad nos or in 
se?”, socially constructed or for real?” (1998b, p. 29). 
On this view ontology contingently follows from epistemology. The contingent nature 
of epistemology, in turn, will be suggested in the next section42. 
2.3 EPISTEMOLOGICAL BEHAVIORISM 
A Rortyan pragmatist argues that there is no other ultimate criterion to be used in 
science (or philosophy) than convenience.  
“The metaphilosophical question about pragmatism is whether there is 
something other than convenience to use as a criterion in science and 
philosophy” (Rorty, 1998c, p. 57; see also Rorty, 1980. pp. 306-311).  
This convenience is not an “anything goes at any time” convenience. The argument is 
simply that there are no other fruitful criteria in science than pragmatical (including 
                                               
42 It seems problematical to argue, either at an individual level or at a general level, that either 
epistemology or ontology simply follows from the other as is done e.g. by Heiskala. “[T]he notion of 
the ontological structure of society is a reflection of the epistemological conception the researcher 





ethical and political) ones. As the pragmatical usefulness of anything is most often a 
complex question up for grabs, this argument solves no (“pragmatical”) problems. It 
merely suggests a more concrete focus of disputes about epistemology and ontology.  
Thus, evaluations of convenience or inconvenience by communities of peers are the 
only justifications of claims to knowledge within the “epistemological behaviorism” 
Rorty advances.  
“Epistemological behaviorism (which might be called simply 
“pragmatism”, were this term not a bit overladen)...is the claim that 
philosophy will have no more to offer than common sense (supplemented 
by biology, history etc) about knowledge and truth” (Rorty, 1980, p. 176).  
In essence, Rorty’s epistemological behaviorism involves the suggestion of  
“explaining rationality and epistemic authority by reference to what society 
lets us say rather than the latter by the former” (ibid., p. 174).  
This is the same thing as “turning everything over from epistemology and 
metaphysics to cultural politics” (Rorty, 1998c, p. 57). The suggestion is that we 
should be able to cope (in an epistemological sense) with everything we confront 
simply by adherance, at a general level, to the following 5 principles:  
FIRST PRINCIPLE: “There is not a fact of the matter [independent of 
observers and actors] as to whether statements people make are warranted 
or not” (ibid., pp. 49-50). 
This argument is largely based on interpretations of Quine’s (1951) critiques of the 
“two dogmas of empiricism” and Sellar’s (1963) critique of “the myth of the given”43. 
(2) SECOND PRINCIPLE: “Whether a statement is warranted or not is 
[dependent on] whether [an unspecifiable part] of one’s cultural peers 
would say it is warranted or unwarranted” (Rorty, 1998c, pp. 49-50). 
There is no “majority vote” involved here (Rorty, 1998, p. 55). This view only 
acknowledges that knowledge is relative to some undefinable agreement. The extent 
of agreement/disagreement is the best measure we can get on the adequacy of our 
knowledge but it will most naturally be partly relative to communities which are 
deemed to have an understanding of the issues involved. A minimal requirement 
would seem to be that researchers within the relevant field agree upon something. 
Thus in fact, on this view we should give up the attempt, which goes back all the way 
to Plato, at defining knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient criteria. Thus, we 
also clearly give up the idea of being able to identify something as definately 
knowledge or definately not knowledge. On this view there are only more or less 
justified beliefs or alternatively more or less justifed knowledge.  
An opponent to this view on knowledge would have to argue that there is  
“some way of determining warrant sub specie aeternitatis, some natural 
order of reasons that determines, quite apart form S’s ability to justify p to 
                                               




those around him, whether he is really justified in holding p” (Rorty, 
1998c, p. 50).  
Philosophers of science and philosophers of knowledge have been notoriously unable 
to “agree” on such a “natural order”. Of course, there is nothing in principle which 
would prevent a currently unwarranted statement to become warranted (ibid., p. 50). 
But there is no definitive philosophical solution to this openness of what to accept as 
knowledge.  
In particular, on this view, the notion of truth can play no explanatory role here 
because according to a Rortyan neo-pragmatism truth is not to be understood as 
anything which can explain something else. Rorty acknowledges a “disquotational 
use, a commending use, and ...a ‘cautionary’ use” but not an explanatory use of the 
concept of truth (1991h, pp. 126-129; 1998b, pp. 21-22). Truth in its disquotational or 
cautionary use does not have any explanatory role. The cautionary use simply refers 
to situations where we say about a claim that it is well justified but not necessarily 
true. The most substantial positive notion of truth Rorty acknowledges is truth 
understood as a compliment paid to certain sentences in the form of commending 
them. But this does not either have any explanatory role. According to this suggestion  
“We should not say that truth is correspondence, coherence, warranted 
assertibility, ideally justified assertability, what is accepted in the 
conversations of the right people, what science will end up maintaining, 
what explains the convergence on single theories in science, or the success 
of our ordinary beliefs” (Davidson, 1990, p. 309; cited in Rorty, 1998b, p. 
24).  
In general, pragmatists simply argue that we should not "try to specify the nature of 
truth" (Rorty, 1998a, p. 3) and that a definition of the nature of truth is not essential 
since "truth is not the goal of inquiry" (ibid., p. 3). 
 (3) THIRD PRINCIPLE: “Our norms or standards of warranted 
assertibility are historical products; they evolve over time” (1998c, p. 49). 
At an abstract level, there is some current agreement that science has certain criteria 
for knowledge not necessarily adopted by other human activities. A usual (non-
complete) list of “scientific values” (Rorty, 1980, p. 331), or criteria of knowledge 
include “[predictive] accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness” 
(Kuhn, 1977, p. 322). However, the “trade-offs between satisfaction of these various 
criteria provide room for endless rational debate” (Rorty, 1980, p. 327). For a 
discussion on these values, see Hoyningen-Huené, 1993, pp. 147-154. The above 
mentioned list is usually taken to indicate the position of methodological monism 
(Braaten, 1991, p. 108) but the pragmatist point of view does not reject the value of 
different methodologies. It thus represents a middle road in the debate on 
methodology. The degrees of the above standards will also vary e.g. between different 
sciences, not only between the natural and social sciences. For quantitative social 
scientific research these criteria are clearly relevant. So are arguably at least 
consistency, simplicity, scope and fruitfulness with reference to general explanatory 
frameworks also for qualitative research (and philosophy!). However, there may well 
be many areas dealt with in social science which cannot be described and explained in 
a consistent and simple and generalizable and fruitful manner. We simply cannot 
know apriori. One essential task for social science is thus also to problematize any 




(un)fruitfulness, (in)consistency, (over)simplicity or (non)generalizability. The “trade 
offs” here provide endless room for hermeneutical ethical-political-pragmatical 
debates. 
The HRM discourse has been criticized on most of these dimensions: consistency 
(Steyaert and Janssens, 1999, p. 185); scope (it might be very limited due to the 
assumptions pointed out by MacDuffie, 1994, p. 199); fruitfulness (Evans (1999) has 
offered one critique, March and Sutton (1997) indirectly another one); simplicity or 
parsimoniousness (Noon, 1992, p. 21). As far as any more exact predictive accuracy 
is concerned it is really too early to say anything other than that not very promising 
results have been produced. In fact, in light of the history of social science at large, 
high predictive accuracy is unlikely to be produced. In social science we are however 
ideally looking for “accuracy” in terms of agreement on the explanatory power of 
different phenomena (in quantitative research a combination of statistical significance 
of relationships, slope coefficients and R-square). Related to the criteria of predictive 
accuracy, fruitfulness and scope is an element generally perceived, on good grounds, 
to be crucial to the scientific enterprise, i.e. replication. In the field of HRM reserach, 
as in organization science at large, there is a lack of such replication studies (Hubbard, 
Vetter and Eldon, 1998; Tsang and Kwan, 1999). This is clearly a weak point. 
However, pace Tsang and Kwan (1999, p. 761) there is no need to evoke a “desk-
thumping, foot-stamping” realism (Fine, 1984a, p. 97) in any form in order to 
understand the importance of replication studies44. 
(4) FOURTH PRINCIPLE: “Our norms and standards always reflect our 
interests and values. Our picture of intellectual flourishing is part of, and 
only makes sense as part of, our picture of human flourishing in general” 
(Rorty, 1998c, p. 49). 
Science, in terms of communities of scientists, always have some purposes and rules 
more or less suitable for those purposes. We read Pfeffer (1993) as arguing for the 
undeniable importance of such shared rules for a field of science although he went too 
far with the (somewhat desperate) idea of imposing them (Cannella and Paetzold, 
1994).  
(5) FIFTH PRINCIPLE: “Our norms and standards of anything – including 
warranted assertibility – are capable of reform. There are better and worse 
norms and standards [depending on purposes]” (Rorty, 1998c, p. 49).  
                                               
44 There are deficiences concerning replications also in qualitative research. It is difficult for 
researchers to explicitly exhibit their specific interpretative application of ideal rules and guidelines for 
different types of qualitative research. This is why at least approximate replication studies by 
independent researchers in this genre would be at least as important as in quantitative research. 
However, here replication studies are probably even less prevalent than in quantitative research. 
Hermeneuticists often argue that “the principle of replication should not be imposed on the social 
sciences for they consider social science observations to be unique in nature” (Tsang and Kwan, 1999, 
p. 761). This a priori argument would be rejected by a Rortyan pragmatist. There is no way to know a 
priori whether some interesting similarities or dissimilarities would not present themselves across 
replication attempts both with reference to the same population as well as other populations. Any such 
similarities or the lack of them would in most cases have an effect on the epistemic confidence we 
would have in the results of any one hermeneutical study. The uniqueness argument should not be 
provoked as a general argument. It would also seem to depend on the specificity of the research 




Rorty’s argument is simply that any debates over methodological, ontological or 
epistemological questions, are best viewed as debates about the utility of assumptions 
and norms of justification.  
The five claims above, as any other claims made by Rorty, are not truths in a sense of 
correspondence to some kind of reality. The above claims can themselves, within 
Rorty’s vocabulary, in the most substantive sense be true only in terms of 
commending or endorsing the sentences (Rorty, 1998b, p. 21-22). Further, even if 
basically agreeing with the above neo-pragmatist principles, those who think it is 
important can continue to claim e.g. that a social constructionist ontology or a 
postmodern attitude is “better by reference to [the] advantages” for some human 
purposes. Similarly researchers can disagree on the (overall) utility/purposefulness of 
different conceptualizations of HRM. “All the pragmatist can do is to point to the 
seeming futility of metaphysical activity” (Rorty, 1998c, p. 42). In Rorty’s view, 
science is not to be viewed as capturing objective reality, but rather “the only sense in 
which science is exemplary is that it is a model of human solidarity” (1991g, p. 39). 
What we shall call science and what not is a notoriously difficult problem sometimes 
referred to as the “demarcation problem” (Niiniluoto, 1984, pp. 19-30). Rorty simply 
leaves us with the point that there are differing degrees of justification of claims made 
within different (“scientific”) diciplines. Some activities many of us choose to call 
mere non-sense. It is important to observe that Rorty’s notions of science and 
knowledge do not lead to “scientism” (“the view that all knowledge is scientific 
knowledge”) (1991i, p. 107). However, he suggests loosely that  
“[w]e call something science insofar as it enables us [or increases our 
possibilties] to predict what will happen, and therefore to influence what 
will happen...We hesitate to put economics, sociology, history, or literary 
criticism [or organization science/studies!] in that box, because none of 
those diciplines seems capable of answering questions of the form “If we 
do this, what will happen?”” (Rorty, 1998a, p. 5).  
Researchers in e.g. organizational science are still fighting, trying to increase our 
understanding and in some of its areas to help us predict or at least foresee what may 
happen if we do this rather than that, or for that matter, what has happened (to us) in 
order to show what might have happened and/or might happen.  
Whitley (1984) has fairly plausibly argued that there are no philosophical reasons to 
expel organizational studies from the family of sciences. But he also admits that  
“indeed, as a field with common explanatory ideals and technical 
procedures it is dubious that it exists” (ibid., p. 387).  
This is partly because “our picture[s] of human flourishing in general” (Rorty, 1998c, 
p. 49) diverge. But there may also be other reasons. When Whitley claims that “there 
are no epistemological reasons to management research not being scientific" (1984, p. 
387), he excludes the empirical possibility of simply confronting a (causal) 
complexity which might affect its status as a science which can answer questions of 




2.3.1 Meaning, reference and justification - and why social science is 
problematical 
Questions of meaning and interpretation are at the center-stage in the debates about 
the nature of social science, appropriate methodologies and the status of social 
scientific knowledge. Philosophy of language has dominated much of twentieth 
century philosophy. Indeed twentieth century philosophy can be characterized as 
having taken "the linguistic turn". For some evidence of this and the hopes attached to 
it, see Rorty, 1967/1992. However, according to Rorty’s largely therapeutical view, 
philosophy of language does in no priviledged sense have anything “to do with 
epistemology, [and] its “ontological” ...[consequences] are bound to be bland” (Rorty, 
1980, pp. 260-261).  
In all its apparent simplicity, Rorty’s suggestion is that  
“[t]he way we identify [the pattern truth makes in the behavior of 
people]...is to gather information about what episodes and situations in the 
world cause an agent to prefer that one rather than another sentence be 
true”[45]...[the] pattern that rationality makes is the same pattern truth 
makes, and the same pattern meaning makes. You cannot have language 
without rationality, or either without truth...the pattern truth makes is the 
pattern that justification to us  makes” (ibid., p. 23-25) 46. 
The empirical project of coming to an agreement on the more specific causes of 
peoples’ endorsement of sentences is of course no easy matter. In addition to the 
attempt to establish some kind of “pattern that truth makes in the behavior of [certain] 
people” social science is also trying to understand/establish additional (causal) 
relationships between the behavior and attitudes of people and/or institutional 
characteristics, i.e. (causal) relationships which cannot be identified only by 
identifying “the pattern that truth makes in the behavior of [those same] people”. 
Thus, empirical social science attempts to go beyond this level of theories of meaning 
and construct empirical theories of (causal) relationships between sentences that 
describe the behavior and attitudes of people/institutions. There are many suggested 
and debated methodologies available for a researcher in social science trying to 
understand/explain the behavior of people and institutions. The attempt to empirically 
identify and justify more or less general causes in more complex cases is one of the 
debated tasks of social science. Although arguably philosophy, including philosophy 
of language, cannot decide for us whether this is possible or not it is clearly a very 
difficult project indeed.  
                                               
45 On this point Rorty cites Davidson (1990, p. 322).  
46 Deconstruction and critical social science ususally head for particular patterns meaning makes (and 
thus at least indirectly for the other patterns identified above) and occationally they do a fruitful job in 
sensitizing us to important unreflected assumptions, important unthought of consequences or 
problematics of our linguistic behavior. It is in questioning, debating and suggesting the above kind of 
patterns that philosophical debate more generally, as one party in the conversation, still (and always) 
probably can be influential. One way to explicate this task, and a way which might be pragmatically 
defended, is to say that it concerns adhering to and defending “the ideal of discursive accountability” 
(Wallgren, 1996, p. 129). What such discursive accountability should be understood to involve is 




In any case, a (philosophical) theory of meaning is, on Rorty’s interpretation,  
“an understanding of the inferential relations between sentences [and to] 
understand these relations is to understand the truth-conditions for the 
sentences” (Rorty, 1980, p. 260).  
By suggestion, the same pattern of inferential relations is thus also the object of a 
theory of truth which is simply “an empirical theory about the truth conditions of 
every sentence in some corpus of sentences” (Davidson, 1990, p. 309; cited in Rorty, 
1998b, p. 23). The suggested holistic view on meaning, which Rorty more or less 
adheres to, involves the idea that “a theory of meaning for a language must do no 
more than” (Rorty, 1980, p. 303) 
“give an account of how the meanings of sentences depend on the 
meanings of words...[where] individual words must [not] have meanings at 
all, in any sense that trancends the fact that they have a systematic effect 
on the meanings of the sentences in which they occur” (Davidson, 1990, p. 
304-305, cited by Rorty, 1980, p. 303).  
Rorty notes that this  
“Davidson’s neo-Wittgensteinian point is that even “red” and “mama” 
have uses - can help make possible the statement of truths - only in the 
context of sentences and thus of a whole language” (Rorty, 1980, p. 303). 
Rorty thus rejects the possible alternative of 
“[s]omeone who is not a holist in this sense...[He/she] will think that 
understanding a language is a matter of two distinct processes – tying 
individual words on the world via ostension [without stage-setting], and 
then letting other words build up meanings around this central core in the 
coarse of being used. He[/she] will also think that understanding what 
“truth” means involves “analyzing” every sentence until ostensions which 
would make it true become apparent. This picture of holism ceasing to 
apply at the point at which reference is least problematic...is one way to get 
the scheme-content distinction going” (Rorty, 1980, p. 304).  
Only empirical adequacy involving ethical-political-pragmatical judgements will put 
an end to a “meaning-regress” in the holism suggested by Rorty. That is also why 
deconstructive critique on this view is simply a critique of explicit or implicit 
empirical theories of meaning. Such critiques can be illuminating in the sense of 
changing theoretically relevant structures (patterns) of meaning or they can provide 
merely aesthetic experiences. Whether they or any other kind of dissemination or 
semiosis will change the content of any implicit or explicit meaning is up to an 
ethical-political-pragmatical process. Since there are other more simple ways to 
understand this state of affairs, from the point of view a Rortyan neo-pragmatist, the 
complicated rhetorical (anti)metaphysics of deconstruction largely belongs to an 
optional, aesthetic sphere.  
In Rorty’s interpretation, reference, i.e. what our terms refer to, is simply a 
“noncontroversial fallout from our best theor[ies] about things in general” (Rorty, 
1980, p. 294). In many cases concerning middle sized physical objects we largely 
agree on what we refer to. However, in many other cases we are evidently far from 




conditions and thus (evidently) what we refer to (e.g. vis á vis  sentences using the 
notion ‘HRM’).  
For many areas of language use we have special sciences. These try both to settle 
disputes on and develop new inferential relations between sentences by constructing 
empirical theories which allow for more controlled corroboration of the truth (i.e. 
justification, i.e. commendability) of what we say, i.e. what we are scientifically 
justified to refer to and say about some phenomenon (e.g. HRM). Empirical research 
is thus never free from (the duty of) justifying and problematizing inferential relations 
between sentences, and thus meaning and truth conditions.  
“[T]hese two inquiries cannot be conducted independently” (Rorty, 1991h, 
p. 138). 
Thus, in some sense empirical scientists are not free from “philosophizing” in the 
sense of theorizing. Nor are, by consequence, philosophers free from (the linguistic 
behavior within) empirical sciences to the extent that they are saying anything which 
concerns the latter. This follows from the argument that any pure theory of meaning 
would not put an end to debates about the meaning of sentences nor the reference of 
words. This would seem to be a highly probable consequence of the holistic theory of 
meaning attended to by (at least) Rorty (1980, p. 303). 
There could in principle be a time when a pure empirical project concerning the 
settlement of questions of reference could be carried out independently of 
philosophising only if there would be a time where a full empirical theory of meaning 
would have been realized and there would be no disputes or conceptual innovations 
affecting such a theory of meaning. As implied by Wallgren (1996, p. 90; p. 120), this 
“time” is exactly as difficult to imagine (but not a priori non-sensical) as the meaning 
of the idea of a full “set of axioms that entail, for every sentence in the language, a 
statement of the conditions under which it is true” (Davidson, 1984c, p. 56, cited in 
Wallgren, 1996, p. 120)47. This is why we think that Rorty’s focus on the more 
limiting aspect of Davidson’s idea is more justified, i.e. whatever a theory of meaning 
would do, it  
“should do no more than ‘give an account of how the meanings of 
sentences depend upon the meanings of words...in terms of their systematic 
effect on the meanings of the sentences in which they occur’” (Rorty, 
1980, p. 303). 
Whether such accounts, even in any limited and thus arguably more conceivable form, 
would be illuminating is an open question (Wallgren, 1996, pp. 89-101) 48. 
                                               
47 For some illuminating arguments about language, meaning and truth along these lines, see Wheeler, 
2000e, pp. 116-136). “In a real language, the [language] is in dispute. That dispute is not about which 
meanings to attach to which words, but rather about what is to be said and when to say it. All such 
disputes take place in a particular concrete situation that makes some predications suitable” (ibid., p. 
136). 
48 It is important to note that such a theory of meaning is an empirical theory. It does not involve a 
priori assumptions about any necessary given meaning, necessarily unified subjects (authors), 




What we try to justify and thus truth, as Putnam has clearly pointed out, is relative to 
the context and our interests. Putnam argues that  
“A caused B depends upon the context and the interests of the people 
making the judgement (for example what people want to know in a 
particular context)…[but to] say that a notion is interest relative is not to 
say that all interests are equally reasonable” (1992, p. 64-66). “[A] causal 
statement... [can] only [be] true or false when a certain framework of pre-
understandings is in place, including which conditions should be 
considered as “background conditions” and which conditions should be 
considered “bringers about” of effects. But to think of conditions as 
background conditions or bringers-about of effects one already has to be 
able to refer. There isn’t a distinction in the physical [or any other] facts 
themselves between background conditions and bringers-about of effects 
independent of the existence of human beings with human interests and 
human capacities” (ibid., p. 209).  
The context and our interests, in turn, are nothing but a function of the patterns truth, 
meaning, justification and rationality (“to us”) make. It is in the midst of the openness 
of these patterns that complexity has to be justifiably reduced in for example 
quantitative (and qualitative) organizational science. It is against the backdrop of this 
openness and complexity that the “pre-paradigmatic” debates within social (and 
organizational) science take place. It is because of this complexity and openness that 
generally warranted statements in social science are so difficult to come by or 
produce. The above mentioned patterns, including the interests and contexts are also 
historically evolving and dependent on the judgement of (an unspecifiable number of) 
one’s peers.   
In line with this, Davidson has argued that  
“all the evidence there is is just what it takes to make our sentences or 
theories true. Nothing, however, no thing makes sentences or theories true: 
not experience, not surface irritations, not the world, can make a sentence 
true” (Davidson, 1984b, p. 194)49.  
Rorty interprets this as saying that  
“[t]he lines of evidential force [i.e. inferential relations between sentences], 
so to speak, do not parallel the lines of referential direction...To know 
about the former lines is to know the language in which the beliefs are 
expressed. To know about the latter is to have an empirical theory about 
what the people who use that language mean [or refer to] by what they say 
– which is also the story about the causal roles played by their lingusitic 
behavior in their interaction with their environment...The urge to coalesce 
                                                                                                                                      
empirical theory of meaning can also acknowledge that there are complex historical processes involved 
in any empirically (pragmatically) determinable meanings. Such a theory of meaning is thus clearly 
limited and tentative in the same sense in which any empirical theory is. Compare Wallgren who 
argues that "formal semantics [should perhaps be thought of] as descriptive of certain features of our 
language...and ways of talking about language" (1996, p. 101).  
49 From Rorty’s perspective such claims would have to be read as arguing for a fruitful way of 
understanding, i.e. as opposed to ways which have “proved to be of more trouble than they were worth” 




the justificatory story and the causal story is the old metaphysical urge...” 
(Rorty, 1991h, p. 148)50.  
There may be both "lines of evidential force" (i.e. meaning) and/or "empirical theories 
about reference" which do not hold up against empirical evidence. In fact, an 
important and difficult task of social science is to put such "lines of evidential force" 
and "empirical theories about reference" in question, with March and Sutton's words, 
without precipitately "destroying vital elements of community built on social myths 
and intuitive knowledge" (1997, p. 704). Referring to Davidson, Rorty argues that in 
the simplest form it can be said that  
the truth of an utterance depends on just two things, what the words mean 
and how the world is arranged...[and] these two inquiries cannot be 
conducted independently” (Rorty, 1991, p. 138). 
Truth depends on the latter only in the sense that the world and our practices/uses of 
words are such that we can continue to be justified in our “linguistic behavior in 
interaction with the environment” (Rorty, 1991, p. 148). This can be either behavior in 
the physical world (which we refer to) or behavior in interaction only in (what we 
refer to as ) the conceptual world, i.e. in interaction with other linguistic behavior, 
within the realm of theories of meaning. On this view, it is philosophically 
uncontroversial to say that quantum mechanics corresponds to physical reality or even 
that e.g. Rawl’s theory of justice corresponds to the Idea of Justice. These kinds of 
statements 
“are true if and only if the world contains the right sort of things, and is 
laid out in the way the statements suggest...if one wants to say that there 
are no such things, then one can give an alternative theory of the world 
which does not contain them, but this will [by Rorty’s suggestion] not be a 
[purely] semantical theory....No roads lead from the [semantical] project 
giving truth conditions for the sentences of [e.g] English...to criteria for 
theory choice...Correspondence, for Davidson [and Rorty] is a relation 
which has no ontological preferences – it can tie any sort of word to any 
sort of thing” (Rorty, 1980, p. 300).  
This elaboration is consistent with Rorty’s anti-representationalism, according to 
which we can view ourselves as  
“in touch with reality in all areas of culture – ethics as well as physics, 
literary criticism as well as biology – in a sense of “in touch with” which 
does not mean “representing reasonbaly accurately” but simply “caused by 
and causing”” (1991, p. 9). 
                                               
50 Another way of putting this is that “Discussions of the way in which truth is correspondence to 
reality float free of discussions of what there is in heaven and earth” (Rorty, 1980, p. 300). Rorty 
argues that in one sense for “holists, so to speak, truth is always evidence-trancendent” (1991h, p. 149), 
i.e. trancendent with reference to any specific evidence. There is always the cautionary use of truth, in 
the sense of some sentence being “fully justified, but perhaps not true” (ibid., 1998b, p. 22; ibid., 
1991h, p. 128). This notion of truth roughly corresponds to the view of truth as “a focus imaginarius” 
(ibid., 1980, p. 306). In a sense there is always also the corresponding view of justification as "a focus 




Empirical theories and their corroboration provide us with the most focused way of 
telling us what kind of entities we are causing and are caused by. The agreement 
among an unspecifiable part of a community on what these entities are, or “what there 
is in heaven and earth”, is the best criterion for the commending use of truth we have. 
Such agreement is dependent on the evidence we can provide according to our norms 
of justification. Within the social sciences, ranging from theology to economics, as 
within everyday linguistic behavior there are a wide range of different norms of 
justification in use. In addition, different scientific journals within any one field of 
science use somewhat different norms of justification/criteria of acceptance. Thus 
different notions about what there is in heaven and earth and accompanying different 
inferential relationships between sentences are affirmed/negated in different 
communities. The only difference between science and everyday uses of language or 
everyday activities to aquire beliefs, is that science is more attentive to (the problem 
of) adequate and shared norms of justification. Thus “the only sense in which science 
is exemplary is that it is a model of human solidarity” (Rorty, 1991 (d), p. 39). 
In some areas of language use, most particularly in the fields of the natural sciences, 
there are some relatively cleared areas of inferential relations, truth conditions and 
commendable uses of the notion of truth, achieved through the corroboration of quite 
specific empirical theories about what carefully controlled events and situations 
people refer to (are talking about). These represent areas of language use where we 
(currently) agree on the “causal roles played by [our] linguistic behavior in interaction 
with the environment” (Rorty, 1991, p. 148). 
In fact, however, Davidson has argued that  
“most of our beliefs - most of anybody’s beliefs - must be true...(because to 
ascribe beliefs in the first place one must evoke the Principle of 
Charity)...[According to Rorty], to say as Davidson does, that ‘belief is in 
its nature veridical’ is not to celebrate the happy congruence of subject and 
object but rather to say that the pattern truth makes is the pattern that 
justification to us makes” (Rorty, 1998, p. 25). 
This does not mean that there are not numerous communities, including smaller 
groups of people, which between them would disagree on many truths, and even many 
truth conditions, simply because patterns of meaning, justification, rationality (and 
truth) differ between them. Even fruitful disagreement is however dependent on a 
mutual understanding of truth conditions. If there would not be a bulk of language use 
following such shared patterns we could not, based upon our own patterns of 
justification, make sense of other people's noises.  
Nevertheless, there is no uncomplicated proof of the fact that we always can make 
sense of other people's (anybody's) noises in this way (Wallgren, 1996, pp. 89-101). 
This means that Davidson's claim that "most of anybody's beliefs must be true" 
according to our norms of justification is problematical. In any case, if we cannot 
make sense of other people's noises in terms of our own patterns of justification we 
always have the possibility to try to get "the hang of a new language game" (Rorty, 
1980, p. 306). Deconstructive analyses or any other critical analysis designate ways in 
which, more or less from within a language game, we can try to alter beliefs, habits of 
action, what we refer to, meanings of words and truth-conditions of sentences, i.e. 




In summary, to share a language is on this view the same thing as agreeing and being 
clear about inferential relations giving truth conditions of sentences through and 
through. This still does not necessarily mean that one has to know or agree on the 
truth or falsity of all the statements. In any case, any two individuals seldom share a 
language through and through, hardly even with themselves as noted by Wheeler. 
“[I]f we do not make the simplifying assumption that a person’s language 
or theory at any one time is a unified whole, then areas of our own 
language are indeterminate relative to other areas of our language” 
(Wheeler, 2000b, p. 31)51.  
The idea that there would be large scale language uses with clear and universally 
accepted sets of inferential relations and references concerning social phenomena is of 
course absurd concerning all but the more simple parts of everyday language use. If 
this was not to be absurd we would not have so many open-ended discussions and 
debates with each other concerning these phenomena. In particular, if there were a 
completely shared unproblematic use of language, there would be no need for critical 
and philosophical debate nor empirical science. Arguably, for any community to be 
able to effectively use and change a language involves systematic inquiry into the 
justification (commendable truth or falsity) of inferential relations, i.e. inquiry into the 
success of the linguistic interaction within the community as well as success of the 
linguistic interaction with the rest of the world.  
Philosophy is one party which can suggest alterations both of the truth conditions and 
truths of certain sentences. What it often does is to suggest the introduction of new 
vocabularies and thus new truth conditions, on rare occasions perhaps even of more 
immediate potential utility/consequences for empirical science52.  
Empirical science is another activity which attempts to alter or produce new truths 
including truth conditions. Empirical science, utlizing some norms of justification, 
inquires into the truth or falsity of any given conceptualizations, i.e. suggested or 
currently practiced linguistic behavior, basically with reference to two broad and 
potentially overlapping areas. The natural sciences deal with questions concerning our 
interaction with that part of the world which does not respond to our inquiries in a 
language which we recognize as itself having truth conditions. The social sciences 
concern both our interaction in terms of scientific linguistic behavior as well as in 
general our (linguistic) behavior in any other human interaction. Thus e.g. a simple 
truth condition might be "'HRM influences organizational performance' is true if and 
only if HRM influences organizational performance". Empirical-theoretical research 
on HRM might e.g. alter or complicate this truth condition by providing evidence for 
                                               
51 For an explication of the characteristics of language which makes this evident, see Wheeler, 2000e. 
However, some confusion arises from Wheeler's use of terms here in that he seems to assume that a 
unified whole (coherent) language could not involve indeterminacy.  
52 Whether such philosophy should be edifying (Rorty, 1980, pp. 357-394 ) and/or imaginative (Rorty, 
1998, p. 5), and/or transformative (Wallgren, 1996, pp. 1991-202), and/or deconstructive and/or simply 
philosophy “as the skill to form, find and produce concepts” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1993, p. 14; our 
translation) or anything else is up for self-reflective debate. Wallgren (1996) seem to us a balanced 




the fact that we need to distinguish between different meanings of 'human resource 
management' and/or 'organizational performance'. Empirical evidence might also 
indicate that the truth of such a claim is conditional on certain other elements. Finally, 
empirical science may provide evidence for theories which explain how such an 
influence operates or that a certain conceptualization of human resource management 
does not seem to have any distinctive influence.  
However, corroborated and very generally agreed upon empirical theories are 
extremely difficult to produce even with reference to small parts of the use of 
language referring to more complex social phenomena. This has to do with both 
conceptual and empirical complexity and dynamics, with interests and with the 
impossibility of extensive controlled laboratory experiments53.  
In order to understand the difficulties involved in social science, we need not evoke 
any metaphysical arguments dictating universal choices between dualisms (e.g. 
mind/body; modernity/postmodernity; freedom/determinism; subject/object; social 
constructivism/objective realism; fact /value; agency/structure; 
individualism/collectivism etc). Any such a priori universal choice between dualisms 
would, on the explicated understanding, merely be an ornamentation of (a critique of) 
social (scientific) practices. In short, by suggestion it would amount to utilizing a 
vocabulary “which might have proven to be of value but in fact did not” (Rorty, 
1998a, p. 45)54. 
2.4 GENERAL EPISTEMOLOGICAL/ONTOLOGICAL CHALLENGES IN 
HRM RESEARCH 
Instead of studying the effects of HRM practices, we might study and/or 
philosophically reflect upon (historical) “background” causes (e.g power/knowledge 
structures) of interpretations of such HRM practices or causes of their very existence 
and try to argue that these are more relevant important (and contingent) causes of any 
HRM effects than the practices per se. We can in principle try to trace whatever HRM 
and HRM related discourses accomplish (or how they have become what they are) as 
far back in history and/or as far into metaphysics as we see a need to go. However, in 
our thesis we take much of the capitalist system, the competitive pressures on 
organizations as well as the more explicit behavior and perceptions of individuals as 
background conditions, i.e. as assumptions for the relevance of our HRM theory of 
organizational performance. 
                                               
53 Our position is basically the same as that described by Heiskala as "the endless complexity of [the] 
ontological description of [social] reality" and that the only conceivable way to go about this 
complexity is to try to justfy a minimization of it "in accordance with the limits set by the research 
task" (1997, p. 327). The complex dynamics of the objects of social scientific research, in addition to 
being due to the causal complexity of social processes at any specific point in time, is also due at least 
to one generally acknowledged dynamic fact: "people are self-interpreting beings who can learn from 
and change their interpretations so that they can act and respond in novel ways, thereby producing 
novel stimuli for subsequent actions" (Sayer, 1992, p. 234). 
54 This last claim is in itself fundamentally (also) both a contingent conceptual and a contingent 




Our interest in this particular study is based upon the judgement that in order to 
increase the substance in debates on the virtues and vices of HRM, we would at least 
need more agreement on how HRM, as it is practiced today, should be 
conceptualized. We also seem to need more empirical evidence of what such HRM 
accomplishes from the more manifest points of views of employees and organizations. 
Before we can agree on these questions, it is difficult to arrive at a fruitful 
conversation about what our attitude towards “HRM” should be. In this thesis we will 
pursue both of these questions. As already argued, these two inquiries can hardly “be 
conducted independently” (Rorty, 1991, p. 138). 
In this pursuit we will try to understand the language, mainly as used within the 
scientific community, in which beliefs about HRM are expressed. We will try to 
discuss and develop relevant, plausible and ethically legitimate inferential relations 
between sentences in this language. In line with the general norms presented here, we 
will try conceptually to justify a certain view of the more specific relevant 
epistemological/ontological landscape of a HRM theorization of organizational 
performance, one answer to the questions “What is strategic soft HRM and what are 
its potential consequences?”. The general (potential) justification or lack of (potential) 
justification for this interpretation of the language of HRM will be the combined 
degree of its utility or fruitfulness for organizations, employees and researchers. 
We will also interpret the language of HRM as a scientific language, i.e. a language 
where the lines of evidential force are (to be) dictated by the broad scientific values 
discussed above. We have already indicated problems involved in such an 
interpretation. We have e.g. mentioned the potentially limited scope of a HRM 
theorization of organizational performance. We will also later discuss many specific 
complications which makes its fruitfulness questionable.  
Although many researchers seem to interpret the language of HRM as a scientific 
language there are also different interpretations. “[HRM’s] purpose is to transform, to 
inspire, to motivate, and above all to create a new ‘reality’…To explain it is to destroy 
it” (Keenoy and Anthony, 1992, p. 238) and “[b]elief in HRM is not based upon 
deconstructing theory or looking for proof, but on faith” (Noon, 1992, p. 27). It may 
after all be that most of the management discourse has this purpose and logical 
structure of belief rather than any other (or that despite aspirations this is the “only” 
purpose/logic of belief it can have). Nevertheless, to the extent that empirical science 
has any job to do, it should not rest content with this state of affairs. HRM’s purpose 
may be to create a new reality. One task of empirical research is to try to specify and 
justify perspectives on such a reality and study the consequences of it from such a 
perspective. 
Thus, we will try to translate our interpretation/development of the language of HRM 
(what we are saying about HRM and HRM related phenomena) into a language of an 
empirical theory capable of quantitative empirical corroboration. To the extent that we 
in fact can find evidence for such a theorization in accordance with acceptable norms 
of justification we provide evidence as to the truth (justification, commendability) of 
what the theorization says or suggests. This would not be evidence as to a 
correspondence with an extra-theoretical reality but simply evidence as to the 




between (an operationalization of) the sentences in a particular theorization55. To the 
extent that the research community can agree on such an interpretation-development-
translation, and only to that extent, can we (as a research community) more seriously 
begin to empirically justify or problematize what we mean by what we more 
specifically say about HRM and its effects56.  
Thus our thesis, and mainstream empirical HRM research at large, is heavily up 
against at least two challenges: (1) agreeing upon an understanding/development of a 
language of HRM (its inferential relations), (2) the translation of such a language into 
an empirical theory allowing us to test and corroborate the truth of what is said in this 
language, i.e. whether the suggested linguistic interaction with an as specified 
environment as possible is successful judged by a set of epistemological norms. 
“[T]hese two inquiries cannot be conducted independently” (Rorty, 1991, p. 138). The 
latter challenge include the problems which the lacking development of operational 
constructs and the empirical complexity confront us with. None of these 
problems/challenges are, however, solvable by a priori philosophical analysis57.  
Nevertheless, research in the social sciences is inextricably involved in complex 
ethical-political-pragmatical questions. In social science the justification of any 
conceptualization of a research topic, and evidence related to it, is e.g. always 
particularly complicated due to the question of whose interests are relevant and 
legitimate and even what these ought to be. One manifestation of the open and 
complex problematic within the social sciences is the need for both conceptual as well 
as qualitative and quantitative empirical research. We will briefly return to the issue 
of methodology below. However, in the next chapter we will summarize our 
understanding of philosophy  
2.5 PHILOSOPHY 
From this short excursion into philosophy it is evident that at least we believe that 
what we or anyone else claim to be able to conclude from research is no “matter of 
fact” in the sense of correspondence to an extra-theoretical reality. At the same time 
we have argued that any a priori, universal epistemology or ontology is likely to be 
both problematical and unfruitful. 
“The great Western philosophers should be read as therapeutic rather than 
as constructive: as having told us what problems not to discuss: scholastic 
problems in the case of Descartes, Cartesian problems in the case of Kant, 
                                               
55 There is thus in our efforts no attempt “to coalesce the justificatory story and the causal story” 
(Rorty, 1991h, p. 148). 
56 Currently there is little agreement on inferential relations and truth conditions of sentences in the 
language of HRM. Thus, there is not yet even the possibility of much corroborated scientific empirical 
evidence as to the truth of what researchers claim about HRM and its consequences.  
57 Concerning our attempt to provide some empirical evidence for our conceptual arguments, we will 
also try to adhere to more specific norms of statistical justification. Also these are constantly debated. 
Organization science (including our study) seldom perfectly complies even with current recommended 
statistical norms (e.g. related to sampling, normal distributions of data, discriminant and convergent 




Kantian problems in the case of Hegel, and metaphysical problems 
(including those raised by Hegel’s attempt to prove that reality is 
intrinsically spiritual in character) in the cases of Nietzsche, James and 
Dewey” (Rorty, 1998, p. 6).  
One might add that late 20th century philosophers have contributed further to the 
therapeutic project of rejecting metaphysical/epistemological problems in terms of 
any essentialism across the board e.g. in the cases of Wittgenstein, Quine, Davidson, 
Rorty and at least partly Derrida. Although Rorty does not view this therapeutic task 
as the only task of philosophy he sees it as an important one.  
“To sluff off an obsolete terminology makes us more sensitive to the life 
about us, for it helps us to stop trying to cut new, recalcitrant material to fit 
old patterns” (ibid., p. 6).  
What therapeutic philosophy can do, from the perspective of a Rortyan pragmatist, is 
to suggest an understanding (a way of talking) in terms of the relations between very 
general (epistemic) statements which do not involve question beggings, aporias and 
self-referential paradoxes. 'Therapeutic philosophy' might also be understood as 
including the suggestion that the pursuit of transcendental, a priori universal, 
indubitable, apodictic arguments relevant for empirical science has, through the 
history of philosophical reflection, empirically been adequately shown to be 
unfruitful. ‘Empirically’ here refers to the history of western philosophy itself. This 
naturally does not mean that the history of western philosophy does not constitute 
interesting material for reflection (on the human condition) nor that future philosophy, 
whatever it will be like, may not do so. 
In fact, without pretending to know what is to become of philosophy, Rorty suggests 
another important task for something we could call philosophy, i.e. as a stakeholder in 
an edifying/imaginative discourse with no pretentions to know something about 
knowing or anything else that anybody else does not (1980, pp. 357-394). This would 
be philosophy as a partner in the conversation rather than as presenting apriori truths 
as foundations or anti-foundations which “legitimizes” critiques of the nature of 
empirical science from some ideal ontological/epistemological point of view. 
However, because of professionalization, esoterism, etc. such conversation will 
always be a challenge. 
In any case, there is in our interpretation of Rorty’s conception no justification for 
arguing for an “end of philosophy” in its entirety. In fact, we have all along made 
explicit that this, we think, is not the aim of Rorty’s writing. Thus, we would argue 
that e.g. Wallgren, in his critique of Rorty, is focusing on some rhetorical excesses of 
Rorty’s writing (1996, pp. 193-197). In fact, we think that Rorty would agree on most 
of what Wallgren himself says about “the promise, the burden and the challenge of 
transformative philosophy” (ibid., p. 191). At least, excluding the most excessive 
rhetorics in Rorty’s writing, we would claim that this transformative conception of 
philsophy, as at least one important notion of philosophy, is something he should 
agree with. As we have tried to show, pace Wallgren, Rorty should not and while 
keeping to his own standards and arguments, cannot claim that “all claims to absolute 
validity or universal significance are non-sensical” (Wallgren, 1996, p. 197). Where 
Rorty has done anything in this direction he has later regretted it and withdrawn from 
it (Rorty, 1998c, p. 45). There is however (perhaps) a crucial difference in attitude, or 




perhaps continues to invest more value in one of the arguably important beacons for 
philosophical reflection, i.e adherence to the “the ideal of discursive accountability” 
(Wallgren, 1996, p. 129). Thus for Wallgren (transformative) philosophical reflection 
concerns  
“our conceptual practices, ...how we live our lives with concepts...it is a 
personal quest, but it is a personal quest within the social context of lives 
with concepts...where we challenge ourselves and others” (ibid., p. 199).  
It is a difficult project. Within this perspective there may be an indefinite number of 
places where it can be arranged for “philosophy and social science [to] meet” (Burrell, 
1994, p. 15) but by suggestion there are no necessary structures, nor any necessary 
lack of structures, of either the world or human thought/language which philosophy 
can a priori lay bare.  
The purpose of all science is arguably to criticize old and advance new arguments in 
ways deemed utile in order to re-weave and re-contextualize our web of beliefs (habits 
of action) (Rorty, 1991b, p. 101). How we do this will in complicated ways depend on 
our judgements and interests. It is here that Habermas’ classification of research 
interests are relevant58. The three interests are, respectively, the technical, the 
practical and the emancipatory (Keat and Urry, 1982, p. 222-225 )59. The 
emancipatory interest is for Habermas closely related to (critical) self-reflection. In 
general  
“A critical discussion, regardless of whether it concerns the acceptance of 
proposals or propositions, includes a three fold use of langauage: the 
descriptive, in order to describe a state of affairs; the postulatory, in order 
to establish rules of procedure; and the critical, in order to justify such 
decisions. Logically these forms of speech mutually presuppose each 
other…[The latter involves] language trancendent approaches and attitudes 
in its discussion (Habermas, 1974, p. 216, cited in Keat and Urry, 1982, p. 
225). 
A Rortyan pragmatist does accept the critical use of language to involve discussion of 
attitudes but not language trancendent approaches. She/he would accept that it 
involves (philosophical) reflection, but not consider there to be any specifically 
philosophical solutions which are ontologically or epistemologically fundamental and 
prior to any solutions based upon broad ethical-political-pragmatical considerations in 
terms of the utility of different approaches60.  
                                               
58 Although the “knowledge constitutive interests” are not for Habermas necessarily related to actual 
intentions and motives of researchers (Keat and Urry, 1982, p. 223), they are nevertheless relevant for 
any piece of research. 
59 In Habermas’ terminology the technical and the practical interests constitute empirical-analytic and 
interpretative modes of knowing respectively. In section 2.7 we will present arguments suggesting that 
the distinction between empirical-analytic and interpretative “forms of knowledge” or methodologies 
are not very clearcut. 
60 As opposed to Habermas (see Keat and Urry, 1982, p. 222), for a Rortyan pragmatist there is only 
one form of knowledge, i.e. agreement upon what sentences to endorse. Thus, e.g. also the different 




Habermas claims that from Rorty’s thinking follows  
“that anomalies that start to arise...are not seen as the result of deficient 
solutions to problems and invalid answers...[T]he contextualist concept of 
language, laden as it is with Lebensphilosophie, is impervious to the very 
force of the counterfactual, which makes itself felt in the idealizing 
presuppositions of communicative action” (Habermas, 1987, p. 206).  
This does not seem to follow from Rorty’s suggestions. Of course, a Rortyan 
pragmatist would be impervious to the force of, i.e. not convinced by an argument for, 
metaphysical or apodictic deficiency, metaphysical or apodictic invalidity and 
metaphysical or apodictic counterfactuals. For Rorty, the goal of science is truth, but 
only to the extent of settling questions on which sentences we should endorse (1998b, 
pp. 19-42), including those proposed by Habermas. Such endorsement will be 
dependent on what a community or communities regard as deficient solutions or 
invalid (and/or unfruitful) answers. However, in Rorty’s view Habermas  
“is scratching where it does not itch... [and Rorty would with many others] 
doubt that studies of communicative competence can do what 
transcendental philosophy failed to do in the way of providing 
“universalistic” criteria” [of justification] (Rorty, 1991m, p. 167)61. 
For us, the point of Rorty’s writing, as for us is the point of Wallgren’s writing, is the 
suggestion, including the interesting justifications for this suggestion, that philosophy 
should not be viewed as capable to adjudicate between conflicting empirical claims in 
any priviledged sense nor to dictate legitimate ways to arrive at these claims by 
reference to some universal epistemology or ontology. On the suggested Rortyan view 
at least, we should reject the idea of an a priori universal conceptual scheme which 
gives apodictic or indubitable or necessary truths, or the necessary absense of such 
truths, a priori stating conditions of the nature and possibility of knowledge and 
communication. Philosophy is on this view only one (potentially important) partner in 
the conversation of mankind and not the authority. Thus, on this view, “the place 
where [epistemological/metaphysical] philosophy and social science meet” (Burrell, 
1994, p. 15) may not be very exciting or fruitful, and always runs the risk of being 
ornamentational. There is however always the potential for a “meeting” with sensere 
(philosophical) reflection, with no more priviledged justification than an engagement, 
always including an invitation to such engagement, with “how we live our lives with 
concepts” (Wallgren, 1996, p. 199). Perhaps such engagement is a duty. 
                                                                                                                                      
and "organicism" (ibid., pp. 761-770) can in the pragmatist perspective propounded in this thesis only 
be seen as different heuristic points of views on the pursuit of knowledge. The same goes for the 
distinction between "narrative knowledge" and "scientific knowledge" or the "logo-scientific mode of 
knowing" (Czarniawska, 1997, p. 12). 
61 For at least two other philosophers doubting this, see Wallgren (1996, p. 149). Rorty has nothing to 
say against the attempt to "point out present obstacles to ‘undistorted communication’” (Rorty, 1998g, 
p. 309) but these obstacles do not in his view include any "esoteric matters" (ibid., p. 309). Rather they 
include such things as "greed, fear, ignorance, and resentment" (ibid., p. 326) and regarding such 
matters one should perhaps "be more dubious about the social utility of philosophy than Habermas is" 




Our argument is thus not that we should not listen to and take arguments by 
philosophers seriously. Of course we should take seriously arguments by people who 
have thoroughly thought about different topics. We try to do this ourselves although 
here necessarily to a very limited extent. On the view we try to explicate, philosophy 
should however not serve as authoritative foundations for empirical social sciences, 
but rather on the suggested view merely as inspiration for alternative routes that 
empirical inquiry could take. The explicated view problematizes the idea that at the 
points where social science get messy or ethically problematic, it can turn to the help 
of philosophy for “solutions”. It can turn to philosophy for well argued normative 
reflections, questionings and suggestions. However, the most unfruitful way to turn to 
philosophy is arguably to use philosophical arguments as “rhetorical ornaments of 
[critiques of ] practice” (Rorty, 1998c, p. 64).  
In summary, what philosophy probably can do is to sensitize us (1998a, p.5) e.g. in 
the way of offering good reasons to  
“stop asking questions that were formulated in earlier times” (ibid., p. 6) 
[and/or by finding ways] “of integrating the worldviews and the moral 
intuitions we inherited from our ancestors with new scientific theories or 
new sociopolitical institutions and theories or other novelties” (ibid., p. 5).  
In short, on this view,  
“philosophy makes progress not by becoming more rigorous but by 
becoming more imaginative” (ibid., p. 8)62.  
Well argued imaginative philosophy might offer fruitful (and justified) inspiration and 
suggestions for studying certain empirical phenomena rather than other, formulating 
certain questions rather than other. For such arguments to have any relevance for 
empirical science, the task is to translate such imaginative philosophy into statements 
which can be meaningfully empirically pursued.  
Kirkeby suggests that we should engage in what he calls "radical phenomenology" 
(2000, p. 13) or a radically normative meta-discourse (philosophy) (ibid., p. 7). 
According to the view proposed in our thesis one has to be clear about the (normative) 
role of such philosophy. Kirkeby himself seems to diverge from the view explicated 
in this thesis already in the beginning of his book when discussing the relation 
between philosophy and management. In the first chapter he argues as if philosophy 
could (and even had) established conditions of possibility or impossibility of certain 
forms of knowledge and practice. His point of view thus still seems to bear traces of 
what we together with Rorty reject, i.e. philosophy as an adjudicator of "questiones 
juris" with reference to empirical science (see Rorty, 1980, p. 392). Although we can 
accept many of the "postulates" Kirkeby offers in this first chapter, one of the peculiar 
arguments Kirkeby presents is that (the experience of) contingency would leave us 
                                               
62 However, as already indicated, we agree with Wallgren that it should not only be imaginative. For 
example, Wallgren acknowledges certain merits with the understanding of "philosophy" proposed by 
Deleuze and Guattari. But Wallgren also at least implicitly criticizes them for their rejection of "not 
only argumentation, but also discussion and communication as means of philosophizing" (1996, p. 177) 
and the resulting "provocative arrogance and lack of differentiation" (ibid., p. 178). This implicit 




with the impossibility of "confidence in scientific explanation and prediction" (2000, 
p. 11) because of the impossibility of "the belief in History as an objective, 
autonomous media" (ibid., p. 11). On the view proposed in our thesis it is critical to 
distinguish between the problematical nature of social scientific explanations and their 
a priori and universal impossibility in terms of helping us cope with reality. 
In order for philosophy to be relevant for example with reference to research on 
HRM, it arguably has at least to engage with the (“dirty”) pragmatics of HRM, i.e. 
engage with the contingent and complex conditions in which the language game of 
HRM takes place. There is clearly no easy way out of HRM. As already noted, our 
standpoint (in this thesis) takes certain goals of the HRM practices for granted. 
In studying any form of human activity we would clearly benefit from a general and 
proper theory of human action or agency63. The absence of such a generally agreed 
upon and well specified theory reflects the complexity of all social science. Actions of 
human beings are arguably understandable more fully only as complex and (in any a 
priori/universal sense) indeterminate interactions between ‘systems’, ‘games’ and 
humans understood as ‘agents’ and as ‘actors’ (Hollis, 1994, pp. 248-260)64. As noted 
earlier, in this thesis we operate largely within the causal understanding of human 
action (the systems perspective in Hollis’ classification) without the assumption that 
“social structures are systems which are external and prior to actions and determine 
them fully” (ibid., p. 248). We might say that we suspend the judgement about 
whether (e.g.) any of the four ways of understanding human action is the “correct” 
one. In fact, we abandon the attempt to a priori settle the question as one “which 
might have proven to be of value but in fact did not (Rorty, 1998a, p. 45). In contrast, 
when discussing the complexity of the explanation/understanding of human action 
Hollis ends with a proposition which we, arguably with Rorty, see as unfruitful:  
“[T]he proper conclusion is that epistemology has to go the long way 
around, visiting arguments about the historical particularity of all ways of 
searching into and discovering truth but then returning with renewed 
determination to transcendental questions of how knowledge is possible” 
(ibid., p. 259).  
We argue that with reference to such places of fruitful meetings between philosophy 
and social science (Burrell, 1994, p. 15) we might just as well wait for Godot.  
In the next section we will, against the background offered above, try to understand 
the relevance of one of the most intensive recent philosophical debates in organization 
science. 
                                               
63 On this issue, see Willmott (1993, p. 695-701) who discuss it with reference to LPT (Labour Process 
Theory), an alternative to HRM theorizations of employee-employer exchanges. 
64 A potential alternative to all four of Hollis’ perspectives (not considered by Hollis himself) is a full 
causal story in terms of interactions between neural networks of human beings and the rest of the 
universe (Rorty, 1980, pp. 387-389). This alternative, however, seems out of the question in most cases 






The debate on incommensurability and paradigms has lately been one of the most 
intense in organizations science (Clegg and Hardy, 1996, pp. 5-8)65. We will try to 
understand what this debate in organization science is about, in what sense 
incommensurability is an urgent issue for HRM research, and in fact, whether and in 
what sense it has to be conceived as a serious problem for organization science at 
large. In one exemplified understanding the core of scientific and academic rational 
debate is in danger. In this understanding incommensurability has serious 
consequences for “all those who believe in the values of debate, argument and 
compromise” (Burrell, 1996, p. 650). Considering the intensity of the debate, it seems 
important to try to understand the grounds for such conclusions. These grounds seem 
somewhat obscure. Burrell argues that the  
“belief in incommensurability...has its origins in politics as well as in 
epistemology” (1996, p. 650). 
It is mainly the justification for establishing Burrell’s conclusions based on 
epistemology that we will take issue with. To begin with, Cannella and Paetzold argue 
that  
“organization science could be viewed as pre-paradigmatic, in the sense 
that no one, new paradigm has emerged as a dominant force” (1994, p. 
336).  
In one understanding, which can be seen as the “narrow understanding” (Hoyningen-
Huené, 1993, p. 142), which is also the sense in which Kuhn has mostly used the 
notion of paradigm since his book “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” (1962),  
“a paradigm is simply a scientific theory with an example of a successful 
and striking application” (Putnam, 1974/1991, p. 127)66.  
Although the question is open for debate, it is far from clear that organization science 
has produced any such paradigm(s). Further, social science may not only be seen as 
pre-paradigmatic, it may also be seen as such in the sense that it will, or even should 
never be anything else (Willmott, 1993, pp. 687-688). There are considerable 
difficulties in deciding whether social and organization science can be seen as 
“paradigmatic” even in the broader sense of “diciplinary matrices” (Hoyningen-
Huené, 1993, p. 142). It would require detailed studies of the extent to which 
scientific communities in organization science share symbolic generalizations, 
models, values and exemplary problem solutions in the sense Kuhn arguably 
understands (or understood these) (Hoyningen-Huené, 1993, pp. 145-162)67. 
                                               
65 Incommensurability has also been one of the most debated issues in philosophy of science. For a 
huge amount of references, see Hoyningen-Huené, 1993, p. 207. 
66 For further discussion on the understanding of paradigms in terms of exemplary problem solutions, 
see Hoyningen-Huené, 1993, pp. 132-140; 154-162. 
67 Hoyningen-Huené (1993, p. 143) notes that since 1969 Kuhn has not used the broader notion of 




At least against this background bold claims like “[n]o ‘solution’ will ever 
satisfactorily bridge the paradigms” (Clegg and Hardy, 1996, p. 8) seem to be 
completely question-begging. We might also argue that whether any authors in the 
debate on incommensurability “intended to use a [or some] Kuhnian version of 
‘paradigm’” (ibid., p. 8) or not seems beside the point. The important issue might be 
seen to turn not so much around paradigms as around the notion of 
incommensurability. Also this concept is however ambiguous and has undergone 
change in Kuhn’s thinking (Hoyningen-Huené, 1993, pp. 206-218). In fact, e.g. in 
1989 Ramberg still argued that “we do not have any clear theoretical conception of 
what incommensurability is” (1989, p. 115). 
According to Clegg and Hardy the debate on paradigms and incommensurability is 
best seen as a “jostling for academic space by individuals with very different values, 
assumptions and agendas in a metaphorical joust” (1996, p. 7). It is partly taking place 
“between the rebels” where 
“The issue is not one of epistemology..., it is one of politics. Those 
defending incommensurability believe it to be the best way to protect 
alternative approaches from the continuing onslaught of mainstream 
approaches...; while many of those who attack it believe it to be 
counterproductive in such a defence” (Clegg and Hardy, 1996, p. 6).  
In this characterization the debate thus seems to be reduced to politics. The question is 
whether protection from the “onslaught of mainstream approaches” can justifiably be 
achieved either in terms of a defence or rejection of incommensurability. 
Epistemically speaking, we will answer “no” on both questions. The notion of 
incommensurability might have been used in a strategic-political sense. The extent to 
which its use is based on obscure or unjustified grounds arguably has consequences 
for the success of the strategy, at least in the long run.  
Clegg and Hardy argue that the debate on incommensurability could largely be left 
behind because it is  
“in the struggle between different approaches that we learn..., and from the 
diversity and ambiguity of meaning; not through the recitation of a 
presumed uniformity, consensus, and utility, given a way that requires 
unquestioning acceptance” (ibid., p. 8).  
From the point of view of epistemological/ontological arguments that have been 
offered in the debate, this seems to beg the question with reference to claims that 
incommensurability makes meaningful (rational) communication between paradigms 
impossible. It begs the question with reference to arguments that incommensurability 
(in social science) has serious consequences for “all those who believe in the values of 
debate, argument and compromise” (Burrell, 1996, p. 650). 
In addition, in some opposition to Clegg and Hardy’s argument above concerning how 
we learn, Kuhn argues that  
“though the ability to recognize trouble when confronted with it is surely a 
requisite for scientific advance, trouble must not be too easily recognized. 
The scientist requires a throroughgoing commitment to the tradition with 
which, if he is fully successful, he will break. In part this commitment is 
demanded by the nature of the problems the scientist normally 




research. To doubt it is often to doubt that the complex technical puzzles 
which constitute normal research have any solutions at all”(Kuhn, 1991, p. 
145).  
In organization science almost any such commitment is not only faced with the 
problem of taking a theory seriously and trying to solve puzzles in terms of working 
out the consequences of it. Researchers are almost always also faced with the need 
and challenge to develop available incomplete theorizations. Nevertheless, it should 
interest researchers whether the choice of commitments should be seen as “irrational” 
and without even the possibility of more widely shared justification. Particular 
researcher’s initial choices between paradigms can most often probably be 
characterized as incorporating limited justification. However, the question is how we 
should react to Kuhn's argument that there are “both necessary and irreconcilable” 
differences (Kuhn, 191, p. 153)68 between paradigms in terms of  
“substantive differences...[related to] the population of the universe 
and...that population’s behavior...[as well as] methods, problem-field, and 
standards of solutions accepted by any mature scientific community at any 
given point in time” (ibid., p. 154). 
Differences are one issue. Incommensurabilities are another issue. Mature scientific 
communities and “both necessary and irreconcilable” differences are yet other issues. 
Despite acknowledging differences and even some incommensurabilities we shall try 
to explicate views according to which there is no good a priori epistemological reason 
to accept necessary and irreconcilable differences and thus to give up either the 
meaningfulness of or the need for communication between paradigms (or schools of 
thought). 
We defend a view according to which there is no a priori solution to the debate 
“through the use of sophisticated philosophical and linguistic discourse” (ibid., p. 5). 
Nor is it, we argue, epistemologically or metaphysically justified to maintain “a hard 
line on any bridge between the paradigms” (ibid., p. 5). Finally, neither is it possible 
to justify a definite defense of normal science opposing alternative approaches (ibid., 
p. 5). Our conclusion will be that the debate should take more concrete forms to the 
extent it continues. 
Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) matrix of paradigms, which has been at the center of 
many of the debates on incommensurability in organization science, involve two 
dimensions of potential meta-level incommensurability, one is more clearly 
metaphysical, the other is more clearly normative (Figure 1). We will begin to 
consider these meta-level aspects in the light of the Rortyan views presented above69.  
                                               
68 The ‘necessary’ and ‘irreconcilable’ here are merely definitional with reference to the notion of 
paradigms.  
69 Scherer and Steinmann (1999, p. 524) distinguish between a meta-meta-level (“paradigm wars”), a 
meta-level (pluralism of paradigms”), and a substantive level (“pluralism of theories”) of organization 
studies. We find that the debates about incommensurability are best understood as taking place either at 
a meta-level or a substantive level. “Paradigms wars” and “pluralism of paradigms” (a problem of 
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Figure 1: The four sociological paradigms (Burrel and Morgan, 1982, p. 29)
 
2.6.1 Meta-level incommensurability 
A potential metalevel incommensurability within organization science is related to the 
(metaphysical) subjectivism-objectivism dimension in Burrell and Morgan 
(1979/1982). Carter and Jackson argue that  
“to abandon incommensurability on the [subjectivism-objectivism] 
dimension means that researchers must simultaneously believe, e.g. that the 
world is objectively real (realist) and socially constructed (nominalist), that 
knowledge is both positivist and ‘anti-positivist’ in nature, that people are 
both determined and possessed of free will and that knowledge is gained 
from both measured law-like relationships (nomothetic) and from 
narratives of unique experience (idiographic)”. [They further argue that ] 
“to render these distinctions meaningless or insignificant requires that not 
just median positions but also extreme ones on the continuum must be 
reconciled or reconcilable” (1993, p. 723).  
Rorty argues exactly for rendering (theories incorporating) these distinctions, in a 
priori and universal forms, insignificant or unfruitful (but note, neither “meaningless” 
nor necessarily reconcilable). Weaver and Gioia refer to a more general list of 
“common divisions affecting organizational inquiry” (1994, p. 567). This list includes 
causation versus meaning; determinism versus voluntarism; object versus subject; 
                                                                                                                                      





structure versus agency; structural functionalism versus interpretation; and holism 
versus individualism. In Rorty’s perspective the relevance of these phenomena are 
simply up for debate with reference to the advantages for human purposes (utility), 
specific research questions and perceived familiarity (prior knowledge) with the 
phenomena in question. At the bottom on this dimension thus lies the possibility and 
need for a loosely hermeneutical debate based upon different attempts to understand 
organizational phenomena70.  
Kuhn argues that through paradigm shifts some problems become irrelevant to solve 
(Kuhn, 1991, pp. 154-156). In this sense, a Rortyan pragmatism could be understood 
as an attempt to suggest a paradigm shift with reference to a set of metaphysical 
problems which at a meta-level have been perceived to be essential to solve and 
which different earlier schools of thought have attempted to use as a priori, universal 
and exclusive categories. 
Regarding the (ideological) regulation-radical change dimension in Burrell and 
Morgan (1979), there are likely to be both differences and “incommensurabilities” 
with reference to basic moral attitudes. Most ideological “paradigms” would claim to 
strive for the most desirable kind of (societal) organization. It is clear that ‘desirable’ 
here means different things or refers to different phenomena. Incommensurabilities on 
this axis exist between two or more primarily politically/ideologically influenced 
paradigms (not two or more clearly mensurable paradigms as in some cases in natural 
science) reflecting desired means and goals. They incorporate different assumptions 
about what is just, or best e.g. for mankind or the ecosystem. None of these 
“paradigms” rests on empirically well corroborated knowledge as to their general long 
run advantage for any identified constituences. Further, there are hardly any generally 
and widely  accepted justifications for well specified explanatory mechanisms related 
to desired outcomes identified within any paradigms even concerning regulation, not 
to mention radical change. Only more or less unjustified beliefs in the outcomes of 
certain ways of organizing and the adequacy or fruitfulness of related explanatory 
frameworks thus prevail even within any of the paradigms71. Only in a very loose way 
which would need considerable elaboration do different views on these matters turn 
on shared and accepted symbolic generalizations, models, and exemplary problem 
solutions (Hoyningen-Huené, 1993, pp.132-162). Within any "paradigm" in the social 
sciences, including organization science, many of these elements tend to involve 
severe problems acknowledged within the paradigms. There is thus a fair way to go 
even before there is any reason to start to discuss incommensurabilities other than at 
the level of general values. “Incommensurability” at this axis thus largely exists at the 
level of “proponent’s attitudes” (Weaver and Gioia, 1994, p. 571). But calling them 
incommensurable with the conclusion that there is no room for meaningful debate, 
seems to confuse the issues. On such matters as regulation versus (radical) change, i.e. 
general values and attitudes, there is the potential for agreement to the degree that 
there is fruitful dialogue (Weaver and Gioia, 1994, p. 571; Willmott, 1993, pp. 668-
                                               
70 Somewhat analogous conclusions are argued for by Weaver and Gioia with the help of structuration 
theory (1994, pp. 582 –584). 
71 Someone might say that the question does not concern outcomes. But then one harks back to a 




669). The (un)fruitfulness of this dialogue is partly dependent on the complexity of 
the general issues of societal organization and our lack of knowledge about the 
consequences of alternative solutions. But there seem to be few attractive alternatives 
to continued inter-paradigmatic debate on this dimension of "paradigms". 
Within the general epistemological and ontological understanding the contours of 
which have been drawn above, organizational researchers may thus (fruitfully) 
disagree (normatively) as to the most important kind of explanations, methods, and 
standards of solutions with reference to any specific phenomenon. They may thus 
disagree as to the ultimate purposefulness of different processes and explanations and 
there seem to be no a priori way of settling disputes on these issues. But there is 
nothing in principle which hinders a hermeneutical discourse between paradigms. 
Arguably nothing more or less follows from incommensurability at this metalevel.  
As already indicated there are however potential incommensurabilities on other 
dimensions than the ones at this meta-level. Excluding philosophical ornamentations 
and complex normative assumptions, we may confront the problem of 
incommensurability at the level of substantive theory. We will consider some such 
potential incommensurabilities in organization science and what our attitude towards 
them could be. Ultimately, we will argue that the “problem” of incommensurability at 
this substantive level in current organization science is not yet even an issue. 
However, before turning to the question of theoretical level incommensurabilities in 
organization science, we will consider the notion of incommensurability in some more 
detail. 
2.6.2 What is incommensurability after all? 
McKinley and Mone define  
“incommensurability as occuring when there are logically or normatively 
incompatible schools of thought” (1998, p. 170).  
There would be logical inconsistency only to the extent that theories would claim to 
completely explain their subject matter and that this subject matter would be identical. 
This way of fixing the problem seem however to involve a questionable 
understanding of the problem of incommensurability72. Even the difference between 
Newtonian assertions that “Mass is invariant” and Einsteinian assertions that “Mass is 
not invariant” does not necessarily entail logical contradictions (Weaver and Gioia, 
1994, p. 571). Another questionable use of the concept of incommensurability seems 
to be with reference to the general fragmentation of organization science (Scherer, 
1998, p. 153). As long as theories and paradigms deal with distinguishable 
phenomena there is not really a problem of incommensurability.  
In the classical example of Newton versus Einstein, the term ‘mass’ arguably means 
different things in Newton’s and Einstein’s theories73. Any apparent “logical 
                                               
72 Weaver and Gioia also criticize Burrells claim that “different paradigms should be counted 
contradictory” (1994, p. 571).  
73 Examples of successive relatively mature incommensurable paradigms and theories often come 




contradiction” could be removed by naming the two concepts differently. The 
problem is that there seem to be no unproblematic way in which we can say that (1) 
Newton’s theory’s claim that “mass is invariant” is false (and contradictory to 
Einstein’s claim that “mass is not invariant”). Rather we seem forced to say that (2) 
Newton’s theory’s claim that “mass is invariant” is true from the perspective of 
Newtonian theory, but we do not, from the perspective of Einstein’s theory, think 
there fundamentally are any such entities. 
The incommensurability is due to the fact that we cannot unambiguously say that 
Einstein’s theory explained false propositions entailed by Newton’s theory. In 
believing in Einstein’s theory we have simply changed our conception of “what there 
is in heaven and earth”. There is no neutral language in which to compare the theories 
strictly. Neither is Newton’s theory reducible to Einstein’s theory without changing 
the former (Kuhn, 1991, p. 153). This is one concrete example of the problem of 
incommensurability at the level of substantive competing theories. This is the subtle 
problem of not being able to maintain an understanding of science as making 
unambiguous cumulative progress in terms of increasing our knowledge of the 
universe while explaining the falsities of earlier or competing theories by substituting 
better explanations of the same phenomena. 
The whole point of the incommensurability thesis seem to be that the differences 
between theories are not simply logical contradictions. If there were (only) logical 
contradictions, we could still try to pursue logical analysis and empirical tests to judge 
which theory is more adequate. “Incommensurability entails irreducibility but not 
incompatibility” (Rorty, 1980, p. 388) where incompatibility refers to logical 
inconsistency (Bernstein, 1991, p. 125-126). Although incommensurability does not 
entail incompatibility, incommensurable theories can nevertheless arguably involve 
incompatibilities (Hoyningen-Huené, 1993, p. 219). Incommensurability becomes a 
problem when two or more theories offer different irreducible (mutually redundant) 
explanations of an empirically indistinguishable phenomenon, or of "roughly the same 
object domain" (Hoyningen-Huené, 1993, p. 219). The problem of 
incommensurability is  
“the problem of how to compare competing or successive theories. Very 
roughly the old philosophy of science suggests that we do so by making 
logical or evidential comparisons in a vocabulary shared by both theories. 
The new philosophy of science contends that although there may be terms 
shared by different theories, the concepts marked by these terms (in 
important and typical cases) will have changed so radically in the move 
from one theory to another as to preclude the use of ordinary logical or 
evidential tools” (Fine, 1975, p. 18).  
An example of such changes of concepts with reference to shared terms in the social 
sciences would arguably be Parsonian and Marxist definitions of ‘structure’ (Weaver 
and Gioia, 1994, p. 317)74. The problem of the insufficiency of “ordinary logical or 
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are also examples from other fields, such as chemistry (Fine, 1975, pp. 20-24). 
74 However, less than a problem of incommensurability, the problem with concepts in the social 




evidential tools” can also arise where two competing theories use more or less 
completely different terms related to empirically indistinguishable phenomena, e.g. 
Aristoteteles talk about natural downward motion and our Newtonian talk about 
gravitation.  
“Was Aristoteles wrong about motion being divided into natural and 
forced? Or was he talking about something different from what we talk 
about when we talk about motion? Did Newton give right answers to 
questions which Aristoteles had given wrong answers? Or were they 
asking different questions?...Why, after all, should we think that there is a 
more interesting answer to these questions than to the question of whether 
the ship of Theseus endured the change of each of its planks? Why should 
we think the that the question “What did they mean?” or “What were they 
referring to?”is going to have a determinate answer? Why should it not be 
answerable in either way, depending on what heuristic considerations are 
relevant to some particular historiographical purpose. The reason we think 
that there should be determinate answers here is...that we think that the 
history of the pursuit of truth should [in a specific objective truth 
functional sense] be different from the history of poetry or politics or 
clothes. (Rorty, 1980, p. 267-268). 
One way to understand the debate about incommensurability is to understand it by 
way of some subtle philosophical arguments mainly in philosophy of language. One 
could argue that what has given fire to the issue of incommensurability are two issues 
in philosophy of language, namely Quine’s critique of the “two dogmas of 
empiricism” (Quine, 1951)75. Because it seems important for understanding the 
rhetorical slants which the debate on incommensurability has taken e.g. in 
organization science, we cite the following lengthy passage from Rorty. 
“The first dogma enshrined what Quine called “essentialism” – the notion 
that one could distinguish between what people were talking about and 
what they were saying about it by discovering the essence of the object 
being discussed. In its linguistic form, this was the doctrine that one could 
discover which term in our language translated a term in that of the ancient 
[or competing] scientists, and then discover the essence of the referent of 
both terms by distinguishing between the analytic statements which told 
one the term’s [universally and a priori true] meaning and the synthetic 
statements which expressed possibly false beliefs about this referent. The 
second dogma held that such translation could always be found, and that 
such analytic statements could always be formulated, because to determine 
the meaning of any referring expression one need only discover which 
reports in a “neutral observation language” would confirm, and which 
would disconfirm, a statement asserting the existence of the referent in 
question. [The critique of these dogmas questioned] the conviction that 
science differed from softer discourse in having “objective reference” to 
things “out there”... – the ability to use contact with the real as the 
touchstone of truth. The horror which greeted Quine’s overthrow of the 
dogmas, and Kuhn’s and Feyerabend’s examples of the “theory ladenness” 
of observation, was a result of the fear that there might be no such 
touchstone. For if we once admitted that Newton was better than Aristotle 
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not because his words better corresponded to reality but simply because 
Newton made us better able to cope, [it was felt that] there would be 
nothing to distinguish science from religion or politics”(Rorty, 1980, p. 
268-269). 
In other words, the “problem” with incommensurability has thus fundamentally been 
conceived as that  
“if we grant the philosopher-historians their point about radical conceptual 
change [or simply radical conceptual differences], then the process of 
scientific development seems to degenerate into a series of puns, into 
arguments all committing fallacies of ambiguity and into choices none of 
which are rationally founded” (Fine, 1975, p. 18). 
However, going from the negative arguments related to some received understandings 
about how philosophy of language could help us out with epistemological problems to 
conclusions about the impossibility of meaningful debate and the whole idea of 
rational academic debate (Burrell, 1996, p. 650) still seems but a rhetorical manouver.  
Also Fine describes the problem of incommensurability as largely a problem 
depending on how we understand the meaning and/or reference of terms76. However, 
Fine discusses some theories of meaning and reference and argues that no attempts, 
based upon these theories, to argue for an unbridgable incommensurability nor 
attempts to argue for the inexistence of any such incommensurability problem are 
satisfactory. 
In line with Rorty (above), Fine suggests that we accept certain cases as 
incommensurable in the sense of  
“genuine cases of indeterminacy with regard to sameness or difference of 
reference (1975, pp. 27-28)...[because] in the situations of interest, 
whenever a case can be made for sameness of reference, an equally good 
case can be made for difference of reference” (ibid., p. 27, italics added). 
However, Fine also suggests that  
“[t]o compare theories, let us suppose that the worlds of the theories 
overlap in such a way that there is a correlation between the terms of the 
theories that makes correlated terms co-referential in each world of the 
region of overlap” (ibid., p. 28). [He acknowledges that] my general 
prescription for how to relate theories contains the supposition of 
overlapping worlds with co-referential correlation of terms. If this 
supposition fails, then we cannot compare theories at all” (ibid., p. 30)77.  
                                               
76 For an interpretation of the movement towards this understanding of the problem of 
incommensurability in Kuhn's writings, see Hoyningen-Huené, 1993, pp. 206-218. In a foreword to this 
book, Hoyningen-Huené's interpretation of Kuhn's thinking is warmly recommended by Kuhn himself. 
77 We can ignore Fine’s apparent (at the time this article of his was written) realist assumptions (ibid., 
p. 29). Nothing seems to hang on them. For further elaboration on the possibilities of comparison of 
incommensurable theories, see Hoyningen-Huené (1993, pp. 218-222) and the discussion in Ramberg 




However, in the latter cases with no understanding of co-referential correlation of 
terms, there may be no real urge at the theoretical level to compare theories in order 
to make a decision as to the adequacy of one or the other of them. In any case,  
“[p]roducing commensurability by finding material equivalences between 
sentences drawn from different language-games is only one technique 
among others for coping with our fellow humans. When it does not work, 
we fall back on whatever does work – for example getting the hang of a 
new language-game, and possibly forgetting our old one. This is the same 
technique we use when non-human nature shows itself recalcitrant to being 
predicted in the vocabulary of traditional science” (Rorty, 1980, p. 356). 
In social science we are most often faced with the question of “getting the hang of” 
different developing language-games. The “problem of incommensurability” in social 
science is most often the problem of what broad language games we should employ. 
These are complex ethical-political-pragmatical questions. As already argued, on 
these matters there can only be the hope for potential agreement to the extent that 
there is fruitful dialogue. There is no panacea and there likewise seems to be nothing 
interesting to provide as justification for the impossibility of meaningful rational 
dialogue concerning such issues. It is only if we restrict rational to 'logically deducible 
to a decisive neutral observation language" that we are faced with such an 
impossibility. Arguably we should resist such an understanding of rationality. 
"Kuhn...(and others) have not shown that science is irrational, but rather 
that something is fundamentally wrong with the idea that 
commensurability is the essence of scientific rationality (Bernstein, 1983, 
p. 86, cited in Ramberg, 1989, p. 126). 
Rorty describes the issue of incommensurability in analaguous but somewhat more 
general terms compared to those of Fine. By ‘commensurable’ Rorty means  
“able to be brought under a set of rules which will tell us how rational 
agreement can be reached on what would settle the issue on every point 
where statements seem to conflict...Note that this sense of 
“commensurable” is not the same as “assigning the same meaning to 
terms”. This sense – which is the one often used in discussing Kuhn – does 
not seem to me a useful one, given the fragility of the notion “sameness of 
meaning”. To say that parties to a controversy “use terms in different 
ways” seems to me an unenlightening way of describing the fact that they 
cannot find a way of agreeing on what would settle the issue” (Rorty, 
1980, p. 316)78. 
Incommensurability in this sense is surely common but it does not mean that we have 
to exclude the possibility of meaningful or even rational communication on such 
issues. The particular goal of this description of the problem is that incommensurable 
for Rorty is not to be understood as the same thing as untranslatable (ibid., p. 302). 
The distinction is important for Rorty because he accepts Davidson’s argument that 
we cannot really give any sense to the very idea of an alternative exclusive but 
untranslatable conceptual scheme (Davidson, 1984?).  
                                               




In arguing for and explicating the problem of incommensurability Kuhn seems in his 
later writings to have had an explicit local, narrow, technical notion of translation (and 
intranslatability) in mind (Hoyningen-Huené, 1993, pp. 215-218). This notion of 
incommensurability and Davidson’s argument (above) do not represent incompatible 
points of views.  
First, for a crucial distinction between two notions of translation, that of a narrow 
technical and that of a more ordinary notion involving an interpretative moment, see 
Hoyningen-Huené (1993, p. 215-216)79. In the narrow sense of translation there is 
arguably often an impossibility of translation. However, such impossibility already 
hits the idea of scientific rationality as commensuration, i.e. of employing essentially 
only a logical apparatus and a neutral observation language in evaluations of theories.  
Second, Davidson’s notion of translation employing the principle of charity is not to 
be confounded with either of the above notions of translation. Davidson’s notion of 
translation is rather to be understood as “a condition of possibility of translation” 
(Ramberg, 1989, p. 74). Davidson employs the principle of charity, much debated in 
philosophy of language, and it is based upon the claim that because in interpreting a 
use of language we cannot strictly “infer the belief without knowing the meaning [of a 
sentence] and have no chance of inferring the meaning without the belief” (Davidson, 
1974, p. 142, cited in Evnine, 1991, p. 102). Davidson’s notion of radical 
interpretation including the principle of charity is intended to solve this problem of 
interdependency. The principle of charity incorporates the idea that “in radical 
interpretation we must assume that the objects of interpretation, by and large, believe 
what we think is true [or obvious] (Evnine, 1991, p. 103). On Davidsons view 
interpretative translation is not something which makes science irrational or 
communication impossible. In fact, quite the opposite, interpretative translation is 
what makes communication possible.  
Davidson’s and Rorty’s perspective would also seem to entail that we cannot really 
give any sense to the very idea of uncomparable mutually exclusive alternative 
theories. This is congruent with what Hoyningen-Huené says about the comparison of 
incommensurable theories (1993, pp. 218-222). There may however be no 
unambiguous way to compare/translate theories where they seem to conflict. 
Translation in the ordinary interpretative sense 
“requires compromises…in addition to changes in the target language, 
whether by addition of new concepts or by the more subtle alteration of 
previously available concepts for purposes of translation (Hoyningen-
Huené, 1993, p. 216). 
But such problems would not seem to be uncommon even with reference to agreeing 
on adequate theory-construction within any paradigm.  
The above discussion could be summarized by Ramberg's argumentation:  
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“[w]e rely on conventions to understand and make ourselves understood. 
Incommensurability, as a communication breakdown, can be understood as 
a breakdown of linguistic conventions, caused by changes [or differences] 
in use that are too abrupt to be absorbed smoothly, or changes [or 
differences] that a particular set of conventions are too rigid to 
accommodate. Semantically, then, incommensurability is a disruption in 
the ongoing interpretation-through-application of our linguistic 
conventions…we do not have to construe this breakdown of conventions as 
implying intranslatability…Incommensurability in discourse leaves us in a 
situation where we can no longer rely on our language, the set of 
conventions whereby we normally effect understanding, to secure 
linguistic communication. But this does not imply that communication is 
not possible, only that interpretation, rather than reliance on convention, is 
required to a greater degree than is usual...Incommensurability in discourse 
can only begin to occur once we think we have began to agree on linguistic 
convention, but in actuality remain confused as to what language we are 
[or should be] using (Ramberg, 1989, pp. 130-132). 
Whether we want to understand incommensurability as semantical problems or more 
broadly as problems related to rules of procedures seems somewhat mute. Rorty's way 
of putting the problem of incommensurability, i.e. in terms of ways " of agreeing on 
what would settle the issue", is congruent with his understanding of the limited 
domain of purely semantical theories. In any case, translation and interpretation has to 
focus not only upon theoretical terms but also upon criteria for evaluating claims to 
knowledge and other standards of research and worldviews, including those described 
by Kuhn as characterizing paradigms. 
"[J]ust as the principle of charity has no implications about the similarities 
or dissimilarities of respective world views, so the ineliminable possibility 
of translation is no guarantee that we share criteria of truth or have a 
common core of empirical knowledge or that our languages enable us to 
refer to some fundamental common set of referents...The point can be put 
thus: while there is nothing that can be said in one language that must 
remain ineffable [or intranslatable] in another, this is neither because of a 
happy conjunction of the sorts of things we say, nor because of a putative 
necessary similarity of logical structure between all possible languages. It 
is only because of what it is [on Davidson's view] to say something" 
(Ramberg, 1989, pp. 124-125). 
We may thus disagree on how to and there is arguably no unambiguous objective way 
either to translate or to compare theories where they seem to conflict. This is the non-
removable consequence of the problem of incommensurability. These consequences 
are devastating with reference to communication, rationality and science only if we 
view the latter phenomena as completely dependent on translation in the "narrow 
technical sense" (Hoyningen-Huené, 1993, p. 216).  
Before any interesting cases of incommensurability at the level of substantive theory 
even arise we would need to have theories which in mutually redundant ways explain 
"roughly the same object domain" (Hoyningen-Huené, 1993, p. 219). We would have 
to able to form an understanding of the theories such that "the worlds of the theories 
overlap in such a way that there is a correlation between the terms of the theories that 
makes correlated terms co-referential in each world of the region of overlap” (Fine, 
1975, p. 28). Such correlations may be only partially possible to establish 




"must have a holistic character...[b]ut the fact that such holistic comparison 
is difficult and, in some situations in theory development, without 
unequivocal result, surely doesn't entail that it's impossible...or that the 
completion of a theory choice always occurs with the help of 
propagandistic means and isn't swayed by the merits of argument" (ibid., p. 
221).  
With this understanding of the context and nature of incommensurability at the level 
of substantive theory we now turn to reflections on the existence of such problems in 
organization science. 
2.6.3 Theoretical level incommensurability in organization science 
Theories may contain universal statements which would make them conflict with 
other theories which also may contain universal statements. But universal statements 
about relationships between phenomena only constitute one aspect of (certain) 
theories. Another aspect is their explanatory power. In organization science we seem 
to be far from clear on any theory’s actual explanatory power. In particular we seem 
to have good reason to believe that no theory proposed in organization science has 
explained its subject matter to one hundred percent. In fact, we will argue that strictly 
speaking we do not (yet) have any cases of interest where we would have to try to 
compare any two theories and try to make a choice as to the adequcy of one or the 
other of them. We are however always faced with the problem of which theory or 
theories we should view ourselves as morally compelled to pursue. But apart from the 
fact that ethical choices cannot be brought under any given algorithm determining the 
correct choice, we will thus argue that there seem not (yet) to be any problem at all in 
organization science of theoretical level incommensurability. 
McKinley and Mone only discuss more or less “mainstream” theories such as 
population ecology, neo-institutional, transaction costs, agency, structural contingency 
and resource dependence theory. They claim that  
“[m]any of the propositions put forward by these different schools are 
logically inconsistent” (1998, p. 170).  
At a superficial level this may be so. Nevertheless, we would argue that there is no 
interesting logical contradiction involved here and their examples (ibid., pp. 173-174) 
do not imply that there is.  
The above organizational theories seem to be empirical theories suggesting some but 
not complete explanatory power, each in their own way, in relation to relatively 
unspecified phenomena. Before there would seem to be any interesting and 
problematical question of either incompatibility and/or incommensurability we should 
try to determine the factual relative explanatory power of these theories where they 
(under some interpretation) seem to explain empirically indistinguishable phenomena 
in contradictory ways. Such tests should be done in the same contexts on the basis of 
temporally and spatially more or less equivalent data as far as possible using 
“controlling” explanatory variables from the potentially incommensurable alternative 
theories.   
As McKinley and Mone acknowledge, the primary problem lies in the specificity of 




theoretical and specifically construct ambiguity (ibid., p. 175). This seems to imply 
that it is difficult to seriously begin to discuss whether the theories are incompatible 
and  “necessarily and irreconcilably” different and thus whether there is a problem of 
incommensurability. In other words, in organization science the important issue does 
not yet seem to be the problem of having no ways of bringing problems about the 
relation between different theories “under a set of rules which will tell us how rational 
agreement can be reached on what would settle the issue on every point where 
statements seem to conflict” (Rorty, 1980, p. 316). We simply do not yet seem to have 
examples of well specified theories (not to mention wider agreement on empirical 
evidence for such theories) argued to offer mutually redundant explanations of 
"roughly the same object domains" under any interesting and largely agreed upon 
descriptions. Thus, the most urgent issues seem to relate to the achievement of 
(temporary) agreement concerning empirical evidence for any more specific and 
unambiguous theory even within any school of thought/paradigm. 
McKinley and Mone’s suggestion for solving the state of affairs in terms of 
theoretical (construct) ambiguity is less convincing than their acknowledgement of the 
problem. They talk about a “democratic creation of a construct dictionnary” (1998, p. 
176). They end up by suggesting a parallell to the financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB)  
“charged with specifying the standards that underlie generally accepted 
practice” (ibid., p. 178).  
The problem would seem to be that construct specifications, standardizations and 
operationalizations are dependent on theory. We can hardly foresee a “board” 
developing or deciding upon all the theories in organization science. When McKinley 
and Mone envision “a theory neutral observation language” (ibid., p. 180), they seem 
to hark back some years in the history of thinking of knowledge. Nevertheless, it is 
evident that organization science would be in need of developing constructs and 
operationalizations together with theory. The loosely defined theories and constructs 
may not take the field very far but “often play to the career ambitions of individual 
scholars” (ibid., p. 178). Astley and Zammuto argued that  
“[a]mbiguous constructs expand the variety of operationalizations that may 
be included within the theory’s encompassing frame of reference and so 
increase the number of research studies that can be constructed as tests of 
the theory ... The extent to which the theory can be used as a point of 
departure in the work of others is a crucial determinant of its impact within 
the field ... At the same time ... linguistic ambiguity ... also reduces the 
chances that [empirical] tests can amount to a refutation of the theory” 
(1992, p. 446). 
Thus, the serious problem seems to be the very issue of theory construction. For an 
example of how far away from specified coherent theories we are, see the discussion 
on institutionalization theory in Tolbert and Zucker (1996, pp. 173-190). A second 
example is the discussion on the resource-based view (Priem and Butler, 2001a; 
Barney, 2001; Priem and Butler, 2001b) and, indeed our own discussion of the 
resource-based view in this thesis80. Other examples of discussions concerning 
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(potentially solvable) internal logical problems of theories in organization science are 
(Bruggeman, 1997; Peli and Masuch, 1997; Masuch and Huang, 1996).  
With reference to the many problems of organizational theories and organizational 
research the line mentioned by March and Sutton between those are  
“more concerned with attention to standards of research and 
inference...[and those] who tell stories about the things that affect 
organizational performance…[and who are] ordinarily quite disconnected 
from serious research on organizations” (1997, p. 703)  
is indeed not all that clear. Research on HRM is involved in this problematic deep 
down to its neck regarding both theory development as well as the development of 
constructs and operationalizations of independent, dependent and control variables.  
2.6.4 Summary of discussion on incommensurability 
The whole debate on incommensurability in organizational science seems to be a case 
of wrongly adopting a certain discussion which (may) have been more upsetting for 
the natural sciences than for anything else. It just never seems to have been a (serious) 
issue for the social sciences in general whether there exists an algorithm or a neutral 
observation language which could decide between well functioning mutually 
redundant competing theories postulating different entities between heaven and earth. 
In fact, one might argue that it has really only been an issue among traditional 
philosophers of science and thus not even within the natural sciences per se81. 
However, there has always been many different schools of thought in the social 
sciences, and more all the time. What seems to have happened is that scholars have 
simply translated the term ‘different’ into ‘a problem of incommensurability’ and 
drawn the conclusion that in cases of difference there is no room for rational debate. 
This seems absurd, to say the least.  
According to Rorty Kuhn only said that  
“reflection of [theories, methods, standards etc] into meta-discourse 
[evaluating theories from different paradigms] makes it harder to resolve 
controversies about paradigm shifts than it is to resolve controversies 
within normal science...Kuhn says that the criteria of choice between 
theories (even within normal science, where hermeneutic problems may 
not yet arise) ‘function not as rules, which determine choice, but as values, 
which influence it’...The only real issue which separates Kuhn from his 
                                                                                                                                      
testability and falsifiability of a theory is related to the extent of specification of operationalizations. To 
the extent that the latter are not specified, it allows room for endless ad hoc changes in "the theory". 
The prevalent lack of operational definitions concerning elements of  organizational theories, we argue, 
is one of the greatest problems of organization science as a science. 
81 Natural scientists usually choose and develop theories which best allow them to do something, 
which makes them (and by suggestion others) better able to cope with some part of reality. Usually 
they do not worry too much about commensurability but rather arguably go about it much in the way 




critics is whether...we can find a range of specifically scientific values 
which should affect such choice” Rorty, 1980, p. 327)82. 
We have already (above) discussed Rorty's understanding of the general nature of 
these values/rules. We should not expect, at least on Rorty’s suggestion, that there 
would be anything apriori and in principle which makes decisions on these values, 
norms and rules absolutely different from political decisions. However, this does not 
necessarily make any “deliberative” processes about such values and thus ultimately 
about choices between different theories “irrational”. 
The irony is that serious consequences of incommensurability are put forward also by 
organizational scholars who oppose the (logical) positivist ideals, including the idea 
of a neutral observation language or some kind of algoritm for making theory choices. 
In order to talk meaningfully and interestingly about commensurability or (in 
particular about a problematical) incommensurability we would in the background 
have to have the importance of some notion of a neutral observation language and a 
logical reducibility of all competing theories to one another.  
For the social sciences the upshot of our discussion would seem to be that we have to 
admit relative unfamiliarity with our objects of research as a whole when theories are 
stripped of (often rhetorical) unnatural attitudes (Fine, 1984), i.e. their connections to 
universal a priori epistemologies, ontologies and methodologies. When such 
"diciplinary frameworks" are stripped away, it is somewhat unclear just how much 
norms of justification vary between different schools of thought. The debate on 
incommensurability would gain considerable momentum to the extent that someone 
could identify an interesting concrete example of substantive theoretical level 
incommensurability in the social sciences. Less than facing any devastating 
“problem” of incommensurability in the social sciences, we argue, researchers seem 
only to have lots of work to do, combining different conceptualizations and 
methodologies in ways deemed justifiable in order to build, test and criticize theories 
and hypotheses.  
However, to adhere to a multiparadigm or pluralist strategy, on the other hand, can be 
simply naive. Sherer and Steinmann argue that  
“[a] multiparadigm or pluralist strategy...[also has] serious questions yet to 
be resolved...[M]ultiparadigm adherents...confuse a mere pluralism of 
different perspectives, where...co-existence is sometimes reasonable, with 
a situation of serious conflict, where...co-existence is not 
possible...incommensurability is a situation of conflict between different 
value positions” (ibid., p. 523)83.  
                                               
82 Kuhn’s equivocal exagerations that people from different paradigms “live in different worlds” can 
arguably be left to their own worth as unfortunate “incidental remarks” (Rorty, 1980, p. 324-325). 
83 Again, these authors should arguably have said that incommensurability is a situation of logically 
and evidentially irreconcilable difference because of the lack of a given shared vocabulary or given 
shared rules of procedure, rather than necessarily a situation of “serious conflict” or impossible co-
existence. As outlined above we do however agree that “serious conflicts” most often are due to 




We agree with the unresolved issues of a pluralist epistemic strategy. However, in 
principle our position is close to the irreductionist/pluralist position. The difference is 
that we would not make such a strong a priori claim about the world of organizations 
as irreductionists do if they would really argue that any roughly same object domain 
of “the world of organizations cannot in principle be captured by a single perspective” 
(Kaghan and Phillips, 1998, p. 205). If we only stick to the claim in the citation, it 
seems to be trivial, i.e. the explanation of different processes and outcomes in 
organizations require different theories/explanations. We do however agree with the 
standpoint that  
"[t]hough irreductionists have no final solution for paradigmatic pluralism 
in organization studies...they do have a recommendation for how 
researchers can behave in the face of paradigmatic pluralism...[it is that] 
tolerance, respect and constructive debate are encountered” (ibid., p. 205).  
Rorty’s hermeneutics amounts to the same attitude. 
“For epistemology, to be rational is to find the proper set of terms into 
which all the contributions should be translated if agreement is to become 
possible...For hermeneuticists to be rational is to be willing to...pick up the 
jargon of the interlocutor rather than [immediately] translating it into ones 
own[84]...Hermeneutics sees the relations between various discourses as 
those of strands in a possible conversation, a conversation which 
presupposes no diciplinary matrix which unites the speakers, but where 
hope of agreement is never lost so long as the conversation lasts. This hope 
is not a hope for the discovery of antecendently existing common ground, 
but simply hope for agreement, or, at least, exiting and fruitful 
disagreement...” (Rorty, 1980, p. 318). 
If and where a hermeneutical attitude does not lead us further, in the last instance 
Rorty appeals to the “priority of democracy to philosophy” (Rorty, 1991j). On the one 
hand, in our understanding of Rorty’s view, the problem of incommensurability seems 
to be related to an unnecessary and implausible dream about commensurability85. On 
the other hand, the dream about incommensurability, “ensuring” the impossibility of 
meaningful communication between paradigms, is simply an unfruitful and 
unjustified attitude. Here Burrell might disagree, but he would have to further justify 
any semantical, epistemological or ontological reasons in his defence. Otherwise his 
arguments arguably survive only as a political strategy. 
In line with Rorty’s hermeneuticist attitude, Sherer and Steinmann argue that  
“the relevance of the incommensurability thesis ultimately depends on the 
belief in the relevance and necessity of closed axiomatic-deductive 
                                                                                                                                      
ambiguity of social phenomena and the corresponding lack of empirical evidence rather than 
incommensurability.  
84 Picking up a jargon does not necessarily mean accepting it full fledged. 
85 For a conscise description of this dream as basically a dream of syntactical reduction, see 




reasoning. It has been shown that this necessity would lead to either 
“infinite regress, a circle, or just in dogmatism” (1999, p. 521) 86.  
What we seem to have left is that in general, and in particular in cases of conflicts, 
“[t]he rationality of the means for the pursuit of ends must be shown in 
argumentation about technical knowledge. The rationality of purposes and 
good intentions must be demonstrated through ethical-political [and we 
would add, pragmatical] argumentation" (Lueken, as cited in Sherer and 
Steinmann, 1999, p. 526).  
Rorty’s position can be seen as close to Lueken’s as described by Scherer and 
Steinmann. However, Lueken’s position still entails an arguably unnecessary and 
problematical referral to a “foundation” or “beginning”. In his view,  
“praxis precedes theory since praxis has to be understood as the reason 
(cause) and methodical beginning of every attempt to create knowledge” 
(Sherer and Steinmann, 1999, p. 527).  
There can arguably be no definite demarcation between a larger notion of praxis, the 
praxis of constructing and the praxis of evaluating theories. From a Rortyan 
perspective, it is arguably unfruitful and unnecessary to assume either a need or a 
possibility of a universally 
“correct beginning of the construction of a concept of argumentation” 
(Sherer and Steimann, ibid., p. 526).  
Excluding the dream about a “neutral language of argumentation”, the suggested form 
of argumentation is ultimately a dialogue which does not only apply existing rules of 
argumentation but seeks to “construct and constitute (new) common rules” (Sherer 
and Steimann, 1999, p. 532). In this interpretation, thus, to the extent that interesting 
cases of incommensurability can be established, 
“the problem of incommensurability has no theoretical solution, but there 
is the practical possibility of a resolution” (ibid., p. 536).  
For this, in effect, not much more is needed, nor arguably fruitful, than adherence to 
all three kinds of loosely defined rationalities identified by Rorty (1998f, pp. 186-187) 
including a hermeneuticist attitude as described above. In particular in the social 
sciences, however, human knowledge, values, interests and beliefs constitute complex 
and inadequate webs which, when faced with the complexity of social phenomena, are 
not likely to be quickly transformable by such rational dialogue. Therefore we will 
probably continue to have different more or less disintegrated schools of thought.  
However, rather than fixating on any necessary and unremovable abyss of 
incommensurability, we would thus argue that different schools of thought confront 
the need for continuous dialogue regarding the search for proper vocabularies in 
which to describe and explain the social world and ourselves. There is thus in this 
interpretation nothing metaphysically given about the consequences of 
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incommensurability. Carter and Jackson’s somewhat attuned justification for Burrell 
and Morgan’s paradigms claiming that  
“the model is an explanatory device which is descriptive...[and] it is simply 
there if one wants to use it” (1993, p. 725)  
thus seems to be beside the point. The question turns on how it is used and with what 
justification. Although Burrell himself defends the incommensurability thesis, as 
expressed in Burrell and Morgan (1979/1982), largely on strategic grounds (Burrell, 
1996, p. 648) he still, as already noted, refers to epistemology when arguing that 
incommensurability hinders rational debate.  
“[T]he notion of incommensurability...hits at the very core of the widely 
held belief in rational academic debate and discourse. What the proponents 
of the thesis of paradigm commensurability fail to understand is that one of 
the few lessons of history, in things epistemological, is that despite the best 
endeavours of many able minds the dream of translation remains just that” 
(Burrell, 1996, p. 650).  
We agree with the claim about translation only when understood as a claim about 
narrow, technical translation of every part of different language-games and we do not 
not agree with the claim about rationality. Burrell is still, somewhat paradoxically, 
captured by the view that  
“to be rational is to find the proper set of [neutral] terms into which all the 
contributions should be [narrowly] translated if agreement is to become 
possible” (Rorty, 1980, p. 318; the parentheses are added by us).  
Thus paradoxically, Burrell relies on a “positivist” notion of rationality as well as 
“dichotomous thinking” exemplifying the attitude that if we cannot have rationality in 
the positivist epistemologist’s sense, then we can have none87.  
Incommensurability seems in fact to be no more dangerous for rational academic 
debate than any other historical disenchantments concerning gods, truth as 
correspondence, or other earlier touchstones for human existence. The debates and 
dialogues within the sciences can continue with rules making them as rational as 
possible, in fact as rational as they have ever been. 
In summary, we have reflected upon the incommensurability thesis, on what in fact an 
argument for incommensurability relevant for organization science would be, and 
what is at stake. In short, we have reflected upon what all the fuzz should be 
understood to be about. The results of our reflections are:  
It seems justified to assume, in organization science as in any other science, that there 
is no “’neutral observation language’ in which proponents of different theories can 
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consequence being that we should wrap up all dialogue? Or should we wrap it up only in the cases of 
potential between “paradigm” dialogues? There seems to be nothing in Burrell’s argumentation which 
would limit the “end of dialogue” only to the latter kind of dialogues. Why then does Burrell bother to 
communicate at all? Perhaps because he does not draw the conclusion that we should end all dialogue. 




offer their evidence” which can help “in bringing decisions between theories under an 
algoritm” (Rorty, 1980, p. 324)88.  
(2) It can be argued that  
“the word ‘paradigm’ indicates criteria of scholarliness which are 
recognized within a certain school of researchers and are put into practice 
by these researchers, but not in other schools” (Sherer and Steinmann, 
1999, p. 520).  
(3) It also seems true that  
“[D]escendants inherit different languages, practices, exemplars, and 
rationales for their work and either have difficulty or no interest in acting 
together” (Kaghan and Phillips, 1998, p. 201).  
These three arguments makes rational dialogue between different schools of thought 
more difficult but not impossible.  
(4) We have further suggested that we do not as of yet have any interesting cases of 
theoretical level incommensurability in organization science89.  
(5) We have also argued for a view which abandons the meta-level 
incommensurability on the subjectivism-objectivism dimension in Burrell and 
Morgan’s (1979) exposition of paradigms in organization science.  
(6) We have suggested that the most difficult "problem of incommensurability" 
concern normative (political) differences which reflect different judgements as to the 
most important explanations/actions/programs as well as the potential limitations of 
different explanations. This seems to be what is at stake in the incommensurability 
debate in organization science. This debate is likely to continue and it seems a healthy 
one where we arguably have no fruitful choice but to be broadly hermeneutical and 
rational in an ethical-political-pragmatical sense.  
Social scientists seem often to be sensitive to the degradation of their field as 
scientific.  
“Organization studies is not an immature science simply because it has no 
dominant paradigm” (Kaghan and Phillips, 1998, p. 207).  
                                               
88 This is not to say that there are not “innocuous” shared neutral observation languages (Rorty, 1980, 
p. 324). 
89 However, arguing that commensuration is always possible Czarniawska (1999, p. 273) indicates a 
use of the term ‘commensuration’ which is ignorant of the problem that has given rise to the debate 
about incommensurability in philosophy of science. Similarly, according to our review above, arguing 
that the issue concerns whether we "can understand a different paradigm by thinking about it" 
(Donaldson, 1999, p. 269) seem to miss the theoretical problem of concern among philosophers of 
science. However, when Donaldson claims that "there is no inherent incommensurability of content" 
(ibid., p. 268) between theories in organization science we do agree at least that there seems to be no 
one who has identified such a problem at the theoretical level. We also agree with Czarniawska on the 




We would argue that social science has to live with being immature as a science. The 
issue is not so much the existence of different “paradigms”. The immaturity is more a 
question of the absence of any well justified agreed upon theorizations, 
conceptualizations and operationalizations within any one “paradigm”. 
Thus, in conclusion, we would argue that more pressingly than a problem of 
incommensurability, the social sciences including organizational science, and within it 
HRM studies, face the problem of producing any explanatory propositions which a 
larger community of critical researchers even within paradigms could agree upon. It is 
this possibility with reference to the HRM discourse which interests us in the current 
thesis. In short, this interest is motivated by our sharing of Kuhns conviction that 
science  
“requires a thoroughgoing commitment to the tradition...[In order for 
anomalies to be fruitfully pursued] they must be in explicit and 
unequivocal conflict with some structurally central tenet of current 
scientific belief. Therefore their recognition and evaluation once again 
depend upon a firm commitment to the contemporary scientific tradition” 
(1991, p. 145). 
We think that so far there are few such “explicit and unequivocal” anomalies in HRM 
research simply because theorizations are still too incomplete. 
There are conflicting demands on a researcher in organization science. On the one 
hand a researcher should probably firmly stick with a tradition in order to potentially 
make any fruitful “progress” in terms of potentially breaking it (Kuhn, 1991, p. 145). 
On the other hand, we should be broadly hermeneutical. The latter attitude is further 
complicated by the arguable fact that  
“the organizational social science literature has become oppressive – 
burdensome in sheer quantity, onerous in expense, overwhelming to 
catholic readers” (Jermier, 1992, p. 210, cited in McKinley, Mone and 
Moon, 1999, p. 637).  
Further evidence of this fact is the claim that  
“the number of papers published [is] overwhelming anyone’s ability to 
read or even keep track of them all” (Field, 1993, p. 323, cited in 
McKinley et al., 1999, p. 637).  
Despite this we probably have no choice but try both to be broadly hermeneutical and 
stick to a tradition.  
2.7 METHODOLOGY 
Our therapeutic philosophical attitude also means that we assume no fundamental a 
priori distinction dictated by “the nature of the research object” between explanation 
and understanding. The difference between a quantitative and a hermeneutical 
methodology is thus arguably not to be seen as 
“a matter of the difference between the “sciences of nature” and the 
“sciences of man”, nor between fact and values [or meaning], nor the 
theoretical and the practical, nor “objective knowledge” and something 
squishier and more dubious. The difference is purely one of familiarity”. 




In line with Rorty's arguments about epistemology and ontology discussed earlier, we 
should not argue that there is something a priori determinable about human beings 
which dictate a hermeneutical methodology for all inquiry about human action. 
Meanings (and/or e.g. identities) may be dynamic and contextually sensitive but 
“[t]here is no [good] metaphysical reason why human beings should be capable of 
saying incommensurable things, nor any guarantee that they will continue to do so” 
(ibid., p. 347) with reference to any specific (research) topic. Rorty’s argument is only 
that arguments referring to such metaphysical reasons are, in the light of the history of 
(western) philosophy bound to be rather unfruitful. For Rorty the only real danger 
concerning abnormal discourse has to do with phenomena like “the scarcity of food 
and the secret police” (ibid., p. 389). Analoguous phenomena might of course include 
intricate and subtle Foucauldian processes of subjectivation in the sense of "tying the 
individual to different models of self-knowledge" (Townley, 1994, footnote 7, p. 136). 
But the apparent potential of abnormal discourse among humans makes this unlikely 
in any problematical cases. Despite this potential there may be certain general patterns 
of meaning which are more stable and more generally shared among human beings, at 
least within certain contexts. Understanding such patterns, and/or explanations based 
upon such patterns, always in need of critical scrutiny, is what quantitative research in 
social science is looking for. 
The line between understanding and explanation is thus, on the suggested 
understanding, 
“not the line between the human and the nonhuman but between that 
portion of the field of inquiry where we feel rather uncertain that we have 
the right vocabulary at hand and that portion where we feel rather certain 
that we do” (ibid., p. 352). 
The reason that we need both qualitative and quantitative methodologies in HRM 
research is of course that we generally are (should be) uncertain of whether we have 
the right vocabulary or not. However, even if we do not feel certain that we have the 
right (a good, justified) vocabulary at hand, we can still try to quantitatively test a 
vocabulary a certain community uses. Our interpretation of the literature on HRM and 
related areas is that at least some researchers think we have some good ideas about 
how HRM works or could work. This thesis attempts to construe a quantitative test of 
some of these ideas90.  
Based on the whole discussion of Rorty's thinking we thus (as one example) reject any 
metaphysical realism with reference to the right vocabulary the pursuit of which 
dictates qualitative methodologies as e.g. argued by Tsoukas (1989). Explicitly 
referring to Rorty, Tsoukas himself seems later largely to have withdrawn from 
anything that resembles epistemological/ontological realism (1998, pp. 304-305). 
However, he still tends to draw general methodological conclusions, now basing his 
arguments largely on analogies to chaos theory and claiming that "the mathematics of 
chaos theory priviledges a qualitative approach to the understanding of chaotic 
systems" (ibid., p. 303). He backs up these arguments by contrasting "[c]haos and 
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in HRM theorizing (or organization science at large), primarily related to developments of both theory 




complexity metaphors" (ibid., p. 305) with "the Newtonian style of 
thinking...search[ing] for the universal, the general and the timeless" (ibid., p. 295). 
This Newtonian style of thinking is, with respect to social science, arguably largely "a 
straw man". Further, he admits that the concepts of chaos theory "may have acquired 
somewhat different meanings in the social sciences compared to the meanings they 
have in the diciplines where they were first developed" (ibid., p. 305). The search for 
new ways to understand social phenomena is arguably important. The only thing we 
claim is that chaos theory, in particular chaos theoretical metaphors, should not be 
seen as a priori dictating the impossibility of looking for more or less stable linear 
relationships between social phenomena. There is probably a long way to go before 
the meaning of any chaos theoretical concepts have been established in social science, 
although many of the concepts would seem to make intuitive sense. Further, there is 
nothing a priori which gives us reason to believe that the outcome of applying chaos 
theoretical metaphors in social science will be more successful than the application of 
analogies to Newtonian linear reasoning has been so far. Although chaos theoretical 
concepts may clearly involve new "analytical capacities" (ibid., p. 305), it seems that 
many phenomena in societies follow trends with at least some endurance. There is 
arguably nothing a priori nor even a posteriori which makes it impossible to explain 
and even to some extent (statistically) predict such trends or patterns by applying 
linear reasoning. However, it has proved to be very difficult indeed.  
Regardless of chaos theory we will probably always need both quantitative and 
qualitative methods (and evidence) in social science, where the qualitative approaches 
in particular may allow researchers to do more "justice to the historicity of the 
phenomena to be explained" (ibid., p. 303). Because of both the complementarity and 
important practical differences inherent in quantitative and qualitative methodological 
approaches, we will arguably never get rid of the judgement that the application of 
only one of these broad categories of methodology increases the risks that we only 
believe that we understand something, while it will always turn out that we in 
retrospect did a poor job. 
“The traditional quarrel about the “philosophy of the social sciences” has 
proceeded generally as follows. One side has said that “explanation 
(subsumtion under predictive laws, roughly) presupposes, and cannot 
replace, “understanding”. The other side has said that understanding 
simply is the ability to explain, that what their oppponents call 
“understanding” is merely the primitive stage of grouping around for some 
explanatory hypotheses. Both sides are quite right.” (Rorty, 1980, p. 347).  
It may however still be the case that due to a contingent complexity and dynamics of 
social phenomena the most fruitful approach for researchers in organization science is 
to limit themselves to case studies, more qualitative methodologies and story telling 
(Czarniawska, 1995). The question is, should organizational science limit itself only 
to this? 
2.8 STORY TELLING 
According to Czarniawska, the question for organization studies “is this: one 
meaning, many meanings or no meaning at all?” (1995, p. 21). If there are too many 
meanings or no meaning at all this would naturally complicate in particular 
quantitative studies. According to Czarniawska this depends on how we approach 




more generally, use a disrespectful reading” (ibid., p. 22). This can be done to all 
texts. If we consider it interesting we are always likely to be able to find ironies and 
paradoxes in any organizations or writings about organizations. Sometimes “semiotic 
reading” (ibid., p. 22), treating texts as an aesthetic product, only creates pleasure. 
Sometimes it can be justified by the extent to which it illuminates more substantive 
issues of importance, e.g. problems with semantical or “metodical readings” (ibid., p. 
22) of a text91.  
In any case the scientific (methodical) ethos seems too easily, and on unjustified 
grounds, dismissed by Czarniawska.  
“In scientific ethos...good writing is true writing, i.e. writing that 
corresponds truthfully to reality and uses formal logic in its representation. 
But if we assume that...no linguistic items correspond to any non-linguistic 
items...then these criteria are neither appropriate nor well grounded” (ibid., 
p. 26).  
We have tried to state the case that the absence of criteria for correspondence is not in 
itself a problem for the scientific enterprise or the "scientific ethos". In fact, nothing 
much hangs on the abandonment of a correspondence theory of truth and arguably no 
scientific theory has ever been “tested by correspondence”. Philosophically 
controversial realism is according to Fine just a needless “unnatural attitude” (Fine, 
1984a; 1984b; 1986) whereas Czarniawska continues that 
“we can point out that as iconic representation or representations tested by 
correspondence are impossible, only political representation is left...[which 
is ] always fictive” (Czarniawska, 1995, p. 27; italics added). 
We have also tried to state the case that the jump from some form of realism to some 
form of complete relativism or "fictivism" is a jump between two extremes neither of 
which is likely to be more generally justifiable or fruitful. 
The problem in Czarniawska's writing seems to be the inference from the idea of 
“science as conversation” to the idea that science is any form of conversation and just 
“plenty of translation” (, pp. 274-275). Czarniawska cites Rorty: “We need to make a 
distinction between the claim that the world is out there and the claim that truth is out 
there” (Czarniawska, 1999, p. 15). She continues:  
“As a consequence, the sophisticated notion of episteme (knowledge) 
becomes equalized with doxa (opinion), held traditionally in disdain by 
science” (ibid., p. 15).  
For the latter sentence she only refers to Rorty (1991c). However, nowhere in that text 
is such a conclusion reached, and it would indeed be a strange one. There is a 
rhetorical twist to Czarniawska’s formulation. In some sense, what she says can be 
defended. The problem and fundamental issue is that she alludes to the implication 
that there can be no difference made between knowledge and opinion once the claim 
that "truth is out there" is abandoned. We have tried to argue, and present arguments 
indicating that Czarniawska’s conclusions above are quite arbitrary.  
                                               




The problem with many understandings and interpretations of science seems to be that 
it is somehow believed that science needs a philosophical foundation. When no such 
thing has been found, the conclusion is drawn that there is nothing distinctively 
important in science worth preserving as compared with other human activities92.  
An understanding of science as dependent on an excorcism of uncertainty carried out 
by philosophy and of science waiting for a panacea on the one hand and, on the other 
hand an understanding of science comparable to any narrative, is also exemplified by 
Burrell:  
“[T]he uncertainties in our theories are to do with the failure of science to 
sell its narrative of being a form of knowledge superior to all others in 
delivering the goods. As a cargo cult of the twentieth century it was 
remarkably successful but new narratives and new epistemologies now 
seem more necessary than ever” (1996, p. 657).  
We see no definite failure of science, although social science has proved very difficult 
indeed. "[T]he salient fact about...[the social] sciences is the absence of the discovery 
of any law-like generalizations whatsoever" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 84)93. Science in 
general is the human activity par excellence where we should not be in the business of 
selling certainty. Science is about well justified beliefs just as much as it is about 
uncertainty in the sense that anything can be questioned. New philosophies might 
influence perceptions of science/knowledge just like Descartes, Kant or Hume and all 
the other “epistemologists” or “metaphysicians” of the philosophical tradition have 
done. But apparently “grounded” or “groundless” in any philosophical (non-
empirical) sense need not be seen as having consequences per se for scientific 
knowledge. As is evident from (e.g.) Burrell (1996), the “groundless” alternative 
offers plenty of rhetorical possibilities, just as the “grounded” alternative does (or 
did). 
Clearly one can legitimately apply “various kinds of literary analysis to [scientific 
writing]” (Czarniawska, 1999, p. 15). However, the purpose and conclusions of 
treating scientific writing as “a genre” (ibid., p 15) and applying literary analysis to it 
needs to be justified as to its value and purposefulness in each case. A neo-pragmatist 
argues that we should abandon universal a priori arguments. 
Nobody arguably knows what the future of organization science looks like. However, 
Czarniawska has one suggestion:  
“I argue for a conscious and reflective creation of a specific genre, which 
recognizes its tradition without being paralyzed by it, which seeks 
inspiration in other genres without imitating them, which derives 
                                               
92 Distinctive characteristics can be identified although no absolute and universal demarcation between 
science and non-science seem to be possible (Niiniluoto, 1984, pp. 19-32). This problem can be 
understood as exemplifying the wittgensteinian idea of “family resemblances” between concepts.  
93 Explanations of this state of affairs has e.g in the 1960s been sought in statistical evidence showing 
that among "those completing Ph.D requirements in various disciplines...natural scientists are 
significantly more intelligent than social scientists...(MacIntyre, 1981, p. 88). Whether this is true or 
not, there are arguably other reasons (noted earlier) for the lack of agreed upon evidence for 




confidence from the importance of its topic and from its growing skills” 
(ibid., p. 28). “Instead of aspiring to become ‘a pure science’, organization 
studies might admit to being ‘a hybrid genre’, and reinvest the energy 
saved from impossible endevours in a dialogic relationship with the world” 
(Czarniawska, 1997, p. 26).  
Czarniawska is trying to argue for something like science as narration or story telling 
(Czarniawska, 1995, p. 14). What Czarniawska understands as "impossible 
endeavours" can be understood with reference to her argument that  
“the practitioner and the theoretician, the positivist and the hermeneuticist, 
the apologist and the critic, all rejoice in a holy search for ‘reality’ beneath 
‘appearances’, ‘depth’ beyond ‘surface’ or ‘backstage’ behind ‘frontstage’ 
of organizations. The narrative approach is the very thing that can save 
organizational theory from this impasse (ibid., p. 20) ... What exactly 
would be the implications [of a narrative approach in organization 
theory]?...[It would transform] ourselves from automatic writers inscribing 
the truth about reality into authors aware of the possibilities and limitations 
of a genre in continuous development” (ibid., p. 23).  
We have tried to argue that there is no given “impasse” as described above. Science is 
not, and has in the eyes of Rortyan pragmatists never in any important sense been, 
about “automatic writers inscribing the truth about reality” other than in a rhetorical 
sense in circumstances such as when the battle with the church had to be won (Rorty, 
1980, p. 327-333).  
The idea of science as story telling seems of undeniable utility at least in illuminating 
deficiences and/or limitations and filling gaps in, giving depth to and suggesting new 
openings for more general claims to knowledge. However, we presumably need many 
approaches in organization science. Even if distinctions are hard to make and 
boundaries difficult to draw (Czarniawska, 1997, p. 26) in the world, the complexity 
of which we are all too aware of today, it is not reasonable to stop making distinctions 
or drawing boundaries (compare Wheeler, 2000f). However, researchers continuously 
have to account for the utility/dis-utility of any distinctions they make. Science (and 
its goal in terms of scientifically well justified beliefs) is one of the most powerful 
(meaning: fruitful) inventions of humanity. But it is no panacea or deux ex machina. 
In particular, social reality has mostly proven to be too complex for it to handle at 
least with any higher degree of accuracy or more unequivocal utility. Nevertheless, 
our societies are in need of suggestions for general tendencies of actions and their 
consequences and it is here that science in a more traditional sense still has legitimacy 
at least as an attempt (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 98)94. What organizational science would 
need is much more replication studies and detailed critiques. It would perhaps make 
(even more) apparent how little we know. In face of the complexities that have 
become apparent through “a few decades” of organizational research (Bouchikhi, 
                                               
94 MacIntyre argues that a meaningful life requires both predictability and unpredictability (ibid., p. 
99). The unpredictability (and abnormal discourse) seems fairly well secured and, regardless of many 
scenarios hostile to or critical of science, not threatened by either social or natural science. Further, it is 
of course true that people have managed, and continue to manage (in general and in organizations), 
without scientifically well justified beliefs (Czarniawska, 1998, p. 275). One challenge for science is to 





1998, pp. 217-218) it may well be that there is very little organization studies can 
offer in terms of more generally well justified explanations. But this goes for all 
explanatory attempts, narrative and “non”-narrative. Narratives are however perhaps 
more likely to offer material for intuitive reflection and inspiration. 
It might also be true that the little narrative “remains the quintessential form of 
imaginative invention, most particularly in science” (Lyotard, 1979, p. 61, cited in 
Czarniawska, 1999, p. 37). But that little narrative is only a small part of what we call 
science and scientific knowledge in the sense of (more or less precicely) "answering 
questions of the form 'If we do this, what will happen'" (Rorty, 1998a, p. 5).  
The same arguably goes for metaphors95. Morgan, for example, is potentially 
operating with a contestable specific notion of metaphor, in that he according to 
Burrell claims or indicates that metaphors, or even “two metaphors taken together can 
provide a better picture of the reality under investigation” (Burrell, 1996, pp. 651-652; 
italics added). It is unclear whether Morgan conceives metaphors as having a precise 
cognitive content. Whether this is the case or not, metaphors in science are arguably 
mainly a tool for linguistic innovation, “essential to scientific progress” (Rorty, 
1991k, p. 162). An essential part of the work within science, however, consists of 
attempts to elucidate the “realm of meaning” which arguably is “a relatively small 
‘cleared’ area within the realm of use” (ibid., p. 164) of linguistic expressions. 
Compare the analoguous contextualizing of “scientific revolutions” which largely 
based upon readings of Kuhn’s work often have, arguably wrongly, come to be seen 
as the most important part of science (Weinberg, 1998). Arguably, both scientific 
revolutions, narratives and metaphors comprise an essential part of the logic of 
science, but only a part. An important focus of science is “the explanatory power of 
standard sense” (Rorty, 1991k, p. 164) as well as elaborating on what such standard 
use should be. 
“If ‘understanding’ or ‘interpretation’ means ‘bringing under an antecedent 
scheme’, then metaphors cannot be understood or interpreted. But if we 
extend these two notions to mean something like ‘making use of’ or 
‘coping with’, then we can say that we come to understand metaphors in 
the same way that we come to understand anomalous natural phenomena. 
We do so by revising our theories so as to fit them around the new 
material. We interpret metaphors in the same sense in which we interpret 
such anomalies – by casting around for possible revisions in our theories 
which may help to handle the surprises” (ibid., p. 167). 
In fact, human resource management can be seen as a metaphor. Thus, e.g. Steyaert 
argues for an "inquiry into what the H means in this weird combination of Human and 
Resource and Management" (1998, p. 1). It is evident that human beings cannot be 
managed in the same way as capital or machinery. It is also evident that human 
resources are not resources in the same sense as capital and machinery. Even if human 
resource management for many people is a somewhat flat and not very surprising 
metaphor it is still not clear what it could “mean” in standard use. The theorization of 
HRM can thus be seen as slowly trying to work out what the methapor of HRM could 
mean and what it might explain. The question is if there will ever be even any 
                                               




temporary agreement on such a standard use. This is one of the questions researchers 
in HRM face, in particular those attempting quantitative explanations of the 
consequences of HRM. 
“[Y]ou do have to kill off a metaphor to get a satisfactory theory of how it 
works. For such a theory will give you a widely-accepted [and potentially 
long and complicated] paraphrase, and a metaphor for which such a 
paraphrase is widely available is just what we mean by a dead metaphor” 
(ibid., pp. 167-168).... [An] ambiguity arises in the case of [the claim that] 
‘metaphor is an indispensable source of knowledge’. If we accept the 
Black-Hesse-Searle view that metaphors convey information, they will be 
able to function as reasons for belief. On Davidson’s view, by contrast, 
‘live’ metaphors can justify belief only in the same metaphorical sense in 
which one may ‘justify’ a belief not by citing another belief but by using a 
non-sentence to stimulate one’s interlocutor’s sense organs – hoping 
thereby to cause assent to a sentence. (As when someone holds up a 
probative photograph and asks ‘Now do you believe?’)” (Rorty, 1991, p. 
169).  
Much of the “new style management” has been argued to be more or less about such 
causing of assent. The potential for “to explain it is to destroy it” (Keenoy and 
Anthony, 1992, p. 238) is always there. However, it is not a priori clear that even if 
we could destroy or kill the metaphor of HRM, we would also destroy the way these 
practices might fruitfully work. 
The open question in organization science at large is: can “small narratives”, 
metaphors or any form of unspecified talk in organization science ever be 
convincingly filled out to produce something we would call scientific knowledge in 
the sense of a "realm of meaning...[as] a relatively small and 'cleaned' area within the 
realm of use" (Rorty, 1991, p. 164) of linguistic expressions. If they cannot, then 
regardless of methodology organizational scientists will always be involved in 
something more akin to organization science as story telling than to anything else 
(compare the somewhat self-assured a priori arguments in Astley and Zammuto, 
1992).  
Somebody (e.g. Astley and Zammuto) might point to family resemblances between 
scientific knowledge and stories and thus show that there is no absolute distinction. 
We claim none. One problem, however, seems to be the often equivocal use of the 
concept ‘knowledge’.  
“We would suggest the creation of narratives of the actual [sic], where, 
through storytelling, the experiences of people in their company are being 
documented and given sense. One abandons here the universal claim that 
some practices which are applicable in other companies can become 
isolated. The alternative is one of local knowledge, where stories give 
access to the local context, and its own ‘peculiar’ way of creating and 
continuing things” (Steyaert and Janssens, 1999, pp. 193-194).  
While such local narration may have much to offer both practitioners and scholars, 
this citation may give the impression that knowledge would be gained as soon as 
anybody communicates something or writes down something. No matter how 
seriously and rigorously anybody studies and writes down something, this is arguably 
at least not what makes it scientific knowledge. The beauty of science is that it in the 




compared to many other human discourses, are exceptionally well justified. 
Justification pertaining to one piece of writing, one study or one person, in particular 
concerning one particular local context is very limited. Even justification pertaining to 
a body of writing during a long period of time by a great number of scholars is on the 
epistemological/ontological view explicated in this thesis always limited. Scientific 
claims to truth, claims whose use scientific communities endorse, potentially always 
involve "a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms" 
(Nietzsche, cf. Allison, 1995, p. xxiv). However, in the long run empirical science 
ideally works to reduce the number of "illusions" in the sense of statements which do 
not hold up against empirical evidence, i.e. "illusions" which are simply "metaphors 
which are worn out and without sensuous power" (ibid., p. xxiv ). Both natural and 
social scientific activity is the systematic work with sentences (in some symbolic 
system) based upon norms and standards which to some extent "always reflect our 
interests and values...[i.e.] our picture of human flourishing in general” (Rorty, 1998c, 
p. 49). In this sense science clearly has family resemblances with politics and 
storytelling. But it should not a priori be reduced to either of the latter phenomena 
because scientific activity also has some distinctive characteristics which have proven 
to be of great value at least within the “more” natural sciences. Scientific activity 
strives, (at least somewhat) more systematically than politics and storytelling, towards 
generally accepted justification, explanation, understanding, and often also more or 
less predictive accuracy based upon empirical evidence (which is not the same thing 
as correspondence with reality). The problem for the social sciences is (dynamic) 
complexity. The neo-pragmatist argues that there is nothing a priori and universal we 
can offer as absolute justification either for or against different efforts to come to 
terms with this complexity. But there is certainly plenty of historical evidence 
speaking for a very sceptical attitude with reference both to any social scientific 
claims to truth as well as critiques of any such truths. 
With this understanding of the complexity of social science we now turn towards the 
more specific aim of working out a conceptualization of HRM and its effects as well 




3 WHAT IS HRM – MEANING 
3.1 CHANGE AND CONTINUITY 
It has been argued that Frederick Taylor’s doctrine, while no longer intellectually 
fashionable, “still pervades much of American culture - so much so…that we no 
longer realize it's there" (Wilentz, 1997, p. 32). Wilentz cites from Kanigel’s 
biography: 
"Taylor bequethed a clockwork world of tasks timed to the hundredth of a 
minute, of standardized factories, machines, women, and men. He helped 
instill in us the fierce, unholy obsession with time, order, productivity, and 
efficiency that marks our age. Foreign visitors to America often remark on 
the rushed, breathless quality of our lives. Taylor - whose life, from 1856-
1915, almost exactly coincided with the Industrial Revolution at its height - 
helped make us that way (cf. Wilentz, 1997, p. 32 ) 
As Wilentz remarks, Taylor’s proposals were found by many practitioners as simply 
too complex and difficult to implement. But Wilentz argues,  
"Kanigel is correct in observing that the crucial element of Taylor's system 
- the aggressive effort by management to gain control over technical 
knowledge connected with work - still dominates American labour 
relations" (Wilentz, 1997, p. 32 ).  
We can add that these reflections are not irrelevant either for most of the 
industrialized world or for current research on HRM. However, what is arguably less 
and less persuasive is the adequacy of the alleged goal of Taylor's.  
"Taylor's aim was to revolutionalize labor relations by giving employers 
complete authority over production" (ibid., p. 3).  
According to Wilentz, Taylor had "observed that men have a ‘natural instinct and 
tendency’ to take things easy" (ibid., p. 34). It is essentially Taylor's assumption of 
human nature, which began to be questioned, arguably beginning already with the 
welfare movement (Dulebohn, Ferris and Stodd, 1995, p 23) and later by the human 
relations movement (ibid., pp. 26-27). This questioning was clearly manifest in e.g. 
McGregor's thinking (Berglund and Löwstedt, 1996, pp. 215-216). Much of todays’ 
discourse on management continues to question this assumption. To the extent that 
work is perceived as meaningful Taylor’s "observation" was arguably dead wrong. 
However, there is still much work which needs to be done which does not incorporate 
much intrinsic meaningfulness. In such contexts of relatively less meaningful work it 
may be correct to assume an a priori “instinct and tendency to take things easy”. 
Nevertheless, the idea of trying to increase the meaningfulness of work, rather than 
the direct control, has been part of much later management thinking and is arguably 
also central to the idea of (at least soft) HRM. The general agenda can be viewed as 
achieving both performance and control through meaning.  
With respect to this agenda in itself there is nothing fundamentally new in the concept 
of HRM. Its potential contribution is rather a question of emphasis and enlargement of 
scope. In fact, already Taylor declared that  
“[s]cientific management...has for its very foundation the firm conviction 




same; that prosperity for the employer cannot exist through a long term of 
years unless it is accompanied by prosperity for the employee, and vice 
versa” (cf. Hancock, 1999, p. 156)96.  
This agenda of achieving performance through meaning (or mutual prosperity), which 
can thus be traced back all the way to Taylor, continues to pose challenges to both 
practitioners and researchers. Indeed, there may also be parallells between new and 
old concepts of people management in terms of rhetorical uses of such concepts. 
Researchers seem to confront a continuous challenge in trying to discern and interpret 
also any negative consequences (including social, cognitive, emotional and physical) 
of the forms people management take. Current questions of importance include e.g.  
"where 'soft' [HRM] apparently has been introduced, to what extent does 
that form (e.g. 'empowered' TQM oriented 'teams') and rhetoric (e.g. 
'customer care') mask 'hard' practice (e.g. labour intensification, cost 
minimization, coercive surveillance)?" (Legge, 1995a, p. 330).  
Twenty years ago Skinner expressed his view about the efforts to improve the 
management of people by the words "big hat no cattle”. He claimed that a huge 
amount of suggested solutions have followed each other and organizations have 
invested "millions to make employees productive, loyal and motivated" but there has 
been no real payoffs (Skinner, 1981, pp. 106-107). The metaphor captures the "big 
talk" and little authority which often characterize organizational discourses related to 
the management of employees  
The “big talk” might also be interpreted to refer to the academic and consultancy 
based management discourse including much of the current discourse on HRM. For 
example, already in 1981, at the end of his article Skinner suggested a range of 
premises and principles which more or less correspond to the ideas for which HRM 
researchers are still trying to provide evidence (ibid., pp. 112-114). However, research 
has recently at least been trying to conceptualize and provide empirical evidence for 
this “big talk” in a more integrated way than before. As already noted, the claim is 
that also theoretical development has put this “big talk” in a better position today 
(Storey, 1995, pp. 3-4). 
In 1990 Guest argued that,  
“while the importance of human resources had been emphasized before, 
the case had not been stated so clearly and convincingly and had not in the 
past found such a receptive audience”(1990, p. 378)97. 
                                               
96 However, one difference applies with reference to how Taylor continued, “...it is possible to give the 
workman what he most wants – high wages – and the employer what he most wants – a low labor cost 
– for his manufactures (ibid., 1999, p. 157). The picture of HRM is arguably not as simplified any 
more. Another difference lies in the fact that few researchers today would be as self-confident in using 
notions such as "true interests". 
97 Keenoy (1997) has some critical ideas of this receptiveness and audience. These will be reviewed in 




It is only reasonable to remember that we always seem to confront both continuity and 
change (Blyton and Turnbull, 1994) although change usually is more exciting and 
receives more attention (Dastmalchian et al., 1991 referred to by Legge, 1995, p. 328).  
The perceptions of change and continuity also tend to be dependent on our time 
horizons (Legge, 1995, p. 328) and interpretations. Legge argues for an underlying 
continuity in people management in terms of its function as a mediator of 
contradictions of capitalism (Legge, 1989) 98.  
We understand the continuous nature of people management, even more generally 
than Legge, as being a mediator of inequities in terms of resources and aspirations. In 
any system, capitalist or non-capitalist, individuals and organizations differ with 
reference to the social, cognitive, emotional and physical resources and aspirations 
involved. Employee management has a central role in mediating the resulting 
tensions99. The implications of allowing the settlement of these tensions to play a 
relatively independent role lie at the core of capitalism. The relatively free play of 
such settlement is the driving force in good as well as in bad. Legislation has however 
also in most capitalist systems a central role in mediating the role of this driving force. 
Some critique of HRM has focused on this issue. The claim is that HRM undermines 
the activities of labour unions and thus the welfare of employees (Guest, 1987; 
Purcell, 1993; Kamoche, 1994,1996). However, some research has found that HRM is 
more likely to be practiced more extensively in contexts of labour union presence 
(Guest and Conway, 1999, p. 368) implying that these are not contradictory. In fact, 
some scholars have argued for the possibility that labor unions could explicitly seize 
upon and try to realize many of the ideas incorporated in HRM (Guest, 1987).  
3.2 HRM AND PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 
In this research project we pursue the possibility of theoretical development and 
empirical evidence related to consequences of a certain form of employee 
management more or less explicitly derived from the discourse on HRM. From the 
point of view of this thesis the historical difference between the concept of ‘HRM’ 
and the concept of ‘personnel management’ is of lesser interest. However, at least for 
orientational purposes the question naturally arises: "Is there any difference between 
the normative models of HRM and those of personnel management?" (Legge, 1995, p. 
71).  
Legge shows ample evidence of the fact that “older” normative models of personnel 
management fairly closely correspond to the “new” normative models of HRM. She 
argues that the apparent difference between HRM and personnel management is 
mostly due to the emphasis in the discussions where the latter is often treated at a 
descriptive level and the former is treated at a normative level (ibid., p. 71). 
                                               
98 The contradictions she refers to were described by Marx (Legge, 1995a, p. 291–294). In fact, Legge 
(1989) argued that the mediational role of HRM largely lies in the fact that the rhetoric of soft HRM is 
used to camoflage essential contradictions of capitalism (more clearly) embodied in hard HRM. 
99 Townley offers another  more (and arguably too) limited definition of this role: “HRM is a discourse 
and technology of power that aims to resolve the gap inherent in the contract of employment between 




Legge cites several sources which are very sceptical towards a distinction between 
HRM and personnel management, one of which is Armstrong who argues that 
[HRM] could indeed be no more and no less than another name for 
personnel management, but...at least it has the virtue of emphasising the 
need to treat people as a key resource, the management of which is the 
direct concern of top management as part of the strategic planning 
processes of the enterprise. Although there is nothing new in the idea, 
insufficient attention has been paid to it in many organizations. The new 
bottle or label can help to overcome this deficiency (1987, p. 32)100.  
However, Legge also identifies some more substantial dissimilarities between HRM 
and personnel management101. First, she argues that there is a different focus on the 
objects of HRM practices which emphasizes the management of managers whereas 
personnel management was more concerned with the management of non-managers 
(ibid., p. 74). This aspect is also identified by Storey (1995, p. 6). This does not mean 
that HRM is not about managing non-managerial employees. Secondly, Legge argues 
that the role of line management as proactively focused on the proper use and 
treatment of employees is stressed in HRM (1995, pp. 74-75). This feature is 
identified also by other scholars (e.g. Mabey and Salaman, 1995, p. 448; Storey, 1995, 
p. 6). Thirdly, HRM lays a greater stress on top management's role of managing the 
whole organizational culture through the HRM practices and policies (Legge, 1995, p. 
75). Also this is identified by Storey (1995, p. 6). 
We might argue for a fourth difference between HRM and personnel management. 
"It is through an integrated and internally consistent set of HR policies in 
relation to recruitment, selection, training, development, rewarding and 
communications, that the organization's core values can best be conveyed, 
according to normative models of HRM" (Legge, 1995, p.75).  
The integrational aspect is emphasized by many scholars (e.g. Mabey and Salaman, 
1995, p. 448; Storey, 1995, p. 6; Guest, 1997, pp. 270-272). Although the personnel 
management literature also talked about "the importance of integrating personnel 
practices with organizational goals" (Legge, 1995, p. 70), the emphasis on the system 
level integration is arguably more explicit in the HRM literature. 
Theoretical/conceptual distinctions are one thing. They should however also influence 
empirical research. The explicit reference to the management of managers and culture 
as well as the role of top management has so far gone largely untested in empirical 
studies. Very few of the recent HRM studies have included intermediate (cultural 
                                               
100 The fluidity of distinctions between todays HRM and earlier arguments about employee 
management are also described by Jacques (1999, pp. 202-205). In addition, we are faced with 
continuous new “fashions” (Abrahamsson, 1997; Rövik, 1997) in management thinking, in particular 
regarding more specific techniques such as BPR (Business process re-engineering) or TQM (Total 
Quality Management) (De Cock and Hipkin, 1997). The distinction between such fashions and (the 
fashion of) the HRM movement is often far from clear (see e.g. Wood (1999) on the potential 
connection between TQM and HRM). 
101 Legge also cautions us by arguing that "neither personnel management nor HRM is a singular 




level) outcomes in combination with organizational performance consequences. A 
large number of recent empirical studies have however focused on the general system 
level application of the individual HRM practices. Many of these have also focused 
on more explicit integrative aspects between HRM practices and between these and 
business strategies.  
Thus in fact, empirical research has not really focused on any of the differentiating 
aspects explicitly identified by Legge in combination with testing the relevance of the 
new emphasis on HRM as a "central strategic management task" (Legge, 1995, p. 75) 
involving organizational performance effects. To the extent that empirical research 
has focused on what is a new emphasis in the literature on HRM, it has concerned the 
(integrative) system level of HRM (Becker and Huselid, 1998, p. 56). Empirical 
studies in personnel management were most often focused on particular personnel 
practices but arguably "such work can generally be discarded from any serious 
analysis of what is actually new and important about HRM" (Boxall, 1993, p. 747)102.  
Thus, in addition to the distinctions identified by Legge, there are arguably at least 
some crucial differences between the HRM literature and the literature on personnel 
management in terms of the forms empirical research have taken.  
However, the more a broad HRM theorization of organizational performance is 
developed the more urgent it might be to return to and bring in the psychologically 
oriented micro theory pursued by personnel management (related to individual 
practices). This seems to be a consequence of Guest's thinking of a theory of HRM. 
“The factors that constitute ‘appropriate’ [HRM] practices are derived 
from the specific theories of organizational commitment, job design, goal 
setting and so on…The key features of [the normative HRM] approach are 
that HRM provides a coherent integration of these behavioral theories and 
that they spell out the linkages between practices and performance” (Guest, 
1997, p. 268).  
The alluded derivation has not yet coherently and explicitly been carried out. Also in 
this research project we will still largely focus only on the “possible broader 
framework linking HRM and outcomes” (Guest, 1997, p. 269). However, we will try 
to consider at least some "important problems with the theoretic underpinnings of 
SHRM research that have contributed to significant shortcomings in empirical 
research” (Chadwick and Cappelli, 1999, p. 2). There is at least a more and more 
thorough discussion on theoretical development which for the time being owes much 
to the resource-based view (Barney, 1991).  
In summary, although there are some arguable differences between HRM and 
personnel management, there are clear gaps between the (insufficient) conceptual 
theorizings of the "new" meaning(s) of HRM, the (insufficient) "new" empirical 
                                               
102 Also Becker and Gerhardt note that "[m]uch of the earlier research on the link between HR and 
performance has looked at single HR practices...The implicit assumption [of such work] is that the 
effects of different HR decisions are additive, an idea that is inconsistent with the emphasis on internal 
fit in the resource-based view of the firm” (1996, pp. 782-783). Even if such work is not inconsistent, it 




evidence and the "new" rhetorics related to HRM. In fact, Legge (1995) devotes a 
whole book to exploring these gaps. 
We will now turn to a discussion of two perspectives that have been taken in the 
HRM literature. These perspective have often been seen as mutually exclusive at least 
in certain contexts. 
3.3 TWO MEANINGS OF HRM 
Fundamental in the HRM movement is arguably the combination of many ideas 
(Mabey & Salaman, 1995, p. 35-36). The complexity is evident in the Harvard 













































Figure 2: Beer et al.’s framework (1984, p. 16)
 
This Harvard framework is classified by Guest as belonging to “descriptive theories 
of HRM” which “provide conceptual maps of the field … [but] provide no clear focus 
for any test of the relationship between HRM and performance” (1997, pp. 264-265). 
Although the framework well exhibits the complexity involved, we thus arguably 
need a lot more specification in order to develop a testable theory of the links and 
mechanisms between HRM and organizational performance.  
Guest has argued that, 
 [One] implication [of HRM] is that there is strategic choice about how 




strategic choice and argue that the key to competitive advantage lies in 
making full use of human resources (e.g. Walton, 1985). From this 
perspective the more important claim to novelty in HRM lies less in the 
recognition of a strategic choice than in the presentation of a particular 
strategic solution" (Guest, 1990, p. 378). 
Here Guest refers to the two broad streams of theorization in terms of 'soft' 
(universalistic) HRM and 'hard' (strategic) HRM. To the extent that we do consider 
the “human side of enterprise” (Guest, 1990, p. 379) both economically and ethically 
important, one challenge is to try to find conceptualizations which combine the two 
putatively contradictory "new" schools of thought.  
According to Legge, such an integration would seem to be relatively unproblematic 
"where an organization pursues a strategy of producing high-value added goods and 
services, in a knowledge-based industry..." (1995a, p. 67). However, Legge asks,  
"what of the organization that as part of its asset management chooses to 
compete in a labour intensive, high volume, low cost industry, generating 
profits through increasing market share by cost leadership?" (ibid., p. 67).  
In such organizations it is more likely that strategic soft HRM does not have as much 
to offer. Certain necessary conditions (noted in section 1.5) of any larger scale 
influence of (strategic soft) HRM may be violated in such industries. However, it is 
not a priori evident that this has to be the case. Strategic soft HRM might at least 
make a (smaller) relative difference also in such industries. Further, it is not yet 
established that any form of integrated HRM approach even in knowledge-based 
industries in fact tends to have distinctively important consequences for 
organizational performance, although such approaches themselves might be viewed as 
more unproblematic in such contexts. 
In any case, the problem with the traditional oppositional distinction between HRM 
and SHRM is that, as Pfeffer (1994) has argued, there seem to be companies which 
have “low cost strategies”, are doing well and have a soft HRM profile. This would 
seem to indicate that the general idea that HRM should (theoretically) be contingent 
on strategy, in the sense e.g. that a “low cost strategy” combined with a less mutuality 
and commitment promoting HRM approach leads to better organizational outcomes, 
is simply wrong. We thus argue that there is some justification for a belief in the 
advantage of a general strategic soft HRM approach. The two strands of HRM, the 
‘soft’ and the ‘hard’ approach, will be discussed in more detail in the following 
chapters.  
3.3.1 HRM as a particular employment strategy 
In one interpretation of HRM it is thus a particular employment strategy which “is 
composed of policies that promote mutuality “ (Walton, 1985b, p. 64). This approach 
is described by Boxall as 
"a movement by management practitioners to substitute commitment-
oriented 'HRM practices' for the traditional industrial relations institutions 
of union recognition and collective bargaining ... in this view HRM is an 
attempt by management to put in place a set of conditions where more 
interesting work, various participative mechanisms, improved security, 




workers emotionally to the firm and make it unnecessary for them to 
organize" (Boxall, 1993, p. 651)103.  
As already indicated, in this sense HRM should be seen as simply a new attempt, an 
"evolution in philosophy, objectives and techniques" (Boxall, 1993, p. 651). In this 
line of conceptualization of HRM, Guest (1987; 1997) has been developing the 


















































Table 1: Linking HRM and performance (Guest, 1997, p. 270)
 
For the moment we will leave the strategic aspects out of the discussion. Guest’s 
model would then be one possible conceptualization of a soft (universalistic, best 
practice) HRM approach. It is also currently one of essentially two existing HRM 
theorizations of organizational performance in terms of an integrative but relatively 
parsimonious framework, spanning a range of more explicit outcomes (or 
mechanisms) at different levels104. However, in Guest’s own words his model is only  
“[a] model which illustrates the kind of linkages which might be explored, 
albeit using arbitrary categories for HRM strategy and HRM practices…Its 
                                               
103 The issue of union recognition and co-operation is important. There is clearly a “black hole” 
scenario (Guest, 1995; 1999) where organizations neither adopt “policies that promote mutuality” nor 
recognize unions. In our conceptualization of organizational performance effects of HRM we attempt 
to include employee perceptions of the HRM practices as well as a range of employee attitudes as 
intermediate outcomes. In such a theorization of HRM, union recognition should be viewed as one 
explanatory variable potentially in relation both to the HRM practices and the intermediate attitudes. 
Regardless of potential short term effects of unions one can of course plausibly still argue that in the 
long run union presence and recognition has an important role as guarantor of a reasonable mutuality in 
employment relations. However, the issue of union recognition falls outside the current reserach project 
and will largely be controlled for by the sample in our empirical study. 
104 More recently Ferris et al. (1998) have presented a partly alternative, partly overlapping social 




main value in the present context lies in highlighting the range of related 
outcomes that need to be considered in any model that seeks to understand 
the impact of the ‘human’ factor in human resource management” (Guest, 
1997, p. 269).  
Boxall offers a critique which he directs specifically at this universalist perspective. 
He contends that ”researchers have not settled on a common understanding of which 
HR practices to identify” within this perspective (Boxall, 1999, p. 446). Definitional 
issues clearly constitute a problem. However, such a common (albeit perhaps more 
contextual) understanding is equally important (and equally non-existent) within the 
strategic perspective discussed below105. Boxall offers the further critique, which he 
also directs at the universalistic perspective, that the problem of common agreement 
on relevant HRM practices is ”compounded when cross-cultural issues are 
acknowledged” (Boxall, 1999, p. 446; Guest, 1997; Wood, 1995)106.  
In addition to the lack of any more specific theoretical derivation of relevant HRM 
practices and intermediate phenomena, there is a lack of agreed upon 
operationalizations of potential constructs. By consequence, any more straightforward 
quantitative empirical evidence for the above kind of an integrated universalistic 
model is difficult to produce. In fact, any empirical evidence whatsoever for such an 
integrated model is still essentially absent. To the extent that we can begin to 
corroborate such a "possible broader framework linking HRM and outcomes" (Guest, 
1997, p. 269), the theoretical mechanisms would also have to be explored in more and 
more detail. 
                                               
105 Boxall (1999) refers to the (common) distinction between ’the behavioral perspective’ and the 
‘universalist argument’ that "a high commitment model of labour management generates superior 
outcomes in all competitive contexts" (1999, p. 446). The latter is thus what is usually refered to as soft 
HRM, i.e. HRM as a particular employment strategy. The distinction between a “behavioral 
perspective” and a “universalist perspective” seems to us an unfortunate way of making the distinction 
between a universalist (“best practice”) view of HRM and strategic HRM because the universalist  
perspective is arguably as behavioral as strategic HRM. The difference is that the strategic point of 
view implies that different strategies require different types of behavior (and attitudes) which can be 
achieved through different forms of HRM whereas the universalist perspective implies that certain 
types of behavior (and attitudes) which can be achieved through a certain type of HRM are universally 
important. As noted, there is not much evidence based agreement about the more specific kinds of 
behavior and specific form(s) of HRM within either of these schools of thought. The non-universalistic 
strategic perspective will be further discussed below. 
106 In this study we will develop a perceptual (or "performative") conceptualization/operationalization 
of more abstract features of HRM which allows for different manifestations of the HRM practices. 
Such an abstraction could diminish cross-cultural problems to the extent that the HRM research 
community would be able to empirically identify such more abstract and general elements of HRM and 
its outcomes which through different manifest processes make a difference in any organization in any 
culture. However, this is clearly largely an empirical question and it may well be that cross-cultural 
differences will make all such efforts vain. It may even be that differences within any more or less 
coherent macro-culture will make it impossible to identify even temporally limited effective 
universalistic features of HRM and its outcomes. This may also be true for any contingency-based 
processes and outcomes. It simply seems too early to bring in the problem of cross-cultural differences 
before convincing evidence of HRM in any culture have been presented. What practicing organizations 
seems to confront is the need to conduct informed trial and error processes. The research community is 
largely in the same boat. However, to the extent that the empirical world allows it at all, with respect to 
the research community such efforts and processes should ideally be more coordinated than has been 




An indication that the common dichotomy between the two strands in the HRM 
literature is not entirely clearcut is that in his model of HRM, Guest (1997) has 
explicitly recognized also the other strand described by Boxall. 
3.3.2 HRM and strategic choice 
According to Boxall, this other strand of the HRM literature, "strategic human 
resource management", explores "the theoretical links between employee relations (of 
whatever sort) and strategic management of the firm" (Boxall, 1993, p. 654).  
Whereas at least the general idea of HRM as a particular employment strategy is fairly 
straightforward, Boxall argues that “the conceptual difficulties associated with 
spanning the strategy/HRM boundary…are much greater” (1996, p. 60). The many 
open questions related to strategic management as well as links between employee 
relations and such strategic management clearly poses problems for quantitative 
research designs. 
Thus it has been argued that to study strategic human resource management  
“for the most part … means intensive case studies employing either 
longitudinal or retrospective designs that can capture the dynamic nature of 
strategy and strategy-making processes” (Dyer, 1984, p. 167).  
Also Chadwick and Cappelli’s suggestions for a re-orientation of SHRM research 
(1999, p. 24-27) would imply detailed case studies. However, Guest has earlier argued 
with general reference to case studies in HRM that “[t]he literature abounds with 
these….However, many are little more than anecdotes" (1990, p. 382). Clearly there 
are better and worse case studies and equally clearly they are important. We would 
nevertheless not like to rely solely on their testimony. We thus arguably need also 
quantitative research attempts which indeed have been pursued by researchers. 
However, regarding earlier studies in this genre Guest claims that “they are weak in 
specifying the process whereby HRM is linked to business” (1997, p. 264).  
While cross-sectional quantitative studies cannot "processually" (Tyson, 1997) study 
such links, they could at least in principle identify consequences of the way HRM is 
linked to strategy and/or influences of different strategies mediated by HRM. 
However this would clearly require some reasonable a priori understanding of "the 
strategy/HRM boundary” (Boxall, 1996, p. 60).  
In a recent article Wright and Snell (1998) have elaborated on this boundary. They 
offer a conceptual framework for studying external (strategic) fit incorporating the 
related idea of flexibility. Wright and Snell point out that “little agreement exists 
regarding the definitions and value of each” (Wright and Snell, 1998, p. 756). 
However, in some contradiction to this they later argue that  
“the discussions of fit in strategic HRM are quite precise in determining 
the variables that constitute fit…..the concept of fit has been well 
articulated in strategic HRM” (Wright and Snell, 1998, p. 761).  
The concept of fit has been elaborated in many forms. However, in line with Boxall 
(1992, 1996), Ferris et al.(1999), Chadwick and Cappelli (1999) and Wright and 




precise” and not “well articulated” in particular with reference to "the variables that 
constitute fit". There is little agreement on the more specific content of strategic 
integration, and agreement on how we should operationalize it and integrate it into a 
theory of HRM. Wright and Sherman offered a classification of the diverse extant 
conceptualizations of strategic fit in empirical research and concluded that there are 
considerable ambiguities with reference to what is meant by fit (1999, p. 58). The 
concept of external fit is thus in our view barely defined in the literature. With 
reference to one conceptualization/operationalization of strategic fit, Becker and 
Gerhardt admit that  
“[I]n a sense, simply entering cross-products to test fit hypotheses may 
show just how little is known about systems of HR practices” (1996, p. 
789). 
3.3.2.1 The concept of strategic fit 
One of the first models of strategic fit was the ‘the matching model’ of HRM 
presented by Fombrun et al. (1984).  
“The primary emphasis of this model is on the desirability of ‘fitting’ HR 
strategy to the firm’s choice of competitive strategy...” (Boxall, 1996, p. 
62).  
Boxall (1992, p. 68-69) argued that the early literature which focused on strategic 
human resource management often suffered simply from inadequate conceptions of 
strategy and the strategic process.  
In one of the few specific studies of the relationship between HRM and business 
strategies, Peck notes that different researchers have argued for almost opposite 
consequences of certain business strategies for corresponding HRM strategies (1994, 
pp. 718-722). Her own empirical study of this relationship was based upon generic 
categories of business strategies (ibid., 716-717) and separate variables for different 
HRM areas (ibid., p. 725) with items derived from a dichotomy between soft and hard 
approaches of HRM in terms of a "buy orientation" and "a make orientation" (ibid., p. 
718). She also developed a general variable of a buy versus make HR philosophy 
(ibid., p. 723). Further she included a variable of the employment relationship 
between managerial and professional employees (ibid., p 724). Based on the study, 
she draws the conclusion that  
“the relationships between organizational strategy, HR and implied 
employment contracts are more complex than previously assumed [and] 
that HR practices may not be simply a mediating variable between strategy 
and the employment relationship (ibid., p. 729)107.  
In her study Peck used the generic strategies typology developed by Miles and Snow 
(ibid., 716-717) but other research has indicated similar difficulties in finding a 
correlation between Porter's generic strategies and HRM practices (Chadwick and 
Cappelli, 1999, p. 12). Peck's results give empirical support either for the fact that, as 
                                               
107 The study involved several weaknesses (ibid., p. 730) including the fact that she identified all 




she claims, the relationships are more complex (and diverse) than previously assumed 
and/or for the fact that there has simply been something wrong with the 
classification/conceptualization of either HR policies and practices or business 
strategies or both108. 
Boxall made a distinction between ‘business strategy’ (dealing with desired 
competitive position in a particular business, goals external to the organization) and 
‘competitive strategy’ (dealing with critical internal resources such as organizational 
structure, human resources, technology and capital). He argues that this definitional 
distinction “helps to make the point that means do not flow unproblematically from 
ends” (1992, p. 60). One possibility which is seldom acknowledged is that there in 
fact may be no consistent relationships between any particular strategy and particular 
(formally identified) HRM no matter how we conceptualize such strategies. There 
may nevertheless at a more abstract level be relationships between HRM and 
strategies which may also have important consequences. We will return to this issue 
below. 
Both Chadwick and Cappelli (1999) and Ferris et al. (1999) strongly argue that the 
typical conceptualizations of strategy and strategic fit used in earlier research, most 
often in the form of generic strategies, involve a set of problematic assumptions.  
“These generic categorizations have little in common with the realities of 
the modern competitive environment…First, categorizations are exclusive, 
assuming that organizations pursue a certain strategic goal while ignoring 
other strategic concerns109. Second, they depict the competitive 
environment, and consequently organizational strategy, as being static 
instead of dynamic. There is much evidence that neither if the two 
assumptions is valid…Further, investigations into the HRM-strategy link 
have almost exclusively focused on predominant intended strategy of the 
firm and assumed that the professed intended strategy is equivalent to the 
emergent or realized strategy. Examinations based on that assumption are 
inherently flawed (Ferris et al., 1999, pp. 392-393, italics added). 
Partly echoing Ferris et al. (1999), Chadwick and Cappelli argue that 
First, generic [strategy] typologies can be highly inaccurate ways to 
characterize strategy in specific contexts, and they exclude other, 
potentially important conceptualizations of strategy. Second, describing 
both firm strategy and HR systems in a unitary fashion on the 
organizational level can mask important attributes of organizations which 
would enhance our understanding of the effects of HR and strategy on 
organizational outcomes. Third, operationalizing strategy with generic 
typologies does not match the RBV theoretic approach, which seems more 
suited to the needs of SHRM research. (1999, p. 20, italics added). 
Thus, one problem with describing "firm strategy and HR systems in a unitary fashion 
on the organizational level" is that management rarely has “a single set of goals and 
means for all employees” (Boxall, 1992, p. 63; Chadwick and Cappelli, 1999, p. 15). 
                                               
108 Wright and Sherman argue that there has been weaknesses in both (1999, p. 68-69).  




In particular there is often a clear distinction between how HRM affects managers and 
hierarchically lower level employees. This has received little attention in prior 
research and should be born in mind when designing studies and choosing samples. 
HRM strategies have also been conceptually identified and classified according to 
other parameters than generic business strategies. These include stages of 
organizational development or growth (Baird and Meshoulam, 1988; Kochan and 
Barocci, 1985), the complexity of the organization (Fombrun et al., 1984) as well as 
matrixes of human resource availability on the one hand and improvement needs in 
terms of business development, expansion, productivity or redirection on the other 
hand (Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall, 1988). These conceptualizations point to the 
potential contextual sensitivity of HRM practices, even within sub-units of larger 
organizations, and thus to the importance of proper research designs, 
operationalizations and choices of populations. None of these contingency "models" 
have however directly been the object of much empirical research, in particular 
combined with research on the HRM-firm performance link110. HRM strategies have 
also been conceptualized in terms of manufacturing strategies. This has been done 
mainly in connection to empirical studies at the plant level. It has been acknowledged 
that also manufacturing strategy often “remains a somewhat elusive concept” (Youndt 
et al., 1996, p. 861). 
Depending on our approach we might need (new) answers to the question of how 
strategy is formed and what strategy is (Boxall, 1992, p. 68) or how strategic 
capabilities evolve (Chadwick and Cappelli, 1999, p. 24). We might need (new) 
answers to the question of which “aspects or conceptualizations of business strategy” 
or which “environmental factors...matter for human resource practices” (Chadwick 
and Cappelli, 1999, p. 22).  
There has arguably not really been any conceptual advances improving the lack of an 
accepted more detailed but at the same time general definition and operationalization 
of external fit which would be applicable in quantitative research. It is clear that the 
relevant strategic parameters are complex. Ferris et al. suggest one way of identifying 
the strategic aspects which matter.  
Future tests of the HRM-strategy relationship might be better served by 
considering strategy to be along a continuum, involving a number of 
strategic factors that are seen by the organization to be more or less 
important as competitive priorities (1999, p. 393, [italics added]). 
To the extent that “[s]trategy scholars have no uniform answer, no widely accepted 
replacements” (Chadwick and Cappelli, 1999, p. 21) to the arguably obsolete generic 
categorizations of strategies, this approach has some justification. However, the 
difficulties involved with the notion of strategic fit do not concern only the 
identification of strategic factors that are important, but also the implications of any 
competitive priorities for human resource management.  
                                               
110 One partial exception is Boxall and Steeneveld (1999) who attempted to situate their cases studies 
in relation to such contextual variables indicating that they may be essential. However, the case study 




Chadwick and Cappelli (in the quote above) indicate that the RBV brings something 
essential to the debate on strategic fit. We will now briefly consider this possibility. 
3.3.2.2 The resource-based view and strategic fit 
Lately the resource-based view (RBV) has been widely referred to and argued to cast 
some (more general) light on the issue of strategic human resource management and 
support the importance of it. Boxall claims that  
“[t]he resource-based view of the firm provides a conceptual basis, if we 
needed one, for asserting that the key human resources are sources of 
competitive advantage” (1996, p. 66).  
The RBV is also often used as a critique of, or at least a complement to, traditional 
strategic thinking and theorizing. Boxall claims that it  
“is clearly a superior view to any static model of market positioning …[and 
that] the resource-based perspective offers a way of theorizing the 
contribution of HR strategy that does not rest solely on the reactive notions 
of the matching model” (1996, p. 65-66). He continues “[it] seems safe to 
suggest…that what the resource-based perspective has stimulated is a re-
balancing of the literature in a way that stresses the strategic significance 
of internal resources and capabilities and their historical development 
(ibid., p. 66).  
In particular, the RBV emphasizes the building of distinctive internal strategic assets. 
Human resources have been argued to be a good candidate for such assets (Wright et 
al., 1994). Human resources may according to the RBV constitute sustained strategic 
assets in so far as they, in addition to being valuable, rare, and non-substitutable, also 
exhibit the properties of historical path dependency, social complexity and/or causal 
ambiguity and, by consequence, the property of inimitability (Wright et al., 1994).  
Although traditional resources of competitive advantage such as natural 
resources, technology, economies of scale, and so forth, create value, the 
resource-based argument is that these sources are increasingly easy to 
imitate, especially in comparison to a complex social structure such as an 
employment system (Gerhardt and Becker, 1996, p. 781). 
In line with this Becker and Huselid argue that “HPWS [High Performance Work 
Practices] represent a source of “invisible assets” (Itami, 1987) that both create value 
and are difficult to imitate” (Becker and Huselid, 1998, p. 58). All this seems logical 
and potentially relevant. Becker et. al. (1997) go further and claim that  
“we believe that both the source of the HRM effect on firm performance 
and its inimitability reflect an ‘idiosyncratic contingency’ “ (ibid., p.41).  
It is an interesting hypothesis implying the importance of idiosyncratic forms of 
strategic fit. However, as Becker and Gerhardt say, the evidence for this hypothesis 
“is entirely inferential” (1996, p. 788). Although often referring to the RBV, 
quantitative empirical HRM studies have arguably not really answered to the 
challenges the RBV poses. The emphasis on idiosyncratic contingency and 
inimitability seems not to have led to any advances in terms of how to empirically test 
what such idiosyncracies and inimitabilities might involve. The closest researchers 




“an HR philosophy that takes as its strategic foundation an HRM system 
that is aligned both internally and externally to successfully implement a 
firm’s strategy is a best practice. The nature of the fit is not. It is in fact 
very firm specific and idiosyncratic which is the basis of its inimitability” 
(1998, p. 59). 
What this “in fact” refers to, we do not know. Further, it seems that idiosyncratic 
contingencies may well exist. But what kind of idiosyncratic inimitabilities and non-
substitutabilities that are valuable/effective we do not really know. Nevertheless, 
potential idiosyncratic contingencies should arguably not only be allowed for, but 
their potential relevance should also be captured by operationalizations in quantitative 
studies. Becker and Huselid claim that  
”The logic of inimitability has motivated a focus on complementarities 
…and ”bundles” or systems rather than the emphasis on individual HRM 
policies and practices that characterizes much of the traditional HRM 
literature” (ibid., 1998b, p. 3).  
However, the operationalizations of such bundles often allow only for some forms of 
equifinalities but seldom capture the distinctive relevance of idiosyncracies111. In 
particular the idea of inimitabilities incorporated in the RBV seems to live a life of its 
own aloof from anything done in most empirical research and it seems that the idea of 
synergistic bundles or systems of HRM practices can stand on its own feet. 
As already indicated, Chadwick and Cappelli also “place their bets” on the RBV. 
They engage in a reflexive discussion of the challenges the RBV poses to researchers 
in SHRM (1999, pp. 22-27). They also note that the RBV places organizational 
capabilities in focus, i.e. "the ability to use resources in strategically advantageous 
ways" (ibid., p. 21). However, the RBV does not offer very concrete help concerning 
the identification of such ways. Chadwick and Cappelli argue that in order to pursue 
its traditional questions, such as whether fit between business strategy and HR 
practices improve organizational performance,  
"SHRM needs some indication of which aspects or conceptualizations of 
business strategies "matter" for human resource practices. Likewise, if 
strategy is to be used simply as a summary of the competitive environment, 
direct measures of the environmental factors which "matter" should be 
used. The assumption previously was that generic typologies must apply 
because they seemed to describe fundamental differences in how firms 
were organized and operated. This no longer appears to be true" (ibid., p. 
22).  
Chadwick and Cappelli argue that this implies contextually sensitive research (ibid., 
p. 23). Pursuing such contextual sensitivity with reference to organizational 
competitive priorities in line with the suggestion by Ferris et al (1999, p. 393), we will 
attempt to conceptualize and define both strategic fit and the general adequacy of the 
HRM system “performatively”, i.e. as defined by the practitioners. We will try to 
identify the extent to which the HRM practices in general support implemented and 
emerged strategic priorities as they are manifested in the daily work of employees. 
                                               
111 We will return to the issues of both equifinality and idiosyncracy when discussing our 




We will identify the general support in terms of the amount, quality and relevance of 
the HRM practices as perceived by the objects of these practices, i.e. general 
employees. In line with the definition in section 1.3 we will call this support the 
sophistication of the HRM system. Concerning the explicit notion of strategic fit, we 
will let managers in the organizations judge how compatible over all the HRM 
practices are with the requirements for pursuing each organizations strategic goals, i.e. 
its “competitive priorities” (Ferris et al., 1999, p. 393). This compatibility will be 
identified by the extent to which the HRM practices support attitudes, competencies 
and behaviors needed to pursue strategic business goals. 
We will further try to analyze the extent to which variation in both strategic fit and the 
general sophistication of the HRM system influence organizational performance 
through some "generic" employee level attributes which have been argued to be of 
general importance (in particular) in knowledge intensive industries. In this way we 
try to analyze the extent to which the organizational capability in terms of the 
workforce can be enhanced by HRM practices which "matter" for the particular 
organizations under study. Chadwick and Cappelli argue that  
"strategies may...be better formed by looking for ways to apply existing 
organizational resources strategically...than by determining a general 
product market strategy and attempting to fit internal resources to it (1999, 
p. 19). 
However, independent of how the strategies are formed, the extent to which the HR 
practices help to apply the organizational capability in terms of the workforce to the 
ends actually pursued in daily activities should "matter". In a sense we will try to 
adhere to the suggestion that researchers’  
"attention may be profitably directed toward...the ability to implement 
human resource policies, rather than on the specific contents of strategies 
and sets of human resource practices, since fit may be a phenomenon 
which is idiosyncratic (ibid., p. 26). 
We will try to understand the consequences, at least in one knowledge intensive 
industry, of such implementational abilities. In doing so we will simplify by 
essentially assuming that organizational strategies matter to the extent that they are 
supported by the HRM practices.  
We will identify strategy itself very simplistically as a continuum along a focus on 
quality. We will use this explicit strategy variable only as a control in order to test 
whether the HRM practices and consequent employee level attributes matter 
independent of the degree of a strategic focus on quality. 
Our theorization may be compared to the one developed by MacDuffie (1995). 
MacDuffie identified the organizational logic of car factories as based upon two 
different components, a flexible versus mass production strategy, and two sets of 
HRM practices.  
We postulate a corresponding potentially partly idiosyncratic organizational logic 
with reference to knowledge and labour intensive organizations. The factors 
corresponding to MacDuffie's production strategy is in our case the (non-




and/or organizational commitment and/or organizational citizenship behavior. This 
can be viewed as a "production strategy" in terms of the degree of “mutuality” 
(Walton, 1985b, p. 64) in the relations between employees and organizations. In 
distinction to MacDuffie we include only one HRM system as the second component 
of the organizational logic. 
MacDuffie analyzed interaction effects of the components of the organizational logic 
he identified. We will use one component of the organizational logic postulated by us, 
i.e. the HRM system, as a means of explaining variation in the other component of 
this organizational logic, i.e. the production strategy112. Further, we will analyze the 
relationship between such a production strategy and both employee and organizational 
performance outcomes. We will also try to explain the indirect influence of HRM on 
employee and organizational performance, mediated by the elements of the suggested 
production strategy.  
The internal resources we identify are only partly potentially distinctive and 
idiosyncratic, i.e. in terms of the HRM system. The internal resources in terms of the 
production strategy are still generic and in this sense not compatible with the RBV.  
However, we argue that these generic assets in terms of workforce characteristics, in 
particular psychological empowerment, should be dependent on the potentially 
idiosyncratic workforce capabilities which are needed in order to effectively do the 
work required in the organization. The extent to which the HRM system influences 
the generic employee assets identified by us is by the same logic also dependent on 
the extent to which the HRM system influences the more specific required employee 
capabilities.  
At least the generic organizational capabilities comprising the suggested production 
strategy allow for the fact that the underlying capabilities may be firm specific. 
Pursuing the importance of the generic internal attitudinal capabilities in terms of 
psychological empowerment, organizational commitment and organizational 
citizenship behavior is arguably of more general interest because they are often 
considered as crucial characteristics of organizations. We will later come back to a 
more in depth discussion of these characteristics and their role in our theorization. 
We will thus partly try to adhere to the RBV in terms of its implications for the 
general importance of internal resources as well as the potential importance of (more 
distinctive) idiosyncracies related to the HRM system and its strategic fit.  
The way we identify the extent to which the HRM practices "matter", in terms of both 
the sophistication of the HRM practices and their strategic fit, makes our methodology 
somewhat ad hoc, but arguably still justified. Chadwick and Cappelli specifically 
emphasize that their suggestions about the importance of contextual sensitivity are not  
                                               
112 In fact, organizations do not even need explicitly to pursue such a production strategy. We will 
simply try to analyze the extent to which the sophistication of the HRM system contributes to the 
emergence of such a production strategy. The interest and importance of such a "production strategy" 




"an appeal for ad hoc methodologies. Descriptions of strategic content and 
of the particular approach to strategy used to describe linkages between 
HR systems and strategies should be based on a thorough knowledge of the 
empirical context for a particular study" (ibid., p. 24). 
However, as Chadwick and Cappelli argue, there may be "many more than three or 
four optimal "generic" configurations" (1999, p. 18) applicable to all organizations. 
This may be true even within any one industry. The dividing line between "ad hoc 
methodologies" (ibid., p. 24) and identifying strategy and/or strategic fit in terms of 
"strategic factors that are seen by the organization to be more or less important as 
competitive priorities" (Ferris et al., 1999, p. 393) is arguably fuzzy. In the next 
chapter we will explain in more detail a suggested understanding of the meaning and 
role of the more explicit notion of strategic fit in the suggested chain of outcomes113. 
3.3.2.3 An explanatory mechanism of performance effects of strategic integration 
Gerhardt and Becker have argued that “[f]uture work on the strategic perspective must 
elaborate on the black box between a firm’s HR system and the firm’s bottom line” 
(1996, p. 793). A similar argument is offered by Ferris et al. (1999, p. 394). The 
whole HRM system is one thing. The strategic fit of the HRM system is (at least 
partly) another thing. In addition to the open question of the mechanism(s) of the 
HRM system, the mechanisms of the strategic fit of the HRM system arguably 
represents a black box in itself. To date, most previous studies have analysed the 
incremental direct influence of strategic fit on organizational performance over and 
above any relationship between the HRM system and such organizational 
performance. However, how could we understand the mechanism(s) whereby strategic 
fit is linked to intermediate and ultimately bottom line outcomes? What is the relation 
between the HRM system as a whole and its strategic fit? 
We suggest that in a strategic soft HRM theorization external fit should primarily 
explain variation in (employee perceptions of) the sophistication of the HRM system 
and indirectly the outcomes of this HRM system. In pursuing this suggestion we 
assume that employees carrying out the actual work are good judges of the 
sophistication of the HRM system. Our argument is thus that an implemented and thus 
potentially causally active strategic fit compatible with a soft HRM approach should 
be reflected in employee perceptions of the amount, quality and meaningfulness of the 
HRM practices, i.e. the sophistication of the HRM system114. 
                                               
113 While thus partly trying to adhere to some possible insights related to the RBV, we also conceive 
the theory as problematical. The problem is that, to the extent that the RBV “offers a way of theorizing 
the contribution of HR strategy” (Boxall, 1996, p. 66) it seems at the same time to inhibit the 
possibilities of testing/making pragmatical use of such a theorization. In the more detailed critique of 
the RBV (below) we will try to work out the consequences of the arguable incompatibility of the 
claims “value creating resource” and “inimitable resource” as they are defined by the RBV. In fact, we 
will criticize the consistency of the RBV as developed by Barney (1991) with any very specific 
potential SHRM related explanatory variables capable of being empirically corroborated. 
114 What about the counter-argument that the extent to which strategic fit is reflected in employee 
perceptions of the sophistication of the HRM practices is dependent on two problematical assumptions: 
(1) that employees agree with the firm objectives and (2) have a good understanding of how HRM 




The general causal logic in the suggested organizational performance theorization in 
the form of strategic soft HRM could thus be stated as: the better the strategic fit, the 
more adequate (in terms of amount, quality and meaningfulness) HRM practices 
should be from the point of view of the employees. This should in turn affect the 
intermediate and ultimate performance outcomes115.  
Employee perceptions of HRM, including the effect of any strategic fit on these 
perceptions, are important if we maintain the position that “policies that promote 
mutuality” (Walton, 1985b, p. 64) are both economically and ethically important. Our 
conceptualization arguably allows us to investigate this assumption. More 
specifically, this conceptualization, together with the inclusion of intermediate 
employee attitudes and behaviors, allows research on the compatibility between soft 
HRM and strategic HRM. It makes possible the identification of the extent to which 
any influence of strategic fit is mediated by the sophistication of the HRM practices, 
and/or involves an independent but compatible influence on intermediate employee 
attitudes and behaviors and/or represents a different influence incompatible with soft 
HRM. 
If we do not conceptualize strategic fit as affecting either employee interpretations of 
the HRM practices and/or any intermediate perceptual attributes related to employees, 
but rather analyze the direct effects of strategic fit on organizational performance it 
seems that we will ambiguously deal with two different issues. One is human (or 
humane) resource management (where human resources are important to nurture and 
develop). The other is strategic fit and human resource  management (according to 
which human resources might be important but a fit between HRM policies and 
business strategy is even more important) (compare Keenoy, 1997, p. 834)116.  
                                                                                                                                      
We assume that the work employees have to do is a manifestation of the emerged strategy actually 
pursued by the organization. In this sense they should be good judges of the strategic fit of the HRM 
practices. Employees may of course disagree about the goals (strategy) pursued by the organization and 
thus about the appropriateness of the work they are required to focus upon and thus perhaps disagree 
about the appropriateness of HRM practices independent of whether they support the work the 
organization considers important. But this argument is problematical. To the extent that the HRM 
practices could positively influence attitudinal intermediate variables, employee work performance and 
indirectly organizational performance, on average one would assume that employees would have to 
agree upon the appropriateness of the work they are required to do. If they do not agree on this then in 
one sense HRM has failed (selection, performance appraisal, training, involvement, communication 
etc) and by consequence its sophistication should be rated as low. Thus, we re-affirm the argument that 
to the extent that HRM even in principle could have positive organizational effects through its 
influence on positive attributes of the workforce, employees should be good judges of the 
sophistication of the HRM practices including its strategic fit. 
115 ‘Better strategic fit’ and "adequate HRM practices" are holistic concepts. Considering also the 
bottom line effects, they are intended to refer to the points of views of both employers and employees.  
116 We could attempt to analyze only the relationship between some kind of sophistication of (the 
strategic fit of) the HRM practices identified by e.g. managers on the one hand, and employee level 
intermediate outcomes (identified by employee perceptions) on the other hand. However, in so doing 
we would run the risk of misspecifying our models without the possibility to gain any understanding of 
a fairly obvious potential reason for such misspecification. The sophistication of the HRM practices 
identified by managers may not promote "mutuality". Most straightforwardly mutuality can be 
identified as the performance effects of a form of HRM which is appreciated by employees. Strategic 




“Nearly all advocates of a ‘tight fit’ between business and HR strategies 
simply ignore the possibility that employee interests might make a 
difference to their prescriptions. In nearly all their work, HRM appears as 
something that is ‘done to’ passive human resources rather than something 
that is ‘done with’ active human beings” (Boxall, 1992, p. 68). 
We think this is an important observation and we agree with Boxall that “[a] theory of 
strategic HRM must explain the relationship between strategic management and 
employment relations in the firm” (1996, p. 62). Even if our suggested 
conceptualization does not explain this relationship it allows us to explore it in terms 
of certain potential consequences of the (potential) allignment of strategic human 
resource management with employee interests.  
3.3.2.4 Flexibility and HRM 
The importance of some sort of flexibility has been pointed out by several HRM 
scholars (Gerhardt and Becker, 1996; Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall, 1988; 
Wright and Snell, 1998). Also negative aspects of flexibility have been discussed in 
the literature (Legge, 1995, pp. 139-173; Blyton and Morris, 1992, pp. 116-130). The 
specific question of whether the sophistication of the HRM practices in an 
organization is due to some sort of flexibility will remain outside this study. 
Nevertheless, the debate on flexibility requires some reflections on its possible 
bearing on our research problem.  
Wright and Snell identify two dimensions of flexibility. The first is resource 
flexibility which does not necessarily have anything to do with dynamic environments 
and deals with appropriate HRM practices for different parts of complex organizations 
(Wright and Snell, 1998, p.763). The second is coordination flexibility and is 
discussed mainly in terms of problems with it. Wright and Snell mention that HRM 
practices differ in their amenability and the immediateness of the impact of such 
amendments. Wright and Snell argue that 
“it is entirely possible that it could be 4 to 5 years before enough of the 
workforce possesses the new skills [produced by amended HRM practices] 
to observe the impact on firm performance. By that time, however, the 
entire system environment (external environment as well as firm strategy) 
may have changed. Thus, one goal for developing flexibility in HRM 
practices is to develop feedback systems that provide accurate and timely 
information regarding the efficacy of a particular practice or system of 
practices” (1998, p. 763-764). 
Skinner (1981) claimed even more radically that it takes approximately seven years to 
achieve a genuine shift in human resource strategy. To the extent that there is any 
truth in this claim it casts even more doubts on the ability of companies to radically 
shift HRM strategies according to swift changes in business strategies. 
In general the feedback loops Wright and Snell are suggesting seem perfectly relevant 
in order to reduce the risks of confronting radical sudden changes and restructurings. 
However, within the perspective of flexibility, in theory the dimensions of fit would 
imply that it will seldom be a question of changing only one practice because of “the 
high interdependence between system elements” (Becker and Gerhardt, 1996, p. 789). 
The frequent change of all of them would indeed seem problematical. Thus, one 




(and probably do) construct HRM systems with an architecture which is likely to be 
relevant for a longer term. Pfeffer (1994, pp. 63-65) also argues for the relevance of 
such basic overarching high profile HRM strategies tailored to different general 
focuses on quality and innovation. In fact Wright and Snell offer a similar claim in 
that  
“the key role of strategic HRM is to ensure fit among a subset of 
strategically relevant variables while simultaneously seeking to build 
generic organizational capabilities that can be applied toward both 
discovering and implementing a variety of diverse strategic initiatives 
(1998, p. 767). 
Due to the “liability of external fit” (changing conditions) and the “liability of internal 
fit” (complexity of incremental change) and the “liability of newness” (uncertainty of 
complex wholesale changes), Chadwick and Cappelli’s (1999, pp. 17-19) arguments 
imply a similar logic. Their conclusion, however, based largely upon the RBV, is the 
importance of taking internal resources in consideration when deciding on strategies. 
Flexibility might be very important but the evident fact remains that organizations 
have to be good at what they are doing. If they are not, flexibility will be of little 
relevance. To the extent that flexibility is very important and compatible with the idea 
of (strategic) soft HRM, employees' perceptions of the sophistication of HRM 
practices should reflect it (or, be a consequence of it). In this way we will arguably 
account for the potential importance of flexibility in the HRM practices although we 
are not explicitly testing such a hypothesis117.  
So far we have discussed flexibility in terms of HRM practices. Wright and Snell 
(1998) also discuss flexibility in terms of employee skills and behavior. In this study 
we do not explicitly test for such flexibility either. However, again a theorization 
should at least be compatible with the potential relevance of such flexibility.  
In their discussion on employee behavioral resource flexibility Wright and Snell 
emphasize the importance of providing "employees with great latitude in deciding 
how to accomplish...goals" (1998, p. 766). The HRM system should "produce"  
"[e]mployees who possess a variety of [relevant] behavioral scripts and are 
encouraged to apply them in appropriate situations, rather than always 
follow standard operating procedures...[This should] increase the 
likelihood of the firm identifying new competitive situations and 
responding appropriately" (ibid., p. 766). 
The extent to which such employees are "produced" should arguably be reflected in 
employees' psychological empowerment, organizational commitment, organizational 
citizenship behavior. These are all aspects of the model of HRM we propose to test. 
                                               
117 Accounting for the potential importance and complexity of flexibility would also require some 
control variables related to changes in the HRM system. To the extent that such changes have occured, 
the potential effectiveness of the HRM system might not (yet) be identifiable. Controlling for recent 
radical changes should at least partly account for the relevance of Wright and Snell's and Skinner's 




Wright and Snell end by emphasising the importance of a “participative 
infrastructure” both for the ongoing organizational performance and the strategic 
planning process (1998, p.768). A “participative infrastructure” is arguably also 
embedded in the concepts of ‘psychological empowerment’, ‘organizational 
commitment’ and ‘organizational citizenship behavior’.  
As already noted, in this study we leave connections between specific manifestations 
of HRM practices, specific strategies and more specific skills, attitudes and behaviors 
outside our model (compare Wright and Sherman, 1999, pp. 59-60). All we do in this 
study is to try to conceptualize a general model which should reflect the potential 
relevance of certain flexibilities and more specific (potentially) idiosyncratic 
competencies118. 
3.4 AN APPROCHABLE GENERAL MEANING OF STRATEGIC SOFT 
HRM: A SYNTHESIS 
Boxall comments that  
 “[i]t needs to be stated, in the strongest possible terms, that existing 
notions of external and internal fit in the strategic HRM literature do not 
amount to a theorization of the employment relationship because they 
merely prescribe an elegant alignment of management practices in a 
unitary conception of the firm. Much more difficult, and more apposite, is 
the question of how to achieve at least a minimal alignment of interests in a 
pluralist conception of the firm” (1996, p. 68). 
When suitably developed, conceptually specified and operationalized, we would argue 
that one theorization which allows analyses of the role of HRM with reference to such 
alignment as well as its consequences is Guest’s (1997) theoretical framework (see 
section 3.1 above). It provides a way to begin to empirically test and develop ideas 
about the more detailed working of HRM in different (strategic) contexts and vis á vis  
different categories of employees. By testing an integrated theory of HRM, 
incorporating dimensions of alignment and the employment relationship, we are better 
positioned to detect misspecifications and misinterpretations of the adequacy and 
effectiveness of HRM practices. We are thus better positioned to corroborate (in a 
Popperian spirit; Putnam, 1974/1991) “the very idea of HRM”.  
We argue that using some set of formally specified HRM practices and/or very 
specific HRM outcomes in testing this "very idea" is problematical given the current 
state of knowledge. With reference to Cappelli and Singh (1992), also Chadwick and 
Cappelli note that  
                                               
118 Note that if our measures would not allow for the potential importance of any kind of flexibility, it 
would have consequences for the corroboration of the HRM theory. To the extent that our measures 
would not account for it we would for example, on the basis of Wright and Snell’s arguments, 
misspecify the relevant HRM system(s). Identifications in terms of formally existing HRM practices 
cannot in themselves capture any potential important (in)flexibility. Managerially identified formal 
properties of the HRM system and their fit with business strategy still leaves out the question of 
whether organizations have been able to implement these practices with adequate flexibility. Changing 
the system at the formal level might be relatively easy, but implementing it adequately would seem to 




“SHRM hypotheses [usually] are based on two unstated propositions: (1) A 
particular business strategy demands a unique set of responses from 
employees (behaviors and attitudes) and (2) A particular set of human 
resource policies produces a unique set of responses from employees. 
Arguments about fitting business strategy to human resource practices are 
really hypotheses about the relationship between Propositions 1 and 2. 
These hypotheses cannot be true unless both propositions are also true, and 
the main difficulty facing attempts to do research on strategy and human 
resources is that we do not have a well-developed body of knowledge 
associated with Propositions 1 and 2 (1999, p. 20). 
We would clearly need to understand more about the contextual demands, conditions 
for and consequences of HRM practices defined in more objective terms. In trying to 
test the “very idea of soft HRM” we acknowledge the epistemological limitations 
related to propostions 1 and 2119. In our research we will use performative 
operationalizations of the HRM system and strategic fit as well as general employee 
attitudes and behaviors which to a considerable degree allow for both equifinality and 
idiosyncracy with respect to both the demands of “a particular business strategy” and 
the effects of “particular human resource policies”.  
When trying to test "the very idea of HRM" largely in terms of the general framework 
provided by Guest (1997) there are, in addition to the epistemological reasons 
Chadwick and Cappelli note, two further sets of reasons (ethical and theoretical) for 
not using formal and objective definitions and operationalizations of HRM practices 
but rather definitions/operationalizations related to employee perceptions.  
One reason has to do with the fact that most organizations are not unitary in terms of 
goals and interests (Boxall, 1996) and in particular with the ethical fact that (at least 
soft) HRM is a discourse about the investment in people and mutuality. Not only the 
ends but also the means of HRM should be consistent with this mutuality.  
Another reason concerns the theoretical importance of capturing the potentially 
idiosyncratic implementations of the HRM practices. These implementational aspects 
would seem to be the causally important variables most consistent with the discourse 
on HRM. In line with this, Pfeffer cautions us that “implementation issues loom large, 
regardless of how sensible [from a more objective or formal viewpoint] the practices 
may be” (1994, p. 30). Also Guest and Hoque note that “having a strategy is not the 
same thing as implementing it effectively. Reporting a practice is not neceassarily the 
same as demonstrating that it is successfully in operation” (Guest and Hoque, 1994, p. 
5). Employee perceptions of the HRM practices would seem to be one interesting way 
of tapping their causality, in particular the causality which is most consistent with the 
perspective of mutuality120. 
                                               
119 Becker and Huselid argue for an equifinality with respect to the mix of HRM practices (1998, p. 6). 
Also Delery and Doty (1996, p. 808) offer such an argument. Thus it might seem as if the lack of 
knowledge with reference both to outcomes of different HRM systems and their relationship with 
strategy could be turned into a strength. However, the open questions concern not only the outcomes of 
different mixes of certain practices but also the very practices themselves. 
120 With reference to the issue of causality, Bouchikhi has offered a somewhat puzzling general 
argument. “The phenomena labeled as structure, strategy, systems or culture have no causal power on 




Irrespective of the epistemological limitations identified by Chadwick and Cappelli 
above, many researchers agree that we need more subtle conceptualizations of both 
HRM practices and strategic (external/internal) fit which should reflect the fact that  
“HR systems only have a systematic impact on the bottom line when they 
are imbedded in a firm’s management infrastructure and help solve real 
business problems…The particular form of these problems, and more 
important, the appropriate alignment of the HR system, are much more 
firm-specific than corporate strategies of cost leadership or differentiation” 
(Becker and Gerhardt, 1996, p. 794). 
A conceptualization in terms of employee perceptions of HRM practices is arguably 
one way to take such considerations into account. These perceptions should reflect the 
extent to which mutuality promoting HR systems “are [appropriately] embedded in a 
firm’s management infrastructure and help solve real business problems” (ibid., p. 
794) in terms of the actual work that needs to be carried out by employees. The 
perceptions should thus reflect an emerged and implemented form of “strategic factors 
that are seen by the organization to be more or less important” (Ferris, et al., 1999, p. 
393) as these strategic factors are reflected in the actual work of employees.  
In this thesis we will explicitly assume at least two things with reference to the HRM 
practices. Firstly, that it is meaningful to identify the sophistication of the HRM 
system as being dependent on how valuable the HRM practices are in motivating and 
enabling employees to perform their jobs. To the extent that we do not so identify this 
sophistication we argue that something else might be involved than an investment in 
the idea that ‘the human side of enterprise’ is one of the most important resources of a 
company. The investment in this idea, one version of the 'human' in human resource 
management, is part of our definition of HRM. The second assumption is that 
employee perceptions of the amount, quality and relevance of the HRM practices 
reflect their motivating and enabling properties.  
As noted above, this study will also employ a performative operationalization of 
explicit strategic fit in terms of managerial perceptions of how well the HRM 
practices support competencies, behaviors and attitudes required to pursue strategic 
business goals. This performative operationalization is due to epistemological 
limitations discussed in sections 3.3.2.1 and 3.3.2.2. In combination with this separate 
managerially identified variable in terms of strategic fit, the performatively identified 
HRM system variable allows for studying the potential compatibility of the points of 
views of "soft" and "hard" HRM. The a priori oppositional distinction between "soft" 
internally aligned HRM and strategic externally aligned SHRM is arguably neither 
necessary nor (potentially) adequate when developing a HRM theory of 
organizational performance in which performance is postulated to be generated 
through positive attributes of the human resource. 
                                                                                                                                      
an organization” (1998, p. 229). It seems that the above phenomena in principle can have causal 
powers and that there are no a priori answers to the question of potential causalities. There is simply 
variation in terms of what potential causal powers we as researchers are interested in (in what situations 
and for what explanatory purposes). The open question is always how much causality (or explanatory 




The traditional distinction between a soft (best practice) conceptualization and a 
strategic contingency conceptualization of HRM is one thing. Another prevalent 
distinction which partly cuts across these two conceptualizations is that between 
internal and external alignment. Usually both are argued to be important for the 
strategic fit conceptualization while only internal alignment is argued to be important 
for the best practice approach. However, to the extent that internal and external 
alignment contribute to the effectiveness of the HRM practices in terms of 
organizational performance, they both have to do some work. Neither of them can just 
be a gear the turning of which does not affect the rest of the machinery.  
An internal alignment of HRM practices would seem to imply that the practices 
support one another in producing consistent kinds of competence, behavior and 
attitudes. But this may be insufficient. In order to be influential in terms of 
organizational performance the forms of competence, behavior and attitudes may have 
to be specifically important for the achievement of strategic business goals. 
The potential importance of some form of external alignment is thus clear. The 
relevant alignment is arguably in relation to strategic business goals which are 
actually pursued, i.e. emerged strategic goals which are pursued in daily activities at 
work. Only through a fit with such goals can strategic fit have an impact on the 
effectiveness of HRM practices. Thus, in our conceptualization, a relevant external fit 
comes down to the HRM practices being supportive in terms of competence, 
behaviors and attitudes which are important to perform current jobs121. However, the 
extent to which all the HRM practices support competencies, behaviors and attitudes 
needed to perform required work should at the same time be a measure of both 
external and relevant internal fit. As Peck argues, "[i]f each functional area is linked 
with the overall strategy then one assumes that the practices as a whole are relatively 
consistent" (Peck, 1994, p. 717). 
Based on these arguments we conclude that, although a conceptual distinction can be 
made between internal and external fit, both may be needed for distinctive 
organizational performance effects. In their relevant forms, they may both come down 
to much the same thing122.  
                                               
121 There is also the kind of fit which is related to such work activities which are going to be pursued 
(Wright and Snell, 1998, p. 765). But these are clearly related to "intended strategy" (or strategy 
emerging in the future) and cannot influence current performance. 
122 Thus, in our conceptualization also the more general motivation of employees e.g. through 
employment security, leisure-time activities and other benefits represent strategic fit to the extent that 
they not only make employees more satisfied but really enhance employee and business performance. 
It is however plausible that HRM activities which are "nice" but only very loosely connected to the 
daily pursuit of business simply might have only a very marginal influence on employee and 
organizational performance differences. HRM scholars still have much work left do with reference to 
the more detailed causal logics of the individual HRM practices. The issue of universal best practices 
comes down to the question of whether there are universal strategic HRM goals relevant for all 
organizations and organizational strategies. There may be some such goals but we should hardly a 





Also Becker and Gerhardt argue for a sense in which “the best practice and 
contingency hypotheses are not necessarily in conflict” (1996, p. 786). They argue 
that 
“if there is a best practice effect it is more likely to be in the “architecture” 
of a system…For example, one architectural element of a high 
performance HR system might be that employee performance is valued and 
rewarded…There may be a best HR system architecture, but whatever the 
bundles or configurations of policies implemented in a particular firm, the 
individual practices must be aligned with one another and be consistent 
with the HR architecture if they are ultimately to have an effect on 
performance” (ibid., p. 786). 
We suggest that our conceptualization can identify a HRM system architecture, not 
just in the form of general company policy statements but in a form which is 
embodied in employee perceptions. The architecture is thus defined as consisting of 
employee perceptions of the sophistication of the HRM system. This 
conceptualization thus arguably allows a test of the consequences of an implemented 
HRM architecture potentially compatible with a strategic soft HRM approach. The 
specific relevance of strategic soft HRM can be evaluated on the basis of the degree to 
which strategic fit can explain the sophistication of this architecture and indirectly 
other postulated outcomes.  
Thus in summary, with our performative operationalizations we try to account for 
ethical and implementational aspects. Through these operationalizations we also try to 
account for both epistemological limitations as well as potential equifinalities and 
idiosyncracies of implemented HRM systems with respect both to the demands of "a 
particular business strategy" (Chadwick and Cappelli, 1999, p. 20) and to the 
employee responses produced by "particular sets of human resource policies" (ibid., p. 
20). For several (epistemological, ethical and theoretical) reasons it thus seems 
important to let the objects of the HRM system judge the perceived adequacy of it. 
From the point of view of the organization the consequences of such adequacy 
constitute at least part of the criteria of the importance of the HRM system123.  
Becker and Huselid claim that  
“An HR philosophy that takes as its strategic foundation an HRM system 
that is aligned both internally and externally to successfully implement a 
firm’s strategy is a best practice. The nature of that fit is not.” (1998, p. 
59).  
                                               
123 Our argument thus is that the aggregated perceived sophistication of the HRM system should reflect 
also the relevant forms of internal and external alignment compatible with "soft" HRM. A separate 
measure of managerial perceptions of strategic fit will only provide the possibility to assess the extent 
to which a managerially identified strategic fit is a compatible and/or relevant cause of this 
sophistication or whether it represents an all together different potential influence on any relevant 
outcomes. To the extent that (strategic) fit is not explanatory in relation to our proposed notion of HRM 
sophistication it might indicate either bad theory, bad conceptualizations/operationalizations or simply 
inadequate efforts by organizations to achieve (strategic) fit. To the extent that we get negative 
correlations between HRM-sophistication and strategic fit it could indicate contradictions between a 
soft HRM approach and strategic HRM, in particular if we can find significant positive relations 
between strategic fit and positive organizational outcomes. In that case we may have to look further for 




By this formulation Becker and Huselid remain silent on the issue whether a 
(longterm continuous) investment in the human resource is included in their notion of 
best practice. In our conceptualization such investment, reflected in employee 
perceptions of the sophistication of the HRM practices, and internal/external 
alignment may potentially be a “best practice”. Our conceptualization thus allows 
studying the possibility that also the nature of fit is a best practice, while allowing for 
the fact that the underlying formal HRM practices may not be. The importance of 
allowing for the latter point seems clear e.g. based upon the arguments offered by 
Ferris et al. 
 “Most studies have asked only the extent to which organizations utilize 
[e.g.] “formal performance appraisals”. [However] “[f]ormal performance 
appraisals” can mean very different things in different HRM systems. Are 
the performance appraisals developmental in nature? Do they include co-
worker or customer input? Are forced rankings used? Are appraisals 
reflective of traditional subjective supervisory ratings? Certainly, the type 
of appraisal most conducive to achieving organizational goals would vary 
across organizational contexts. The generic “formal appraisal” is thereby 
limited in the amount of information it conveys. The same is true for 
generic measures of selection methods, reward systems, and other HRM 
practices” [italics added] (Ferris et al., 1999, p. 393)124. 
A related issue of contingency is that the characteristics of a HRM system cannot 
avoid the fact that there will always be idiosyncracies in the way individual managers 
(or groups of managers) treat employees. "A recognition of such potential difficulties 
must be built into the study of human resource strategy" (Boxall, 1992, p.64). HRM 
should according to many involve also (line) managers (e.g. Storey, 1995, p. 6) and 
the development of managers (Legge, 1995, p. 74). Over the long run at least, HRM 
should influence both the qualities of managers and general employees. However, 
when trying to study the direct influence of the HRM practices on employee and 
organizational outcomes it is thus also of interest to try to control for a range of 
variables partly related but arguably still conceptually distinct from the HRM 
practices. In this study we will, among other controls, try to include variables in terms 
of organizational, superior and co-worker support variables as well as justice related 
variables. We will argue that these are theoretically interesting and important controls. 
With reference to outcomes we pursue the extent to which the perceived general 
sophistication of the HRM system can explain variation in general employee attitudes 
in terms of psychological empowerment, organizational commitment and 
organizational citizenship behavior. These employee attitudes and behaviors allow for 
the fact that the more specific forms of competences, attitudes and behaviors required 
and possibly produced by potentially idiosyncratic forms of sophisticated HRM, can 
vary between organizations. This may be the case even if they at some level pursue 
                                               
124 A related point is offered by Wright and Sherman (1999, pp. 68-69). Mueller argues even more 
strongly that “it would appear that the preoccupation among both managers and researchers with 
explicitly formulated, codified HRM policies is a position for which there is neither sufficient 
theoretical nor empirical justification” (1996, p. 759). Becker and Huselid offer an analogous argument 
in that they claim that “because these approaches imply such a limited range of strategy – HRM 
matches, there is little difference in their implications for HRM as a source of competitive advantage” 




formally similar human resource policies and/or business strategies. Our assumption 
in this thesis is that at least psychological empowerment (perhaps also organizational 
commitment and organizational citizenship behavior) reflect whatever underlying 
more specific and/or unique competencies that may be needed by employees to 
perform and thrive in the organizations125. Also at the level of outcomes we thus try to 
allow both for the fact that particular (formal) HRM policies/practices may not 
produce a unique set of more specific employee responses and that a particular 
business strategy may not demand a unique set of responses from employees 
(Chadwick and Cappelli, 1999, p. 20). The more explicitly tested assumption is that 
certain general employee work performance attributes (to be discussed later) reflect 
the employee work performance consequences of the general attitudes and that such 
work performance has distinctive consequences in terms of organizational 
performance. We discuss these issues in sections 7.2.4.1-3 and 7.2.5. 
One way to try to improve upon the current limited contextual understanding of the 
functioning of the HRM practices, is to follow Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi 
(1997) and MacDuffie (1995). They looked for potentially effective, general but 
industry specific answers in terms of combinations of formally defined HRM systems. 
This implies research within single industries combined with a thorough 
understanding, on behalf of the researcher, of work systems and organizational logics 
in these industries (Chadwick and Cappelli, 1999, pp. 23-24).  
However, when trying to put a general hypothesis of the influence of HRM to test, we 
arguably may still need more open ended definitions and operationalizations of the 
HRM systems, as well as their consequences. For instance, as reported by Becker and 
Huselid (1996, p. 794), in their comparative intra–industry case studies Cappelli and 
Crocker-Hefter (1996) found no “no best practice, rather each firm had a distinctive 
HR system that represented a core competency for that particular organization”126.  
Chadwick and Cappelli suggest another complication and possible solution with 
reference to identifying proper dimensions of HRM. 
“In industries where the human resource implications of a dominant 
production technology or employee governance mechanism are not 
obvious, making sense of the multitude of strategic actions firms might 
take can be a major problem…One solution is to break the organization 
into pieces where a dominant organizational logic does prevail…Of course, 
the difficulty with this approach is that it trades universal descriptions of 
the relationships between strategy, HR practices, and performance for 
contextual validity” (1999, pp. 23-24) 
                                               
125 With reference to the RBV, a weakness of the suggested model is clearly that, despite the 
arguments (reviewed below) about the importance of the suggested intermediate mechanisms 
(attitudes), they may not be distinctively important. It may well be the case that, to the extent that 
general explanations can be achieved at all, both employee and organizational performance differences 
can only be accounted for by more specific idiosyncratic properties of the work force. 
126 Evidently, a proposition that such core competencies in fact are significant causes of organizational 




Our methodology in terms of performative definitions/operationalizations, it might be 
argued, trades universal, formal and more objective descriptions of HRM practices 
and internal/external fit for at least an effort to achieve contextual (and theoretical) 
validity.  
In utilizing the suggested conceptualization which attempts to integrate and account 
for the arguments in the literature as well as acknowledge the limitations of current 
knowledge, we have thus tried to justify the argument that it is not appropriate to test 
hypotheses related to more objectively defined HRM practices, architectures or forms 
of fit. What the sophistication of the HRM practices more specifically than in the form 
of employee perceptions of amount, quality and meaningfulness consist or might 
consist of will remain outside this study. This research can at the most provide some 
evidence that pursuing the suggested general sophistication in the HRM system may 
influence certain outcomes including organizational performance. With reference to a 
generalizable HRM theory of organizational performance, we should arguably look 
for it at some such level of abstraction. To the extent that we can find evidence for 
something like the proposed general idea of strategic soft HRM, future research might 
probe properties and their formal-material antecedents in more contextually sensitive 
detail. 
Before presenting the suggested conceptual model and deriving more explicit 
hypotheses which we set out to empirically test we will do three things. First, we will 
return to some more detailed considerations of the status and implications of the 
resource-based view. We will then also consider the ethical aspects of HRM and their 
implications for research on links between HRM and performance. Then we turn to 
prior research on such links. Only after having done this are we ready to present what 
we argue to be a plausible and ex ante justifed model of certain links between HRM 




4 WHAT IS HRM – THEORY 
Wright and MacMahan (1992) provided a landscape of different theories of potential 
interest for HRM research. Of these theories the resource based view (RBV) is 
perhaps the most relevant for, and potentially most compatible with, strategic soft 
HRM. It has also increasingly been referred to as a foundation for and/or supporting 
the importance of SHRM (Wright & McMahan 1992; Storey, 1995; Purcell, 1995; 
Hiltrop, 1996; Boxall, 1996, Becker & Gerhardt, 1996). Specifically, Barney (1991) is 
widely referred to in these discussions. Therefore this particular version of the RBV 
will be focused upon below. We will try to understand its applicability to and 
implications for SHRM as well as the research thereof. This is done mainly through 
an analysis of two conceptual articles more specifically applying the RBV to thinking 
about SHRM: Wright, McMahan, & McWilliams (1994) and Mueller (1996).  
The underlying question is the same as Boxall's: In the framework of a resource-based 
perspective, "how do we theorise the role of HR policies and practices, the 
'interventions' of HRM?" (Boxall, 1996, p.67). It is important that we be clear about 
what the resource-based perspective is within which this theorising takes place. In this 
critical review of HRM and the RBV we argue that certain anomalies are involved in 
the use of the RBV as it has been developed by Barney (1991). What follows may be 
viewed as a deconstruction of sorts of the RBV and in particular its connection with 
HRM. One way to describe this critique is that we  
“attend to the langauge in the text[s] and to those areas where [the] 
language betrays itself” (Calás and Smircich, 1999, p. 656). 
However, since we see little purpose in deconstruction per se, we end with some 
(somewhat) more constructive arguments concerning the implications which seem to 
follow from the logic of the RBV. We will also argue that a theorization of HRM’s 
potential effects of organizational performance will have to operate at a more specific 
level than the RBV. 
4.1 THE RESOURCE BASED VIEW ACCORDING TO BARNEY - A 
SHORT PRESENTATION 
The RBV is a theory of sustained competitive advantages. Barney defines sustained 
competitive advantage as follows:  
“A firm is said to have a sustained competitive advantage when it is 
implementing a value creating strategy not simultaneously being 
implemented by any current or potential competitors and when these other 
firms are unable to duplicate the benefits of this strategy” (1991, p. 102).  
The RBV makes the assumption that some firm resources in at least some industries 
are not homogeneously distributed and not highly mobile (ibid., p. 103). This 
assumption makes it possible to understand the possibility of sustained competitive 
advantages (ibid., p. 105).  
More specifically, to  
“hold the potential of sustained competitive advantage...a firm resource 
must have four attributes: [1] it must be valuable, in the sense that it 




it must be rare among a firm’s current and potential competition, [3] it 
must be imperfectly imitable, and [4] there cannot be strategically 
equivalent substitutes for this resource that are valuable but neither rare nor 
imperfectly imitable” (ibid., p. 105-106).  
Two resources are strategically equivalent (substitutes) when they each can be 
exploited separately to implement the same strategies. Thus, non-substitutability 
refers to the requirement that there be no similar nor any different resources which 
can be strategic substitutes to a resource in order for it to contribute to sustained 
competitive advantage (ibid., p. 111). 
Resources are inimitable for one or a combination of the following reasons:  
(i)"the ability of a firm to obtain a resource is dependent upon unique 
historical conditions “, (ii) “the link between the resources possessed by a 
firm and a firm’s sustained competitive advantage is causally ambiguous “, 
or (iii) “the resource generating a firm’s advantage is socially complex.” 
(ibid., p. 107).  
Unique historical conditions simply refers to a firm’s “unique path through history” 
(ibid., p. 108). Causal ambiguity refers to the requirement that  
“both the firm that possess resources that generate a competitive advantage 
and the firms that do not possess these resources but seek to imitate them 
must be faced with the same level of causal ambiguity" (ibid., p. 109).  
Social complexity refers to social phenomena  
“beyond the ability of firms to systematically manage and influence” (ibid., 
p. 110).  
It is clear that the causal ambiguity involved in this theory is a "type 1" causal 
ambiguity (Mosakowski, 1997, p. 417), i.e. a fundamentally irreducible ambiguity. 
The concept of social complexity is analogous in its fundamental irreducibility. 
A resource is non-substitutable (inimitable) when all efforts to substitute for (imitate) 
them have ceased, and when all possibilities for emerging substitutes (emerging 
imitations) have been excluded. This concerns efforts by existing as well as potential 
competitors. 
4.1.1 The RBV - a critical discussion 
The question which arises is whether the RBV is a purely philosophical point of view, 
with no empirically determinable consequences. This is not Barney’s view, as he 
suggests “some specific empirical questions which need to be addressed” (1991, p. 
112). However, in order to do this, we would have to determine a priori universal 
properties (i.e. inimitability, non-substitutability). The implication of the RBV is that 
if there are sustained advantages, they will (by hypothesis) have to be universal, even 
if not eternal (ibid., p.103). Note that it cannot be a question of an induction to 
universality because, as explicated by Barney, the universal properties have to cover 
also all potential competencies, resources and efforts by current or potential 
competitors. The theory must thus necessarily involve an a priori identification of the 
universal properties of inimitability and non-substitutability. Such universality is 




Whether there are companies with such advantages, seems impossible to determine 
empirically. However, the idea would seem to be that the theory outlines conditions 
relevant as a focus imaginarius. Empirically we have to use judgement, both in 
research and in management, to determine conditions more or less in congruence with 
this focus. It is however disturbing that the theory outlines conditions which we by 
definition cannot identify empirically127. 
Barney draws the seemingly correct but cautious conclusion that  
“implicit in this model is the assumption that managers are limited in their 
ability to manipulate all the attributes and characteristics of their firms” 
(ibid., p.116).  
One could argue that it is not only an assumption but also an implication of the 
criteria of social complexity and causal ambiguity. The question is to what extent they 
are limited. Barney stresses  
“that managers are [not] irrelevant in the study of [sustained competitive] 
advantages. In fact, managers are important in this model, for it is 
managers that are able to understand and describe the economic 
performance potential of a firm’s endowments”(ibid., p. 117).  
On the other hand, according to Barney’s own conditions for sustained competitive 
advantages, they are (with the exception of the cases only involving unique historical 
paths), not able to understand what this performance potential consists of. Nor can 
they rationally and strategically produce it. However, Barney goes on to say that  
“without ... managerial analyses sustained competitive advantage is not 
likely” (ibid., p. 117).  
Thus the evolved potential sustained competitive advantage is not likely to be 
sustained if managers do not analyse it and then utilise, support and develop it. Such 
identification by managerial analysis and managerial activity is then one more 
(somewhat contradictory) condition for the resources actually to contribute to 
sustained competitive advantage. 
What shall we say about this, i.e. about managerial ability to support and develop such 
advantages, and thus about SHRM within the picture offered by the RBV? It would 
seem to be necessary to radically distinguish between the processes beyond 
manageability which have led to the advantage and the possibilities to manage its 
contribution and even its development. It is clear that in order to prevent the 
advantage from decaying,  
                                               
127 For an interesting critique which argues that the RBV, as a theory of competitive advantage, is 
simply tautological and lacking in empirical content, see Priem and Butler (2001a and 2001b). Our 
critique will focus more on the part of the RBV which is not necessarily tautological (Priem and Butler, 
2001b, p. 60), i.e. that part of the RBV which theorizes sustained competitive advantage. We will argue 
that even if the terms 'value' and 'rarity' could be defined in non-tautological ways, there are other 
problems incorporated in the RBV. Thus, our critique focuses on the extent to which "[t]he RBV has 




"the firm must continually reinvest in the factors that create the ambiguity 
and barriers to imitation" (Reed & DeFillippi, 1990, p. 97).  
But this seems problematic in that if management is by hypothesis not able to 
understand how the advantage developed, or even what it consists of, then how will 
they know how to nurture it strategically? How will they know that they are not 
destroying it by some specific practice or policy?  
There seem to be the following danger. We utilise the RBV as an abstract and non-
confirmable theory postulating the existence of and explaining how resources develop 
into sustained competitive advantages. We then move back to the more managerial-
friendly view continuing from the point where they have emerged. We will argue that 
there is a tension in so doing. In fact there is a serious problem of internal consistency 
in the RBV which undermines its explanatory potential. 
Barney has referred to a dilemma he calls the inimitability paradox (Barney, 1986, p. 
662-663). However, he does not problematise the idea of managing a sustained 
competitive advantage, only the idea of creating one. Regarding culture as such a 
potential advantage he says,  
“the normative implications of culture research are limited to assisting 
firms that already possess valuable, rare, and imperfectly imitable cultures 
and culture management skills in recognising and nurturing these 
organisational characteristics to obtain sustained above normal 
performance” (ibid, p. 663).  
In a later work he discusses “costly-to-imitate resources...(because of path 
dependence, causal ambiguity, or social complexity)” and says that managers in firms 
with such advantages “may be able to help their firms gain sustained competitive 
advantages” (Barney, 1996, p.172). This seems somewhat vague and not abiding with 
his strict definitions in the RBV outlined above.  
Essentially, the RBV needs an argument to the effect that there is a theoretical 
difference where a resource exists on the continuum between manageability and 
sustainability of an advantage. This claim follows from a basic proposition deduced 
from the RBV: In principle, the more one gains in sustainability, the more one loses in 
manageability, i.e. the more causal ambiguity and/or social complexity is involved. 
This could be a zero-sum game. The RBV seems to need something else than the 
ideas of the effects of causal ambiguity and social complexity on sustained 
competitive advantages, as these concepts are defined in Barney (1991).  
Reed & DeFillippi have tried to make sense of the properties of ambiguity, 
complexity, and sustainability. They are not concerned with extreme ambiguity, but 
rather with  
"situations in which managers understand causal relationships better than 
their competitors, and where competencies can be manipulated for 
advantage" (1990, p. 91). 
But even if we ease up the criteria of ambiguity and complexity, as is e.g. also 
suggested by Boxall (1999, p. 194), there is still a problem. There is no unproblematic 
reason for why the knowledge of the causes to advantage would not spread to 




gains, caused by the existence of barriers to imitation, would be greater than the costs 
of increased complexity and diminished manageability. For example, if only very few 
persons can grasp the overall performance generation (Reed and DeFillippi, 1990, pp. 
91-92), manageability is arguably significantly reduced. This is because it is very 
likely that decision making and agreement will be all the more politically 
problematical and arduous if this overall picture is not more widely shared and 
understood.  
To the extent that reference is made specifically to barriers to imitation of competitive 
advantages we agree that "barriers to imitation are never insurmountable" (Porter, 
1985). It is thus argued that the RBV should be reformulated to claim that the 
sustainability of a competitive advantage pertaining to a resource essentially is 
dependent on the time, persistence, competence and other resources required to create 
this resource. Of course, this will be a function of causal complexity. But this 
complexity is not defined by the concept of non-manageability nor that of un-
knowability as it implicitly is in the RBV outlined by Barney (1991). Nor is 
complexity thus defined as very limited knowability as it is by Reed & DeFillippi 
(1990). Basically we thus argue that the RBV stumbles on its own attempts to 
sophistication. In the literature applying the perspective of the RBV we confront 
similar attempts and stumblings. 
4.1.2 SHRM and the RBV - a background 
As has been pointed out, fundamental in SHRM is the combination of many ideas 
(Mabey & Salaman, 1995, p. 35-36). In general one can argue that there is a certain 
affinity between the RBV, its notions of complexity and causal ambiguity, and this 
view of SHRM as a combination of many dimensions. These are thus potential 
common denominators linking the RBV with SHRM.  
Even if many studies refer to the RBV, often they do not respond to a central critique 
flowing from the RBV, i.e. the attempt to relate formal SHRM policies and practices 
directly to superior performance outcomes128. Other implications of the theory are 
also left unnoticed. Becker et al. e.g. discuss their views within the framework of the 
RBV (1997, p.41), but simultaneously underwrite the claim that HR managers need 
“deep knowledge of the web of cause-and-effect relationships” (ibid., p. 43). Such 
knowledge is, we argue, problematic within the RBV. Similarly, Huselid et al. claim 
that the resource-based view suggests that  
“a firm’s pool of human capital can be ‘leveraged’ to provide a source of 
competitive advantage...competitive advantage is possible if a firm insures 
that its people add value to its production processes and that its pool of 
human capital is a unique resource, both difficult to replicate and difficult 
to substitute for. HRM practices comprise the many activities through 
which firms create human capital that meets these conditions” (1997, p. 
173).  
                                               
128 Even combinations of such formally identified practices seem, in particular in relation to the 
measurements and conclusions drawn, unsatisfactory in this sense. The conclusions are generally that 




Again we have an ambiguous use of the RBV. This seems to contradict Barney’s 
argument, which follows from his conditions, that firms which do not have such 
sustained competitive advantages, cannot create them (Barney, 1986). 
In the following we are going to reflect in more detail upon the fruitfulness and 
internal consistency regarding the application of the RBV to the study of SHRM. The 
two articles examined paint different pictures of HRM and sustained advantages but 
to a degree they both remain vulnerable to a common criticism. This derives from the 
above mentioned ambiguities within the resource-based perspective under analysis. 
4.1.3 The conditions of possibility of HR-based sustained competitive 
advantages 
Wright, McMahan & McWilliams attempt to establish (1) that human resources can 
give rise to sustained competitive advantage, (2) in what circumstances they can do 
this, and (3) that managers do have control over these resources (1994, p. 302). 
Regarding the condition of value incorporated in the RBV, Wright et al. refer to the 
theoretical rationale that has been offered for “the ways in which human capital 
resources increase firm value and techniques for estimating this increase in value” 
(ibid., p. 306-307). What is referred to is utility analysis. However, Wright et al. do 
not find these estimation techniques feasible and ultimately conclude:  
“What is important is that there is a consensus that higher quality human 
resources result in higher financial value for firms” (ibid., p. 307).  
The essential point from the perspective of HRM research is, however, that the 
research community strives for and understanding and a consensus on what these 
qualities are, what practices contribute to such human resources and how they do it.  
Wright et al. also defend the proposition that human resources of high cognitive 
quality are rare (by definition) because cognitive ability is normally distributed in any 
population (ibid., p. 308)129.  
Next, Wright et al. reflect upon inimitability, the third requirement of resources 
contributing to sustained competitive advantage. Their argumentation seem to pose 
some questions, already touched upon above. Wright et al. claim that the theoretical 
possibility of imitation of human resources  
“is highly unlikely due to the many contingencies that exist in different 
organisational situations..., [to the fact that] human resource advantages are 
most frequently characterised by unique historical conditions, causal 
ambiguity and social complexity, and thus, are almost always inimitable” 
(ibid., p. 310-311).  
This seems to imply that the conditions for inimitability are (most often) 
conjunctively, not only disjunctively satisfied regarding human resources.  
                                               




How can anything with such characteristics be managed or explained? This could be 
interpreted to be an honest and straightforward announcement of an aporia in strategic 
human resource management focused on sustained competitive advantages, and the 
research thereof. On the one hand HRM seems important and fruitful. On the other 
hand it seems impossible. How are we to understand this?  
We would have to make a radical, and arguably problematical, distinction between the 
social complexity and causal ambiguity of the processes involved in the advantage on 
the one hand, and the processes needed to nurture and develop this advantage, on the 
other. This seems untenable. There is thus a serious problem in any attempt to 
combine reference to the RBV with some specific theory of HRM and its outcomes, 
with the exception of contexts characterized exclusively by unique historical 
conditions. 
4.1.4 Generalisability, sources, and manageability of HRM based advantages 
Wright et al. continue by making some specific and central statements regarding (1) 
the generalisability of human resource advantages, (2) their sources and (3) their 
manageability , respectively, which we want to follow up.  
(1) Human resources are 
“one of the few resources which have the potential to ... be transferable 
across a variety of technologies, products and markets...[and] many human 
capital resources are quite generalisable” (ibid., p. 312).  
This seems contradictory to the claims about social complexity and causal ambiguity. 
They say e.g. regarding social complexity that  
“[i]t is possible that relationships between key personnel such as sales 
representatives and buying agents will develop over time and become part 
of a network that includes a larger group of personnel such as design and 
marketing staff, production and distribution workers, and management, as 
well as final consumers” (ibid., p. 310).  
This holistic idea would seem to make the human resources very sensitive to changes 
and not “transferable” and “quite generalisable”. Specifically, high cognitive abilities 
alone would not seem to be enough to produce such relationships. 
(2) In their critique of HRM practices as a source for competitive advantage Wright et 
al. claim that  
“the source of sustained competitive advantage lies in the human resources 
themselves, not the practices used to attract, utilise and retain them” and 
that the HRM practice-oriented perspectives “are somewhat deficient from 
a theoretical as opposed to a practical standpoint” (ibid., p. 317).  
It seems, however, that we cannot exclude the possibility that the HR practices are 




human resources “themselves” as the "ultimate source" seems to be both inadequate 
and to exemplify an unduly essentialistic causal ontology130. 
(3) Wright et al. go on to claim that even if the (ultimate) source of sustained 
advantage is the HR capital pool, human resource management practices play “an 
important role “ (ibid., p. 318) in developing these advantages.  
“[T]he human resource capital pool is a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition for human resources to act as a sustained competitive advantage" 
(ibid., p. 318-319). [In addition to the human resource pool,] “the correct 
mix of HR practices is a necessary condition for the maximal effectiveness 
of the HR capital pool” (ibid., p. 318). 
This makes logical sense as long as we insist upon the fact that human resource 
practices can produce and nurture sustained competitive advantages in a planned and 
controlled way at the most regarding advantages which are exclusively due to 
historically unique contexts.  
The problem (or advantage) concerning SHRM practices arguably lies in the detailed 
and intricate relations between their implementation and many other dimensions of 
organisational reality. These relations seem very aptly characterisable as socially 
complex and their relation to advantages (at least currently) causally ambiguous. Only 
the codified aspects of HRM practices can more easily be imitated131.  
The above mentioned ”apology” (Wright et al., 1994, p. 317) regarding the focus of 
practical SHRM does not seem relevant. If we adhere to the RBV the focus should be 
changed, both the theoretical and the practical. The focus should be on the 
combination of existing human resources, the implementation of SHRM practices and 
other organizational processes. Precisely here lies the problems of combining SHRM 
and the RBV. What managers or researchers can do in order to enhance and 
understand sustained competitive advantage in accordance with the RBV seems 
highly limited. In fact, we question the very theoretical possibility that there can be 
knowledge of a correct mix of HR practices to develop or nurture a sustained 
competitive HR advantage in other contexts than potentially historically unique cases. 
Thus, as we shall argue, we also question the sustained (as opposed to more or less 
sustainable) nature of any competitive advantage132. 
Wright et al. claim that  
                                               
130 In addition, Wright et al. indirectly defined “high quality human resources” (p. 307) in terms of 
normally distributed “cognitive abilities” (p. 308). Thus something (e.g. SHRM practices) seems 
needed in order to impede the same level and distribution of these cognitive abilities in all 
organizations. This something is either chance or some processes which are more “ultimate” than the 
actual quality of the human resources. From the perspective of SHRM, as already noted, it had better be 
some form of SHRM practices. 
131 It has been claimed that human resource policies relatively easily are subject to imitation between 
firms (Udayagiri and Hunter, 1995). This, of course, does not mean that the implementations of related 
practices, which after all are the ones potentially leading to advantages are easily imitable. 




“Managers can use HR practices...to attract, identify and retain high ability 
individuals...[and] once a differentially high quality human resource capital 
pool has been developed, the firm has a first mover advantage over 
competing firms” (ibid., p. 319)133. 
This is problematical as the RBV implies that this process has to be emergent and 
contingent, not strategically manageable. The RBV would minimally claim that only 
when a company already has (perhaps due to a unique historical path) a differentially 
high quality human resource management staff, then it could possibly further create 
and nurture the advantage. The processes of attracting, identifying, retaining 
developing and motivating high ability individuals would depend on there being 
sustained competitive HR advantages which enable companies to do this (sustainably 
better than competitors). Thus, the properties of causal ambiguity and social 
complexity seem somewhat implausibly reduced to the emergence of sustained 
advantages in skills related to human resource management?134  
Wright et al. end up emphasising two codified or codifiable criteria for sustained 
competitive HR advantages, i.e. the formal criteria of HR practices, and the formal 
criteria of cognitive abilities. We will see that Mueller (1996) moves in the opposite 
direction.  
It is the circumventing of the idea (acknowledged by Wright et al.) of the limited 
ability of managers embedded in the RBV which invites most critical reflection. We 
basically follow a move from  
”One of the problems inherent in [the RBV] ...is that it limits, to a great 
extent, the role of the manager in creating sustained competitive 
advantage” (ibid., p. 321), 
to  
“very few other firm resources are under as direct a control of managers as 
human resources” (ibid., p. 321).  
This seems a problematical conclusion after the development of the view that human 
resources can be a source of sustained competitive advantage precisely for the reason 
that they are socially complex and causally ambiguous phenomena dependent upon 
                                               
133 They also claim that first mover advantages arise because high quality human resources are rare, 
inimitable and non-substitutable. But the RBV does not imply that sustained competitive advantage is a 
condition for first mover advantages. Barney argues only that the heterogeneity of resources is such a 
condition (Barney, p.104). 
134 The sustainability of such advantages is as problematic as any other sustainabilities. The more 
urgent problem for explicit SHRM theorizing seems to be to conceptualize and provide empirical 
evidence for what properties of HRM practices give rise to any advantages. As we have argued earlier, 
both the properties, and the ways to achieve these properties, may well be very idiosyncratic and 




unique historical conditions. These are precisely the elements which according to the 
RBV limits the possibilities of management135. 
Thus, we question the reduction of sustained competitive HR advantages to general 
cognitive abilities of employees. We also think that the link between sustained 
competitive advantages and SHRM practices needs further reflection.  
Lado & Wilson argue that  
“[a]n examination of the role that the HR system plays in facilitating or 
stifling the development of organisational competencies [contributing to 
sustained competitive advantage] is warranted” (1994, p. 700, italics 
added).  
To the extent that we refer to sustained competitive advantages, we have argued that 
there is a hidden and serious problematic of knowing what stifles and what facilitates 
this process. 
4.1.5 Persistence and the evolutionary character of human resources 
Mueller argues that rather than more empirical research into the effect of HR policies, 
we should question “the conceptual accounts of HRM” (1996, p. 759). He argues that  
“From the evidence it would appear that the preoccupation among both 
managers and researchers with explicitly formulated, codified HRM 
policies is a position for which there is neither sufficient theoretical nor 
empirical justification” (ibid., p. 759).  
Mueller’s answer to this situation is an evolutionary resource-based theory which 
includes the following propositions:  
The development of strategic human resources “happens as a slow, incremental, 
evolutionary process that requires patience [and] is facilitated by ‘persistent intent’ ” 
(ibid., pp. 771; 771-772). It crucially depends on “underlying processes of skill 
formation” and existing “spontaneous co-operation “ (ibid., pp. 771; 773-775). It is 
more efficient the more “HRs work in concert with other resources” (ibid., pp. 771; 
775-776).  
Mueller sometimes seems to forget the talk about sustained competitive advantage 
and discusses the general development of “strategic human resources”. If this is 
intended as a synonym for sustained competitive advantages, then we come back to 
the point made earlier concerning the causal ambiguity and social complexity of the 
processes involved. How could researchers then explain and managers know what to 
be “patient” with, how to “facilitate” such development, and what “underlying 
processes of skill formation”, “spontaneous co-operation “ and tacit knowledge (ibid., 
p. 777) to draw upon?  
                                               
135 In apparent distinction to Wright and MacMahan, Snell et al. claim that “people are one of the most 




(1) As yet, there is not much evidence, nor conceptual argument, as to what “daily 
forms of bargaining, exchanges, tit-for-tat, negotiations and resistance” (ibid., p. 774), 
are part of the causes of (sustained) competitive advantage.  
(2) Not to mention that there is not much evidence as to what type of HRM policies 
and practices are necessary to support such phenomena.  
The RBV seems to imply that we could answer the former questions only in the cases 
characterised exclusively by a contingently unique historical background and/or social 
complexity. The case of social complexity is however already problematic. An 
implication of the theory is that we can solve the latter problem related to SHRM 
practices only in cases where there is no causal ambiguity nor any social complexity 
and thus necessarily relevant uniqueness of historical paths (as these concepts are 
defined in the RBV). 
Mueller thus potentially has a similar dilemma as the earlier authors. He also wants to 
preserve the idea that management is important and that HR policies play a necessary 
role in the “tapping of the organisation's hidden reservoir” (ibid., p. 777). He says that  
“even if formalised HR exercises are insufficient for the creation of 
[strategic advantages], they can still perhaps play an important role in 
conjunction with other changes or already existing resources” (ibid., p. 
770-771).  
One interpretation of Mueller’s idea is that the evolutionary resource-based theory 
downplays the causal ambiguity and social complexity involved, and thus rejects the 
RBV outlined by Barney (1991). Mueller's arguments would seem to suggest that the 
resource mobility barriers are to some extent evolutionary (i.e. arbitrary) and temporal 
factors. The development of competitive human resource advantages is a time 
consuming, somewhat idiosyncratic process. The idiosyncracy has a lot to do with the 
essentially complex and non-identical136 relationships between actors and systems, 
between agency and structure. The evolutionary aspect of the processes means that 
management cannot have full control of the creation of the advantages. But it can 
perhaps make them possible by persistent attempts. In this framework there is no 
principal theoretical problem with the view that once advantages have emerged they 
can be further managed, nurtured, developed as well as explained (but also imitated or 
substituted).  
However, the analogy to natural evolution requires the following emphasis. “Natural” 
biological phenomena, when emerged and to the extent that they are stable at all, are 
arguably supported by sustaining processes continuously at work. In a parallell 
fashion, in particular in a turbulent, dynamic and expanding world like that of 
organisations, social phenomena seem not to be stable in and of themselves. Rather it 
would seem that e.g. in order for (complex) social advantages to sustain, they would 
need active social nurturing just to continue to exist. And the possibility of this, in the 
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case of highly dynamic social phenomena, would seem to depend on our knowing 
what produced or produces them137. 
Thus, for explanatory purposes we have to be able to determine the evolutionary 
processes that were involved in the emergence of particular advantages [no ex post 
causal ambiguity á la Barney (1991)]. Where emerged, these or alternative processes 
must then also be effectively repeatable and sustainable [at least no ex post causal 
ambiguity nor social complexity á la Barney (1991)] 138. Otherwise the management 
of the advantages would be impossible. So would the explanatory potential of any 
SHRM practices. 
4.1.6 Conclusions 
According to the RBV as outlined by Barney (1991) we could not, as managers nor as 
researchers, say much (in a rational sense) about SHRM’s role in the development nor 
the nurture of sustained competitive advantages. It would not be a rational activity in 
the sense that we would know or could come to know, and/or have control of the 
effects of what we are doing, except in cases where only the condition of historical 
uniqueness is satisfied. We have argued that this in fact means that “sustained” 
competitive advantages under these circumstances are simply very unlikely to exist. 
Another way of putting this conclusion is that either the RBV needs to be 
reformulated or strategic HRM (as it gets conceptualised through the RBV) is 
irretrievably intuitive in addition to its goals remaining very problematic in most 
cases. We have thus argued that this formulation of the RBV is not going to be of 
much help in the study of SHRM.  
Thus firstly, whatever empirical research on SHRM can find out, it has to be 
something else than the effect of SHRM on sustained competitive advantages even if 
there may at some levels be severe social complexities and causal ambiguities 
involved. It is thus suggested that we should not a priori overemphasise the causal 
ambiguity nor the social complexity involved, as is done in the RBV developed by 
Barney (1991). We should concentrate on potential competitive HR advantages which 
are simply more difficult to create/imitate/substitute rather than impossible to 
create/imitate/substitute. Essentially this means that we should abandon the idea of 
sustained competitive advantages. This seems to be the only way not to be drawn into 
insurmountable conceptual problems.  
Secondly, to the extent that there is anything plausible in the RBV, there is a 
suggestion which receives support in the above reflections. This is the idea that 
                                               
137 The case in a non-turbulent world/culture would be somewhat different. There the same processes 
can be sustained as a tradition without the representatives themselves necessarily knowing what 
produced them.  
138 Any such alternative processes are presumably able both to produce and sustain advantages. In 
particular concerning social phenomena, there seem to be no good arguments claiming that some 
processes can create things and other processes can only sustain them. It is perhaps conceivable that 
some processes, in themselves insufficient to produce a social phenomenon, can nevertheless help 
sustain such phenomena for some time. However, if they are not able to produce them on their own, 




SHRM research should allow for and try to utilize operationalizations which can 
account for the relevance of any contextual idiosyncracies in the implementations of 
HRM practices. As already noted, in our empirical study we will try to use such 
measures. 
Thirdly, the logic of Mueller's arguments seems to indicate that time horizons are 
important. Significant and more lasting effects on organizational performance can 
hardly be expected to show up after only a year or two of even serious focus on 
SHRM practices. With reference to the identification of such time horizons there are 
severe limitations also in our study. Some steps in this direction are however taken in 
this research. Our operationalizations should be sensitive to the potential importance 
of time horizons with reference to achieving implementational adequacy of the HRM 
practices. 
Finally, the topic of HRM’s influence on organizational performance essentially 
seems to demand a much more specific theorization than what the RBV can provide. 
A organizational performance theory of HRM would seem to belong to what Priem 
and Butler call "midrange theories" (2001b, pp. 64; 61). Conceptually, the gains from 
utilizing the RBV in the pursuit of such a theory seems limited to some support for the 
a priori plausibility that HRM may be influential, as well as some implications for a 
possible explicitness and extent of formalization of such a theorization. The result 
may not be a simplistic theory with very specific necessary formal elements. Rather 
what we should strive for seems to be a theorizing of different sufficient and relatively 
loosely defined elements and processes139. 
Below we will suggest a model, including operationalizations, along these lines. 
Before presenting this model we still need to consider two aspects of HRM. First, we 
will consider the much debated ethico-political debates with reference to HRM. Then, 
we will consider and evaluate earlier empirical research on the influence of HRM. 
The following two chapters may be considered as further justifications for both the 
legitimacy and relevance of our empirical research project. 
                                               
139 Mueller claims that although his arguments “denies HRM the status of a sufficient condition, it can 
still leave a necessary role for HR policies in order to provide a stimulus for change and start a processs 
that results in a more extensive tapping of the organizations’s ‘hidden reservoir’ ” (1996, p. 777). 
Testing such a hypothesis would seem to be very difficult. It would involve looking for counter-
evidence to the hypothesized necessary role of HRM. But what would be the more specific necessary 
elements of HRM, i.e. what kind of counter-evidence should we look for? In this thesis we will still try 
to identify a sufficient role of HRM. Mueller may be right about the futility of such attempts. However, 
his argument at least partly seems to depend on how we conceptualize HRM practices and policies. 




5 WHAT IS HRM – VALUES 
“Is HRM Ethical? Can HRM be Ethical?” is the title of an article by Legge (1998). As 
chapter 2 suggested in more detail, every research topic, research approach and 
knowledge claim has to be justified and can only be justifed by a set of ethical-
political-pragmatical arguments and considerations. Thus, the question of values, or 
the ethical aspects of HRM are in a sense foundational. Therefore we will try to 
defend our approach by situating it with reference to a set of more or less severe 
"ethical" criticisms which have been directed towards HRM and the HRM literature.  
Partly linked to the gaps in the empirical HRM literature discussed in chapter 6, at 
least some researchers have been troubled by a fundamental question concerning 
HRM or the "HRM movement". This question has concerned whether HRM is mainly 
a  
“formula for managing decline, down-sizing and retrenchment, or 
genuinly, as it claims, a formula for unleashing, focusing and enhancing 
organizational creativity and capability” (Mabey and Salaman, 1995, p. 
18). 
In other words, as already noted in section 2.8 one fundamental ethical question can 
be understood as concerning "what the 'H' of HRM" (Steyaert and Janssens, 1999, p. 
179) stands for or could stand for. 
5.1 MARKET MECHANISMS 
Keenoy (1997)140 recapitulates traditional concepts like 'collective bargaining', 
'unions', 'personnel management', 'interests', 'employment protection', 'pluralism', 
'conflict'. All of these are obviously important concepts but pluralism, conflict and 
collective bargaining cannot be considered ends in themselves. The "movement" of 
HRM and the arguable positive potentials within it faces us researchers with the 
possibility, and in particular the need, to consider what might be alternatives or 
complementarities to the above characteristics and their consequences for individuals. 
However, Keenoy sees little positive potential and points to a re-imagination of the  
"socioeconomic and organizational life to facilitate, promote and legitimize 
the purifying effects of the 'market mechanism' in all its various guises. 
This ideological project(ion) is associated with a 'new' set of 'normal 
science' lingustic images relating to employment regulation (e.g. 
'flexibility', 'deregulation', 'performance', 'quality', 'customer', 
'individualism', 'commitment', 'non-union', 'competition')... Analytically, 
[the] "linguistic turn" has engendered a significant shift of emphasis. The 
employment relationship, having been a structural (pluralist) relationship is 
being reconstituted as an astructural (unitary) relationship. We have also 
seen a parallell shift of focus away from internal employer-employee 
relationships characterized by endemic competition...'people-management' 
is being re-imagined as (human) 'resource-management'. " (1997, pp. 835-
836). 
                                               
140 Keenoy (1997) is a review of two central and fairly critical books on human resource management 
which both appeared in 1995 (Legge, 1995; and Storey, 1995), a good decade after the flood of articles 




The "ideological projection" mentioned by Keenoy above is clearly ideological in the 
sense that the current notions of global capitalism, competition and world trade are 
ideological. Given these, most of the above "linguistic images" connected to the ideal 
of HRM try to describe tools and phenomena which at least in some form seem to be 
of relevance in todays organizational world. 
The ideas of employment security, employee development, satisfactory pay and 
benefits, better communication and appraisal discussions, employee influence and 
autonomy as well as the general idea of pursuing commitment also have another side 
than the one implied by Keenoy. In so far as these ideals can be theoretically 
promoted and pursued in practice, they seem to fly in the face of the self-evidency or 
givenness of the extreme affirmation of the "purifying effects of the ‘market 
mechanisms’” within the HRM movement. The way in which strategic soft HRM 
taken seriously is contradicting negative associations of the ‘market mechanism’ as a 
producer and distributor of employees is: It emphasizes a complex and integrated 
form of competence and motivational development within organizations, properties 
which cannot at least in any simple way be bought in the market.  
Keenoy claims that given the  
"ideological spin, there is no inconsistency in HRM embracing the logic of 
the market while - at the same time- 'valuing' its human resources. They 
are valued for their 'resourcefulness' (and what that costs) not their 
'humaneness' (and what that might deserve). " (ibid., p. 836). 
With reference to this topic, Jacques argues that  
”[t]odate, managerialist writing has treated the human more or less solely 
as a capital ‘resource’, and failed to engage the hard questions of power 
and voice that are increasingly necessary in order to be even instrumentally 
effective as a profit producer. Similarly, but conversely, most critical 
writers reject out of hand the idea that the human be thought of as a capital 
resource. While this is admirable from a certain perspective, such romantic 
Humanism prevents engagement with the dominant language of the 
workplace in which, like it or not, ‘human capital’ and ‘human resources’ 
are representations of the worker one must be able to deploy in order to 
interact with, and influence, the web of power relationships structuring the 
workplace” (1999, p. 201).  
In line with this we have tried to develop a conceptualization which at least to some 
extent lets us pursue the compatibility of the "humanistic" and the "human 
capital(istic)" points of views. In particular, the conceptualization is intended to be 
sensitive to the assumption that employee’s engagement, influence and some other 
attitudes are “increasingly necessary [for organizations to consider] in order to be 
even instrumentally effective as a profit producer”. 
As already noted, some organizational contexts seem to offer more fruitful ground for 
strategic soft HRM to flourish. It seems important that researchers make an effort to 
develop models which capture any possible negative as well as positive empirically 
detectable consequences it might have in different contexts. To the extent that 
organizations practice soft HRM only at a verbal/rhetorical level, a proper 
conceptualization of HRM should detect consequences of this.  




“we should be developing frameworks and dimensions which allow us to 
study aspects of employment relations and human resource management 
without distinctive reference to the union issue” (1994, p. 2).  
However, in line with Keenoy, Guest also claims that  
“[I]n wider society, in some respects the conditions are being recreated 
which led to the growth of trade unionism a century ago” (Guest, 1995, p. 
129).  
Guest refers to the UK but his point has arguably greater generalizability. Also 
Hancock argues that  
“[I]f one thing seems to have increasingly come under threat from [the] 
‘new style managerialism’, it is the contract of employment...[This 
contract] appears to have become increasingly undermined as the 
legal/rational foundation of social relations within contemporary work 
organization [p. 97]...Even where it could be argued that some form of 
organizational citizenship may be emerging based upon a new from of 
contractual relationship...it is more likely to revolve around an elite core of 
employees at the expense of a relatively disenfranchised periphery, with 
this largely female, low-skilled and part-time labour force left unable to 
exercise choice or freedom of participation within this brave new 
organizational lifeworld [p. 98]” (1997, pp. 97-98).  
There should evidently be a proper legal context which defends employees against 
abuses and more or less extraordinary events. At present, this is not a problem to the 
same extent in the Nordic countries as it perhaps is e.g. in the USA. A proper balance 
of freedom and legal requirements in this area is a difficult issue. It will remain 
outside the present thesis. In our view (at least the rhetoric of) HRM and in particular 
strategic soft HRM concerns mutual benefits of investing much more in employees 
than any such legal requirements are likely to dictate141. 
                                               
141 To the extent that something like strategic soft HRM offers gains only to knowledge intensive 
organizations and their most resourceful employees, societies (still and again) face tricky ethical 
questions related to the increased “meritocratic” tendencies involved in the “HRM movement”. On the 
one hand it may e.g. be seen as reducing income differences between “traditional” passive shareholders 
and employees. On the other hand, if something like strategic soft HRM does not pay off e.g. in less 
knowledge intensive contexts, the income (and other) differences between those who are more “able” 
(including more "lucky") and those who are less so increase (“the Mattheus effect”). There are arguable 
ethical limits to such differences. They are however difficult to identify and agree upon. How much 
should one be compensated for social and genetic advantages, which largely are beyond each 
individual’s own responsibility and possibility to influence? Ethics run into confrontations with 
pragmatical questions. If individuals are not compensated for such individual capacities, what could 
move them to do their best? What does "doing their best" mean on a collective level? Global political 
processes can only balance, but arguably not once and for all solve these ethical-pragmatical issues. 
That they are highly relevant seems to be confirmed as “recent American research demonstrates [that] 
there is little ´trickle down´ of productivity-driven wage inflation from a growing, knowledge-driven 
economy to the lowest skilled workers “(Boxall and Purcell, 1999b, pp. 192-193 who refer to Nord, 
1999). The liberal argument that justice is a question of same opportunities for everybody is naturally a 
very complicated one. To render the opportunities “the same” simply seems empirically to be an 
impossible endeavour. Thus “the same opportunities” is ususally used in a somewhat equivocal sense. 
The opportunities can of course be more or less the same, where more is better than less. Rawls has 
some important things to say about these issues. His position or suggested point of view for deciding on 




With reference to HRM, Keenoy goes on to claim that  
"...when managers 'rightsize' the organization, it is, by definition, an 
entirely 'positive' act in tune with 'the market' (1997, p. 836).  
Here we are faced with rhetorical arguments from an opponent to HRM about 
'rightsizing' being a 'positive' act through and through without taking any context into 
consideration142. It is rhetorically implied that continuous layoffs would have positive 
effects on long-term commitments of employees and supporting serious efforts to 
build a competent human resource. Keenoy’s argument (consciously) conceals or 
downplays the argument that in the long run the humaness and resourcefulness are at 
least to some extent dependent on each other. This is of course the debatable 
assumption that strategic soft HRM embodies. This idea still needs to be critically 
developed and tested in different contexts. That would increase the chances for well 
justified beliefs concerning these issues. The assumption is of course more likely to be 
true in contexts of knowledge intensive organizations where the “human resources” 
have more bargaining power. In other contexts labour unions could well take up the 
themes of (strategic) soft HRM (Guest, 1987). However, such efforts would arguably 
in todays world gain considerable momentum only to the extent that empirical 
research can convincingly show positive individual as well as organizational effects of 
something like strategic soft HRM. 
Humanity is still only learning, increasingly on a global scale, to cope with an 
accelerated capitalism. There is an increasingly inevitable truth in the claim that 
employees are part of “perilious journey” where no-one is “safe” (Keenoy, 1997, p. 
836, referring to Dunn, 1990). What it inevitably means is that human beings (again in 
western industrialized societies) are more widely in danger of being treated as 
resources which can be disposed of when ineffective. These increased pressures are 
arguably less the fault of HRM and more one of the questionable consequences of 
global capitalism.  
The present study attempts to study whether (some of) the rhetoric of HRM, given 
these conditions, can be corroborated even in the most favorable of circumstances. 
The current research task is thus the exploratory formulation of a model enabling us to 
begin to test alledged mutual intra-organizational benefits implied by the HRM 
rhetoric. Nevertheless, whether we should talk about mutual benefits at all or simply 
exploitation can still be debated. 
                                                                                                                                      
thus his analysis has the downside that many philosophical analyses tend to have (see e.g. the 
discussion in Kukathas and Pettit, 1990, pp. 92-118). Nevertheless, his arguments can serve as a 
guideline for reflections on what justice is. A dialogue on this issue is bound to continue but remains 
outside this thesis.  
142 In fact, some of the argumentation by Keenoy can be seen as partly permeated with similar 
academic needs of legitimation which, as Legge (1995b) argues, promotors of HRM are victims of. We 
can never get rid of academic territorial battles of existence. But this fact does not invalidate 
researchers efforts to look for empirical evidence of claims made within such battles. On the contrary, 




5.1.1 HRM and exploitation 
At least Marx’s romantic idea of non-exploitation has arguably to be given up. This 
idea, i.e.  
“[t]he assimilation of social labour to the model of autonomous activity in 
the sense of creative self-realization could derive a certain plausibility at 
most from the romantically transfigured prototype of handicraft activity...” 
(Habermas, 1987, p. 65).  
As we see it, the problem with Marx’s more general idea of exploitation (related to 
surplus value) is the very evaluation of the value of the work done by different 
categories of stakeholders. This problem arises as soon as we acknowledge that the 
world is not a simple world of (generalizable) equally productive active workers and 
passive capitalists and that it is very diffcult to fix the value of any labour to the 
amount or some fixed notion of qualitative aspects of input in a system of production. 
The problem is also complicated by the fact that how we distribute any generated 
capital seems, as an empirical fact, to affect the vitality and (material) well-being of 
societies in complicated and still insufficiently known ways. The difficulty of 
determining the value of different types of input by different stakeholders is of course 
solved in more or less capitalistic societies by treating it as largely a function of 
supply and demand, albeit still in a complex combination with different political 
decision making processes143.  
Disregarding explicitly marxist ideas about exploitation, the idea of (strategic soft) 
HRM is of course not a development away from the more straightforward idea of 
exploitation in terms of ‘getting the most out of employees’. Rather it seems to be (as 
people management arguably always has been) an attempt to alter the conditions 
under which such exploitation takes place. HRM is intra-organizationally trying to 
increase the value of the workforce supply. Whether HRM ameliorates the conditions 
of exploitation and/or merely intensifies them is a debatable question. However, to 
critisize HRM per se for intensifying work, we argue, would seem to be to bark under 
a small branch of the right tree. Depending on the kind of HRM, it could also be to 
bark under the wrong tree. Although there certainly seems to be a complex 
interaction, it seems to us to be the capitalistic system which largely drives employee 
management forward.  
If we distance the possibility of non-exploitation in the above more straightforward 
sense, then the question of exploitation can be approached (at the manifest level) as an 
empirical phenomenon. It can be viewed as empirical in the sense of how employees 
react to rewards, influence, competence, employment security etc “under the rule of 
HRM”. That it is not an empirical phenomenon in an ‘empiricist’ atheoretical sense is 
evident in terms of the common accusation that  
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“bourgeois studies..., in accepting the face value of workers’ responses to 
surveys and interviews, disregard their conditioning by the underlying 
‘objective’ structure of productions relations” (Willmott, 1993, p. 691).  
It is evidently such conditioning which different critical social constructivist accounts 
of social phenomena try to come to grips with. However, there are intensified 
methodological problems (but a priori no impossibilities) in justifying any accounts 
along the lines of “false consciousness”. Such attempts have to explain away or 
(re)manipulate large parts of the manifest empirical world, instead of relying on it as 
providing empirical data. The general problem seems, however, still to be the 
pragmatically plausible available alternatives for organizing societies.  
Both the problem of taking employees’ perceptions for granted and the question of a 
differentiation between employees with different bargaining power are well described 
by Hancock (1997). He offers an eloquent critical interpretation of a “new style 
management” (Parker, 1997, p. 75) along the following lines:  
[the new style managerialism or ‘clan’ model] subsumes the individual 
within an artificially imposed and instrumentaly oriented collectivity, 
which is itself premised upon an artifical and narrowly constructed concept 
of ancestral or familiar duty...[the] priority placed upon ‘symbolic means’ 
as the key to the cohesion of organizational life suggests the apparent 
decline of the legal/rational basis of authority which, as Weber noted, is so 
characteristic of a modern and, implicitly, democratic society [Hancock, 
1997, p. 102]...it increasingly appears plausible that organizational 
employees are being re-absorbed within what is indeed a haze of medieval-
like symbolic mysticism... the requirements of flexible, technology-driven 
organizations have produced the need for a neo-feudal version of the 
(male) vassal class [in the form of core employees], with incentives auch 
as company health care, housing and profit sharing schemes, and even a 
‘job for life’ as implied by ‘promises’ of no voluntary redundancies, 
increasingly resembling the efforts of feudal lords to ensure the loyalty of 
their key vassals through the bestowing of honours and, later, life-long 
fiefdoms [ibid., pp. 103-104]...Driven by...instrumental imperatives, [the 
new style management]...seeks to manipulate individual subjectivity as a 
means of continually engineering what are now viewed as prerequisite 
levels of ‘normative consent’ within the (post)modern work-force [ibid., p. 
105]...what is at stake here...is a new state of dependency [ibid., p. 108]”.  
This is one of the bleak pictures of the context of HRM which receives further 
relevance in terms of the arguments offered by Bauman (1998/1989; see below). 
Although HRM, as we have defined it, is not identical to this ‘symbolic management’ 
it would probably be painted by much the same brush by Hancock. As we argue, the 
means of ‘symbolic level’ managerialism are not in themselves reproachable, it is the 
ends of this managerialism which are in question. Descriptions like the one given by 
Hancock are arguably a symptom of the current difficulties involved in initiating a 
critical discussion of the causes of such ends. These difficulties in turn are due to the 
current apparent lack of viable politically and socially plausible alternative theoretical 
landscapes which could offer a counter-force to global capitalism144. The ends of ‘the 
new style managerialism’ and those in general dictated by the competitive struggle 
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should however have to comply with some reasonable ethics. To the extent that 
Hancock's description is even close to being wright, this is a clear challenge. 
Conditioning by some form of symbolic communication is inevitable in any social 
action and it is a technique which organizations, and HRM in particular, are involved 
in deep up to their necks. As has been stated earlier, in this thesis we accept whatever 
(unconsciuous) conditioning there is as an inevitable consequence of the competitive 
pressures in the capitalistic system. What we try to do is to study and analyze relations 
between conditioned and constructed (or manipulated if you will) employee 
perceptions of these practices.  
The decision as to what knowledge to pursue and how is, as we argued in chapter 2, a 
difficult ethical-pragmatical-political decision. Capitalism (in some form) promises a 
relatively better future for all. Despite its recent “victory” more and more people 
arguably tend to have become sensitized to the precarious and perilous nature of it. 
Even without marxist arguments, the utopian character of capitalism would seem to 
have vanished, to all but some of its most forceful protagonists. The normative dispute 
with reference to what is left of capitalism’s promise (and alterations of this and 
alternative promises) is likely to continue despite some rather speculative claims as to 
the end of history (Fukuyama, 1989, 1989/1990). This debate is likely to continue 
simply because of the complicated nature of human social processes: 
“Just as, for Marx, capital alienates while it produces, organizes life within 
the workplace and atomizes life in civil society, so, for Foucault, 
power[/knowledge] simultaneously empowers and represses, and, for 
Weber, rationalization simultaneously increases efficiency and 
dehumanizes” (Marsden and Townley, 1996, p. 671).  
Nevertheless, as there in our view hardly is a viable alternative to capitalism in some 
form at least in the short term, it still seems of interest to pursue knowledge also 
related to “manifest” organizational phenomena. Thus, as earlier specified, the 
purpose of the current empirical research project is to study how employees (and 
organizations) in knowledge intensive contexts in highly industrialized countries react 
to HRM within the current capitalistic system. 
5.2 THE CONSTITUTION OF “US” 
 “[T]he choice between Dewey and Foucault is not the choice between 
which description of organizations and its possibilities is more accurate. It 
is a choice between which vision under particular circumstances or 
discussions is the more likely to result in [morally acceptable] action. 
...[we] need both Dewey and Foucault, we need both the possibility of 
boundless optimism for our organizational world and the flatness of 
Foucault’s employee-waifs” (Weaver, 1997, p. 46).  
The most serious problem for the HRM discourse might slowly arise from a cultural-
existential critique inspired e.g. by Foucault concerning the ways in which 
characteristics of modern business society in various ways constitute us as human 
beings and/or the broader history of such constitution. In this thesis we side with the 
positive possibilities more akin to (albeit perhaps not as optimistic as) Dewey’s 
outlook than to Foucault’s visison regarding the janus face of “organization and 




This Janus-face is something to which e.g. genealogical analyses can sensitize people. 
Future public discussion, experiment, experience and critical interrogations will or 
can only help us decide upon the extent to which this "way of life" is existentially 
and/or culturally desirable and/or optional relative to what sacrifices. This seems 
ultimately to be an issue for democracy to decide, albeit with the help of critical 
thinking and interrogations (Rorty, 1991j). Foucault’s notion of power/knowledge 
does nothing in terms of grounding one critique or another (Rorty, 1991j, p. 173-
175)145. Power/knowledge is (increasingly) everywhere but has to some extent always 
been there. There can be interesting things to say about its working during different 
time periods. But as there are good reasons to give up the idea of an essence of 
man/woman as well as an essence of anything else (Hall, 1991; Wheeler, 2000), there 
is no way of opposing some power/knowledge structures without further arguments. 
These questions will be ethical-political-pragmatical. They have to be broadly 
contextual and consider a complicated array of consequences of different “choices”. 
Mitroff has argued that  
“choices for the future cannot be deduced from economic data or from 
abstract measures of organizational functioning" (Mitroff, 1983, p. 3, cf 
Starkey, 1999, p. 181).  
The author should have emphasized that they cannot be deduced only from this. 
Aristotelian images of a good life, “enacting the...ideal of the full development of 
human beings” (Legge, 1999, p. 256) might serve as a focus imaginarius but is still 
obviously romantic and limited in the world of organizations. The same applies to 
conceptions of human beings as (through and through) “becoming” (Steyaert, 1998, p. 
5).  
“The ethical justification of the market rests on the value we place on 
autonomous individualism – the right of the individual to freely exercise 
choices as long as those choices do not prevent others from exercising 
similar rights” (Legge, 1999, p. 260). 
This very statement includes the whole complexity of the (abstract) network(s) in 
which “autonomous individuals” are embedded. Individuals can arguably never be  
“free to pursue the satisfaction of their own preferences, to have projects of 
their own that define their own identity and humanity” (ibid., p. 260) 
within organizations compelled to compete in a capitalistic system. The extent to 
which individuals can do this outside organizations or by choosing alternative 
organizations in whose activities they take part is arguably one sign of a civilized 
society. Within any organization this freedom is necessarily limited. The idea of 
strategic soft HRM is that increasing this freedom within any organization and its 
constraints can be beneficial to both employees and organizations. It may be that it 
enforces (some) individuals to develop “a workaholic lifestyle before collapsing into 
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‘burnt out’” (ibid., p. 256). This is an empirical proposition for which there is some 
evidence and which research should pursue. However, it is not a priori impossible 
that, given a set of contemporary exogenous influences on the pace of work, strategic 
soft HRM might in fact reduce the amount of stress. 
Knights and McCabe sensibly argue that  
“despite considerable changes, OI’s [organizational innovations] remain 
both a condition for, and a location for, the exercise of organizational 
power relations” (1998, p. 168).  
There is a complicated picture to be painted of the active political influence tactics of 
both managers and employees in addition to the subjectivation "tactics" of the more 
diffused and abstract system of power/knowledge (Ferris and Judge, 1991; Ferris et 
al., 1999).  
When Townley argues that  
“the depiction of competencies produces an essentialism, a template of 
what is desirable behavior” (1999, p. 299),  
we must not conflate philosophical questions of essence with empirical questions of 
focus. Templates of competencies are moving empirical frameworks and need not 
reflect any “essentialism” at all. Townley’s analysis would have gained interest if she 
had also studied moral values (implicit or explicit) involved in any complementary 
recommendations or practice. As it stands Townley’s argument only says that we have 
to look at human behavior in a holistic fashion. Thus, in so far as Townley says that 
competencies per se are not the only thing which matters she points to an important 
matter. She argues that we need to engage in  
“an analysis of the power effects of practices, their implications for 
instilling proximity and distance and their implications for the ‘humanity’ 
they create” (ibid., pp. 300-301).  
There will be a continuous need to do this but the moral issue of proximity and 
distance (ibid., p. 298) concerns much larger questions than the question of HRM. Her 
analysis of HRM’s (or a specific competency framework’s) relation to Nietzsche’s 
“pathos for distance” (ibid., p. 298) is adequate to the extent that we are producing 
ethically indifferent or autonomous vulgar high performance robots. There is nothing 
in the HRM movement per se which dictates this but it may nevertheless promote it. 
Townley reviews a “document entitled core competencies for Public Service 
Management” (ibid., p. 285), and claims that on the criteria  
“self-confidence, impact and influence, organizational commitment, team 
leadership...there are grounds for suggesting that Hitler had a high degree 
of competence” (ibid., p. 288)146.  
It is not absurd that we would have to admit that Hitler was competent in certain 
ways. People can be competent and still do wrong things. The important task for us is 
                                               




to keep on condemning wrong behavior, not competence. However, there are 
indications of a complicated relation between "wrong behavior" and "competence". 
Referring to one specific empirically derived competency framework, Townley 
reports that  
“The superior performer’s (according to ratings by managers) relationship 
to the other is more manipulative, for example, in ensuring that team 
members buy into goals, engaging in the communication of a vision that 
emotionally engages group members, or using others to influence or assist 
in changing opinions of the team. In all this, there is limited concern for the 
other. Treating the other in a reciprocal relationship based on trust and 
respect is associated with the average performer...the criterion of having a 
positive regard for others, a positive belief that people are good, was not 
associated with effectiveness. Nor was the ability to care about and build 
close relationships with other individuals. Nor was accurate self-
assessment related to effective performance” (Townley, 1999, p. 297).  
We have to remember that this is one empirical study and it only identifies general 
relationships. Presumably (hopefully) high performers come in many guises. 
However, it indicates that efficiency (and effectiveness?) might empirically collide 
with ethics. The study indicates the importance of critically discussing what such high 
performers accomplish. Avoiding the possibility of robotization is one of the purposes 
of “the conversation of mankind” or “edifícation” or “edifying philosophy” (Rorty, 
1980, pp. 357-394 ). Even if it does not involve a general critique of the “HRM 
movement” per se, HRM is certainly part of the topics of this conversation, in 
particular if we extend the perspective of “HRM” to what goes on in kindergartens, 
schools, universities as well as other organizations. Townley’s critique relates to a 
more general one advanced by Bauman (1989).  
“At the heart of Bauman’s critique of modern organizational design is a 
deep moral concern. He accuses bureaucracies of instrumentalizing 
morality with respect to the goals of the organization and totally 
disregarding the moral substance of the goals themselves [Bos, 1997, p. 
998]...Telling somebody to simply abide by the rules and standards and 
threatening her/him, in case of disobedience, with dismissal or other sorts 
of punishments, incapacitates that person’s moral instinct, renders it 
predictable, and directs it in a way which is assumed to be in the interest of 
the organization as a whole...People who willy-nilly relinquish their 
autonomy and replace it by what others think are, in Bauman’s view, 
nothing less than dangerous” (ibid., p. 1006).  
One could arguably also largely condemn much of HRM as incorporating such a 
“heteronomization of morality” (ibid., p. 1007). However, to some extent, in so far as 
morality is a social phenomenon, such heteronomization is inevitable, but should not 
involve the (complete) loss of integrity and other positive moral attributes. As Bos 
notes,  
“we can only be moral subjects because we always choose how we subject 
ourselves to a particular rule [or with less overtones of any necessary free 
will, we can be moral only in sofar as we discuss and are moved by moral 
issues]....Admittedly, managements will try to restrain this freedom [or 
with less overtones of free will, they try to restrain the effects of different 
vocabularies] and influence people’s discreation with respect to rules, 
because this enables them to control the organization. In this sense, we 




we need not share his pessimism with respect to the outcome of the 
struggle” (ibid., p. 1012).  
What this problematic minimally indicates is the importance of the “conversation of 
mankind” in order not to forget among other things “the truth about certain very 
important matters, like whom one can kill when” (Rorty, 1998, p. 53). These 
questions relate to the social nurturing of integrity and tolerance as well as e.g. 
individuals possibilities to realize positive moral attributes without comitting ‘suicide’ 
with reference to their employability. “Most people are simply not...autonomous 
heroes” (Bos, 1999, p. 1010). Many things are related to this issue, among other 
things probably some kind of welfare state in order to reduce any employee 
dependencies on particular organizations. But as Bauman tries to show, modernity and 
modern bureaucratic organization also incorporates dangers (1998, p. 269). It is clear 
that many genres of expression in the conversation of mankind are important. Novels 
and films, but also critical writing in general, can examine  
“the ethical trials and temptations that a competitive industrial order 
always puts in the way of those who want to become its forceful 
protagonists” (Coles, 1988, p. 60, cf. Starkey, 1999, p. 181).  
Organizational design and HRM can be used both for morally acceptable and 
inacceptable purposes. Bauman's argument is that in large modern bureacratic 
organizations (and societies) there are increased latent possibilities of immoral 
behavior. We might argue that as organizational scientists we should try to find a way 
of creating theories which are sensible to all the potential bad consequences. This is 
an old moral dilemma which arguably does not have simple solutions (Wallgren, 
1996, p. 172-179).  
Bos cites Bauman's argument that the Holocaust was  
“fully in keeping with everything  we know about our civilization, its 
guiding spirit, its priorities, its immanent vision of the world” (Bauman, 
1989, p. 8, cited in Bos, 1997, p. 997, italics added147).  
When referring to nazism, fascism and Holocaust in discussions about HRM (e.g. 
Hancock 1997; Townley, 1999), it seems important to keep certain distinctions clear 
concerning this issue. What Bauman refers to in the citation above are the dreams 
about "rationalization, planning and control" (1998, p. 137; our translation) which are 
inherent in modern civilization. However, even if such a dominating abstract form of 
guiding spirit and priorities may not rule out another Holocaust, there are fortunately 
still other guiding spirits, priorities and ‘voices’ constantly at work in order to try to 
prevent it as well as to ameliorate less severe wrongdoings in the world. As Bauman 
says, "[t]he fact that Holocaust is modern does not mean that modernity is Holocaust" 
(ibid., p. 138; our translation). Bauman does not claim that the Holocaust was either a 
necessary consequence or even determined by modern bureaucracy and instrumental 
rationality (ibid., p. 42). Rather,  
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"Holocaust was a unique meeting between the old tensions which 
modernity overlooked, undervalued or did not succeed in solving - and the 
powerful tools for rational and effective action which the modern 
development created" (ibid., p. 20; our translation). Thus, "[t]he possibility 
of the Holocaust was grounded in certain universal characteristics of 
modern civilization, the carrying out, on the other hand, was connected to 
a specific and not at all universal relationship between the state and the 
society" (ibid., p. 123; our translation). Thus, "the possibility of Holocuast 
has not disappeared" (ibid., p. 126; our translation).  
Bauman's main points with reference to this possibility is related to the sociological 
aspects of moral behavior and in particular the morally debilitating force of the 
combination of authority and the social production of distance (ibid., pp. 251-271; our 
translation). But he admits that he is a long way from offering a "social theory of 
moral behavior" (ibid., p. 269). In summary, Bauman presented a challenging analysis 
of the fragility of our “civilized societies” posing far reaching questions for the global 
society. However, to the extent that we do not conclude that trying to get anything to 
function effectively leads to Holocaust, we probably have to continue on all fronts, 
increasing both effectiveness and ethical sensibility. As there evidently is always 
going to be more or less severe forms of conflicts between effectiveness and ethics, 
this issue requires an on-going discussion. 
The above critical comments and arguments remind us of the complicated nature and 
context of HRM and the difficulty of proper research designs and theoretical 
landscapes. They indicate the importance of continuing the theorizing/discussion of 
HRM and its consequences including potential effects on employees, organizations 
and societies. We need theoretical arguments, quantitative and qualitative empirical 
studies in many different forms, including 
“Genealogical Analysis..., “Contextualized Theorizing and Re-reading..., 
Contextualized Story telling..., Writing (in) the Margins” (Steyaert and 
Janssens, 1999, p. 192-194).  
In particular we seem to need to refrain from drawing any sort of overly victorious 
conclusions from any one form of theoretically driven empirical research as such 
research always tends to be very limited. There are no a priori and no simple a 
posteriori answers.  
In summary, this thesis concerns primarily the issue of what, within the present 
capitalistic context, human resource management does to a limited set of aspects of 
organizations and employees' conscious perceptions, which are also always in a larger 
sense more or less societally constituted. The employees which this study looks upon 
are also priviledged in the sense that they have not been laid off and their bargaining 
power is fairly high. We start to look at how HRM functions in this world as we want 
to try to test empirically whether HRM even in what has been argued to be the most 
favorable of circumstances can live up to its rhetorics. But in addition, when properly 




least at the manifest level) such investments as well as the rhetorics of the HRM 
discourse in circumstances which a priori appear less favorable148. 
5.3 HRM AND THE ETHICS OF NORMAL SCIENCE 
Keenoy argues, with a certain degree of irony, that  
"it is reported that control has given way to empowerment, supervision has 
been replaced with teamwork, participation breeds involvement while 
alienation is being overcome through financial participation" (1997, p. 
836). 
Keenoy does not offer us any references here but it is no doubt highly debatable to 
argue that this has taken place to any large extent (see e.g. Storey, 1995; Legge, 1995; 
Blyton and Turnbull, 1992). The degree to which organizations, in particular 
organizations having more freedom to choose, have adopted progressive soft HRM 
related practices seems in fact far from being overwhelming.  
“What was thought to be potentially good, the ideal of the HRM-oriented 
non-union [new] establishment where the interests of the staff were taken 
seriously, has now become bad or, to the extent that it is a deliberate 
exploitation of a weak, non-union workforce, even ugly” (Guest and 
Hoque, 1994, p. 1). 
But if so much as small steps in the direction suggested in the “reports” refered to by 
Keenoy can be detected, it seems important for researchers to stand back from the 
intellectual barricades in order to critically study their possible positive effects for 
both sides of traditional conflict, employees and employers. Again, if such effects can 
be detected it might encourage organizations to further pursue them.  
“Many of my colleagues outside the US rightly point out that American 
management theories (of which HRM writing is representative) tend 
toward a feel-good ‘win-win’ perspective that leaves no place for 
incommensurable differences or conflict. At the same time, I find many of 
my colleagues, especially those in the UK, to be uncomfortable with even 
momentarily decentering conflict...Like Quixote, one may be jousting to 
defend the constituency of another era” (Jacques, 1999, p. 210). 
Related to the “win-win” perspective Keenoy has argued that empirically HRM 
practices “are never ‘hard’ or ‘soft’: despite appearances, they are always both ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’” (1999, p. 13)…and refers to a claim made by Peters that Hewlett-Packard,  
“having provided employment security, empowered employees to take any 
problem to supervision (and expect to be listened to), provided a safe and 
equable working environment, given employees individual performance 
targets and individual pay rates - in short, having given employees all the 
support necessary for them to perform at the level required by the company 
– then, there are ‘no excuses if something goes wrong’ (ibid., p. 14).  
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We argue that there is a rhetorical misconception of soft HRM in Keenoys 
argumentation. Soft HRM can never imply that organizations would not put any 
pressure on employees nor that organizations are nice places to idly dwell in. Neither 
does it of course imply that there should be “no excuses”. We argue that conceptually 
soft HRM has to be compatible with a ‘performance imperative’. This seems to us to 
be the postulated and hypothesized content of (strategic) soft HRM.  
However, it is a both theoretically and empirically complicated question to what 
extent (strategic) soft HRM is practiced and in fact has positive effects both from the 
point of view of employees and employers. Even if we attempt to decenter conflict 
there is no unproblematic, given, “normal-scientific” language for us to adopt. 
Keenoy argues that  
“[i]n observing, the priviledged observer interprets the phenomena in terms 
of his/her preferred frame of reference. Therefore what is ‘seen’ [is] an 
interpretation of the perceived projection” (1999, p. 15).  
To the extent that this is true it is of course as true of any research and any research 
methodologies. Keenoy goes on,  
“the observed is also implicated in the observer and, in so far as we act in 
response to our perceptions, we actively constitute and (re)create 
HRMism” (ibid., p. 15).  
This is not necessarily so. As researchers we should always, in a “Popperian spirit” 
(Putnam, 1974/1991, pp. 121-137), act critically on our interpretations and 
perceptions, and those of others. This is as true for quantitative as it is for qualitative 
research methodologies149. Somewhat peculiarly Daft and Lewin argue that  
“Normal science is concerned with internal validity, experimental rigor, 
planning, control of confounding variables, and to a lesser extent with 
external validity. Understanding the phenomenon beforehand makes for 
clean, tidy research, but the actual knowledge return will be incremental. If 
a researcher understands the phenomenon well enough to predict and 
control what happens, why ask the question? The significant discoveries, 
the best science, require us to be more venturesome and heretic in research 
and design, and to explore fundamental questions without knowing the 
answer in advance. The worth of the research outcome is measured by 
surprise. The greater the surprise, the more interesting the result, and the 
greater the new knowledge about organizations” (Daft and Lewin, 1990, p. 
7).  
Beside an interestingly naive and completely unsupported notion of knowledge in this 
citation, it involves a more general peculiar misunderstanding of (normal) science. 
This understanding of science might be the result of an arguably wrong understanding 
of the significance of Kuhn’s writings (Weinberg, 1998, 1999). As noted in chapter 2, 
Kuhn himself has argued that  
                                               
149 In addition, actively constituting and (re-)creating HRMism in some form is not necessarily and a 




“At least for the scientific community as a whole, work within a well 
defined and deeply ingrained tradition seems more productive of tradition-
shattering novelties than work in which no similarly convergent standards 
are involved"”(Kuhn, 1991, p. 144). 
However, if normal science means that we can be more or less convinced that we 
have the right vocabulary for a certain subfield, we do not think that there is room for 
any normal science in any subfield of organization science. But this does not mean 
that we therefore have to be revolutionary. Rather, there should be something well 
established and largely agreed upon before the term revolutionary is even applicable. 
We would argue that although there are more or less well established uses of certain 
vocabularies and methodologies in subfields of organization science, these cannot be 
characterized as normal science. All organizational scientists are still more or less 
grouping for relevant concepts, definitions, constructs and operationalizations. This is 
no state of affairs characteristic of normal science. 
It seems that when arguing that “the field of organization science has prematurely 
settled into a normal science mindset” (1990, p. 2), Daft and Lewin equate a 
hypothetico-deductive approach and a quantitative methodology with “normal 
science”. However, to the extent that we interpret them as claiming only that we are in 
great need of qualitative studies, and both corroborative quantitative and critical 
qualitative studies concerning the (external) validity of any concepts used in 
quantitative research, we can agree with them.  
There are many reasons to believe that social studies have to settle for much less than 
“normal scientific” knowledge, mostly involving attempts to make some explanations 
plausible in a very tentative sense. The question “[i]f a researcher understands the 
phenomenon well enough to predict and control what happens, why ask the 
question?” (Daft and Lewin, 1991, p. 7) just seeems out of place for the reason that 
we generally do not have such understanding. Daft and Lewin seem not be alone in 
their assumptions as it has been claimed that also  
“[p]hilosophers of science frequently write as if it is clear, given a set of 
statements, just what consequences those statements do and do not have” 
(Putnam, 1974/1991, p. 129).  
The problems of knowing “just what consequences…statements do and do not have” 
in social science are of course tremendous. Obviously, apart from all the conceptual 
problems related to research on HRM, there is a lot going on in many organizations 
which seems ill suited for a strategic soft HRM approach. What HRM researchers 
working within empirical social science can do is to try to design studies which test as 
specific versions of existing or developed models of/arguments about HRM as 
possible (while controlling for as many other phenomena as we can perceive relevant) 
in order to determine what properties of HRM practices can be empirically identified 
and what consequences they might tend to have. Such attempts should no doubt 
involve “’empirical’ and interpretative sensitivity” (Keenoy, 1999, p. 17). Keenoy 
may be right in claiming that  
“each [social] phenomena may possess and can project a variety of 




What this implies is that we need integrated research, employing different 
methodologies, much more replication studies and replication studies including new 
variables (without abandoning the replicated variables), which can identify 
moderations and/or mediations and/or ambiguities of any potential “mutually 
implicated identities” that researchers can come up with. Currently, there seems to be 
little justification for HRM researchers to “settle into a normal science mindset”. 
However, there is nothing a priori wrong with at least temporarily aiming for it. On 
the contrary, to the extent that we believe in Kuhn, it seems highly recommendable.  
In reviewing earlier empirical research below we will try offer some more 
justification for these arguments about the non-existence of 'normal science' even 




6 WHAT IS HRM – PERFORMANCE EFFECTS 
There are by now many comprehensive literature reviews and discussions of the state 
of the art of empirical research on potential HRM–performance links. We will begin 
with a short review of such reviews. 
6.1 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE- GENERAL OVERVIEW 
The evidence for systematic effects of combinations of HRM practices on 
organisational performance is not overwhelming. Mueller claims that  
“the stronger evidence seems to suggest that we do not know about the link 
between HRM on the one hand, and improved business performance on the 
other hand” (Mueller, 1996, p. 762).  
Also Dyer & Reeves claimed, regarding the contribution of human resource strategies 
to organizational effectiveness, that  
“At this juncture, then, it seems that the strategic human resource 
management bandwagon, notwithstanding its conceptual allure, is 
barrelling along on a rather fragile empirical undercarriage” (1995, p. 656).  
Even within the more mainstream research there has been little common 
understanding of how different HRM approaches should be conceptualized. 
Studies of so called high performance work systems vary significantly as 
to the practices included… and sometimes even as to whether a practice is 
likely to be positively or negatively related to high performance. For 
example, Arthur’s (1994) high performance employment system, which he 
termed a “commitment” system, specifies a low emphasis on variable pay, 
whereas the high performance employment systems defined by Huselid 
(1995) and MacDuffie (1995) have strong emphases on variable pay. 
Another example would be HR strategies that rely on internal promotions 
and provide access to employee grievance procedures. Huselid (1995) and 
Pfeffer (1994) described such practices as high performance. Other studies 
(Arthur, 1994; Ichniowski et al., 1994) have included these practices as 
elements of more rigid HRM systems often associated with less productive 
unionized environments. Huselid and Becker (1995) termed these two 
practices “bureaucratic HR” and found them to have economically and 
statistically significant, negative effects on firm profitability in two 
different data sets” (Becker andGerhardt, 1996, p. 784)150. 
In reviewing four empirical studies designed to derive taxonomies of human resource 
strategies Dyer and Reeves’ general conclusion is that  
the number of human resource management practices measured in these 
studies varies from a low six…to a high of eleven…there are twenty eight 
different input measures across the four studies… only three show up in 
                                               
150 Later Becker and Huselid have argued, both on conceptual and empirical grounds, that these two 





three of the four studies. Twenty-two of the twenty-eight human resource 
practices appear in only one study151 (1995, p. 658). 
As Boxall observes, Dyer and Reeves (1995)  
“suggest that there are simply not enough studies which examine the 
impact of HR strategies on performance and there is too much variation in 
how the models are defined (in terms of both practices and desired 
outcomes). This is a fair assessment on both counts” (Boxall, 1996, p. 64).  
Thus, despite the growing research from a more macro–analytic perspective explicit 
corroborations of the link between holistic HRM systems and organizational 
performance is “quite limited to date” (Becker and Gerhardt, 1998, p. 70). In 
particular, despite some evidence for such a link the attribution of performance effects 
to HRM systems still lacks an empirically corroborated understanding of the potential 
mechanisms involved. Becker et al. admit that we do not know “how [an HRM] 
system creates that value” (ibid., p.40). Until we know that152, one tends to remain 
sceptical as to causal directions between organizational performance, HRM systems, 
and other potential variables.  
“Without intervening variables, one is hard pressed both to explain how 
HRM influences firm performance and to rule out an alternative 
explanation for an observed HR-firm performance link such as reverse 
causation” (Becker and Gerhardt, 1996, p. 793). 
Yet many articles, somewhat prematurely it might be argued, assume and emphasize 
the importance or even criticality of HRM due to increased (global) competition. 
HRM might be important but we do not yet have much evidence of/agreement on 
anything generalizable in terms of what aspects of HRM that would be critical and in 
particular how such aspects would have an influence. The mainstream idea of HRM 
necessitates evidence of performance effects (Becker and Huselid, 1998, p. 70). 
Without this, the idea will have a much more fragile ground to stand on. The difficulty 
of providing such evidence (at some level of abstraction), backed up by convincing 
theoretical arguments, is a curious predicament as it may seem almost obvious that the 
way organizations treat and utilize their workforce should have consequences153. 
                                               
151 The situation is actually worse than this. Not only do the practices included in different studies 
vary, there is in addition considerable variance in how these practices are measured. Thus, researchers 
are far from an agreement on what we actually mean with any one HR practice and thus what we refer 
to when we discuss HRM. “To date, the relevant literature is distinguished by the fact that virtually no 
two studies measure HRM practices in the same way” (Delaney and Huselid, 1996, p. 967). Even 
further, the construction of HRM system variables as well as variables related to internal/external fit 
vary considerably.  
152 It is plausible that there is not going to be a simple answer to this question. 
153 Of course, even in the absence of such evidence firms will continue to deal with HRM related 
processes and many of them are important simply in order to avoid collapse and keep the organization 
running. But the allocation of substantial, and even uniquely substantial causal influences on 




6.2 RECENT EVIDENCE 
The evidence of consequences of the HRM practices is diverse, fragmented and 
debatable to the extent that any attempt to review the empirical evidence is confronted 
with a choice: (1) present a short review conveying almost no information. (2) present 
a long and complex review enabling us to form some judgement as to what these 
studies have shown or not shown. We have chosen the second alternative154. 
Becker and Gerhardt claim that only  
“Huselid and Becker (1995, 1996, 1997) and Delaney, Lewin and 
Ichniowski (1989)155 have attempted to develop a comprehensive firm-
wide measure of an organization’s HRM system” (Becker and Gerhardt, 
1998, p. 63).  
Arthur (1994), Ichniowski et al. (1997), MacDuffie (1995), and Youndt et al. (1996) 
also “adopted a broader measure of the HRM system, but one that is necessarily 
circumscribed by their analysis at the plant level” (Becker and Gerhardt, 1998, pp. 62-
63). However, they argue that  
“each of these approaches , while somewhat different, usefully contributes 
to the cumulative empirical literature” (ibid., p. 63)156.  
To the above list of studies we will add Delaney & Huselid (1996), Delery & Doty 
(1996), Becker and Huselid, (1998b). We will also review some research which has 
explored effects of HRM on potential intermediate level outcomes (Ogilvie, 1986; 
Guest and Hoque, 1994; Guest and Conway, 1999).  
Becker and Huselid plausibly argued that analyses  
“focusing on just part of the HRM system risk overstating the effects of 
those individual policies by capturing part of the larger HRM system 
effects” (1998, p. 62). 
In fact, Ichniowski et al. (1997) offered some empirical evidence for this claim. Thus 
we will restrict our review mostly to studies and analyses focusing holistically on 
HRM practices at a system level157.  
                                               
154 Since this review was written, Wood (1999) has been published. It is also a fairly long and thorough 
review which seems a good complement to the one presented here. It is somewhat more reader-friendly 
as it does not in certain respects go into the same detail.  
155 This work was not at our hands so it will be excluded from the review. It is not published in a 
scientific journal. 
156 In fact, as argued above, detailed industry level studies are probably one important way to proceed 
in HRM research. 
157 It is clear that research ideally should try to sort out the degrees of effectiveness of individual 




We will review the evidence by topic in terms of the effects of the "universalistic" 
HRM system, the effects of internal fit, the effects of external fit, the effects of 
holistic or configurational fit, as well as the evidence for intermediate mechanisms, 
each in turn. It is symptomatic of the theorizations/evidence that Guest (1997), Wood 
(1999) and the present review utilize somewhat different categorizations of the 
evidence. 
As our interpretations of the empirical studies often problematize and diverge from 
the respective authors' interpretations we will for the sake of balance at the end of 
each review also present the conclusions of the respective authors. 
6.2.1 HRM system: HRM as a set of practices  
Huselid (1995) and Huselid and Becker (1995, 1996, 1997) have done a series of 
studies utilizing more or less the same basic approach, building upon and developing 
it in subsequent studies. They have also been engaged in methodological dicussions. 
Huselid (1995), in terms of a sample including a wide range of organizations in the 
United States, studied the relationship between two indexes of HRM practices on 
employee turnover, productivity and financial performance158. The 'employee skills 
and organizational structures'-index but not the 'employee motivation'-index was 
significantly related to employee turnover (ibid., p. 657; Models 1-3)159. Entered 
separately, both indexes were significantly related to productivity. When entered at 
the same time only the employee motivation index remained significant (ibid., p. 658; 
Models 4-6). Without controls in terms productivity and employee turnover, both 
indexes were significantly related to a measure of Tobin’s q (ibid., p. 660; Models 7-
9). With these controls included, only 'employee motivation' remained significant 
(Model 10). In relation to a measure of gross rate of return on capital (GRATE) only 
the index for 'employee skills and organizational structures' was significant (ibid., p. 
661; Models 11-14). Generally the delta R2’s of the HRM indices were low160. 
Because we will problematize Huselid's mediational analyses below, only the results 
of HRM's influence on Tobin's q and GRATE in terms of Models 10 and 14 are 
relevant. 
Huselid reported evidence of mediation effects of employee turnover and productivity 
on financial performance (ibid. pp. 662-663). Huselid (ibid., p. 662) refers to the 
criteria for mediation effects provided by Baron and Kenny (1986). However, 
                                               
158 Although identified through an exploratory factor analyses (ibid.,p. 645), the items in these two 
indices do not represent conceptually clearly interpretable dimensions. Rather many of the items 
conceptually would seem to influence both employee motivation and skills. In addition some of 
Huselid's original HRM items had to be excluded altogether because of not loading on either factor. 
159 Huselid did not distingush between voluntary and involuntary turnover. 
160 Huselid has a vague caveat for this (see ibid., pp. 657-661; Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6) downplaying the 
fact that what a regression analysis does is to estimate the impact of an independent variable while 
controlling for a host of other variables. Huselid's analyses indicate that after the inclusion of his 
control variables the variance explained by the HRM indexes are simply very small. However, Huselid 
split up the HRM items in two conceptually not entirely convincing indices. Because of this his results 




according to these criteria Huselid was in fact only able to establish one very weak 
mediation effect.  
With reference to employee turnover, the 'employe motivation'-index was not 
significant (ibid., p. 657, Models 2-3). With reference to productivity, the 'employee 
skills and organizational structures'-index was not significant (ibid., p. 658; Model 6). 
Huselid's following analyses are somewhat obscured by the fact that in Model 10 and 
14 (ibid., pp. 660-661) he included both of his mediators at the same time while these 
were not significantly related to both of the independent variables.  
In any case, with reference to Tobin's q the effect of 'employee motivation' does not 
show any tendency of being mediated (ibid., p. 660, Models 9-10). Further, the 
influence of employee turnover on Tobin's q in Model 10 is miniscule and this was 
the only medational possibility left for 'employee skills and organizational structures' 
on the basis of Models 3 and 6.  
With reference to GRATE the mediator in terms of employee turnover simply had no 
effect (Model 14). As this was the only mediational route left open for 'employee 
skills and organizational structures' (on the basis of Models 1-6), there is simply no 
evidence for a mediated influence of the latter. Also the (mediated) influence of 
'employee motivation' on GRATE can be exluded since in Models 12-13 it is simply 
insignificant.  
In summary, the only evidence for a mediation with reference to HRM's influence is 
the apparently miniscule mediational role of employee turnover with reference to the 
relationship between 'employee skills and organizational structures' and Tobin's q. 
However, also this mediation is somewhat ambiguous since both productivity and 
turnover were entered simultaneously in Model 10161. 
Huselid utilized a fairly large amount of controls “based on a careful review of the 
prior empirical work” (ibid., p. 653), but no controls for other cultural level 
organizational/management processes. This may have left heterogeneity biases 
undetected. 
Huselid also performed some calculations of the practical significance of the HRM 
practices. However, these calculations are based upon standard scores of the HRM 
practices (ibid., p. 654) and are thus difficult to give any precise meaning to162. Even 
more problematically, Huselid’s calculations are based on some significant results and 
some insignificant ones (ibid., pp. 656; 658). Finally, there may also have been 
                                               
161 These conclusions are based on the criteria provided by Baron and Kenny (1986) referred to by 
Huselid. To the extent that these criteria are not adequate it may be possible to draw some other 
conclusions. In addition, as already noted the mediations of HRM's influence may have been 
underestimated by the fact that Huselid split up the HRM system in two variables. In any case, what is 
clearly missing in Huselid's analyses is the reporting of the significance of the indirect effects. 
162 In fact, Huselid nowhere tells the reader exactly how each practice was  measured, e.g. whether 
'proportion' which figures in many items of the questionnaire (ibid., p. 646) referred to a Likert scale or 
percentages. Likert scales would mean that it is difficult to interpret Huselid’s calculations of the 




problems with simultaneity bias (reverse causality) which makes the calculations of 
the practical influence of HRM even more questionable.  
The results of Huselid (1995) are described by Becker and Huselid as demonstrating 
the effects of shifts in HRM practices (1998, p. 72). However, we have to remember 
that such “shifts” refer to what is measured. The variation in the independent variables 
are not related to the content of HRM practices per se but rather to the extent of 
application throughout the organizations of a set of formally identified practices. Thus 
Huselid does not analyze the effects of the extent to which variation in the content of 
employment practices or employment approaches can explain outcomes. The 
analytical focus is thus somewhat different than that of some of the other studies 
reviewed here163. But to the extent that we can approve of the methodological aspects 
of Huselid’s analyses, they do give some indication of the possibility that the wider in 
the organizations certain formally defined HRM practices are applied, the better the 
outcome in terms of certain financial results will be.  
Huselid himself concludes that  
“[a]cross a wide range of industries and firm sizes, I found considerable 
support for the hypothesis that investments in such practices are associated 
with lower employee turnover and greater productivity and corporate 
financial performance... The impact of High Performance Work Practices 
on corporate performance is in part due to their influence on employee 
turnover and productivity (1995, p. 667).  
Huselid and Becker (1996) consider some methodological problems related to 
research on HRM-performance links. They used statistical techniques on panel survey 
data to test whether there might be lagged effects and/or a heterogeneity bias in their 
cross chapteral analyses, in particular in Huselid (1995).  
In this study Huselid and Becker also used a conceptually more acceptable 
HRTOTAL measure of the HRM practices. There was also statistical reasons for this 
measure as  
“the hypothesis that the two coefficients of the two HR management 
system dimensions [used in Huselid (1995) ] were equal could not be 
rejected” (Huselid and Becker, 1996, p. 413).  
This total measure of HRM was significantly related to Tobin’s q based both on data 
from 1991 and 1993. The relationship between GRATE and 'HRTOTAL' was 
significant only in the data from 1993 (ibid., p. 413)164.  
                                               
163 As noted, the whole problem of how to measure the HRM practices is still precarious (Wright and 
Sherman, 1999, p. 68). Using similar measures to those in Huselid (1995), Becker and Huselid 
comment that “[o]ur measures of a “high performance” HRM system is not designed to necessarily 
reflect what is new or faddish, but rather to capture the “performance dimension” of any HRM policy” 
(1998b, p. 13). However, any such formal definitions of HRM practices as used by Becker and Huselid 
(1998b) and Huselid (1995) nevertheless do neither allow for “any” HRM policy nor account for the 
potential importance of variation in the implementations of HRM systems.  
164 The difference in the coefficients between the 'HRTOTAL' and the two separate dimensions of the 




Huselid and Becker sensibly argue that it is important to control for  
“the existence of unmeasured management practices that are both 
positively correlated with [HRMsystems] and firm performance “ (1996, p. 
403)165.  
This is the case in particular as  
“[T]here is considerable evidence in the business press that firm 
reputations for a wide range of management practices are highly correlated 
[reflecting either genuine correlations or halo errors]” (ibid., p 403).  
However their test (pp. 403-404) of a heterogeneity bias is somewhat unsatisfactory. 
Their conclusion is that  
“attenuating effects of measurement error [which are potentially 
exacerbated in panel estimates (p. 404)] in the panel data are 
approximately equal to the positive heterogeneity bias” (ibid., p. 417).  
This conclusion is based upon insignificant coefficients in the fixed effect model 
(ibid., p. 415) and an estimation of the effects of measurement error the problematic 
nature of which is acknowledged by the authors (ibid., pp. 416)166. Further, as they 
acknowledge the test in terms of the fixed effects model  
“turns on the assumption that other firm characteristics that may be 
reflected in the cross-sectional estimates...are fixed over time, while HR 
strategy is not” (ibid., , 420).  
It is exactly this assumption that we would like to see a control for. In fact, as they did 
not include (any) control variables in their tests related to within firm variation, they 
cannot exclude the possibility that some heterogeneous influences may have affected 
the results of their panel estimates.  
Huselid and Becker also tested for a potential explicit lagged effect of the HRM 
system. Although there were indications of such an effect (pp. 418-419), 1 or 2 years 
seems still to be too short a period for a true test of lagged effects. This is 
acknowledged by Huselid and Becker (1996, p. 418). In addition the tests of lagged 
                                                                                                                                      
skills and organizational structures dimension had greater effect on GRATE than 'HRTOTAL' had. The 
employee motivation dimension in turn had greater effect on Tobin’s q than 'HRTOTAL' had (ibid., p. 
412). This seems to indicate some problems with the HRM system measures. 
165 Such unmeasured management practices might include e.g. organizational, superior and co-worker 
support related variables, justice related variables or whatever variables (conceptually more unrelated 
to HRM practices) that researchers have found to influence organizational performance.  
166 They acknowledge that the method they more ideally should have used in correcting for the 
influence of measurement errors "require more than the two periods of data available in our sample" 
(Ibid., p. 405). Therefore they estimated the measurement errors separately drawing on Cronbach's 
alphas for the HRM practices scales. As we will argue below, it is far from clear that Cronbach's alphas 
are applicable to HRM system constructs since the HRM practice items should arguably be seen as 
causal indicators. Finally, Huselid and Becker acknowledge that their calculations of the estimates 
corrected for measurement errors are "likely to yield biased estimates because the control variables 




effects did not include the same set of control variables (ibid., pp. 411; 419). 
Nevertheless, in their discussion Huselid and Becker draw the conclusion that the 
relatively much greater lagged effect on GRATE than on Tobin’s q could partly be 
due to  
“accounting convention, where investments in HR management systems 
are fully expensed in the current period, while their benefits can be 
reasonably expected to be realized across multiple periods” (ibid., p. 419).  
As the benefits seem to diminish in 1993 compared to 1992 such conclusions seem 
unduly speculative. In additon, this argument suddenly assumes that a large part of 
the HRM measures reflect investments in the very year of 1991 (and the results would 
indicate that their main effect comes in one year and then diminishes). We are simply 
not given any reason to believe that there would have been large scale changes in the 
HRM practices, but no relevant changes in any other phenomena potentially 
influencing organizational performance, in the very year of 1991. There seem to be no 
reason for that assumption, in particular as Becker and Huselid in a later similar study 
argue that they assume they are observing equilibrium relationships.  
“Even though we measure the HRM system in 1995, it does not imply that 
the system was implemented in 1995” (1998b, p. 5).  
This assumption would seem to put in question the whole idea of testing for lagged 
effects in such a study. However, Becker and Huselid later argue that the lagged 
effects they reported in the study under review  
“provide additional confidence that the positive HRM-firm performance 
relationships is not simply attributable to reverse causation” (1998, p. 73).  
Also Delaney and Huselid (1996, p. 966) justify their conclusions in relation to this 
evidence. Nevertheless, this evidence does not show that it was not the better 
performing organizations which had adopted HRM more extensively and that it was 
not something (other than HRM) which made them perform well in 1991 and even 
better in 1992 and 1993167.  
Huselid and Becker themselves make basically very cautious conclusions from this 
study arguing that what is really needed is the inclusion of better control variables and 
intermediate mechanisms in future studies (1996, p. 419-420). 
                                               
167 Simultaneity bias (reverse causality) is conceptually closely related to the heterogeneity bias but 
nevertheless a different phenomenon. Heterogeneity bias (control bias) refers to other variables being 
responsible for some of the effect allocated to (in this case) HRM practices. A simultaneity bias refers 
to actual reverse causality with respect to the dependent variable. Both phenomena would lead to 
wrong identification of causalities. Because there are a multitude of organizational processes with 
potential lagged effects and because of potential feedback processes from good performance, the test 
for lagged effects is in itself not a test for either heterogeneity or simultaneity bias. Through a 
longitudinal study with more than two or three observations at different points in time analyzing the 
effects of lagged changes in variables, we could minimize the risk for potential heterogeneity and 
simultaneity biases. Alternatively, we could also reduce the risk of wrongly attributing causality due to 
either heterogeneity or simultaneity biases by using proper controls and identifying specific 




Becker and Huselid (1998b) used a similar sample, similar respondents and kinds of 
measures as the earlier studies by Huselid (1995) and Huselid and Becker (1996). 
However, they further broadened the HRM system measure (Becker and Huselid, 
1998b, p. 7). In addition they included more explicit measures of external fit which 
we will return to below. Relating this study to earlier studies Becker and Huselid 
argue that  
”[R]eplicating the HRM system – firm performance relationship with a 
different measure in a different time period is important support for these 
prior empirical results” (Becker and Huselid, 1998, p.10) 168.  
Becker and Huselid also mention that the effect of the HRM system variable falls by 
about 40% when taking into account their Implementation Alignment measure. They 
argue that  
“[t]his is not astonishing given the substantial correlation between the 
HRM System and Implementation Alignment variables. This suggests that 
in prior research part of the positive effects of the HRM system on firm 
performance may have reflected the aspects of other organizational 
policies that leveraged the influence of the HRM system” (Huselid, 1998, 
p. 10-11).  
By ”other organizational policies” they refer to the items included in their 
Implementation Alignment index169. Becker and Huselid (1998b) conclude that  
“we found a uniformly consistent support for a strong positive relationship 
between the presence of a HPWS and firm performance...the point 
estimates were economically meaningful [and]...consistent with earlier 
work that has examined the HRM system-firm performance relationship” 
(ibid., p. 13). 
For us the above results confirm our conviction of the importance of achieving 
theoretically motivated agreement on relevant practices, variables and questions of 
measurement. It also indicates the potential importance of controlling for many more 
phenomena than what has been done in research so far. Depending on what we control 
                                               
168 It would seem that replication using (at least) the same measures would be even more important. In 
addition, the epistemic relevance of replication studies is also largely related to replications by 
independent researchers (Tsang and Kwan, 1999, p. 765). Tsang and Kwan provide a taxonomy of 
different types of replication studies (ibid., pp. 765-768). Based on their arguments, an additional weak 
point with Becker and Huselid’s (1998b) replication is that it mixes replication in terms of conceptual 
extension on the one hand, and generalization and extension on the other hand (ibid., pp. 767-768). It 
would be important to begin with exact replications (ibid., p. 765). Although, one could argue that 
HRM research is still in a too early exploratory stage to warrant replications in any form (ibid., p. 771), 
they would seem to be important before far reaching conclusions are being drawn. 
169 However, whether these should be competing explanations is questionable. Some of the variation in 
the effectiveness of the HRM system as measured by their Implementation Alignment variable is 
arguably contained in the variation of the HRM System index and vice versa. Thus to some extent 
these two measures are overlapping (measuring the same thing) rather than independent. As already 
described, we propose a different conceptualization of both the substance of and the relation between 
the HRM practices and external alignment. By analyzing the indirect effect of an explicitly and 





for and how we specify and measure HRM practices and related phenomena in an 
HRM theory of organizational performance, we might apparently receive very 
different results. Plausibly there are a host of other organizational policies and 
phenomena which might be highly correlated with any HRM practices or 
”organizational policies” than the ones so far controlled for in research on HRM170. 
Youndt et al. (1996) analyzed a sample from the metal-working industry in the 
United States. This study includes performance data as averages of multiple 
respondents answers at two different points in time. They asked functional and 
general managers about HRM “systems used in their organizations” (ibid., p. 847) 
apparently in relation to production workers (ibid., p. 850). They did not report the 
exact items related to the HRM practices but they grouped the items into two indexes, 
i.e. a "human capital enhancing HRM system" and an "administrative HRM 
system"171.  
                                               
170 As Huselid (1995), Huselid and Becker (1996) and Becker and Huselid (1998b) only analyze the 
direct relation of the HRM practices on firm performance (basically with no controls for other 
organizational processes) their calculations of the monetary values of differences in the HRM practice 
indices seem somewhat premature. At least some part of these effects are very likely to be due to 
reverse causality or heterogeneity bias. In addition, to really be able to reflect upon and assess the 
values reported the reader would like some more consistent information throughout the studies on the 
increase in market values in percent. This percentage is e.g. not given in (Huselid, 1995, p. 659). 
Comparable figures would enable us to assess the compatibility of the reported influences in different 
studies. However enough information is still provided to allow at least some comparisons. Huselid 
(1995) resports an increase in sales per employee of 16 % related to a one standard deviation increase 
in the HRM indices (ibid., p. 658). In Huselid and Becker (1996), the increase in market value resulting 
from one standard deviation increase in the HRTOTAL index is 14%. At least these two percentages 
seem in principle compatible. On average (even if the particular relation depends very much on the 
industry, profit levels, interest rates and future expectations) it might not be too far from reality to 
assume that a 1% increase in sales results in a 1% increase in market value. Thus one can argue that 
Huselid's (1995) and Huselid and Becker's (1996) results appear quite consistent. (The calculations 
comparing the increases in GRATE and Tobin's q in Huselid and Becker (1996, p. 418) and Huselid 
(1995, p. 659) are however in a sense trivial and more rhetorical. They only confirm that the measures 
of performance in terms of Tobin's q and GRATE are compatible. However, Becker and Huselid 
(1998b, p. 13) report that a one standard deviation change in the HRM system variable resulted in a 
17% (51.000 dollar) change in market value per employee. This was true when they controlled for the 
Implementation Alignment index (measuring external fit) and thus not really comparable to the other 
studies. The coefficient for the HRM system index was 65% larger when this was not controlled for 
(based on the HRM system coefficients in Models 1 and 2, ibid., p. 11). Thus the comparable figure for 
the 1998b study would be 1,65x17% = 28%. In the 1998b study they used a more comprehensive HRM 
index which might explain some of the larger effect. But it is difficult to digest the fact that the 
somewhat larger HRM measure would have explained 100% more of the difference in market value 
(28% compared to 14%). The instability in these figures is thus some reason to doubt their 
meaningfulness. When such inferences are made we would also like to see the variation in interest rates 
to be able to assess the inferences and compare them to earlier ones. In any case the issue of reverse 
causality remains a question. With a more specific model including intermediate outcomes we could 
begin to exclude this possibility. However, it might be that the more theoretically adequate models we 
test the more perceptual the measures will become and thus the more difficult it becomes to interpret 
inferences to effect sizes in monetary terms. 
171 A question arises as to the appropriateness of grouping combinations of HRM practices into two 
indexes with no confirmatory factor analyses used to assess discriminant validity. In particular as a 
confirmatory factor analyses was used to test the convergent validity of all the HRM measures of 
individual HRM practices (ibid., p. 845). We will later argue that any such factor analyses of the HRM 




Youndt et al. first reported a support for a link between a “human-capital-enhancing 
HR system” and performance in terms of employee productivity, customer alignment, 
and equipment efficiency (ibid., p. 853)172. However, based on later analyses they 
argued that this evidence was misleading. These universal effects seemed to have 
been produced by the large effects of interactions between a human-capital-enhancing 
HRM system and a quality strategy for all of the outcome variables (ibid., pp. 853-
854, 857). This raises some general doubts as to the existing evidence for the 
universalistic hypothesis where such an additional analysis (either an interaction with 
or a control for strategy) has not been performed.  
Youndt et al.'s conclusion is that  
“the apparent main [universalistic] effect of human-capital-enhancing HR 
on performance is predominately a function of the performance 
enhancements obtained when firms link human-capital-enhancing HR 
systems with a quality manufacturing strategy” (ibid., p. 858)173.  
                                                                                                                                      
to "normative theory derived from previous studies on the strategic management of human resources" 
(ibid., p. 850). Such "theory" is however not very well articulated anywhere. 
172 They do not report the additional variance in these three outcomes explained by this HR system 
alone, only for two HRM systems as a set (ibid. pp. 854-856). The administrative HR system index had 
no significant individual effect on these performance measures (ibid., pp. 854-856). 
173 However, our points (1) and (2) below indicate that this interpretation of the results are somewhat 
ambiguous.  
(1) On the one hand, Youndt et al.'s analyses in terms of steps 4 in Tables 4-6 indicate that "the 
conditional main effect [of a human capital enhancing HRM system] is positive across the applicable 
levels of manufacturing strategy" (ibid., p. 854). Although this is discussed only in relation to the 
outcome in terms of "customer alignment", we interpret their comments to apply also to the other 
outcomes. A conditional main effect for each level of the strategies is also supported in steps 3 of 
Tables 4-6. 
(2) On the other hand, they also show some evidence in terms of plot-diagrams indicating that, with 
reference to the outcomes in terms of "customer alignment" and "equipment efficiency", combinations 
of low quality strategy and a human capital enhancing HRM system have a negative influence (ibid., p. 
857). From this evidence they conclude "that it is misleading to suggest that human capital enhancing 
HR has a general main effect on performance" (ibid., p. 854). The plot-diagrams are compatible with 
their analyses of interaction effects. It is also quite possible that although the conditional main effects 
of the capital enhancing HRM system were significant and positive, these results may have been due to 
"the large performance impact of linking [high] human-capital-enhancing HR with a [high] quality 
manufacturing strategy" (ibid., p. 854) as depicted in (some of) the plot diagrams.  
However, the plot-diagrams (ibid., p. 857) do not include any control variables and are thus not 
comparable to their regression analyses of universalistic effects. Youndt et al. did not complement their 
plot diagrams by proper statistical analyses (t-statistic) of the difference in the correlation coefficients 
for the human capital enhancing HRM system and the three forms of performance between the two 
groups of high versus low quality strategies (for such significance tests, see Jaccard et al., 1990, pp. 27-
28, Venkatraman, 1989, p. 426). Without the significance tests we are unable to tell whether the results 
depicted in the plot-diagrams are reliable or simply an ad hoc result produced by very few 
observations.  
Thus, excluding the limited reliability of the evidence in terms of the plot diagrams, Youndt et al. did 




Delery and Doty (1996) reported support for a link between parts of a set of 
individual HRM practices related to loan officers (ibid., p. 829) and ROA as well as 
ROE in their sample from the banking industry in the United States174. The fact that 
the effect of some of the individual HRM practices were insignificant might be 
interpreted in at least three ways. It may simply indicate multicollinerity problems 
(Delaney and Huselid, 1996, p. 958). However, the correlations do not indicate such 
problems (Delery and Doty, 1996, p. 819). Their results may also indicate either that 
organizations in the sample simply did not consistently and adequately implement all 
the practices identified in the study. Delery and Doty’s results could thus be 
interpreted as an indication that some formally identified practices are more difficult 
to implement in a meaningful and effective manner than other. This would indicate a 
need to study implementations and receptions of the HRM practices. Their results 
may also indicate that some individual practices included are simply irrelevant or at 
least individually insufficient to explain variation in organizational performance. In 
any case the results should caution researchers as to our knowledge of relevant formal 
specification of HRM practices and/or systems of HRM practices and indicate the 
need for theoretical development with reference to the influence of the HRM 
practices175.  
Reverse causation is one possible interpretation of Delery and Doty's results. In 
particular since two of the three significant main effects in their analyses with 
reference to ROA (ibid., p. 820) were related to profit sharing and employment 
security. These may be more likely to be practiced in organizations which do well 
without explaining why these organizations do well. At least a partial reverse 
causation seems likely. 
Delery and Doty themselves, however, offer  
theoretical justifications for the plausibility of their conclusions that the 
degree to which results oriented performance appraisals, profit sharing and 
a policy of employment security are practiced (visavi a specific job) 
                                                                                                                                      
test is positive (as it is in Youndt et al., 1996) it is not incompatible with a universalistic effect. It 
simply means that the effect will increase with increasing values for the moderator. 
Further, what is not even mentioned by Youndt et al. is that for the outcome in terms of "employee 
productivity", the plot-diagram indicates that both low and high quality strategies benefited from 
human-capital-enhancing HR systems. For this outcome the universalistic hypothesis is thus supported 
both by their plot diagrams and their regression analyses.  
174 Delery and Doty test a somewhat different conceptualization where HRM practices are given 
individual importance rather the system. Although an index has its downsides it is arguably closer to 
most conceptualizations and arguments about HRM system level effects. We will later discuss the 
adequacy of indexes in more detail.  
175 Their results should thus caution us as to what might be buried under indexes of HRM practices 
which are utilized in many studies. Researchers seem to be between a Skylla and Charybdis of sorts. 
Individual practices may produce multicollinearity problems in addition to not really testing a system 
level effect. They may understate “the combined firm-level effect of … multiple [HRM practice] 
measures to the extent that complementarities exist among the HRM practices” (Delaney and Huselid, 




explain a considerable part of the variance in organizational performance 
among the sampled banks (ibid., pp. 825-826)176. 
Delaney and Huselid (1996) reported support for the effect of HRM practices on 
organizational performance in their study of profit and non-profit organizations from a 
nation wide sample in the United States. Their measures of performance were 
perceptual measures related to a multifaceted index of non-financial performance and 
a somewhat less complex measure of more financially related performance (the items 
for the latter were marketing performance, profitability, sales growth and market 
share) (ibid., p. 956). Some of their measures of HRM practices were substantially 
compromised by the externally provided data-base used in the study (in particular the 
measure of employee participation and employment security) (ibid., pp. 954-955). 
Their analyses included analyses of the effects of individual HRM practices which we 
will not consider due to the above mentioned biases such analyses are likely to 
involve (ibid., p. 958). The inclusion of all the HRM practices resulted in only 
training, staffing selectivity and incentive compensation being significant in several 
models. Similar caveats as the ones in Delery and Doty (1996) (above) are possible. 
When all the HRM practices were included, the additional variance explained in either 
performance variable in any model (delta R2 approximately = 0.035) was lower than 
in the study by Delery and Doty (1996). This is to be expected since Delaney and 
Huselid (1996) included some more control variables. We may note that none of the 
significant HRM practices in Delaney and Huselid (1996) belonged to the same 
categories as the ones found to be universally significant by Delery and Doty (1996). 
Delaney and Huselid themselves conclude that their results  
“suggest that progressive HRM practices, including selectivity in staffing, 
training, and incentive compensation, are positively related to perceptual 
measures of organizational performance"(1996, p. 965).  
Arthur (1994) reported support for the general effectiveness in terms of higher 
organizational labour efficiency, lower scrap rates and employee turnover of a HR 
commitment approach (as compared to a HR control approach) related to maintenance 
and production workers of steel “minimills” in the United States.  
                                               
176 In distinction to Delery and Doty, Youndt et al. (1996) tested the universalistic hypothesis 
controlling for organizational strategy. This seems a more correct way to test the hypothesis. Strategy is 
arguably an important control factor. However, Delery and Doty also conducted a test of the 
universalistic hypothesis controlling for strategy although they do not discuss this under that 
description (ibid., p. 822, table 5). The results of this test were to some extent similar to their plain test 
of a universalistic hypothesis in terms of significant individual practices (with the exclusion of 
employment security), however with only very weakly significant overall delta R2's for the HRM 
practices. 
Neither do Delery and Doty, as Youndt et al. did, discuss whether the universalistic effect might have 
been largely due to a strong interaction effect with some specific form of strategy. However, the fact 
that none of the interaction effects were stronger than any of the significant universalistic effects (when 
controlled for strategy) indicates that this was not the case. Also the delta R2's of the interaction effects 
were only weakly significant (ROE) and insignificant (ROA) in these analyses (Delery and Doty, 1996, 




The employee turnover measure in Arthur (1994) did not distinguish between 
voluntary and involuntary turnover. The theoretical hypothesis of an influence of 
HRM on employee turnover would arguably refer specifically to involuntary turnover. 
Although a commitment approach should also be correlated with lower involuntary 
turnover, it should lead to lower voluntary turnover. Arthur was consequent in testing 
only differences (by performing a t-test) in mean turnover between organizations 
utilizing the two HR systems (ibid., p. 679). His results supported the fact that 
employee turnover was significantly lower in organizations employing a commitment 
HRM system. However, in these analyses no control variables were thus included. 
Regression analyses gave some support for the fact that a commitment HRM 
approach "is significantly related to both fewer labour hours per tons and lower scrap 
rates" (ibid., p. 679). However, the overall regression model for scrap rate is not 
significant and "the significance of the human resource system variable in this model 
must [thus] be treated with some caution" (ibid., p. 679). 
Arthur also found support (ibid., p. 682) for the fact that a "negative relationship 
between turnover and manufacturing performance...[was] higher in commitment 
human resource systems than in control systems" (ibid., p. 679).  
A downside of this study is that the outcomes in terms of labour efficiency (labour 
hours) and scrap rates would arguably also depend on the sophistication/modernity of 
the equipment used in the mills. The absence of such controls (ibid., p. 682) favors 
some further caution in the interpretation of the results177. 
Although nowhere explicitly described by Arthur, he apparently only utilized a 
continuous index of all the HRM practices in his regression analyses (and not e.g. 
dummy variables related to the clusters) thus not really testing differences between 
clusters. The advantage of actually using distinct clusters of HRM systems in testing 
the effect of HRM practices would be that the effects of HRM might not be linear. 
Testing distinct systems provides evidence as to distinct effects of more clearly 
distinguished approaches. A methodology of analyzing different relationships 
between dependent variables and clusters of HRM systems should ideally be 
combined with analysis of the effect of simple variation in one continuous HRM 
system variable. Differences in results between such analyses would provide 
interesting information.  
Further, as Arthur does not provide any form of financial performance outcomes the 
study cannot present evidence as to whether the increased efficiency, lower scrap rates 
and employee turnover were achieved in an economically effective way. 
                                               
177 One general problem with Arthur’s study is that the sample is fairly small, N=14 and N=16 for the 
two HRM systems. Thus the reliability of the findings suffer from this. In particular, based on 
Lehmann’s (1979) recommendation for a cluster reliability criteria stating that the number of clusters 
should fall in the range of N/50 to N/30, the sample seem to have been to small for extracting 2 clusters 
(not to mention the six originally identified in Arthur’s cluster analysis). Arthur referred to some 
additional second hand validation tests (ibid., p. 677) which tells us something about the general 
intuitive validity of the results of the cluster analysis. As Arthur notes, "the pattern of scores for the 




Arthur’s conclusion is that the study supports hypotheses about  
“the effectiveness of commitment-type human resource systems, at least in 
the context of manufacturing plants using technologically intensive and 
relatively integrated continuous production processes” (p. 683)178. 
Ichniowski et al (1997), based on a sample of homogeneous steel productions lines 
reported support for the positive effects on productivity and quality of increasing 
degrees of soft HRM related sophistication in the application of sets of internally 
aligned HRM practices179. We interpret this study as testing HRM system effects. 
They argue for the internal coherence of their different HRM systems in some more 
detail than e.g. Huselid (1995), Youndt et al. (1996), or Arthur (1994). However, they 
do not explicitly test an effect of internal coherence over and above the effects of 
different sets of HRM practices.  
Ichniowski et al. (1997) used four groups or classes of their total set of HRM 
practices. The latter were justified both by prior research and their empirical sample 
(ibid., pp. 4-6). Their measures of the HRM practices were dummy variables related 
to questions of whether certain types of practices are applied or not (ibid., pp. 18-19, 
table 2). This procedure would seem to potentially involve the loss of a great deal of 
variation concerning the extent to which (at least some of) the specified practices were 
utilized. However, the measures were developed on the basis of considerable field 
interviews and concerned a homogeneous group of employees (ibid., pp. 2-4). 
Using their longitudinal data they also calculate “fixed-effects estimates” of 
productivity effects of changes in the HRM systems (ibid., pp. 7-8). However, they 
acknowledge the limitation of these analyses because the amount of “changers” are 
scarce (ibid., p. 6). Instead they argue that their controls in the cross-sectional 
estimates should be sufficient (ibid., p. 8). If very few changes in the HRM variables 
occurred then the monthly cross-sectional data seem to amount to an additional 
control that the correlations were consistent and not only coincidental for a certain 
point in time. However, a similar control would seem to be achieved also through 
single period data from a larger number of plants. 
The results of the basic equation with a set of technology controls (ibid., p. 32, Table 
4) seem to be stable even with the later inclusion of additional controls. These results 
indicate that the time a production line is effectively running and producing 
(=productivity) increases with the sophistication of the HRM system. The R2 (=0.40) 
of the whole equation gives us no idea of how much of the variation was explained by 
the HRM practices since no hierarchical analyses were presented. The productivity 
                                               
178 In the analysis of the universalistic effect Arthur controlled for strategy. However, what he did not 
test is whether the overall superior effectiveness of a commitment approach might have largely been 
due to large positive effects of combinations of differentiation strategies and commitment HRM 
approaches and low negative effects of combinations of the same HRM approach with low cost 
strategies (compare Youndt et al. above). 
179 36 production lines of 17 companies were studied using monthly panel data (ibid., p. 2). An as 
relevant set of controls (as well as an as relevant set of HRM practices) were gathered based on fairly 




gains of the HRM systems were reported to vary in the range of 2,5-6.7% (ibid., p. 9). 
The effect on quality seem to have been in the same range, although with even larger 
effects of the most sophisticated HRM system (ibid., p. 25, table 6).  
They also report evidence as to the fact that individual HRM practices can not explain 
variation in productivity over and above the explanatory power of the HRM system 
dummies and that the estimates of individual practices are biased (ibid., p. 12). 
Overall considerable attempts were made to include relevant controls. Of these, 
perhaps the controls of manager quality seems less adequate as it was only based on 
tenure-type data. Tenure might not reflect essential differences in management 
quality. Another reason for some caution in the interpretation of the results seems to 
be the data.  
Ichniowski et al.’s field data also suggest that there appear to be considerable barriers 
to the change of HRM practices (ibid., pp. 11-12). This might be interpreted as 
evidence for a historical path dependence in accordance with the RBV (Barney, 1991) 
which could make HRM an important factor for the achievement of more sustainable 
competitive advantage. On the other hand, it seems ultimately in this case to be a 
question of new site investment with new or old technology (Ichniowski et al., 1997, 
p. 11). This then does not amount to evidence of effects of social complexity, causal 
ambiguity or, in fact, the kind of historical path dependence conceptualized by the 
RBV (Barney, 1991).  
Ichniowski et al. comment that “all our “green field” lines adopted innovative 
practices” (Ichniowski et al., 1997, p. 12). More exactly  
“recently opened lines at “greenfield” sites, as well as older lines that had 
been closed but were opened with new owners and workers, are adopting 
innovative work practices…continuously operating lines at “brownfield” 
sites are still much more likely have traditional HRM practices” (ibid., p. 
11).  
This makes a reader suspicious that there might have been something in these new 
investments that escape the controls and accounts for the identified effects of HRM 
systems. Ultimately this study operates with the kind of detailed highly contextual 
control variables which makes it is impossible for an outside reviewer to judge their 
relevance. Thus we would really need independent replication studies in this case.  
While belonging to the most rigorous studies in this genre, Ichniowski et al.’s study 
still lacks data on the employment relationship, i.e employee receptions and reactions 
to the implementation of the HRM practices. Ichniowski et al. are thus subject to the 
potential critique which argues that the increases in worker productivity might be due 
to  
"'sweating' workers through a faster work pace, standardized jobs, social 
control via peer pressure and stress" (Macduffie, 1995, p. 218). 
Ichniowski et al.’s conclusion that “innovative HRM systems raise worker 
productivity” (Ichniowski et al., 1997, p. 13) is after all inferred (albeit with an 




innovative HRM practices. There are no direct measures of either employee 
productivity or employee attitudes.  
Ichniowski et al. conclude that  
“systems of innovative HRM practices [in the steel finishing lines] have 
large effects on production workers’ performance, while changes in 
individual employment practices have little or no effect” (ibid., p. 13). 
Summary. There is some evidence indicating a direct relationship between different 
forms of organizational HRM systems and/or practices and different forms of 
organizational performance. We will now turn to the evidence for an influence of 
internal fit of the HRM practices. 
6.2.2 Internal fit: HRM as internal integration 
Huselid (1995) used two exploratory measures of internal fit. 
First, the interaction of his two indexes in terms of 'employee skills and organizational 
structures' and 'employee motivation' was significant and positive with reference both 
to Tobin's q (only weakly significant) and GRATE (ibid., pp. 664-665)180.  
Second, internal fit as matching, measured as the absolute value of the difference 
between a firms score on the two indices, was negative and significant for GRATE 
but insignificant for Tobin’s q (ibid., pp. 664-665). With reference to GRATE this 
hypothesis thus gave support for an influence of internal fit. It should however be 
noted that in this analysis the employee motivation index in itself was negative and 
significant.  
This second measure for internal fit as matching amounts to a pure test of alignment 
in the same sense as is noted with reference to the measures applied by Delery and 
Doty (below), i.e. that in capturing (one form of) internal alignment, it punishes both 
for higher and lower adoption of the parts of the HRM system. However, we have to 
remember that Huselid's measure defines internal alignment in terms of the extent of 
applying a certain amount of HRM practices through out the organization in 
distinction to some form of internal alignment related to the focus or substance of the 
HRM practices.  
His conclusion is that he found  
“only modest evidence” for an effect of internal fit and he acknowledges 
“the preliminary nature of the measures” (ibid., pp. 669-670). 
Becker and Huselid (1998b) develop a measure which essentially captures the 
proportion of HRM practices which have been relatively (arbitrarily defined) widely 
applied in the organizations as measured by the original HRM System variables. As 
                                               
180 In effect, this measure is a multiplicative alternative to using one additive index of the whole HRM 




Becker and Huselid partly acknowledge (ibid., p. 8) this approach does not really 
capture any meaningful and explicit idea of overall internal coherence181. 
Nevertheless, Becker and Huselid (1998b) analyzed the effect of two forms of their 
conceptualization of internal coherence. Their results indicate that internal fit among 
the HRM System items has a larger effect than the simple average of the HRM 
System items whereas internal fit among the Implementation Alignment items has a 
smaller effect than the simple average of these items182. Both dimensions of internal 
fit are reported to have significant effects on performance. 
They conclude that their results provide evidence for the fact  
“that internal fit within the HRM system is more important to firm 
performance than internal fit within the supporting organizational logic” 
(ibid., p. 12)183.  
Using a similar measurement approach as above they further tested the incremental 
effect of the internal fit of the two dimensions over and above the effects of the simple 
indexes of the respective dimensions. Here they confronted severe multicollinearity 
problems and insignificant coefficients (ibid., p. 12) but nevertheless concluded that  
“approximately two thirds of the gains from improving the HRM system 
comes from increasing the internal fit of the system. The gains from 
internal fit within the supporting organizational logic, on the other hand, 
are trivial” (ibid., p. 12) 184.  
Delery and Doty (1996) might be interpreted as testing a hypothesis of overall 
internal alignment based on their classification of three ideal type employment 
systems (their hypothesis 3, ibid., p. 812). In terms of explained variance in ROA and 
ROE they received no support for this (ibid., p. 823).  
There might be a problem in the way they constructed their ideal types. For example, 
tight job descriptions, extensive training and participation/voice are not evidently 
                                               
181 The organizations HRM systems are allocated a value of 1 for each HRM practice on which they 
score higher than the 75th percentile in the sample. Becker and Huselid’s HRM system index in itself 
might be argued to reflect some kind of “hierarchical internal fit” in terms of average organization-
wide applications of the same HRM practices. The variable explicitly characterized by Becker and 
Huselid as a measure of internal fit really is only measuring the average amount of those practices that 
are in relative terms very widely applied in the organizations. This measure gives relatively less 
consideration to the whole system. 
182 The Implementation Alignment items are argued to measure organizational logic or strategic fit. 
They involve a complex set of measures related to the perceived effectiveness of the HRM practices, 
the role of the HRM department and top management. 
183 In connection to the review of their evidence of an effect of external fit (below) we will argue that 
these results are somewhat puzzling. We will also problematize the general adequacy of their items 
related to external fit (Implementation Alignment). 
184 In fact, among the factors constituting internal fit of the HRM system practices, they found support 




coherent (ibid., p. 816). In addition, the appropriateness of results versus behavior 
oriented performance appraisals should be more dependent on the kind of job 
activities than the kind of employment system. The use of incentive systems can 
arguably be appropriately used in any employment system185.  
In addition, there is the general problem with the study that it attempts to study 
organizational performance effects based on HRM practices related only to a specific 
job in complex organizations. 
Delery and Doty also tested a hypothesis that there is one superior ideal type 
employment system (ibid., p. 824). They received some support (in terms of R2) for 
the fact that internal coherence in terms of a market type ideal employment system 
was superior. Considering the content of their ideal market type employment system 
(ibid., p. 816), this result offers no clear support for what we have called a strategic 
soft HRM approach. However, the simple universalistic hypothesis, more in line with 
such an approach, received more support in terms of explained variance than did the 
coherence in a market type ideal employment system186. Again, this might indicate a 
problem with the specification of the ideal type employment systems and/or their 
calculation of the internal coherence of the employment systems. 
Delery and Doty conclude that 
“the configurational analyses...identified a single HR configuration that 
resulted in better performance [in terms of the market type ideal 
employment system being positively related to performance]...however, 
the variation explained in the configurational analyses did not exceed the 
variation explained when the individual dimensions were simultaneously 
used to predict performance. Thus we cannot make strong arguments that 
synergy among the HR practices under investigation enhance 
organizational performance” (ibid., p. 827).  
Delaney and Huselid (1996) attempted two different ways to test the effect of 
internal integration. One was through a scale indicating the number of practices for 
which each firm was above the median in the sample. This variable provided no 
evidence of an effect. Not even attempts to increase the sophistication of this 
measure187 resulted in evidence of such an effect. They also attempted several partial 
                                               
185 Also with reference to internal coherence Delery and Doty tested their hypothesis in terms of 
individual HRM practices, not in terms of a HRM system index. Delery and Doty explicitly calculated 
the distance for each HRM practice from an empirically derived calculation of an ideal score (ibid., pp. 
816-817; 823-824). In principle, to the extent that the ideal scores can be justified, their method of 
measuring internal coherence is interesting.  
Delery and Doty’s method punishes not only for low, but also for high investments in individual HRM 
practices in relation to the ideal type and rewards only for internal alignment. Arguably, this is what a 
pure test of alignment should do. 
186 With the exception of tight job descriptions, the universalistic hypothesis was related to an HRM 
approach compatible with the strategic soft HRM hypothesis we pursue in our work. 
187 “[I]ncluding individual dummy variables indicating whether each practice was above the sample 




interaction effects between sets of two HRM practices. These analyses provided no 
evidence of an effect. Multicollinearity among the different interactions precluded 
inclusion of several interactions in one and the same model (ibid., p. 962). The 
authors acknowledge that the lack of evidence may have been due to issues of 
measurements of the HRM practices. 
Summary. There is thus little evidence of a pure effect of internal fit even as 
researchers have tried many different approaches. This supports our conceptual 
discussion  of the insufficiency of internal fit per se in producing organizational 
performance effects. Although, Becker and Huselid (1998b) interpreted their results 
as clearly indicating an effect of internal alignment, we will argue below that this 
piece of evidence is not entirely convincing.  
6.2.3 External fit: HRM as strategic integration 
MacDuffie’s (1995) studied a world wide sample of automotive assembly plants and 
put considerable effort into developing contextually relevant measures of HRM 
practices, performance outcomes and control variables. His HRM questions were 
mostly “tied to shopfloor activities at the plant level” (ibid., p. 203). His outcome 
measures consisted of contextually well justified forms of quality (defects per vehicle) 
and labour productivity. His hypotheses concerned independent variables in terms of a 
production organization system as well as its constituents in terms of a flexible/mass 
production strategy, worksystems and HRM policies188.  
The results show that the regression coefficients for the overall additive production 
organization index with reference to the outcomes of both productivity and quality are 
substiantially higher than for any of the individual independent variables (constituting 
the production organization system) alone (ibid., p. 212, Table 6 and p. 215, Table 8). 
This is indicative evidence for an effect of strategic fit or the organizational logic as 
MacDuffie calls it. The differences in explained variances are small with reference to 
productivity but large with reference to quality189.  
MacDuffie did not include either of the production organization indexes in the same 
equation together with the constituent elements. This would arguably have been a 
                                               
188 His HRM measures are in effect split up in two indexes. 'Worksystem' concerns the organization of 
work where he among other things includes items related to work teams, job rotation, decentralization 
as well as items related to employee participation. 'HRM policies' includes items related to recruitment, 
compensation, training and status differences. 
189 The greater effect size and explanatory power of the additive compared to the multiplicative version 
of the 'production organization index' in these analyses is interpreted by MacDuffie as calling into 
question “the assumption that the relationship among the component indices is best modelled as 
multiplicative rather than additive” (ibid., p. 215). This interpretation takes for granted that good 
measures should have good explanatory power. Another interpretation of the result is that it is 
important to understand what these two measures in fact measure. In addition, although the regression 
coefficient is smaller, the delta R2 is in fact greater where the multiplicative index is included compared 




better test of the integrational effect. However, MacDuffie did analyze interaction 
effects while including also the components190.  
From Table 7 (ibid., p. 213) it appears that related to productivity the three way 
interaction term (between the independent variables) is stronger than any of the 
individual effects of these variables. From table 9 (ibid., p. 216) it appears that this is 
not the case related to the quality outcome. 
The standardized coefficients are generally larger with reference to the quality 
outcome than for productivity (ibid., pp. 214-215)191. Also the differences in variance 
explained compared to the control equation in the quality outcome models are larger. 
The standardized coefficient (not shown in the tables) for the additive version of the 
overall production organization index is as high as 0.73 (ibid., p. 215) and the delta R2 
compared to the equation where only the control variables are present is as high as 
0.365 (ibid., p. 215, Table 8. Equation 6).  
Although not commented upon by MacDuffie, his analyses also provide some support 
for universalistic effects of 'HRM policies' with reference to both 'productivity' and 
'quality' when 'buffers' (production system strategy) and 'worksystems' are controlled 
for (see Equation 1, Table 7 and Equation 1, Table 9 respectively) 192.  
In fact, there is only a negligible difference in the variance explained in productivity 
by the (additive) production organization system variable (comprising the postulated 
organizational logic) compared to that explained by the universalistic HRM terms and 
a control for 'buffers' (compare Equation 6, Table 6 with Equation 1, Table 7). This 
might be interpreted as evidence for the fact that the effect of the organizational logic 
is not very substantial.  
With reference to the quality outcome there is a considerable difference both in the 
regression coefficient for, and the variance explained by, the production organization 
system variable compared to the universalistic HRM terms (Equation 6, Table 8 and 
Equation 1, Table 9 respectively). Thus, in particular for the quality outcome we 
might draw the conclusion that the explanatory power of an aligned organizational 
logic is considerably greater than that of the two sets of universalistic HRM practices.  
However, this conclusion is complicated by the fact that the variance explained by the 
control variables in the quality model was very low (ibid., p. 215). MacDuffie 
acknowledges that this  
                                               
190 MacDuffie does not elaborate on the difference between the three way interaction term (in Tables 7 
and 9) and the multiplicative production organization index (in Tables 6 and 8). They would appear to 
be the same. However, when analyzing the three way interaction terms he included more controls in 
terms of (combinations of) the constituent components. The coefficients are thus not comparable. 
191 One exception is that 'buffers' or the production system index  (flexible/mass production) on its own 
is not significant related to quality (ibid., p. 215, Table 8, Equation 2). 
192 With respect to both outcomes the beta coefficients are considerably higher for the interaction 
variables than for the universalistic HRM variables. However, the HRM practices included by 
MacDuffie are split in two indexes. This might artificially reduce their universalistic explanatory power 




“raises the possibility that the control variables are incorrectly specified in 
the quality regressions” (p. 218).  
MacDuffie discusses the possibility that a “Japan effect” might account for the results 
in the study. For the quality outcome “there is little evidence of any 'Japan effect'” 
(ibid., p. 216). However, when he adds Japan-related dummies in the productivity 
model  
“the coefficients for the three independent component indices, as well as 
the overall multiplicative production organization index, ceased to be 
statistically significant” (p. 216) 193.  
Thus, with reference to productivity the evidence for a stronger effect of an 
organizational logic compared to that of the universalistic HRM variables is weak. In 
particular when controls in terms of the Japan-related dummy variables are included 
the results related to the productivity outcome appears somewhat questionable. As the 
whole model in terms of control variables related to the quality outcome is 
questionable we seem still adviced to interpret Macduffie’s results with some caution. 
Further, MacDuffie does not capture dimensions of implementation or reception of 
HRM practices. His data cannot e.g. “identify nuances of team functioning” (ibid., p. 
218). In particular, the employment relationship still remains outside this study. As 
MacDuffie acknowledges,  
“[c]ritiques argue that flexible production plants achieve much of their 
productivity advantage by “sweating” workers through a faster work pace, 
standardized jobs, social control via peer pressure, and stress from a 
bufferless production system and “kaizen” (continuous improvement) 
efforts that emphasize reductions of labor input” (ibid., p. 218).  
Thus, as there are no intermediate effects related to employees, the ‘human’ of human 
resource management remains unexplored in MacDuffie's study, independent of 
whatever else we shall conclude from his analyses. 
In addition, MacDuffie’s conclusion below in terms of “economic performance” is 
perhaps somewhat premature. He has no measures which would capture the fact that 
                                               
193 Peculiarly, MacDuffie does not comment on Equation 6, Table 6 (i.e. the additive production 
organization index) in relation to the dummy controls (ibid., p. 216). However, "the statistical 
significance of the interaction effects is unchanged when the Japan-related dummies are added" (ibid., 
p. 216). In Equation 3, Table 7 the three way interaction term is still reported to be significant even 
including the Japan related dummies (ibid., p. 216). Nevertheless, some questions arise because 
MacDuffie does not explain the difference between the multiplicative form of the production 
organization index (ibid., p. 208) and the three way interaction variable in terms of the constituents of 
the production organization index. To the extent that they are the same variables we have the following 
problem: the multiplicative form of the overall production organization index was not significant when 
the dummy variable was entered in Equation 5, Table 6 whereas the three way interaction term in 
Eqution 3, Table 7 was significant when entering the dummies (ibid., p. 216). This indicates some 
instability in the analyses. True, these two variables are entered in different equational contexts (ibid., 
pp. 212-213). However, the large difference in the coefficients between these variables in Equation 5, 
Table 6 and Equation 3, Table 7 might be due to multicollinearity problems in the latter equation. To 
the extent that there were such problems the fact that the significance of the interaction terms remained 




these reported gains in productivity and quality were achieved in an economically 
beneficial way. 
MacDuffie himself draws the following conclusions:  
“Overall, the evidence strongly supports the hypothesis that assembly 
plants using flexible production systems, which bundle human resource 
practices into a system that is integrated with production/business strategy, 
outperform plants using more traditional mass production systems in both 
productivity and quality. These results provide the strongest statistical 
evidence to date of a positive relationship between innovative human 
resource practices and economic performance...[t]his study does shed light 
on the issue of “fit” between HR strategy and business strategy” (ibid., p. 
218)194.  
Huselid (1995) found scattered and somewhat inconsistent support for an effect of 
external alignment. Here some measures of strategic HRM and strategic fit even 
indicated a negative effect on performance. As with the measures of internal fit in 
Huselid (1995) the results indicate the importance of developing conceptually well 
argued measures. We would understand positive or simply insignificant effects but 
negative effects of external alignment is close to a contradiction in terms  and 
indicates measurement problems. 
Also Huselid concludes that he found  
“little evidence for external fit” (1995, p. 669). 
Becker and Huselid (1998b) developed a complex variable to measure external 
coherence in terms of the average perceived effectiveness of the individual HRM 
practices, a somewhat diverse set of behaviors and processes related to the HR 
department and top management. The perceptions were related to the HRM managers 
in the organizations. Some of the items related to specific HRM practices concerned 
how effectively the practices enhanced business performance whereas some of these 
items referred to how effectively the organizations dealt with more specific issues 
related to these practices. In this way Becker and Huselid tried to take into 
consideration the ”organizational logic” (ibid., p. 3) 195.  
                                               
194 MacDuffie does not report a support for a general universalistic HRM hypothesis. Neither does he 
report support for a traditional contingency hypothesis. Rather, as MacDuffie notes, his interpretation 
of the results provide support for a hypothesis related to a general universalistic organizational logic, 
i.e. the superiority of a specific form of strategic fit which is in principle compatible with what we have 
called strategic soft HRM. As we shall see, MacDuffies results are also compatible with the results of 
Youndt et al. reviewed below. 
195 Becker and Huselid (1998b) go about the issue of identification of external fit in a way reminicent 
of ours. They avoid any categorizations of explicit (generic) strategies. However, their measure still 
involve arguable problematical aspects.  
In addition to items related to the effectiveness of the HRM practices, their measure of external fit 
includes separate items for top management behavior and HR department behavior. We feel that the 
latter elements (which indeed might viewed as part of an ”organizational logic”) should nevertheless be 
used as separate and explanatory variables with reference to properties of HRM, including the property 




Becker and Huselid do not explicitly comment much on the results related external fit 
alone. They draw more on the results of a cluster analysis incorporating both internal 
and external complementarities to which we shall return in the next chapter on HRM 
holism. 
However, it seems puzzling that Becker and Huselid’s HRM System index has a 
larger effect on organizational performance than their Implementation Alignment 
index (ibid., p. 11, Table 4). This is not puzzling due to any a priori argument that 
strategic fit should have greater influence on organizational performance than any 
HRM system per se. Rather, the result is puzzling because the items in the 
Implementation Alignment index (largely) refer specifically to how effective the 
different HRM practices in the organizations are. Either the index seem to suffer from 
low construct validity, meaning that it does not really measure what it purports to 
measure, or something else is suspicious in the analysis. If neither of these, we would 
have to conclude that the very existence of the HRM practices is more important than 
their effectiveness196. 
Although acknowledging that they received more support for the importance of what 
they called internal fit among the HRM system practices197, Becker and Huselid 
conclude that their analyses also provide support for the role of  
                                                                                                                                      
and Huselid's measure may be argued to confound external fit (the appropriateness of the HRM 
practices with reference to business strategy) and organizational logic (the elements supporting the 
HRM practices). Including all these phenomena in one and the same variable arguably blurs the 
interpretation of the results.  
A more severe problem, it seems to us, is the way Becker and Huselid identify in particular the HRM 
areas of training and the structuring of work in terms of their effectiveness in enhancing business 
performance. Such effectiveness should arguably be an outcome variable measurable by other means 
and explained by features of the HRM system. Questions related to such effectiveness is not only 
capturing strategic fit but a very direct way of identifying the very effectiveness of strategic fit which 
they are trying to sort out by their analyses. This way of posing the questions thus introduces a 
tautological element into their analyses. The same problem applies to a lesser degree with reference to 
their measures of the other HRM practices. These are also measured by their effectiveness, albeit not 
with direct reference to business performance (ibid., p. 7). In particular, the formulation of the 
questions in combination with the choice of respondents (HRM managers) open the doors to positive 
biases depending on how the companies are doing financially. This problem of bias is hard to 
eliminate, but arguably it could be diminished by putting questions of more specific characteristics of 
the HRM practices to (non-)managerial employees with no stake in how the HRM processes influence 
organizational outcomes. 
196 It does not necessarlily seem puzzling that the coherence of the Implementation Alignment items in 
fact have less effect than the simple Implementation Alignment index (ibid., p. 12). Becker and Huselid 
acknowledge that "sorting these two effects out is a challenge because these versions of ...[the] system 
measure are so highly correlated" (ibid., p. 12). In any case, Becker and Huselid's operationalization of 
internal alignment in this case was in terms of the arbitrarily defined proportion of (among other things) 
HRM practices that are relatively very effective. It may be that a few very effective practices cannot 
compensate the application of a broader array of relatively effective practices. However, any 
interpretations of these results are made more difficult by the fact that their Implentation Alignment 
index also includes other elements than the effectiveness of the HRM practices. In their conclusions 
(reported below) Becker and Huselid try to offer an explanation for these results. 
197 In fact, as already noted, among the factors constituting internal fit they found support for the 




"external fit between the HRM system and the supporting organizational 
logic...[However, v]irtually no gains from internal fit were observed for the 
supporting organizational logic. This suggests conciderably more 
equifinality among these supporting policies since one [very] broadly 
implemented support structure provides no incremental gain" (ibid., p. 14). 
Youndt et al. (1996)  reported some support for the overall explanatory power of 
different forms of strategic fit with reference to their performance outcomes of 
manufacturing facilities. More specifically a cost strategy-administrative HRM system 
index interaction was positively related to their organizational performance variable 
“equipment efficiency”. A delivery flexibility strategy-administrative HR system index 
interaction was positively related to performance in terms of “customer alignment”. 
Finally, a quality strategy–human-capital-enhancing HR system index interaction was 
positively related to all the performance variables, “customer alignment”, “equipment 
efficiency” and “employee productivity” (ibid., pp. 853-856)198. To some extent the 
results thus confirm a true contingency hypothesis in indicating that positive effects 
can be achieved by different combinations of strategy and HR systems. However, the 
beta coefficients were generally much stronger for the quality strategy – human-
capital-enhancing HR system interactions. Thus, taken together their results suggest 
that the largest and broadest effects of HRM are achieved under such circumstances. 
This latter evidence is in congruence with MacDuffie’s results (above). 
In an additional analysis they used cluster analysis to determine more complex 
combinative strategies. This seems one way, compatible to Delery and Doty's (1996) 
hybrid strategy measures, to try to meet the critique of generic strategy constructs 
which we discussed above. However, just as Delery and Doty, so conceptualized 
Youndt et al. received no support for the effects of strategy nor of strategy-HR 
interactions (1996, p. 855). 
Based on the above mentioned interaction effects, Youndt et al. themselves draw 
basically positive conclusions related to several kinds of HRM-strategy fit effects on 
performance, although with the ususal arguments for limitations at the very end of the 
article. They conclude that  
in production environments where firms try to compete on quality, human-
capital-enhancing HR systems designed to develop “talented and team-
oriented people…create an egalitarian work environment…incorporate 
group incentives…use salaried compensation” (pp. 858-859) can 
contribute to performance199 They also conclude that a fit between a cost 
                                               
198 Their analyses also indicate some negative influences of what they call a scope flexibility strategy 
in combination with an administrative HRM system as well as a delivery flexibility strategy in 
combination with such a HRM system (ibid., pp. 854-855). The two HRM systems are correlated with 
0.56 and the correlation between two of the strategy variables are also fairly high (0.44 and 0.49) (ibid., 
p. 852). Thus, one would have liked to see some arguments refuting the suspicion that there were 
severe multicollinearity problems in the analyses including all the interaction effects between the two 
HR systems and the four different strategies (ibid., pp. 854-856). Without any such arguments, the 
reader just have to assume thet there were no such problems. 
199 As they use HR system indexes in their analyses all the references to individual HRM practices in 
their conclusions should be treated with caution. Based on their analyses we do not know whether it is 
a combination of the individual practices or mostly only some of them which are important. Compare 




strategy and an administrative HR system as well as a fit between a 
delivery flexibility strategy and the latter are important. In addition they 
concluded that a strategic fit between a scope flexibility strategy and the 
latter HR system had a negative effect on performance (ibid., pp. 858-
859)200. 
Delery and Doty (1996) reported modest support for an overall interaction effect 
between a set of individually analyzed HRM practices and a contiinum measure of 
product/market innovation strategy in terms of ROE and ROA (ibid., pp. 821-822). 
The delta R2's of the interaction effects were only weakly significant (ROE) and 
insignificant (ROA) in these analyses (ibid., p. 823, table 5).  
Further, similar caveats and interpretations as mentioned regarding Delery and Doty’s 
evidence for the effect of the universalistic set of HRM practices (above) might be 
considered.  
(1) In particular, the high individual interaction effect related to career opportunities 
and an innovation strategy might be interpreted as indicating a reverse causation. 
Such an interpretation would argue that the better the performance of the 
                                               
200 It seems important to recognize the reasons for suspending any normative judgement with reference 
to the non-existence of HRM-strategy fit effects based on these results. The identified set of four 
manufacturing strategies were able to explain none of the variation in the administrative HR system 
variable and only 11% of the variation in the human-capital-enhancing HR system variable. The only 
significant predictive relationship was found between a quality strategy and the latter HRM system 
(ibid., p. 856). The weak correlation between strategies and HRM systems is already indicated by the 
correlation table (ibid., p. 852). As Youndt et al. acknowledge (ibid., p. 856), this suggests that only a 
small part of the organizations were making use of strategic fit at all as defined in this study. This 
might be due to the “elusive” nature of the concept of manufacturing strategy which Youndt et al. also 
acknowledge (p. 861). In any event, the sample used in the analyses may have lead to underestimations 
of the extent to which a human-capital-enhancing HR system interacts with the other strategies as well 
as how an administrative HRM system interacts with any of the strategies.  
Baron and Kenny (1986) claim that "it is desirable that the moderator variable be uncorrelated with 
both the predictor [independent variable] and the criterion [dependent variable] to provide a clearly 
interpretable interaction term (1986, p. 1174). However, neither Jaccard et al. (1990) nor Venkatraman 
(1989) argues for such a condition. While the test of interaction effects does not require, and is even 
made more difficult by large-scale existence of forms of fit it seems that some correlation between the 
moderator and both the independent and dependent variables is needed. A linear interaction effect tells 
us whether there is a significant consistent difference in the slope of the independent variable (in this 
case the HRM system) in relation to the dependent variable under different values of the moderator 
variable (in this case strategy) (Jaccard et al., 1990, p. 25). To the extent that there is little correlation 
between the moderator and the dependent variable the estimation of the coefficient for the interaction 
effect will probably be insignificant already for this reason. 
Youndt et al.’s analyses highlight the importance of distinguishing between empirical and normative 
conclusions. Normative conclusions about the non-significance of effects of different configurations 
cannot be made when such configurations are not significantly represented in the analyzed samples.  
It seems clear that (business) strategy should always be controlled for when analyzing any 
universalistic effects of HRM systems. This control has been lacking in many tests of universalistic 
effects. MacDuffie (1995) controls for his "strategy variable" in terms of the production system but 
only when analyzing interactions (ibid. pp. 213; 216). Delery and Doty (1996) also apparently control 
for strategy only when analyzing the contingency hypothesis (ibid., p. 822) and so does Huselid (1995) 




organizations, the more innovative strategies they pursue. The more innovative 
strategies they pursue the better will the internal career opportunities be. The 
interaction effect would then indicate that the internal career opportunities will be 
increasingly better, the more innovative strategies the organizations pursue and the 
better they perform. However, this interpretation seems not to be justified since 
the main effect of an innovation strategy seems to have been negative or 
insignificant201.  
(2) Also the main effect of internal career opportunities appears to be insignificant 
according to the evidence of both Tables 4 and 5: Thus it would also seem 
unjustified to argue that the better the organizations do financially, the more career 
opportunities there are and to the extent that the organizations are also pursue an 
innovation strategy, it further increases the career opportunities.  
(3) Thus it could seem that there is a true interaction effect such that the higher 
innovation strategy an organization pursues, the more the internal career 
opportunities will affect performance.  
(4) However, one other interpretation is perfectly compatible with all the regression 
results and the correlation table. This is: for each level of focus on an innovation 
strategy the better an organization does, the more career opportunities there will 
be. Thus, this interpretation would indicate that the performance of the 
organization does not directly influence career opportunities. It is only 
organizations which do well financially and focus on innovative strategy which 
also offer better career opportunities202. 
The evidence that the negative slope of the relationship between employee 
participation and financial results (ROA) was higher the more the organization 
focused on high product/market innovation seems to contradict much of the discourse 
on the importance of utilizing employee knowledge (ibid., p. 823).  
Delery and Doty conclude that 
 the effects of results oriented performance appraisals (+), participation(-) 
and internal career opportunities (+)203 are dependent on strategy (ibid., p. 
829). 
                                               
201 The interpretation is made somewhat difficult since it is not clear from Delery and Doty's 
discussion nor from Table 5 whether the coefficient for the effect of the innovation strategy is from the 
main effects regression equation or the regression equation including the interaction effects. As Jaccard 
et al (1990, pp. 26-27) argue, these two coefficients are theoretically different. However, the correlation 
table (ibid., p. 819) indicates that innovation strategy per se is not significantly related to the financial 
performance of the banks. 
202 This interpretation is not incompatible with the fact that defender banks are reported to have done 
better to the extent they did not offer extensive internal career opportunities. This is mentioned to have 
been the result of analyses which are not shown to the reader (ibid., p. 822).  
203 Note that internal career opportunities in a study by Huselid and Becker had a significant negative 




Summary. There is thus some fragmented and highly inconclusive evidence of an 
influence of strategic fit on organizational performance. We will now turn to what 
may be considered more sophisticated tests of the influence of HRM on 
organizational performance. 
6.2.4 HRM holism: HRM as consistent integration 
Delery and Doty (1996) tested a configurational hypothesis (their Hypothesis 4, ibid., 
pp. 812; 817; 824) in terms of a fit defined as the closeness of the organization's 
employment system to the one ideal type employment system (out of three) "that was 
most appropriate for the ideal strategic type most similar to the organization's 
strategy" (ibid., p. 817). This definition and operationalization was based on 
developments of Miles and Snow's theory of generic strategies (ibid., p. 815). This is 
really a test of internal alignment combined with external alignment. However, they 
received no support for this.  
They also tested a configurational fit hypothesis related to a contiinum of 
combinations of hybrid employment systems and hybrid strategies (their Hypothesis 
5, ibid., pp. 812-813; 817; 824). They received no support for this either.  
The difference between these two tests was that in the latter also the strategy variable 
was allowed to vary on a contiinum and the ideal employment system variable was 
calculated on the basis of a fit with such a contiinum variable (the closeness to which 
was then calculated for each organization). In effect they tested the hypothesis that the 
similarity in, on the one hand the proportional deviation from one of two polar 
opposite ideal type employment systems, and on the other hand a corresponding 
proportional deviation from one of two polar opposite ideal type strategies should 
predict performance204. The latter hypothesis (5) thus implies or allows that there is an 
infinite number of effective combinations of internally and externally aligned 
employment systems. 
Delery and Doty argue that  
"[o]ne plausible explanation for the null results associated with the 
configurational perspective is that too many or too few ideal type 
employment systems were included in the analyses" (ibid., p. 824). 
However, in particular after their "exploratory post hoc analysis" pursuing the 
possibility that a "single ideal employment system will result in maximal 
organizational performance" (ibid., p. 824), they acknowledge that the most plausible 
interpretation would seem to be that they included wrong conceptualizations of ideal 
types (ibid., p. 825). It is thus possible that the specification of the ideal type 
employment systems were not appropriate (and thus also the proportional deviation 
from them) and/or that external fit in terms of (proportional) closeness to a generic 
strategy was an inappropriate measure. 
                                               
204 They defined continuums between each of their three ideal types (ibid., p. 813) but since there was 
a middle category, they in fact defined one continuum between two polar opposites with reference both 




However, any ideal type employment system has to be evaluated on grounds partially 
independent of the results of statistical analyses of nomological relationships. After 
all, we have to allow for the possibility that correctly conceptualized maximally 
effective HRM systems do not have a sufficient influence on organizational 
performance205. 
Becker an Huselid (1998b) reported support for an internally and externally 
integrated configuration of High Performance Work Systems in their multi-industry 
sample. In addition to their separate analyses of external and internal fit, Becker and 
Huselid (1998b) went on to perform a cluster analyses through which they were able 
to identify four different clusters, measured by the scores on the items in both the 
Implementation Alignment and HRM System indexes206. In this way they arguably 
explored the effects of internal and external alignment in combination. 
Methodologically and theoretically this seems to be an interesting approach. As 
argued by Becker and Huselid, in principle cluster analysis has the advantage of 
allowing a test for complementarities without imposing  
“any a priori constraints on the nature of either the internal bundle of 
elements within each strategy or, external mix of...the overall HRM 
strategy” (Becker and Huselid, 1998b, p. 12).  
Becker and Huselid claim that in their cluster analysis ”[f]irms are sorted into groups 
that use a common mix or bundle of HRM practices” (Huselid, 1998, p. 8). But we 
still have to remember that this ”common mix or bundle” refers to what has been 
measured. On the one hand the variation captured is related to how extensively the 
organizations on average have adopted different sets of the HRM practices identified 
by Becker and Huselid’s operationalizations207. On the other hand the variation 
captured is related to how effective HRM managers on average perceive the utilized 
HRM practices to be in addition to the perceived degree of existence of certain 
                                               
205 Delery and Doty's conceptualization of internal and external fit can be seen as quite elaborate. 
However, both their strategic types and their ideal type employment systems are problematical to the 
extent that, as already noted in the conceptual discussion, we lack knowledge of both the requirements 
of a particular strategy and the outcomes of particular employment (or HRM) systems (Chadwick and 
Cappelli, 1999, p. 20). In our study we will therefore not focus on any such (potentially infinite 
number) of combinations of a formally specified set of HRM practices and formally specified 
strategies. Rather, as already noted, we will measure the HRM system in terms of employee 
perceptions of the amount, quality and relevance of a potentially unlimited number of forms of generic 
HRM practices incorporating also the potential (implemented and perceived) relevance of internal and 
external alignment. In addition, we have a separate measure of external/internal fit in terms of 
managerial perceptions of the extent to which the practices specifically contribute to properties of the 
employees which they need in pursuing strategic business goals.  
206 Becker and Huselid argue that “the cluster results are broadly consitent with what might be 
expected in a multiindustry cross sample” (ibid., p. 9). However, the generalizability of this cluster (and 
thus replicability of the results) is yet to be determined. Compare the arguments in section 
8.3.1concerning strategic fit as gestalts as well as the discussion in Ramsay et al. (2000) at the end of 
section 9.5. 
207 The commonality of the adopted practices in different organization within the different clusters is 





behaviors and processes related to the top management and the HR department. As 
already noted, some confusion arises from the tautological element introduced by 
some of the Implementation Alignment items as well as the complex nature of the 
whole index208.  
The operationalizations of the relevant HRM phenomena are not easy to develop in a 
satisfactory manner209. 
Becker and Huselid themselves conclude that  
“the cluster analysis results strongly supported our hypothesis that the 
performance effects of HRM are attributable, in part, to complementarities 
within the HRM system, as well as the “fit” with a supporting 
organizational logic. The High Performance cluster which characterized 
                                               
208 An indication of a potential problem in Becker and Huseld's (1998b) measures is that the items 
related to the extensiveness of application of the performance appraisal and, in particular, the 
compensation practices exemplify higher scores in the Compensation cluster than in the High 
Performance cluster. Nevertheless, the perceived effectiveness of performance management and 
compensation receive lower scores in the compensation cluster. These results can be observed by 
comparing Clusters 2 and 4 in terms of the means of the 11 items related to the extent of the application 
of the compensation/performance management related practices on the one hand, and the 2 terms 
related to the perceived effectiveness of performance management and compensation on the other hand 
(ibid., p. 9, Table 2).  
With reference to the results of their regression analyses where the Compensation cluster had weaker 
relationship with organizational performance than the "fully integrated" High Performance cluster, 
Becker and Huselid offer the intuitive interpretation that effectiveness is related to how extensively or 
effectively the other practices are applied. "[T]he Compenstation strategy was not leveraged with a 
supporting organizational logic" (ibid., p. 14).  
However, the problem with the measures relate to the fact that while, in accordance with Becker and 
Huselid's argument, the effect on organizational performance should be less for the compensation 
cluster than for the "fully integrated" High Performance cluster, the effectiveness of the performance 
management and compensation practices per se [looking at the items in the questionnaire (ibid., p. 7)] 
should arguably not relate to such integration.  
Thus, to the extent that the items in the two dimensions were actually perceived to relate to the same set 
of HRM practices, the above results might also be interpreted as an indication of the existence of two 
forms of a potential bias in the items related to external fit. On the one hand it might be that the more 
all the practices are utilized, the more effective each one of them are simply perceived to be by the 
HRM managers. Alternatively, it might be the result of an attributed simultaneity bias in that the 
organizations where all the practices are on average more utilized are also better performers. Thus 
regardless of their factual effectiveness, it is possible that they are perceived more effective in well 
performing organizations and/or organizations which apply all the HRM practices more extensively. 
Such biases are difficult to eliminate. However, as already indicated, by posing the questions in a less 
direct way and by posing the questions to individuals with less stake in how effective HRM is, the 
biases are at least likely to be diminshed. 
209 As we shall see, through the choice of our sample, where we perhaps reasonably but still far from 
satisfactorily can assume that the HRM practices identified by our operationalizations are applied 
throughout the dominating group of employees in the organizations included in the sample, we can 
concentrate upon identifying variation in qualitative differences in implemented  HRM practices. We 
would argue that this is a theoretically more relevant dimension of the set of HRM practices than only 
the extent of hierarchical adoption of a formally specified set. But of course the hierarchical 




firms that had integrated both of these elements into their HRM strategy 
provided economically and statistically superior effects on firm 
performance compared to the other three strategies...Firms that take 
advantage of these complementarities experience a 17 percent greater 
impact on firm performance [than the effects predicted by the independent 
component values of the HRM system and Implementation Alignment 
measures]” (ibid., p. 14). 
Summary. Thus, with reference to two sophisticated analyses of complex 
configurations of HRM practices and strategies or organizational logics we have 
somewhat contradictory as well as problematical evidence. 
6.2.5 HRM and intermediate attitudinal mechanisms 
Ogilvie (1987) reported support for a relationship between organizational 
commitment (OC) and perceptions of HRM practices based on a sample of 67 
managers from an agricultural company (1987, pp. 342-343).  
Already prior to 1987, many studies had reported support for relationships between 
individual HRM practices and OC, however, using limited control variables (ibid., pp. 
340-341). In addition to the deficiency related to missing control variables, these 
studies are vulnerable to the same critique (mentioned above) as studies of HRM-firm 
performance links utilizing only one or a limited amount of HRM practices as 
explanatory variables. They are likely to overestimate the relationships due to 
correlating unmeasured HRM variables. 
Ogilvie still only included a fairly limited amount of HRM practices including 
employee perceptions of their relative level of pay, the accuracy of the pay-
performance contingency, the fairness of promotions and their fringe benefits relative 
to those of employees in other companies (ibid., pp. 344-345). He did not analyze 
potential effects of the HRM system. The data in terms of employee perceptions of the 
HRM practices can however be considered a strength. 
Ogilvie included a relatively large set of control variables (ibid., pp. 340-341) 
including, prior work experience in the industry, tenure, measures of job 
characteristics in terms of task feedback and task identity, as well as some partly 
unspecified items related to the perceived work environment in terms of supervision 
and social aspects (ibid., p. 344).  
Hierarchical regression results indicated that the variables related to accuracy of pay 
contingency and fairness of promotion were significantly related to organizational 
commitment (ibid., pp. 348-349). Organizational commitment was operationalized 
with Mowday et al.’s (1979) Organizational Commitment Questioannaire210. 
Ogilvie attempted to diminish common method bias through collecting the data by 
interval scaled interview questions rather than standardized questionnaires (ibid., p. 
350). We are not sure of the effectiveness of such a method.  
                                               





Ogilvie concluded that  
“[t]he results...supported the hypothesis that the [HRM] practices...of an 
organization have considerable positive relationships with organizational 
commitment” (ibid., p. 349). 
Guest and Hoque (1994) reported support for the effectiveness of a sophisticated 
HRM strategy based on sample of 122 nonunion (ibid., p. 5) and mainly 
manufacturing related (ibid., p. 4) new establishments. Data were gathered from either 
“the head of personnel” or “the most senior line manager with special responsibility 
for personnel issues” (ibid., p. 5). The sample was divided into four groups based on 
the one hand on the single item measure of HRM strategy211 and, on the other hand, 
based on a  
“cut-off point separating those establishments that [formally] used more 
than half of the practices [identified in the study] from those that used less 
than half” (ibid., p. 6).  
Dependent variables were respondent’s perceptions of HRM outcomes, employee 
relations outcomes and firm performance outcomes (ibid., p. 8). In addition to 
descriptive comparisons (ibid., p. 8), the authors performed multiple regression 
analyses with some controls (ibid., p. 13).  
Some particular results stand out (ibid., p. 13). The commitment of lower grade staff is 
higher in the groups with extensive utilization of HRM practices (with or without a 
HR strategy). As commitment is measured by the senior respondents this variable 
might have low validity212. In terms of the quality of staff employed those with 
extensive use of HR practices in combination with an explicit HR strategy did best. 
Also here the common method errors might seriously influence the results. In terms of 
the quality of work of lower grade staff there are no significant differences between 
the groups. The quality of HR policies and practices was not significantly higher in 
the group of organizations extensively and strategically employing HRM practices 
compared to the one with a conscious HR strategy in terms of little use of HRM 
practices. This might be a consequence of the choice of respondents, since both 
groups had conscious (albeit opposite) HRM strategies. Compared to the latter group, 
both extensive and little use of HR practices in combination with a largely absent HR 
strategy had significantly negative correlations with the quality of the practices. 
Flexibility of staff seems to have been most significantly correlated with the group 
with a strategy of low HR utilization. This measure does (apparently) not distinguish 
between different forms of flexibility and is thus fairly ambiguous. The employees’ 
                                               
211 “Do you have a human resource strategy formally endorsed and actively supported by the top 
management team at the establishment?” (ibid., p. 5). 
212 The authors argue that “[t]here is no good reason that we are aware of to believe that particular 
categories of manager have consistent biases in their responses to these issues” (ibid., p. 7). However, 
Huselid and Becker argue that “studies have shown that ratings of organizational policies will differ by 
organizational level (Barron and Black, 1996; Eaton, 1994)” (Huselid and Becker, 1996, p. 415). 
Further evidence of potential biases in terms of low interrater reliabilities are noted by Wright and 
Sherman (1999, p. 64). It is also likely that common method errors are involved here. As we shall note 




ability to move between jobs as needed seems to be about the same in the groups 
strategically utilizing high or low numbers of the HRM practices. Absenteeism seems 
surprisingly to be more correlated with the group strategically and extensively 
utilizing HRM practices than in the group with no HRM strategy and low utilization 
of HRM practices. Absenteeism is however clearly less correlated with the group 
extensively and strategically utilizing HR practices compared to the group with an HR 
strategy of low HR utilization.  
In terms of industrial dispute, how well the recession was weathered, productivity and 
quality benchmarked against domestic companies the group strategically utilizing a 
high number of the HRM practices did clearly best. These latter results are 
encouraging from the point of view of HRM. 
In summary, the results seem to indicate that organizations which had no HR strategy 
and low utilization of HRM practices did (on most measures) worse than those 
organizations with a conscious HR strategy of either low or high utilization of HR 
practices (ibid., p. 9). In addition, with reference to the quality of staff employed, the 
commitment of lower grade staff as well as organizational performance measures a 
strategic extensive utilization of HRM practices seems to have produced the best 
results.  
However, some methodological and theoretical aspects would still have to be further 
elaborated in order to give clearer and more convincing evidence. First, single 
managerial respondents for all the variables were used. This seems inappropriate in 
particular when we deal with employee attitudes like commitment. Secondly, the 
number of practices formally used does not yet seem to be a theoretically justified 
measure of HRM practices. It does not capture aspects of implementation and neither 
does it capture e.g. the percentage of employees affected by the practices. As 
acknowledged by the authors also the formal existence of an HRM strategy is no 
guarantee for its implementation (ibid., p. 5). Thirdly, the elements of internal and 
external fit are measured only in terms of two meaures (one for each) and treated 
basically as an HRM practice (ibid., p. 12). Fourthly, more control variables would 
still seem to be needed. Fiftly, Guest and Hoque do not attempt to analyze indirect 
effects of HRM on organizational performance through the potential mechanisms 
identified by them. 
The authors conclude that  
 “[T]hose with a strategic approach to HRM which involves extensive use 
of a range of HRM practices, consistently report the best results for HRM, 
employee relations and performance outcomes. In contrast, ...those with no 
strategy and a low take up of HRM practices, consistently report the 
poorest outcomes...The results [thus] demonstrate that strategic HRM pays 
off” (p. 11). 
Guest and Conway (1999) studied the relationship between an HRM system and 
employee attitudes based on a multi-industry sample of 1000 organizations213. In this 
                                               
213 Their article also extensively discusses the role of trade unions. These aspects of their research will 




study the authors actually used a conceptualization/operationalization of the HRM 
system reminicent of the one attempted in our study. Guest and Conway's study 
"differs from most in this area in that it is based on employee reports and 
perceptions in arriving at the classification of policy, but with the distinct 
advantage of being able to describe with more authority how employee 
reports of these policies and practices affect their experience of and 
attitudes towards employment...the key...is that the practices and policies 
are reported by those at whom they are directed rather than by those who 
promote and implement them" (ibid., pp. 372-373). 
However, Guest and Conway identified HRM practices only in terms of whether they 
existed in the organizations or not (ibid., p. 373). They then "classified responses as 
reflecting either high or low HRM policy priority by separating those above and 
below the median number of practices that employees reported" (ibid., p. 393)214. 
Thus, it can still be argued that the identification of the HRM system was theoretically 
somewhat inappropriate in that the existence, even as identified by employee 
perceptions, does not tell us much about how well the system functions.  
Nevertheless, the study provides evidence for the fact that the highest scores on job 
satisfaction , organizational commitment and management-worker relations as well as 
the lowest scores on intentions to quit were reported by employees in organizations 
more extensively applying (in terms of employee perceptions) the HRM system and 
where employees were not trade union members (ibid., p. 375). However, "trade 
union membership is associated with less experience of redundancy and a lower 
propensity to leave" (ibid., p. 376). The evidence presented for these arguments 
consists of correlational analyses with no control variables. 
The study then focuses on the experience of employees in "Black hole" organizations, 
i.e. organizations with a low presence of both trade unions and HRM practices (ibid., 
p. 370). Through regression analyses including a fair amount of controls (ibid., p. 
381) it is shown that HRM practices predict employee's organizational commitment 
(ibid., p. 382)215. Guest and Conway do not discuss what kind of organizational 
commitment construct they used. Neither do they justify their control variables with 
reference to the commitment literature. In analyses of the same data material 
published elsewhere the authors claim to have shown also that the human resource 
management practices predict what the authors understand as a "psychological 
contract" (ibid., p. 382)216. Since the psychological contract in Guest and Conway 
(1999) also predicted organizational commitment, HRM might have also an additional 
                                               
214 They also did some additional analyses of the organizations which so identified ended up in the 
lower quartile (ibid., p. 393). 
215 Here Guest and Conway do not explain what variation in the HRM practices their HRM variable 
reflected but one can assume that they used the same kind of above/below median approach as utilized 
with reference to the whole sample. 
216 Their construct of psychological contract involve six unspecified items related to the dimensions of 
"perceived fairness of treatment, trust in management to keep its promises and judgement of the extent 
to which [management] has actually kept its promises in key araeas such as pay, job demands and 




indirect effect on organizational commitment (ibid., p. 384). The study did not include 
any employee or organizational performance outcomes. 
Summary. Thus, there is some evidence for the influence of HRM on employee 
attitudes, in particular organizational commitment. All these studies are still fairly 
weak in terms of integrating their analyses with the extant and complex literature on 
organizational commitment. Further, none of the reviewed studies have analyzed an 
integrated theorization of HRM's influence on organizational performance with 
reference to its indirect effects. We are not aware of other studies taking their 
departure in the macro-analytic HRM literature and analyzing potential intermediate 
(attitudinal or behavioral) mechanisms of HRM's influence. There is thus a clear lack 
in the literature with reference to understanding the mechanisms of HRM's potential 
influence on organizational performance. 
6.3 SUMMARY OF THE REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
We begin to have some empirical evidence of the influence of HRM from both 
industry specific as well across industry samples, albeit with different definitions and 
measures of HRM, different output measures, different categories of employees and 
sometimes even contradictory results217. All the reviewed studies bear apparent 
witness to some kind of importance of HRM. However, a lot more evidence is needed 
as to how important it is and by what mechanisms in what contexts it potentially 
influences performance. In particular, as the empirical evidence begin to accumulate 
the importance of theory becomes more apparent (Guest, 1997). In fact, the 
development of theory is likely to become necessary in order to make sense of a 
broadening flora of somewhat fragmented and partial evidence as well as in order to 
direct and focus future research.  
Already now it has to be acknowledged that the interpretation of the accumulated 
evidence is no easy task. We have tried to establish interpretative indeterminacies 
related to most of the reviewed studies218. The studies never simply show something 
unambiguosly. The research community's grip on the complexity of these issues is 
still too weak for the opposite to be even close to true. The conclusions drawn initially 
                                               
217 It is evident that we have not reviewed all prior empirical research on the influence of HRM. The 
reader may consult Wood (1999) for reviews of some additional studies. We have also, like Wood 
(1999), excluded all cross-cultural studies dealing with the influence of HRM as well as all studies 
dealing only with a limited set of the HRM practices and their influence. One of the reviewers pointed 
out four specific studies which should be mentioned but which we, at the time of writing this thesis, did 
not know of (Patterson et al. (1997); Ramsay et al. (2000); Guest (1999) and Appelbaum et al. (2000). 
These studies clearly offer evidence of interest for the current study. Some of them offer sceptical 
evidence (Ramsay et al., 2000), some of them at least rhetorically almost overwhelmingly positive 
evidence (Appelbaum et al., 2000 and Patterson et al., 1997). However, we argue that they do not in 
any fundamental way offer reason to change the spirit of the above review. In particular, these studies, 
although presenting some progressive research designs and interesting evidence of intermediate 
relationships, still seem to us to be behefted with many of the problems we try to identify in this study. 
They do not offer any evidence of the significance of indirect effects; they do not include a 
systematically identified (extensive) set of potentially relevant control variables and they involve 
similar problems related to measurements and constructs as discussed above.  




always tend to be positive followed by chapters of more or less severe limitations of 
the studies. Different interpretative possiblities are seldom discussed. It is generally 
the tentative positive conclusions most other researchers then refer to which leads to 
an image of more or less well established evidence.  
There seem to be increasingly sophisticated attempts to understand the influence of 
HRM. However, as long as there is such a wide spread in the broader 
conceptualizations of HRM, specific definitions, operationalizations and 
methodologies it is difficult to talk about legitimate knowledge219. Some such 
consensus as argued for by Pfeffer (1993) seems to be important to develop. This 
would of course have to emerge as a result of researchers reflecting upon and debating 
earlier research/theorization efforts. Research in SHRM has only begann the journey. 
The question of whether it is also already nearing its end is up for grabs (Steyaert and 
Janssens, 1999, p. 181). Wright and Sherman (1999) do not think so. “The lack of an 
overarching paradigm is not lethal, but does slow research progress” (ibid., p. 70). If 
no consensus emerges despite continuing efforts and debate, it might be lethal. 
What this review has also tried to establish, in particular in combination with the 
earlier conceptual review of the literature, is that for many reasons different 
approaches in research on effects of HRM practices still seem to be needed220. 
However, the interpretative difficulties related to earlier studies in this field makes it 
somewhat difficult to decide how research on HRM-performance links could 
progress. This is not least the case because there are some general difficult 
methodological/theoretical problems which have been present in earlier research and 
which we will discuss below. 
“The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs...is a man made 
fabric...like a field of force whose boundary conditions are 
experience...But the total field is so underdetermined by its boundary 
conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of choice as to what 
statements to reevaluate in the light of any single contrary experience” 
(Quine, 1952, pp. 42-43)221.  
One of the most obvious “contrary experiences” in the field of HRM research is the 
non-correspondence between formally identified HRM practices and implementions 
of these practices (Truss and Gratton, 1997). An additional fact seems to be the non-
correspondence between researchers use of generic conceptualizations of strategy and 
corresponding forms of strategic fit and the “experience” of strategies in organizations 
(Chadwick and Cappelli, 1999)222. Thirdly, there are “contrary experiences” with 
                                               
219 Wood draws very similar conclusions related to the current evidence (1999, p. 409). 
220 The same implications can arguably be drawn from Wood (1999) in light of the inconsistent and 
fragmented evidence for the traditional dichotomy in terms of the perspectives of contingency 
(strategic fit) vs. universalism (best practices). 
221 As Quine has later remarked, the metaphors of ‘man made fabric’ and ‘field of force’ clearly 
“needed unpacking” (1991, p. 272). We discussed these issues in more detail in the chapter 2 and in 
fact sided with a somewhat different “unpacking” of this view than the one Quine himself has pursued. 
222 Boxall argues that “we lack qualitatively rich studies across a variety of industries where the extent 




reference to the way HRM is “talked about” and what has actually been tested in 
empirical research. What has at least been largely lacking in research on HRM and 
organizational performance is the perspective of the employees. They are the objects 
of the HRM practices and the natural “mechanisms” of any HRM influence on 
performance223.  
In this study we will try to re-evaluate or change conceptualizations related to these 
phenomena. We will proceed to test whether, based on such a re-evaluation, we can 
find reasons to believe in some of the central claims in the HRM literature regarding 
HRM’s influence on organizational performance. 
“Despite the growing academic and practitioner interest in strategic HRM, 
what we can say with confidence about the HRM–firm performance 
relationship is actually quite limited…we believe that the paths through 
which any effect actually develops, and subsequently the implications for 
management, necessarily operate at lower levels of analysis, including the 
individual. As a result, one of the most important gaps in this literature is 
the absence of good empirical work that links the levels of analysis” 
(Becker and Huselid, 1998, pp. 92-93).  
However, obviously there is an immense “latitude of choice” in how to go about this. 
Although we have not included all the elements and levels of HRM effects suggested 
by Becker and Huselid (1998), we try to move in this direction. In particular we try 
(for many reasons elaborated above) to combine this approach with the perspective of 
the employee. As Becker and Huselid acknowledges, 
“Another aspect of this literature that has gotten little attention, but which 
will also have an influence on the prospects for change, is the extent to 
which the value created by a HPWS or other relevant organizational 
innovation is shared with the employees. A HPWS is premised on the 
assumption that an organization's employees are more than a cost to be 
minimized, but rather a potential source of competitive advantage. A 
properly implemented HPWS creates a firm specific relationship between 
employees and shareholders, similar to a bilateral monopoly” (1998, p. 93). 
From a different angle this is also echoed by Wright and Sherman in that they  
“believe that increased attention to SHRM theory would foster a shift from 
strictly examining HR practices to examining employees’ skills and 
behavioral responses...Assessing practices without examining employees’ 
                                                                                                                                      
However, the HRM literature is interested in the influence of the phenomenon of strategic fit on 
competitive advantage. In order for there to be such influences there would have to be room for 
relevant differences in strategic fit also within industries 
223 Boxall argues that "there is still a widespread failure to structure studies around the phenomenon of 
workforce segmentation” (ibid., p. 64). Either studies should clearly be so structured or samples should 
be chosen in order to ameliorate problems of work force segmentation and misspecification of 




responses to the practices seems to be theoretically and empirically 
deficient” (1999, p. 70)224. 
Finally, a related point is made by Wood (1999).  
“[T]here has been no systematic examination of the link...particularly 
between HR outcomes and performance. Moreover, there has been an 
increasing neglect of the psychological processes that mediate or moderate 
the link between HR practices and performance. The issue has been treated 
as an organizational-level matter when it is in fact a multi-level question” 
(ibid., p. 408). 
Thus there is an almost overwhelming agreement among many researchers that 
empirical research somehow needs to get involved with trying to explain the 
mechanisms of HRM's potential influence with explicit reference to the perspective of 
the employee. Our empirical review has also tried to justify this need. In chapter 3 we 
elaborated on our general understanding of the meaning of HRM. We argued that the 
perspective of the employee is theoretically important for several (ethical, 
epistemological and theoretical) reasons. In the following we will present a modified 
version of Guest's (1997) framework on the basis of which we will pursue to test the 
adequacy of the elaborated broad understanding of "the very idea of HRM" 
incorporating also the perspective of the employee. 
                                               
224 Although this statement does not necessarily involve such a claim, we have argued that it is 
important to examine employees’ responses both in tems of employees’ responses to HRM practices 




7 THE PROPOSED MODEL  
Keenoy asks whether HRM is "a theory of competitive advantage, or a theory of 
employee motivation or a theory of strategic management? Is it all three?” (1997, p. 
829). The answer is arguably that in the sense of theorizing rather than theory (Weick, 
1995) it is all three. As we see it, HRM is a theorizing of strategic employee 
management and its consequences for competitive advantage.  
7.1 GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE MODEL  
In this thesis the following model of HRM is proposed (Figure 3). It is largely based 






















In summary, conceptual arguments related to the differents elements included in this 
model can be found in different sources in the explicitly HRM related literature. At 
least the following can be mentioned: the importance of persistence in the efforts to 
apply HRM policies and practices (not explicitly shown in the model above) (Muller, 
1996); the importance of HR professionalism (not explicitly shown in the model 
above) (Huselid, Jackson and Schuler, 1997; Ulrich, 1998); the elements of strategic 
(internal/external) coherence in the HRM practices (e.g. Mabey and Salaman, 1995; 
Guest, 1997; Storey, 1995; Wright and Sherman, 1999; Chadwick and Cappelli, 1999; 
Becker and Huselid, 1998; Wright and Snell, 1998); the importance and relevance of 
employee appreciation of the HRM practices built into our HRM system variable can, 
we argue, be inferred from the idea incorporated in soft HRM of treating people as the 




1999; Boxall, 1996; Wood, 1999; Becker and Huselid, 1998); the element of 
empowerment is only mentioned explicitly very briefly e.g. in Storey (1995); the 
elements of commitment and organizational citizenship behavior are very briefly 
mentioned and outlined in (Guest, 1997)225; the element of employee work 
performance has not been dealt with in any more detail in the HRM literature 
although some forms of employee performance are briefly touched in Guest (1997) 
and Pfeffer (1997, p. 172). In general some form of employee performance is a 
prerequisite of HRM's influence to the extent that it does not only concern 
"downsizing and retrenchment" (Mabey and Salaman, 1995; p. 18); the element of 
organizational performance has been present in much of the HRM literature in 
various forms. We will approach it in terms of employee turnover, customer 
satisfaction and quality, as well as profitability (Guest, 1997) 
The whole conceptual apparatus, more explicit causal logics, hypotheses and 
operationalizations will be discussed in more detail below. References to our attempts 
to justify the choice of a quantitative research design to test the adequacy of this 
theorization can be found in the beginning of chapter 8. 
7.2 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
7.2.1 Persistency and HR professionalism  
HRM practices are arguably not straightforward to implement in a meaningful and in 
particular a strategically relevant fashion. Therefore the organizations’ persistent 
efforts to develop and guarantee the quality of the HRM practices should have an 
effect on employee perceptions of their properties. Mueller argues strongly for the 
importance of persistent efforts and an attitude of continuous improvement (1996, pp. 
772-773). Also the arguments about how long it takes to create effective HRM 
systems (Wright and Snell, 1998, pp. 763-768 and Skinner, 1981) can be understood 
as emphasizing the importance of persistence in developing HRM practices. 
Depending on the focus of these efforts persistency might also explain strategic fit. 
Because of such focal contingencies unaccounted for in this thesis, the persistent 
efforts to develop the the quality of the HRM practices will be used as an explanatory 
variable only in relation to the holistic sophistication of the HRM system. 
We hypothesize that  
Hypothesis 1: Persistent efforts to develop and sustain the quality of the 
HRM practices will be positively related to the sophistication of the HRM 
system. 
HRM professionalism has been argued to influence the effectiveness of the HRM 
practices.  
“Insuring that members of the HRM function have the appropriate 
capabilities (or competencies) has been suggested as one way to increase 
                                               
225 Naturally (psychological) empowerment, organizational commitment and organizational citizenship 
behavior have been discussed more extensively in related literatures. We will consider this literature 




the likelihood of effective HRM [by] Lawler (1992) [and] Ulrich and Lake 
(1990)” (Huselid et al., 1997, pp. 173-174).  
Huselid et al. make a distinction between professional HRM capabilities and business 
related capabilities. As we see it the relevant variable affecting (strategic) HRM 
effectiveness should largely be the degree of HRM professionalism as defined by 
Huselid et al. (1997). If treated separately, the business related capabilities exhibited 
by HRM staff members (as defined by Huselid et al.) should have an influence on this 
HRM professionalism and only through that on (strategic) HRM effectiveness. We 
will simply use HRM professionalism, including one item related to “business related 
capabilities”, as an antecedent to the entire HRM system.  
Although potentially interesting, also Huselid et al.'s distinction between strategic and 
technical HRM effectiveness seems ad hoc as to many details and even confounding 
potential general outcomes of all HRM activities with effectiveness in some HRM 
activities. We make no such distinction.226.  
We will thus use HRM professionalism as a hypothesized antecedent to the entire 
HRM system as defined by us. Also here there are potential focal contingencies 
unaccounted for in this thesis. We will thus use HRM professionalism as an 
explanatory variable only in relation to the general sophistication of the HRM system 
but not its strategic fit.  
We hypothesize that  
Hypothesis 2: HR staff professionalism will be positively related to the 
sophistication of the HRM system. 
7.2.2 Strategic fit 
In chapter 3 we elaborated on our understanding of the meaning of strategic fit. We 
discussed the complex nature of both the nature of strategy and strategic fit. We also 
discussed the lack of knowledge related to both the employee responses demanded by 
a particular strategy as well as the employee responses produced by a particular HRM 
system (Chadwick and Cappelli, 1999, p. 20).  
Whatever the precise nature of strategy and strategic fit is, the existence of strategic fit 
should according to most HRM theorizations lead to certain favorable employee and 
organizational outcomes. We argued that one way to deal with the lack of knowledge 
is to let the practitioners evaluate the appropriateness of both the strategic fit and the 
HRM system. 
As noted by Wright and Sherman 
                                               
226 In their analyses they received support for the influence of HRM professionalism on both technical 
and strategic HRM effectiveness. They received only a weak support for the influence of business 
related capabilities on strategic HRM effectiveness and no significance in its relation to technical HRM 




"Wright and Snell (1998) indicated that three aspects of the HR system are 
critical to achieving fit: HR practices, employee skills, and employee 
behavior" (Wright and Sherman, 1999, p. 56). 
Turning this argument around, we argued that strategic fit should primarily explain 
the perceived sophistication of the HRM system and indirectly employee attitudes 
(involving among other things also the element of competence in terms of 
psychological empowerment) and employee performance. By postulating such an 
intermediate mechanism of strategic fit we try to improve theorizing (Bacharach, 
1989), i.e. suggesting why and how strategic alignment influences firm performance.  
In other words we will test the general hypothesis that the influence of strategic fit on 
all the outcome variables in our model is mediated by HRM sophistication. As 
discussed below, testing our model will require testing a host of sub-hypotheses. Here 
we postulate the main ones.  
Based largely on our own conceptual arguments in chapter 3 we thus hypothesize that  
Hypothesis 3: Strategic fit will be positively related to the perceived 
sophistication of the HRM system. 
Based on our conceptual arguments and the empirical HRM literature we further 
hypothesize that  
Hypothesis 4a: Strategic fit will be positively related to organizational 
performance in terms of profitability. 
Hypothesis 4b: Strategic fit will be positively related to organizational 
performance in terms of quality of products and services. 
Hypothesis 4c: Strategic fit will be negatively related to voluntary 
employee turnover. 
7.2.3 The HRM system 
In testing the proposed model we rely on the argument that, rather than individual 
HRM practices,  
"HRM systems are the most appropriate level of analysis because they 
more accurately reflect the multiple paths through which HRM policies 
will influence successful strategy implementation" (Becker and Huselid, 
1998, p. 55)227.  
Guest has provided a schema for potential discrete effects of sub-groups of HRM 
practices in terms of skills, motivation, and flexibility (1997, p. 269). However, we 
will use the entire HRM system as the main explanatory variable also with reference 
to our intermediate variables since we agree with the claim that  
                                               
227 However, as our empirical review of Delery and Doty (1996) beared witness to, there may be 





“any single practice may play a multifaceted role in the overall human 
resource system, [and] there is no clear conceptual basis for seperating 
practices affecting [e.g] motivation from those affecting [e.g] skill” 
(MacDuffie, 1995, p. 203).  
We still only test an HRM theory of performance at the level of a “broader framework 
linking HRM and outcomes” (Guest, 1997, p. 269). To the extent that the adequacy of 
such a framework can be established in more than one context, we could more 
fruitfully begin to look at more finetuned mechanisms/theoretical explanations. 
Conversely, if some such broader framework cannot be corroborated, researchers 
might have to go back to the drawing board/inductive/idiographic research and 
consider how a more adequate theoretical model could be built up from more detailed 
potential mechanisms of the effects of different practices/systems in different 
contexts.  
It has been argued that the the behavioral perspective developed in Jackson, Schuler 
and Rivero (1989), explains "how the HRM system creates new firm capabilities 
while [the RBV] emphasizes the attributes required for these capabilities to generate 
competitive advantage" (Becker and Huselid, 1998b, p. 3). The criteria postulated by 
the RBV and their arguably limited relevance/adequacy were discussed in chapter 4 
above. The explanation offered by the behavioral perspective, in turn, seems to remain 
at the level of the statement that "competitive advantage is in part a product of HRM 
systems that elicit employee behaviors consistent with the firm's broader strategic and 
environmental contingencies" (ibid., p. 2). This is a straightforward but fairly 
unilluminating claim. 
Guest discusses the possibilities of expectancy theory (1997, p. 268). However, 
tapping the causal logic of the expectancy theory would imply going beyond the broad 
HRM system level effects. As noted, such an attempt will not be pursued in this work. 
While a broad system level HRM theory of employee and organizational performance 
would seem to be compatible with an expectancy theoretical explanation of such 
performance effects, it is arguably difficult to separate its influence in terms of the 
elements of actual ability and motivation as required by the expectancy theory. In 
addition, motivation will arguably affect ability and vice versa. The concept of 
psychological empowerment would seem one way to account for this mutuality and 
the holistic influence of the HRM system on both ability (competence) and 
motivation. 
Social exchange theory might be another candidate for understanding/explaining 
HRM's influence. The latter seems however itself in need of considerable 
development and specification and might be less suited for the kind of micro-analysis 
HRM research is involved in (Turner, 1987, pp. 223-238). Although, as we shall 
argue, social exchange theory seems unable to distinguish between the multitude of 
potential influences on the hypothesized intermediate variables, a broad understanding 
of social exhange offer plausibility to the hypothesis of HRM's motivational 
influence. 
Need-satisfaction theories might offer some explanatory help in understanding the 





“It is generally assumed in need-satisfaction theories that employees come 
to the workplace with some pre-dispositional needs (Salancik & Pfeffer, 
1977). If these needs are satisfied, employees will have positive attitudes 
towards work, which in turn, will generate constructive behavior” (Law 
and Wong, 1999, p. 148).  
Our model clearly contains such a general logic. However, it is not limited to this 
logic. As implied by social constructionism and arguments related to conditioning, 
HRM practices are largely also about producing needs and ways to satisfy needs, and 
not just to satisfy pre-dispositional needs.  
With reference to the Job Characteristics Model (Hackman and Oldham, 1976, 1980) 
Law and Wong note that  
“[t]he Model has been criticized for assuming a direct correspondence 
between objective and perceived job characteristics (Roberst & Click, 
1981) and, thus, ignoring the potential effects of other factors such as 
social interactions on job perception and job outcomes (Salancik & Pfeffer, 
1977). One reasonable research question in response to this criticism is to 
examine the relative effects of job perception and social interactions on job 
outcomes” (Law and Wong, 1999, p. 150).  
This same criticism and response to it is relevant with reference to research on HRM – 
performance links. We should control for a host of social interactions which prior 
research has shown to be related to the intermediate variables in our model. However, 
the causal logic of HRM's influence is also likely to include a host of social 
interactions. This is also implied by the arguments and the model of HRM's influence 
offered by Ferris et al. (1998). Thus, we should either explicitly theorize the role of 
social interactions or include such variables as controls when testing the (more) direct 
influence of HRM systems on performance. The latter will be the primary strategy in 
the present study.  
Ultimately, although our theorization may be compatible with many theories which 
offer plausibility to the hypothesized influence of HRM, in this research we do not put 
the explanatory power of any of these theories to a test. We will pursue our analyses 
in the absence of a more general theoretical explanation (or theoretically motivated 
causal logic) of system level effects of the HRM practices. Rather, what we primarily 
try to test is the adequacy of the arguments about the meaning of HRM presented in 
chapter 3. Thus, the more specific causal logic of the developed notion of strategic 
soft HRM is the theorization we attempt to test. 
We propose to test the assumption that variation in strategic soft HRM as 
conceptualized in this study is sufficient (Bacharach, 1989, p. 506)228 to produce 
differences in psychological empowerment, organizational commitment, 
organizational citizenship behavior, employee work performance and organizational 
performance. We will also test for mediated effects in accordance with the proposed 
model. As discussed below, this involves a host of sub-hypotheses. The more specific 
causal logic of HRM’s influence on our chosen intermediate constructs, together with 
                                               
228 Bacharach (1989) is still operating with an arguably simplified Popperian notion of falsifiability. 




hypotheses, will be further discussed below. Here we put forward the general 
overarching hypotheses that  
Hypothesis 5a: The sophistication of the HRM system will be positively 
related to organizational profitability. 
Hypothesis 5b: The sophistication of the HRM system will be positively 
related to customer satisfaction. 
Hypothesis 5c: The sophistication of the HRM system will be negatively 
related to voluntary employee turnover. 
7.2.4 Intermediate consequences of HRM 
In the suggested model exhibited in figure 3 above, psychological empowerment is 
treated as a fundamental intermediate outcome of the basic HRM practices. The basic 
HRM practices should produce a fertile ground for it to develop. HRM practices are 
mainly as a group focused on two things, to produce motivation and competence. 
Perceived competence is one dimension of the concept of psychological 
empowerment we postulate as an outcome variable. Motivation is arguably closely 
related to all the dimensions of psychological empowerment, i.e. competence, 
meaning, influence and self-determination (Spreitzer, 1995). Thus, the concept of 
psychological empowerment seems to be an interesting parsimonious and suitably 
abstract outcome measure of HRM practices.  
Organizational commitment as an outcome concerns more clearly only the 
motivational effects of HRM. It indicates the degree to which employees are 
motivated to stay with the organization and contribute to organizational performance. 
Because all the dimensions of organizational commitment lack the element of 
competence, organizational commitment in any form should arguably not have an as 
significant effect on employee performance as psychological empowerment229.  
Organizational citizenship behavior, in turn, is also likely to be dependent on both 
motivation and competence. It has been argued that organizational citizenship 
behavior in the longer run can have positive effects on organizational performance. 
Assuming organization wide equilibrium effects this study will mainly test the 
explanatory role of OCB with reference to the organizational performance outcomes. 
Partly an employees’ organizational citizenship behavior should arguably also have an 
effect on the performance of coworkers and thus indirectly on organizational 
performance230. We will however not test this hypothesis. Rather, we will test what 
should be conceived as a minimal requirement, i.e. that an employee's organizational 
citizenship behavior is at least consistent with more traditional measures of employee 
performance. 
                                               
229 Below we will argue for a distinction between affective value commitment on the one hand and 
affective continuance commitment on the other hand, as depicted in the suggested model (figure 3 
above).  
230 This effect on employee performance is however likely to be smaller than that of empowerment 
since organizational citizenship behavior after all largely only concerns helping and assisting others in 




Of the four suggested intermediate employee attitudes, psychological empowerment 
should thus be the one most directly related to employee performance, incorporating 
aspects of both skill and motivation and a possibility to act on these. The model 
postulates that the effect of the HRM system on employee work performance is 
mediated by both psychological empowerment, affective value commitment and 
affective continuance commitment. The model also outlines potential internal 
relations between these employee attributes. The justifications for these relations will 
be pursued in more detail below.  
Which of the multitude of available constructs potentially relevant as outcomes of 
HRM in fact ought to be included in a model of HRM and firm performance can only 
be settled by theoretically and empirically informed exploratory empirical studies in 
different contexts (compare Wright and Gardner, 2000, pp. 6-7).  
7.2.4.1 Psychological Empowerment 
The general interest in empowerment is due to arguments as to the fact that  
"[w]here performance was earlier a matter of what a person should do, 
modern work roles rely more on what he or she can, wants, and 
knows…[which] means that individuals [must] possess greater freedom not 
to apply certain norms in concrete aspects of the job" (Torbiorn et al. 
1997b , p. 5)231  
In this thesis we will utilize a concept of psychological empowerment which has been 
developed by Spreitzer (1995) who in turn based her construct on Thomas and 
Velthouse (1990).  
In this line of research psychological empowerment has more specifically been 
defined as “intrinsic task motivation manifested in a set of four cognitions reflecting 
an individual’s orientation to his or her work role” (Spreitzer, 1995, p. 1443). The 
following elements have been inlcuded in it:  
“Meaning. Meaning is the value of a work goal or purpose, judged in 
relation to an individual’s own ideals or standards... 
Competence. Competence, or self-efficacy, is an individual’s belief in his 
or her capability to perform activities with skill... 
Self-dermination. Where competence is a mastery of behavior, self-
determination is an individual’s sense of having choice in initiating and 
regulating actions... 
                                               
231 Becker and Huselid argue that “For example the contracting literature speaks directly to the 
challenges of relying on employee empowerment and teams as a method of strategy 
implementation…Firms understand that individual employees have valuable “local specific 
knowledge” (Becker and Huselid , 1998, p. 60). A related argument is also offered by Wright and Snell 




Impact. Impact is the degree to which an individual can influence 
strategic, administrative, or operating outcomes at work...” (Spreitzer, 
1995, pp. 1443-1444). 232 
In line with Conger and Canungo we view empowerment “as a motivational construct 
– meaning to enable rather than simply to delegate” (1988, p. 474). It has been argued 
that “empowerment as an enabling process affects both initiation and persistence of 
subordinates’ task behavior” (ibid., p. 476) whereas Thomas and Velthouse argued 
that it affects employees' activity, concentration, initiative, resiliency, flexibility 
(Thomas and Velthouse, 1990, p. 670)233. Fundamentally we view empowerment as a 
result of enabling practices. But is is also a process in that behavioral attributes that 
are likely to result from empowerment should “increase the likelihood that individuals 
will achieve outcomes that will, in turn, provide further evidence of competence, 
choice and impact on meaningful goals” (ibid., p. 673).  
HRM and psychological empowerment. We argue that the HRM system should 
produce the prerequisites for and thus be a fundamental cause of psychological 
empowerment  and thus of perceived autonomy and involvement as well as 
competence and meaning, regardless of job design. Although we also assume that job 
design is largely controlled for by our sample, as Spreitzer argues  
“[t]he four dimensions of empowerment are viewed from the perspective 
of the individual; these cognitions complement the more objective, job-
oriented characteristics and individual differences developed by Hackman 
and Oldham (1980). Consequently, from this cognitive perspective, it is 
possible for individuals to experience empowerment even if their 
“objective” job characteristics are not enriched, and vice versa” (Spreitzer, 
1996, pp. 484-485) 234. 
                                               
232 Torbiorn conceptualizes the dimensions of psychological empowerment somewhat differently. He 
includes the notions of ‘should’, ‘may’, ‘can’, ‘will’, and ‘know’ (1997, pp. 3-4). His notion of 'may' 
comes close to Spreitzer's dimension of self-determination and his notion of ‘can’ comes close to 
Spreitzer’s ‘competence’. With reference to the other dimensions of psychological empowerment these 
two conceptualizations are more divergent. Torbiorn’s notion of ‘will’ could be understood to come 
rather close to Spreitzer’s ‘meaning’ (Torbiorn, 1997a, p. 18; ibid., 1997b, p. 7). Alternatively 
Torbiorn's notion of 'will' could perhaps be seen as an outcome of Spreitzer's understanding of 
psychological empowerment rather than part of such a concept. Torbiorn’s notion of ‘know’ could 
perhaps be seen as an antecedent to Spreitzer’s psychological empowerment, at least the dimensions of 
self-determination and competence. Torbiorn’s notion of ‘should’ seems to be a more traditional 
concept of responsibility not included in Spreitzer’s dimensions whereas Spreitzer's dimension of 
impact is not really included in Torbiorn's construct of psychological empowerment. In any event, these 
two different conceptualizations show that researchers have not settled for an agreed upon notion of 
psychological empowerment. 
233 We view empowerment as referring generally to job motivation rather than the more limited task 
motivation.  
234 Thus, the concept of psychological empowerment does not distinguish between more 
intersubjectively justified perceptions of empowerment e.g. in terms of competence, impact and self-
determination on the one hand, and on the other hand, self attributions potentially depending e.g. on 
how well employees are payed, what benefits they enjoy and how secure they judge their employment 
to be. The self-perceptual/cognitive nature of psychological empowerment makes its explanatory role 
in terms of employee and organizational performance somewhat less clear although at least the 




Conger and Canungo review propositions as to management practices which should 
“heighten a sense of self-efficacy” (ibid., p. 478). Practices which should accomplish 
a heightened sense of empowerment include selection and training, open 
communications, extensive network-forming235, setting inspirational and/or 
meaningful goals (performance appraisals) and rewards systems (1988, p. 478). These 
practices are not only likely to influence empowerment in the sense of perceived self-
efficacy, but also in the more general multidimensional sense of enabling. 
Spreitzer argues that  
“[c]ognitively, high-involvement [HRM] systems enable employees to 
better use information and to understand how they can influence 
organizational activities” (ibid., p. 485).  
This should arguably influence psychological empowerment236. But high involvement 
HRM systems should be able to accomplish even more than this. We argue that 
psychological empowerment in multifaceted ways is likely to be largely dependent on 
selection processes, socialization processes, development programs, performance 
appraisals and communication processes. Also financial aspects (compensation, 
general benefits, employment security) can have (more) indirect influences on 
psychological empowerment by attracting and keeping competent employees in the 
organization, thus increasing the possibility of psychological empowerment. Thus we 
hypothesize that  
Hypothesis 6: The sophistication of the HRM system will be positively 
related to psychological empowerment237. 
It might be the case that strategic fit is the causally most effective variable as it 
focuses on the degree to which the HRM practices support the competencies, attitudes 
and behaviors needed to perform the work required to achieve business goals. It might 
thus be that strategic fit has a direct effect on psychological empowerment 
independent of the more holistic employee perceptions of the sophistication of the 
HRM system.  
Empowerment and employee work performance. Spreitzer argues that empowered 
employees  
                                               
235 Socialization practices is one form of activity, together with open communications and meaningful 
training, which can contribute to this. 
236 Spreitzer also argues that high involvement systems facilitate “employees’ trust in an organization 
and increase their sense of control, ego involvement, and identification with it” (ibid., p 485) and thus 
psychological empowerment. This understanding of the underlying causal logic brings fourth the 
connection between psychological empowerment and organizational commitment (and partly confuses 
the causal direction between them). 
237 The detailed logic of this production should be developed in an HRM theory of organizational 
performance. Partial explanations might be e.g. (low) role ambiguity, (high) access to resources, (high) 
participative unit climate (Spreitzer, 1996, pp. 487-490). Neither these specific mechanisms nor the 




“are likely to proactively execute their job responsibilities by, for instance, 
anticipating problems and acting independently, and hence are likely to be 
seen as effective” (1995, p. 1448).  
Spreitzer also refers to Thomas and Velthouse's (1990) arguments that “empowerment 
will increase concentration, initiative, and resiliency and thus heighten managerial 
performance” (Spreitzer, 1995, p. 1448)238. Spreitzer further refers to arguments 
claiming that  
“empowered individuals...are likely to be creative, ...innovative in their 
work, ...[and that] empowerment is important for stimulating and 
managing change in organizations” (ibid., p. 1449)239.  
In addition, Spreitzer (1995, p. 1448) refers to evidence in the literature as to the 
consequences of each of the individual dimensions of empowerment which should 
make it even more plausible that psychological empowerment can affect work 
performance. Finally, Torbiorn argues that  
“work situations in a growing number of jobs are no longer easy to specify 
or to standardize...A good performance thus requires organizational trust in 
subjective judgements, skills, will etc. on the part of the individual” 
(1997b, pp. 3-4). 
Assuming that this is true with reference to the work (situations) of consultants, we 
thus hypothesize that  
Hypothesis 7a: Psychological empowerment will be positively related to 
the quality and efficiency of employee’s work performance. 
Hypothesis 7b: Psychological empowerment will be positively related to 
employee’s innovative behavior regarding products and services. 
7.2.4.2 Organizational Commitment 
The interest in the concept of organizational commitment has been related to its 
potential of  
“generating flexible working, innovative problem solving and high levels 
of performance...[as well as] retaining loyal workers...[which] may be 
beneficial to customer service and quality [p. 593]...Commitment has 
generally been thought to encompass three components: identification 
(value congruency), involvement (absorption and willingness to exert 
considerable effort) and loyalty (attachment to the organization and a 
desire to stay in membership)...[I]dentification and involvement are forms 
                                               
238 Both Spreitzer (1995) and Thomas and Velthouse (1990) discuss managers but there is no reason to 
limit the consequences to this type of employees. 
239 The latter part of this argument is congruent with Wright and Snell's arguments for the importance 
of behavioral flexibility rather than "standard operating procedures...[This should] increase the 
likelihood of the firm identifying new competitive situations and responding appropriately" (1998, p. 
766). This argument provides additional reason, apart from the more straightforward potential 
employee performance effects, to expect organizational performance outcomes of psychological 




of affective [or value] commitment, whereas loyalty corresponds more 
closely with continuance commitment [p. 595]” (Fenton-O’Creevy, 
Winfrow, Lydka and Morris, 1997, pp. 593-595)240.  
Often all these three dimensions have been viewed as forming affective or 
psychological commitment (e.g. Sjöberg, 1997, p. 11). Notwithstanding the popularity 
of the concept of organizational commitment the fact is that 
“Commitment has been studied from so many different theoretical 
perspectives...that [already] Hall (1977) remarked that we might better 
abandon the term altogether and deal instead with a set of concepts, each 
focused on one or another aspect of commitment” (Angle and Perry, 1981, 
p. 1). 
Peccei and Guest have also called “for work to explore whether ...[the above 
mentioned] separate factors show different relationships to antecedents and outcome 
variables” (Fenton et al., 1997, p. 596). Fenton-O’Creevy et al. note that the 
Organization Commitment Questionnaire (OCQ), also tapping the dimensions 
outlined above, has “been critisized for confusing commitment and its outcomes” 
(1997, p. 594). 
The different dimensions or aspects of organizational commitment in terms of 
identification, involvement and loyalty can in fact be understood as associated with at 
least two different general phenomena, i.e. the decisions to participate and to produce 
respectively. With reference to this distinction, Angle and Perry argued that a 
“committed member’s definite desire to maintain organizational 
membership would have a clear relationship to the motivation to 
participate. Willingness to exert considerable effort on behalf of the 
organization and the belief in and acceptance of the organization’s goals, in 
combination, have implications for the member’s motivation to produce for 
the organization” (1981, p. 2). 
Apart from the tautological character of two thirds of this argument, it might be 
argued that Angle and Perry in fact still do not recognize a difference between the 
dimensions of identification and involvement. According to Mayer and Shoorman, 
March and Simon argued  
“[that] the considerations that lead to the decision to participate are based 
on the notion of exchange between the individual and the organization. The 
inducements provided by the organization are balanced against the 
contributions required in order to maintain membership [and that] the 
strength of identification with the goals and values of the organization 
leads to a decision to produce” (Mayer and Shoorman, 1998, pp. 18-19) 
                                               
240 As noted by Fenton-O'Creevy et al. there are several conceptualizations and operationalizations of 
organizational commitment. In fact, already in 1983 there were “over 25 commitment-related concepts 
or measures” (Caldwell et al., 1990, p. 247). Fenton-O'Creevy et al. utilize the BOCS (British 
Organizational Commitment Scale) originally developed for "UK blue-collar workers" (1997, p. 
595).The dimensions/aspects of this scale are however similar to those in the widely used OCQ 




In accordance with this clearly non-tautological argument also the involvement-
dimension of the concept of commitment outlined above should arguably be 
distinguished from and understood as an outcome of the dimension of identification 
rather than being part of the same multidimensional construct, sometimes understood 
as affective commitment (Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 1997, p. 595). Sjöberg argues that 
both the dimensions of involvement and the (affective) desire to stay are clearly 
outcomes of the dimension of identification (1997, p. 12).  
But also influences in reverse directions are plausible. The more involved one is (for 
whatever reasons), the more one may begin to desire to stay (loyalty) and the more 
one may begin to identify with the organization. The more loyal one is (for whatever 
reasons) the more one may begin to be involved and the more one may begin to 
identify with the organization.  
Even further, distinctions within the dimension of continuance commitment 
(influencing the decision to participate) have also been made. Conceptually, 
continuance commitment would seem partly, in the form of a desire to stay, to be an 
outcome of at least identification but arguably also involvement, and partly, in the 
form of a need to stay, an outcome of items not primarily influencing or influenced by 
identification/involvement such as the ease of movement due to costs of leaving (side-
bets) and/or low perceived alternatives (Iveson and Buttigieg, 1999, pp. 308; 309)241. 
The structure of organizational commitment and the relations between the dimensions 
can clearly be complex242. Conceptually, at least the “passive” component of 
identification and the “active” component of involvement might be argued to be close 
enough to conceptually justify a multidimensional construct of affective (value) 
commitment. Such a multidimensional construct would seem to potentially be 
influenced by the HRM system and potentially influencing work performance.  
Also (affective) continuance commitment (in terms of a desire to stay) would 
conceptually seem likely to be influenced by the HRM system. In particular in a 
context of performance pressures such as the consulting industry, it is also 
conceivable that such continuance commitment might influence employee 
performance 243. 
                                               
241 Sjöberg (among many others) views commitment in terms of "the individuals calculative bond with 
the organization" based on perceptions “of the costs and benefits associated with organizational 
membership” (1997, p. 11) as clearly distinguishable from a conceptualization of commitment as a 
psychological bond in terms of identification, involvement and a desire to stay (ibid., p. 11). Thus, also 
Sjöberg marks out the distinction between continuance commitment in terms of a desire to stay and a 
more instrumental continuance commitment affecting the decision to participate based on side bets. 
However, also the desire to stay (at least as reflected by the component of loyalty in the BOCS 
measurement instrument to be presented in section 8.3.4) may be more instrumental/calculative than 
what is assumed by such arguments. In fact as we will suggest, also identification and involvement are 
likely at least partly to be the result of calculative elements. 
242 It might be noted that the concept of psychological empowerment has a much shorter history and 
that in time similar complexities might arise with reference to its dimensions. 
243 At least Angle and Perry (1981) and Mayer and Shoorman (1998, 1992) have found evidence for 




With reference to a distinction between value and continuance commitment, Mayer 
and Shoorman noted that  
“[t]he correlation between value and continuance commitment [0.59 in 
their sample (1992, p. 677)] suggests that the dimensions represent 
overlapping conceptual space” (ibid., p. 679).  
Huselid and Day, in turn, more explictly referring to calculative continuance 
commitment argued that  
“Prior work (...Mathieu & Zajac [among others]...) indicates that both 
facets are necessary to adequately explain organizational commitment...the 
large theoretical and empirical overlap (r =.50) between these two 
dimensions of commitment suggests that neither should be examined in 
isolation” (Huselid and Day, 1991, p. 381)244.  
Based on their meta-level analysis Mathieu and Zajac themselves drew the conclusion 
that  
“attitudinal and calculative commitment are not entirely distinguishable 
concepts [but] the two forms of OC are sufficiently distinct to permit 
comparisons between their relative relationships with other variables” 
(1990, p. 172).  
However, Mayer and Shoorman argued that Mathieu and Zajac's meta-analysis 
suffered from a questionable classification of measures of different forms 
(dimensions) of commitment (Mayer and Shoorman, 1998, p. 17). Clearly there is 
considerable confusion and controversy regarding the concept of organizational 
commitment. 
This is arguably a consequence of the already indicated disturbing feature in the 
literature that researchers have used, and seem to continue to use the concept of value 
(attitudinal or affective) commitment and continuance commitment with less than 
desirable inter-subjective agreement.  
In Meyer and Allen (1984; 1987; 1991) and Allen and Meyer (1990; 1996) as well as 
e.g. Janos (1995) affective commitment is conceptualized as “emotional attachment 
to, identification with and involvement in the organization” (Meyer and Allen, 1991, 
p. 67). As measured by the ACS this construct is conceptually close to the notion of a 
complete uni-dimensional construct of affective commitment as measured both by the 
BOCS and by the OCQ. The constructs of commitment as measured by the OCQ and 
the ACS have also empirically been found to correlate highly, with correlation 
coefficients varying between 0.71 and 0.89 (Meyer and Allen, 1996, p. 262). While 
not identical, these constructs are thus both conceptually and empirically closely 
related.  
In contrast to the unidimensionality of such notions of affective commitment, Mayer 
and Shoorman (1992; 1998), as already indicated, provided evidence of the distinctive 
nature of value commitment consisting only of items corresponding to the two 
                                               
244 However, e.g. in Iverson and Buttigieg the correlations between affective commitment and either of 




dimensions of identification and involvement, and a construct of continuance 
commitment in terms of a desire to stay. This is in line with Fenton-O’Creevy’s 
characterization of the dimensions of affective commitment and continuance 
commitment (above) as measured by the BOCS instrument (1997, p. 595). As 
indicated above, and despite the fact that Fenton-O'Creevy (ibid.) as reviewed below 
showed some evidence of the discriminative nomological validity of all three 
components/aspects/dimensions included in the BOCS, this "two dimensional" notion 
of affective/value commitment is also what we will try to identify in the present study. 
Further, the notion of continuance commitment has been treated differently in the 
literature. As noted by Sjöberg. (1997, p. 11) a calculative notion of continuance 
commitment was originally developed by Becker (1960). Mayer and Shoorman’s 
(1992; 1998) construct of continuance commitment (developed by Schechter, 1985) is 
in an explicit way ambiguous between the basis in terms of a (calculative and/or 
psychological/attitudinal) desire to stay and a more negative (more clearly calculative) 
need to stay (Mayer and Shoorman, 1992, pp. 682-683). The notion of continuance 
commitment (or loyalty) as measured by the BOCS is not as explicitly ambiguous 
with reference to a desire and a need to stay but neither does it make a clear 
distinction between these aspects or bases of continuance commitment. In their 
studies Meyer and Allen have developed and utilized a construct of continuance 
commitment measured by CCS including items which are intended to "exclude affect" 
(Brown, 1996, p. 242). In their study Huselid and Day utilized yet a different 
continuance commitment scale as developed by Alutto, Hrebeniak and Alonzo (1978) 
in addition to the OCQ measuring attitudinal or affective commitment (Huselid and 
Day, 1991, p. 383). It has been argued that empirical evidence does not support the 
fact that Alutto et al.’s scale of continuance commitment would measure the same 
thing as Allen and Meyer’s CCS (ibid., 1996, p. 257). Lastly, as already indicated 
there is also evidence indicating that the CCS notion of continuance commitment in 
fact incorporates two differentiable constructs of calculative continuance commitment 
(Allen and Meyer, 1996, pp. 258-259). However, in contrast to e.g. Janos (1995), 
Allen and Meyer note some evidence supporting the practical irrelevance of 
distinguishing between the subscales (ibid., p 259). 
In addition to these different constructs, Meyer and Allen have also introduced a 
dimension in terms of normative commitment (sense of obligation to retain 
membership). This dimension has been argued to be nomologically more complicated 
and less adequate than perhaps the other ones (Mayer and Shoorman, 1998, p. 25). In 
any case, in a large overview Allen and Meyer (1996) argue that the discriminative 
validity of affective, normative and continuance commitment as developed by these 
authors has considerable support in the literature. Allen and Meyer refer to evidence 
for acceptable test-retest reliabilities (ibid., p. 255) as well as a number of studies 
providing factor analytic support for the distinction between the ACS, NCS and CCS 
(ibid., pp. 255-258). With the exception of a few studies most of the factor analytic 
support is limited to the commitment scales only. However, Moorman, Niehoff and 
Organ (1993) included the scales of ACS and CCS, five separate dimensions of 
organizational citizenship behavior, procedural justice, work satisfaction and in-role 
behavior (1993, p. 215). Nevertheless, in their measurement model and subsequent 
structural equation models they included scale scores for all variables except their 
construct of procedural justice. Thus, they did not provide evidence of the 




included constructs. In fact, since they included all the scale scores in the 
measurement model one may suspect the reverse. Allen and Meyer (1996, p. 258) 
report that Shore and Tetrick (1994) provided evidence of the discriminative and 
convergent validity between ACS, CCS, job satisfaction and perceived organization 
support245.  
The complex potential relationships exhibited by affective, normative and 
continuance commitment (in terms of an ease of movement) as well as some empirical 
evidence of the discriminative validity of the two aspects of such continuance 
commitment is both shown and discussed by Jaros (1995). Iverson and Buttigieg 
provide (as well as refer to) some evidence indicating that the two cost-related sub 
scales of continuance commitment might be “differently related to affective 
commitment” (Iverson and Buttigieg, 1999, p. 309). In fact, as judged by the evidence 
in Iverson and Buttigieg (1999) and Hartmann (2000), the two subscales of 
continuance commitment appear to be differently related to affective commitment in 
different samples. In the former case 'Low perceived alternatives' appear to be 
significantly and negatively related, while 'High sacrifice of leaving' is not 
significantly related to their construct of affective commitment. In the latter case 
'High sacrifice of leaving' is significantly and positively related, while 'Low perceived 
alternatives' is not significantly related to their construct of affective commitment.  
In addition to these complexities, distinctions have also been made between both foci 
of commitment (e.g. coworker, superior, top management, organization as well as 
family, union etc) and, in addition to the bases of commitment in terms of 
identification, involvement and desire to stay, at least two bases of commitment in 
terms of internalization and compliance (Becker, 1992). However, the distinction 
between internalization and identification has, in particular with reference to the foci 
of top management, not been very successful (Hunt and Morgan, 1994, pp. 1574-
1575). The distinction between different foci of commitment have not either been 
successful with reference to the dimension (or basis) of commitment in terms of 
compliance (ibid., p. 1575).  
Despite all this complexity, as already indicated, based upon the arguments by March 
and Simon reviewed above and in line with the evidence in Mayer and Shoorman 
(1992; 1998), in this study we will attempt to separate one two dimensional construct 
of affective (organizational) commitment (in terms of identification and involvement 
as measured by the BOCS) and a one dimensional construct of continuance 
commitment (in terms of a desire to stay with the organization as measured by the 
BOCS). Further, also the evidence that continuance commitment as measured by the 
CCS is negatively, while ACS appears positively correlated with employee 
performance (Allen and Meyer, 1996, p. 269; Meyer et al., 1989) provides some 
justification for the lesser relevance of CCS as a focal variable in an HRM 
theorization of organizational performance. While using the above mentioned 
                                               
245 Shore and Tetrick (1994) do provide some support for the validities of these constructs. However, it 
is only in terms of 4 shortened composite scores for each of the constructs (ACS; CCS; OCQ) and 
perceived organization support as well as single item composite indicators for each facet of job 
satisfaction (the latter items did not form a satsifactory construct at all). An additional weakness of 
their evidence is that it appears that in none of the models did the p-value for the chi-square statistic 




constructs we will, among other things, (somewhat imperfectly) try to control for 
relationships with at least (the "foci" of) co-workers and superiors as well as the need 
to stay as outlined in section 8.2.2. 
Below we will review some empirical evidence as to the distinctive nature of the 
dimensions (primarily) in terms of value and continuance commitment. Both Fenton 
O’Creevy et al. (1997) and Mayer and Shoorman (1998) regarding antecedents, and 
Angle and Perry (1981) and Mayer and Shoorman (1992) regarding consequences of 
organizational commitment hypothesize and provide some evidence as to the fact that 
the two dimensions in terms of value and continuance commitment are “primarily 
related” (Mayer and Shoorman, 1998, pp. 18-21) and “are more sensitive” (Angle and 
Perry, 1981, p. 3) to different variables.  
Antecedents of commitment. Fenton-O’Creevy et al. (1997) provided evidence for a 
distinctive structure of antecedents with reference to all the dimensions in terms of 
identification, involvement and loyalty.  
What they analyzed was the effect of career expectations and one variable measuring 
future industry and organizational prospects. The former had significant positive 
relationships to identification and loyalty but no relation to involvement. The latter, 
future industry prospects, had a positive relationship to loyalty but a negative to 
involvement246. Fenton-O’Creevy et al. draw the conclusion  
“that the three sub-components [of the BOCS construct] cannot be said to 
add up to an overall measure of organizational commitment, as each 
measures different phenomena...” (1997, p. 606). 
Mayer and Shoorman (1998) analyzed the structure of certain antecedents relations to 
value  and continuance commitment respectively247. 
In their correlational analyses most variables had compatible significant, albeit 
statistically distinct, correlations with both dimensions of commitment. Of the 
variables included, only tenure and age were related only to continuance commitment. 
Only prestige of the organization was related only to value commitment (ibid., p. 23). 
Mayer and Schoorman conclude that a "two dimensional construct representing value 
and continuance commitment are both theoretically and empirically distinguishable" 
(ibid., p. 25). However, Mayer and Shoorman also refer to some research 
contradicting their own results e.g. with reference to the relationships between 
dimensions of commitment and tenure and age (ibid., pp. 18-19).  
Mayer and Shoorman (1998) also analyzed the differences in model fit between 
(essentially) two structural models. They tested one model where, on the basis of 
March and Simon's arguments referred to above, distinct antecedents were estimated 
                                               
246 They offer a number of alledgedly sample specific explanations as to the fact that future 
expectations had a negative effect on employee involvement (ibid., p. 605). 
247 Although tapping similar phenomena as the dimensions in terms of identification, involvement and 
loyalty analyzed by Fenton et al. (1997), Mayer and Shoorman thus used clearly different measurement 
instruments for their two dimensions. Their measurement instrument is exhibited in Mayer and 




to be related only to one of the distinct dimensions of continuance commitment and 
value commitment respectively. The other model involved a test of all antecedents’ 
relations to both dimensions of commitment. In the latter analysis they restrained the 
relations of each antecedent to be equal to both dimensions. By so restricting the 
parameters, Mayer and Shoorman received some support for the fact that the first 
model with distinct antecedents for the two distinct dimensions of commitment better 
fitted the data (1998, pp. 23-24). 
In fact, by imposing their parameter restrictions Mayer and Shoorman somewhat 
paradoxically assume that the choice concerns on the one hand, organizational 
commitment involving completely separate dimensions, and on the other hand, 
organizational commitment as a perfect uni-dimensional construct. However, as soon 
as we acknowledge the multidimensionality and/or imperfection in the 
dimensions/items of commitment there are likely to be somewhat differing 
antecedents with respect to these dimensions.  
Although there may be distinct and even contradictory relations between particular 
antecedents and particular dimensions of commitment, there may nevertheless be 
consistent and robust effects of more comprehensive antecedents and some form of 
multidimensional commitment construct. With reference to current knowledge it 
seems that the question still is whether any separate suggested dimensions add up to a 
second order multidimensional construct at all, and with reference to what antecedents 
(and/or consequences) different dimensions are nomologically interestingly 
distinguishable. Fenton-O’Creevy et al. (1997) and Mayer and Shoorman (1998) only 
showed that at least with reference to some antecedents, different dimensions may 
show distinct relationships which may be interesting to acknowledge in some 
circumstances248. 
Among all the relationships Iverson and Buttigieg (1999) analyzed, involving also 
some HRM practices, there was no indication “that managing the forms of 
commitment...[would] pose any inconsistencies in policy formulation” (ibid., p. 
329)249.  
With a somewhat more specific reference to HRM, however, Caldwell et al. identified 
some potential inconsistencies between a broad measure of career paths (or 
“rewards”; 1990, p. 251) alledgedly inducing instrumental commitment but being 
negatively correlated with value commitment while other "practices" (one variable 
related to selection/recruitment and another related to firm and employee values; ibid., 
p 251) were positively related to value commitment (ibid., 257). However, when they 
                                               
248 The variables which have been shown to have different effects on different dimensions of a 
multidimensional commitment construct should be controlled for when analyzing potentially congruent 
antecedents of such a construct. With reference to such attempts, at least organizational prospects and 
some variables related to career prospects, employee age, tenure and organizational image would thus 
be important controls. 
249 Iverson and Buttigieg utilized conceptualizations of the dimensions of organizational commitment 
which differ both from those used by Fenton-O'Creevy et al. (1997) and Mayer and Shoorman (1998). 
Iverson and Buttigieg included dimensions of affective and normative commitment as well as two 




included controls, no significant relations between any of the HRM dimensions and 
instrumental commitment was found (ibid., p. 255)250.  
Judging the relevance of their results with reference to our research is made difficult 
because their measures of instrumental commitment differ significantly from the 
measure of continuance commitment used in the present study (Caldwell et al., 1990, 
p. 252). Further, in their analyses they used orthogonal factor scores which hindered 
both correlations between all the HRM practices on the one hand, and instrumental 
and value ("normative") commitment on the other hand. Their analyses thus pick out 
variation e.g. in career paths ("rewards") which is uncorrelated with variation in the 
rest of the HRM practices. However, the effect of something like career paths may 
differ depending on the rest of the HRM practices. The idea in HRM research is 
precisely that the HRM practices may have synergistic effects. There may also be 
some interesting common relationships between their independent variables and the 
dimensions of commitment which they leave unrecognized due to the use of 
orthogonal factor scores also for the dimensions of commitment. In addition their 
results may overestimate the relations between the identified HRM practices and the 
dimensions of commitment because they do not control for many other HRM 
practices (and only a few other phenomena) which may affect the dimensions of 
commitment. However, they provide some tentative evidence of the fact that 
“instrumental career paths” on their own may diminish value commitment and that 
instrumental commitment may not be affected by any of the orthogonalized HRM 
practices included in their study251.  
The prevalent use of different conceptualizations of organizational commitment 
makes it almost impossible to draw any simple general conclusions based upon earlier 
research. However, a quick review shows that research has indicated some distinctive 
relationships between different dimensions of commitment and antecedents. The 
theoretical arguments that are often offered is that continuance commitment (a 
decision to participate) and value commitment (a decision to produce) may be based 
upon two different underlying processes in terms of instrumental exhange and 
(psychological) identification respectively252. However, despite these arguments we 
tend to agree with Ogilvie who argued that  
“instead of treating the exchange [or calculative] and psychological 
approaches as distinct conceptualizations..., they may be more 
                                               
250 Caldwell et al. utilized yet another conceptualization of oganizational commitment compared to 
Fenton O’Creevy (1997), Mayer and Shoorman (1998) and Iverson and Buttigieg (1999). 
251 The weakness of their study seems to be the non-existence of a clear theoretical rationale for why 
the identifed career paths would diminish value commitment. An obvious strength of their analyses 
involved the attempt to remove common method bias (ibid., p. 249; 253). 
252 As already touched upon, the exchange perspective explains “commitment as a function of a 
cognitive evaluation of the costs and benefits of maintaining organizational membership” (Ogilvie, p. 
338). The psychological perspective, on the other hand, can be interpreted as explaining commitment 
by claiming that “to the extent that organizational experiences are viewed as helping individuals to 
attain mastery and support, individuals will identify with the organization and feel committed to it” 




appropriately viewed as two related processes resulting in the same 
outcome” (1987, p. 339)253.  
In line with Ogilvie, we argue that to the extent that HRM practices can explain OC 
(in terms of identification, involvement and desire to stay) the mechanisms associated 
with any of these dimensions arguably are a function of both cognitive/evaluative and 
psychological/identificatory processes.  
However as already noted, based upon the above review we will in our study attempt 
to use two different constructs of commitment, i.e. affective (value) commitment 
consisting of the dimensions in terms of identification and involvement on the one 
hand, and continuance commitment in terms of a desire to stay on the other hand. By 
using control variables we also try to distill the positive aspect in terms of a desire to 
stay from any form of continuance commitment based upon side-bets. 
The potential of any effects of HRM on organizational commitment is interesting 
since  
“[a]lthough there is a large body of literature on the importance of 
organizational commitment, until recently there has been little empirical 
evidence on ‘how to’ obtain a committed workforce” (Iverson and 
Buttigieg, p. 326).  
Iverson and Buttigieg provided some evidence of relationships between certain 
individual HRM practices and different forms of commitment (1999, p. 323; 326-
327). Their identification of these relationships may however still be biased because 
of correlations between included and excluded HRM practices (Becker and Huselid, 
1998, p. 62). Although it appears important also to analyze the relationship between 
individual HRM practices and different forms of commitment, we argue that more 
robust relationships should be found between such commitment and a system level 
sophistication of HRM. 
Thus, with reference to a broad notion of both cognitive/evaluative and 
psychological/identificatory processes, and based on the general arguments for system 
level HRM effects, we hypothesize that  
Hypothesis: 8a: The degree of sophistication of the HRM system will be 
positively related to affective (value) commitment 
Hypothesis 8b: The degree of sophistication of the HRM system will be 
positively related to continuance commitment254 
It might however be the case that strategic fit is the causally most effective variable as 
it focuses on the degree to which the HRM practices support the competencies, 
                                               
253 In line with Farrell and Rusbult’s (1981) reward-cost paradigm as utilized by Iverson and Buttigieg 
(1999, p. 313) one might even argue that there is only one process in terms of different dimensions of 
rewards and costs.  
254 An exhange theoretical argument for a mediational role of psychological empowerment can be 
evoked in terms of the implicit idea that empowerment is what employees desire. This argument will be 




attitudes and behaviors needed to perform the work required to achieve business 
goals. It might thus be that strategic fit has a direct effect on organizational 
commitment over and above the more holistic employee perceptions of the 
sophistication of the HRM system.  
Consequences of organizational commitment. In terms of correlational analyses 
Angle and Perry (1981) provided some evidence as to distinct consequences of value 
and continuance commitment. ‘Intent to quit’ was significantly related only to 
continuance commitment and ‘tardiness’ was significantly related only to value 
commitment (ibid., p. 9)255.  
Mayer and Shoorman also found evidence, based on zero-order and first-order partial 
correlations, for the fact that the different dimensions of value and continuance 
commitment have different relations to a set of outcomes (1992 p. 679). However, in 
distinction to Angle and Perry's results, Mayer and Shoorman's analyses indicated that 
both value commitment and continuance commitment were almost exactly equally 
correlated with 'intent to quit' (1992, p. 679). In general, value commitment was 
correlated with both the expected “continuance-commitment-outcomes” and a range 
of employee performance outcomes. The latter were not related significantly to 
continuance commitment.  
Conceptualizing organizational commitment in somewhat different terms, also 
Iverson and Buttigieg provide evidence for the fact that affective (value) commitment 
tends to explain expected continuance commitment outcomes such as turnover 
intentions and absenteeism even better than any of their dimensions of continuance 
commitment (1999, p. 325). 
Based on this one might question the (theoretical) utility of including continuance 
commitment in studies of organizational commitment (Mayer and Shoorman, 1992, p. 
681). In particular in an HRM theory, from the organizational point of view, we 
would be less interested in continuance commitment per se, than in commitment 
which is likely to lead to performance and continued membership in the organization. 
For these purposes (components of) value commitment seem to do a satisfying job.  
“[V]alue commitment did a very creditable job in predicting all the 
outcomes in the study [including outcomes conceptually more closely 
related to continuance commitment]” (ibid., p. 681).  
Nevertheless, there seem to be something of potential interest also in continuance 
commitment from the perspective of a HRM theory of organizational performance. 
One potential difference between value and continuance commitment might be that  
“individuals who are value-committed may indicate that they intend to stay 
in an organization, but if they are not continuance committed, will leave 
when the opportunity presents itself” (ibid., p. 681).  
                                               
255 In their analyses a composite score of all the items of commitment was significantly related to every 
variable which some of the separate dimensions were significantly related to. The magnitudes of the 




Iverson and Buttigieg also note that there are conceptual differences between potential 
motives of value and continuance commitment. It might be that  
“employees with strong affective commitment remain because they feel 
they want to,...[while] those with strong continuance commitment remain 
because they feel they need to” (1999, p. 309). 
Mayer and Shoorman argue that  
“The key evidence for the inclusion of continuance commitment is its 
significantly stronger relationship with quitting, the behavioral outcome 
most clearly conceptually linked with continuance commitment” (1992, p. 
681).  
Iverson and Buttigieg also identifed some other differences in outcomes with 
reference to an individual performance measure in terms of accepting change. In their 
study, the component of continuance commitment in terms of ‘low perceived 
alternatives’ (to the current employment relationship) negatively affected attitudes to 
change while value commitment was positively related to it (1999, p. 325)256.  
We should perhaps find a way to sort out the negative consequences from the positive 
ones of continuance commitment. It has to be noted that in the argumentation above 
Mayer and Shoorman (1992) refer to a different concept of continuance commitment 
compared to the "purely" calculative one in Iverson and Buttigieg (1999) and Meyer 
et al. (1989). According to Mayer and Schoorman, March and Simon  
"proposed that in the context of [the] inducements/contributions 
calculation [leading to a decision to participate], two major variables weigh 
into the participation decision: perceived desirability of movement and 
perceived ease of movement” (Mayer and Shoorman, 1998, pp. 18-19).  
As suggested by a fair amount of earlier research, Iverson and Buttigieg (1999) 
included items of two different components of commitment related to continuance 
commitment which do not measure the desire to stay with the organization but only 
the ease of movement. Thus, they identify only the need stay because of low 
perceived alternatives and high sacrifice of leaving257. With reference to a concept of 
continuance commitment in terms of a desire to stay (i.e. desirability of movement), 
with appropriate controls for the need to stay (i.e. the ease of movement), we should 
be able to more adequately tap the differences in the degree to which employees want 
                                               
256 As already noted, there is also some other evidence indicating that “the wrong kind” of continuance 
commitment (that based on side-bets, low perceived alternatives as well as both of these together) 
might be negatively correlated with employee performance (Meyer, Paunonen, Gellatly, Goffin and 
Jackson, 1989, p. 154). 
257 Iverson and Buttigieg do provide some evidence of the discriminative validity of all the dimensions 
of organizational commitment as measured by ACS, NCS and the two subscales of CCS. However, the 
p-value of the chi-square statistic remained clearly unsatisfactory and the loadings of three of the four  
items reflecting normative commitment were on the lower side (ibid., p. 319). In general, the 
interpretation of their study is made difficult by the fact that they do not provide any fit statistics of 
their structural models related to antecedents (ibid., p. 323) and outcomes (ibid., p. 325) of the 
dimensions of commitment. In fact they do not provide any information on what kind of constructs 




to stay in distinction to both a need to stay and affective commitment in terms of 
identification/involvement. At least in the present study, as already indicated, we 
attempt to use a notion of continuance commitment or loyalty which should tap also 
the desire to stay with an organization. By controlling for at least some aspects of ease 
of movement we try to distill the effect of a desire to stay. 
Concerning performance related outcomes, Becker et al. argue that in general  
“the relationship between organizational commitment and job performance 
is more tenuous [than its relationship to absenteism and employee 
turnover]” (1996, p. 464).  
In fact, based upon their meta-analysis, Mathieu and Zajac argued that “commitment 
has relatively little direct influence on performance in most instances” (1990, p. 184). 
At least partly because of the tenuous evidence of relationships between commitment 
and job performance further distinctions related to organizational commitment, which 
we already noted above, have been suggested.  
“[A] number of theorists and researchers have begun to view employee 
commitment as having multiple foci and bases...With respect to the bases 
of commitment, early research suggested that different motivational 
processes underlie single attitudes [in terms of compliance, identification 
and internalization]” (Becker et al., 1996, p. 465).  
With reference to such motivational processes, Becker et al. note that the “factor 
analytic support for the distinction between identification and internalization is 
mixed” (ibid., p. 466). The authors report some further evidence for an empirical 
distinction between these bases of commitment as well as their different foci in terms 
of supervisors and organizations (ibid., p. 472) 258. They argue that  
“[i]n retrospect, it is not surprising that overall commitment to an 
organization is largely unrelated to employee performance. A cogent 
theory for why identification with and involvement in an organization 
should directly promote job performance has not been developed” (ibid., p. 
466).  
However, somewhat strenuously we think, Becker et al. argue that while commitment 
based on identification should not be related to job performance (ibid., p. 467) 
commitment based on “the internalization of goals and values seems likely to predict 
performance” (ibid., p. 468). In any case, Becker et al.’s (1996) results indicate first of 
all that overall supervisor focused commitment rather than organization focused 
commitment and overall commitment based on identification rather than 
internalization are related to performance (ibid., p. 475). Separating both the foci and 
the bases of commitment, the results indicate that supervisor focused internalization is 
significantly positively related to employee performance while organization focused 
internalization is significantly negatively so related (ibid., p. 475). However, there 
seems to be no very good explanation for the latter relationship. Neither supervisor 
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nor organization related identification were significant in this analysis259. In general, 
we think that one may still be sceptical with reference to the distinction between and 
content validity of ‘identification’ and ‘internalization’ applied in their study260.  
Becker et al.’s (1996) conclusions also remain largely ambiguous as they did not 
include other controls than age, gender, tenure and impression management. With 
more controls there might not have been any significant relations at all between 
commitment and work performance. Becker et al. argue that  
“[h]ad the purpose of this study been to explain variance in performance, 
we would certainly have included a whole host of variables – cognitive 
ability and goal difficulty, for instance – not contained in the present 
investigation. However, the objectives of this study were to examine the 
links between different types of commitment and performance and to test 
three specific hypotheses [concerning the relation between different forms 
of commitment and job performance]” (ibid., p. 479). 
We argue that to the extent that that was the purpose, the authors should also have 
controlled for “a whole host of” elements possibly affecting performance but 
potentially not affected by commitment261. Nevertheless, Becker et al.'s study provide 
further evidence of the fact that the case of the effects of commitment as well as the 
proper construct(s) of commitment still seems to be largely open to debate. The 
consequences of different forms of commitment clearly seem in need of further 
evidence, in particular evidence including appropriate controls and different contexts.  
As noted by Angle and Perry,  
“the impact of employee commitment depends, not only on what 
employees are committed to do, but also on what the potential is for 
                                               
259 Their results may be involved in severe multicollinearity problems. They did however perform 
ridge regressions (ibid., p. 476) which they interpreted as indicating no such problems.  
260 Although utilizing somewhat different items, for example Williams and Andersson ended up 
combining dimensions of internalization and identification (1991, pp. 608-609). Also Caldwell et al. 
(1990), using the same items as Williams and Andersson (1991) found one common factor for these 
items conceptually interpreted to be related to identification and internalization respectively. Further, 
Hunt and Morgan (1994) offer a conceptualization where different foci and basis are not viewed as 
competing explanations. In their study different sub-organizational foci, all including both dimensions 
of identification and internalization, are conceptualized as antecedents to global organizational 
commitment. This is more in line with our conceptualization, and as we shall see, in particular more in 
line with our exploratory extension of our overall model. In any case, we cannot distinguish between 
the different basis in terms of internalization and identification. In fact, complicating the matter even 
further our dimension in terms of identification is closer to Becker et al.’s (1996) notion of 
internalization than their notion of identification. In addition, we cannot explicitly and directly 
differentiate between supervisor and organization focused commitment. In the discussion of controls 
we will however argue that indirectly we will approximate such a distinction. 
261 The argumentation of Becker et al. is at least partly echoed in Huselid and Becker (1996). “The 
focus of this article is not a completely specified model of firm performance. Our goal is to develop a 
sufficiently specified model such that the estimated effects of HR strategy on firm performance are 
unbiased” (1996, p. 406). The meaning of such efforts, without trying to control for “a host of” 




specific behaviors to influence organizational outcomes...[as well as the] 
availability of a replacement labor pool” (ibid., p. 11).  
In the present sample from the consulting industry, where employees face 
considerable performance pressures as well as arguably relatively high possibilities to 
influence organizational outcomes, we do not exclude the possibility that both 
organizational value commitment and organizational continuance commitment in 
terms of a desire to stay could have an effect on employee performance262.  
In light of (and despite of) the review above, we consider it interesting both to try to 
validate a multidimensional second order construct of affective (value) commitment 
as well as study the effects of the two potentially identifiable distinct aspects of 
organizational commitment, i.e. what may be refered to as affective (value) 
commitment and a potentially organizationally positive (affective) continuance 
commitment263. We hypothesize that  
Hypothesis 9a: Value commitment will be positively related to the quality 
and efficiency of employee work performance 
Hypothesis 9b: Value commitment will be positively related to employee’s 
innovative behavior regarding products and services. 
Hypothesis 9c: Continuance commitment will be positively related to the 
quality and efficiency of employee work performance  
Hypothesis 9d: Continuance commitment will be positively related to 
employee’s innovative behavior regarding products and services. 
Hypothesis 9e: Value commitment will be negatively related to employee 
turnover 
Hypothesis 9f: Continuance commitment will be negatively related to 
employee turnover 
7.2.4.3 Organizational citizenship behavior 
“Work behavior that is in some way beyond the reach of traditional 
measures of job performance but holds promise for long-term 
organizational success is receiving increasing theoretical attention as the 
challenge of global competition highlights the importance of organizational 
innovation, flexibility, productivity, and responsiveness to changing 
external conditions. In the last decade, many terms have been used to 
describe such behavior including organizational citizenship behavior 
[OCB]” (Van Dyne, Graham and Dienesch, 1994, p. 765). 
                                               
262 Also Allen and Meyer reason that (even) the "pure" calculative form of continuance commitment 
can be hypothesized to "be either unrelated, or negatively related, to performance - except in cases 
where job retention [is] clearly contingent on performance (1996, pp. 266-267; italics added). While 
the latter may thus apply concerning the current sample, a replacement labour pool has arguably not 
been largely and easily available in recent years in the consulting industry in Finland and Sweden. This 
fact might diminish such effects. 
263 In the chapter on operationalizations we will present the exact nature of the measurement 




As was the case with the concept of organizational commitment, and to some extent 
also the concept of psychological empowerment, conceptualizations of OCB are 
diverse (ibid., p. 765). Van Dyne et al. identify basically three forms of organizational 
citizenship behavior, i.e. dimensions in terms of 'organizational obedience', 
'organizational loyalty' and 'organizational participation' (ibid., p. 767)264. A 
somewhat different conceptualization, in terms of a combination of elements from 
Graham’s (1989) and Organ’s (1988) dimensions, can be found in Moorman and 
Blakely (1995). This concept of OCB include dimensions of 'interpersonal helping', 
'individual initiative', 'personal industry', and 'loyal boosterism' (ibid., pp. 131-132).  
All these dimensions can be viewed as aspects of organizational participation, an 
"interest in organizational affairs...expressed through...responsible involvement in 
organizational governance" (Van Dyne et al., 1994, p. 767). The dimension of 'loyal 
boosterism', for example, can be understood as measuring an employee's attitude 
towards “contributing to [the organization's] good reputation" (ibid., p. 767). In such a 
broad sense all the dimenisons together can thus be viewed as aspects of 
organizational participation in terms of generally "cooperating with [broadly defined] 
others to serve the interests of the whole [organization]" (ibid., p. 767) 265. 
According to Van Dyne et al. the early attempts to view OCB as extra-role behavior 
clearly distinguishable from intra-role behavior have at least by some researchers been 
abandoned as too complicated (1994, p. 766). Nevertheless, Williams and Andersson 
argued for isolating "variance in OCB measures that is not associated with 
performance of in-role behaviors” (1991, p. 614). On the basis of their empirical 
evidence, also Moorman et al. argued for a control in terms of in-role behaviors on the 
grounds that “different organizations may stress different OCB dimensions to the 
degree of making them in-role” (1993, p. 219)266. 
We will not make a distinction between individual related and organizational related 
OCB (Williams and Anderson, 1991, pp. 601-602). Williams and Anderson argue that 
such a distinction is important because “these two forms of OCB can have different 
antecedents” (ibid., p. 602). This claim is also partially supported by their findings 
related to different dimensions of job satisfaction (ibid., p. 611). However, in our 
theorization we are interested in the relationship between HRM and a global form of 
                                               
264 Based on their exploratory factor analyses, Van Dyne et al. classified additional dimensionalities of 
'participation', i.e. in terms of 'advocacy participation', 'functional participation', and 'social 
participation' (ibid., p. 783). 
265 Because there is still some way to go in developing a well corroborated generally accepted 
conceptualization of OCB we ended up choosing items and dimensions which seemed meaningful and 
relevant for our study. Our operationalization of the construct of OCB is presented below.  
266 We measure and try to study HRM's influence on employee attitudes towards OCB. In our study the 
“in-role” behaviors are defined by superior interpretations of a set of loose criteria related to the 
quality, efficiency and innovativity of consultants' work performance. We will analyze whether the 
attitudes toward OCB and the external evaluations of aspects of actual work performance are 
distinguishable phenomena, which they according to most interpretations of OCB should be (compare 
Williams and Andersson, 1991, p. 605; 612). We will attempt to use the external evaluations of work 




OCB. With appropriate controls (which we will discuss below) there seem to be no 
reason to distinguish between HRM’s influence on either form of OCB. 
Antecedents to OCB. With reference to the general underlying dynamics of OCB 
Van Dyne et al. argue that  
[t]he active citizenship syndrome is based on covenantal relationship...The 
more strongly a person identifies with the collective entity (such as a 
particular relationship or community) and feels valued and values the 
connection...the more he or she will be an active contributor to the 
community...Thus, covenant is conceptualized as a reciprocal relationship 
based on ties that bind individuals to their communities and communities 
to their members...” (ibid., p. 768).  
This conceptualization would seem to to indicate that HRM as conceptualized in this 
study should have a substantial influence on OCB. Van Dyne et al. also argue that  
“covenantal partners can disagree about particulars without threatening the 
existence of the relationship and can forgive each other should 
disappointing performance occur” (ibid., p. 768).  
There is however nothing in our conceptualization of HRM which would theoretically 
imply such a consequence267. Van Dyne et al. further claim that  
[i]n contrast to contractual, exchange, or other instrumental 
relationships...covenants are existential; they focus on a state of being and 
involve intrinsically motivated effort rather than earning something or 
getting somewhere” (ibid., p. 768). 
This characterization is somewhat contradictory to the hypothesized explanations Van 
Dyne et al. themselves offer later in their study. Also Williams and Anderson note 
that some findings “indicate that pay cognitions are important predictors of OCB 
performance”, and they argue that this “is counter to the social exchange framework 
that has guided recent explanations of OCBs” (1991, p. 603). We consider the 
distinction between relationships based on instrumental exchange and covenants 
identified by Van Dyne et al. (above) problematical and we do not view it as 
important. Thus, we do not view ("reciprocal") OCB/pay relationships as 
contradictory to an understanding of OCB loosely based on social exchange. For us 
social exchange simply is a form of more or less conscious “calculative 
reciprocation”, including both psychological and evaluative/calculative aspects268. 
Such a loose general social exchange theoretical explanation of OCB seem to us to be 
a more appropriate understanding of any mechanism between antecedents and OCB 
than Van Dyne et al.’s suggestion in terms of covenantal relationships. 
                                               
267 Because it may well have an effect this potential underlying dynamic of OCB will rather in our 
study be controlled for by a variable related to organizational support. 
268 Thus, we consider the whole discussion of the difference between relationships based on processes 
of calculative reciprocation, social exchange, psychological contracts, and covenantal relationships 
largely irrelevant for the present study. Compare the discussion above in relation to the concept of 




Based on this understanding of the dynamics of OCB we argue that the HRM system 
should be a robust causal antecedent to OCB. This is the case in particular as OCB, at 
least in knowledge intensive contexts, would seem also to require competence in 
addition to motivation. The condition of competence seems to have been largely left 
out from most conceptualizations of antecedents to OCB269. Based on these arguments 
we hypothesize that  
Hypothesis 10a: The degree of sophistication of the HRM system will be 
positively related to organizational citizenship behavior270 
It might however be the case that strategic fit is the causally most effective antecedent 
to OCB. This could be the case since our construct of strategic fit focuses on the 
degree to which the HRM practices support the competencies, attitudes and behaviors 
needed to perform the work required to achieve business goals. The extent of such 
support should lead to reciprocating OCB. It might thus be that strategic fit has a 
direct effect on OCB independent of the more holistic employee perceptions of the 
sophistication of the HRM system.  
Consequences of OCB. As argued earlier, there is no clear causal logic between an 
employee’s (attitudes towards) organizational citizenship behavior and the same 
employee’s "core" work performance271. However, to the extent that there is a 
justification for the argument that OCB should identify work behavior that "holds the 
promise for longterm organizational success" (Van Dyne et al., 1994, p. 765), there 
should be some relevant performance consequences of OCB272. We suggest that 
according to the above promise, individual employees’ OCB should be related to 
organizational performance. It is true that the influence on organizational performance 
of any individual’s OCB is likely to be trivial (Podsakoff et al., 1997, p. 265). 
However, in a large enough sample of organizations, individual’s OCB should at least 
be consistent also with organizational performance. Further, to the extent that OCB 
has a non-problematical positive influence on organizational performance its should at 
least be consistent with more "in-role" employee work performance. However, as 
suggested by Podsakoff et al. helping behavior may negatively influence employee 
work performance because it takes time away from pursuing one’s own work (ibid., p. 
263). Nevertheless, we argue that 
                                               
269 One partial exception is provided by Wayne, Shore and Liden (1997) who included ‘developmental 
experiences’ as on antecedent to perceived organizational support which in turn was shown to be 
related to OCB. 
270 The arguable dual underlying dynamic of OCB in terms of both competence and motivation would 
seem to make psychological empowerment a plausible mediator of HRM's influence on OCB. Also an 
exhange theoretical argument for such a mediation can be evoked in terms of the implicit idea that 
empowerment is what employees desire. The plausibility of a mediational role of both psychological 
empowerment and organizational commitment will be further discussed in connection to the review of 
relevant control variables in chapter 8. 
271 An argument related to learning in interaction might be developed. 
272 It has been argued that OCB should have organizational performance consequences because it 
should “lubricate the social machinery of the organization, reduce friction, and increase efficiency 




Hypothesis 11a: Organizational citizenship behavior will be positively 
related to employee’s innovative behavior regarding products and services. 
Hypothesis 11b: Organizational citizenship behavior will be positively 
related to the quality and efficiency of employee work performance 
Hypothesis 11c: Organizational citizenship behavior will be positively 
related to organizational performance in terms of quality 
Hypothesis 11d: Organizational citizenship behavior will be positively 
related to organizational performance in terms of profitability 
Further, it is conceivable that increased aggregated organizational citizenhip 
behaviors among employees should produce a culture of mutual “bonding” which 
should improve the organizational ability to retain employees. Thus, we hypothesize 
that 
Hypothesis 11e: Organizational citizenship behavior will be negatively 
related to employee turnover 
7.2.5 Employee and Organizational performance 
The conceptualization and measurement of organizational performance is a 
complicated area (Wright and Sherman, 1999, pp. 64-65). Some of the HRM studies 
reviewed above have identified performance related to the plant or unit level such as 
productivity or quality. These performance outcomes have been relatively 
unproblematical but do not yet tell us anything about the overall financial 
performance of organizations. Huselid and Becker in their various studies have been 
using one accounting measure related to return on capital and another in terms of 
stock market performance, i.e. the Tobin’s q. Citing Hamel and Prahalad, Huselid and 
Becker have claimed that the latter measure of the difference between book value and 
market value can be attributed to the ”core competence (or) people embodied skills” 
(1998b, p. 3). However, the Tobin's q can clearly be related to many other aspects of 
organizations and markets than specifically people embedded skills. Nevertheless, 
compared to any other measure, the difference between market value and book value 
(Tobin‘s q) properly identified can be considered as one candidate273.  
Meyer and Gupta argue that  
“there are many performance measures, more all the time...the most 
commonly used performance measures tend to be uncorrelated with one 
another; and no performance measure dominates for long...[T]hat is, 
performance measures given great weight by managers shift dramatically 
over time...performance mesures have a tendency to run down – to decline 
                                               
273 What Tobin’s q measures is essentially the market’s expectations of a company’s future 
performance. This might be related to people embedded skills but it might also be related to a host of 
other things even if we control for such phenomena as organizational size and industry. In particular it 
tends to be related to top management characteristics and behavior as well as immaterial rights and 
exclusive products. These things might be a consequence of HRM but they need not. Even though 
Tobin’s q from a theoretical point should reflect “people embedded skills” or earlier accomplisments of 





over time in their ability to discriminate good from bad performance...One 
[reason] is positive learning resulting in actual performance improvement. 
Another is perverse learning resulting in the appearance but not the fact of 
improvement...The paradox is this: coordination and control in 
organizations are best achieved through multiple, uncorrelated, and 
changing performance indicators that render it difficult to know exactly 
what performance is” (1994, pp. 310-311). 
Evans argues that the dependent variable cannot (appropriately) be the ‘bottom line’ 
or performance (1999 p. 328) but perhaps for the medium term (ibid., p. 332). Evans 
cites Cameron (1986) “To be effective, an organization must possess attributes that 
are simultaneously contradictory, even mutually exclusive”. Evans continues by 
claiming that  
“[o]pposing forces such as short and long term, differentiation and 
integration, external and internal orientation, hierarchy and network, cost 
control and quality, change and continuity can never be reconciled once 
and for all...The dependent variable of focus becomes that of tension 
between opposites” (1999, pp. 328-329). 
More than ultimate performance outcomes, Evans is in fact discussing attributes 
organizations should possess in order to be successful or effective. Thus he himself 
still faces the problem of telling us what he means by effective/successful so that 
researchers can begin to explore the justification for the importance of any “tensions 
between opposites”. If there is no answer to that question, any dependent variables in 
terms of “opposites between tensions” will be just normative postulations to the extent 
that, e.g. shareholders will not begin to determine the values of organizations based on 
the degree (and quality?) of tensions between opposites.  
Whatever the attributes an organization “must possess” in order to be effective in the 
long run, it seems that on average, assuming that we observe more or less equilibrium 
phenomena, organizations should satisfy their customers and be profitable. There is 
thus still some justification for ultimate more simple performance measures in some 
form. The research community, however, appears to manifest no consensus on what 
they should be.  
The “business model” of organizational performance 
“suggests that there are multiple measures of performance (e.g. product 
quality, customer satisfaction, financial performance), none of which takes 
precedence over the others and hence constitutes performance all of which 
are to be maximized. Moderate correlations among various performance 
measures are suggested by the business model, but these correlations are 
expected to be lagged rather than contemporaneous” (ibid., p. 356). 
We will operationalize organizational performance in terms of the perceived quality 
of products and services, perceived customer satisfaction and perceived 
profitability. This operationalization is in some congruence with the above notion of 
“the business model”. Analogously to our (and Becker and Huselid’s (1998, p. 5)) 
assumption that we on average are observing equilibrium levels of HRM, we also 
assume that on average we are observing equilibrium levels of relative performance. 
The HRM discourse might be argued to offer partial answers to the question of what 




in HRM is trying to find ways of properly testing how important for success these 
partial answers are. Surely they can represent but a very tiny piece of puzzle in the 
grand scheme of organizational performance. 
To the extent that the HRM debate, and in particular strategic soft HRM can ever be 
empirically justified we would have to be able to show that employee work 
performance (in some form) has an effect on organizational performance.  
"Certainly, the performance of an organization is more involved and 
complex than the sum of the separate performances of its employees. 
However, the collective performance of employees does, indeed, represent 
a critical and necessary condition" (Ferris et al., 1998, p. 249)274. 
Ultimately this is what the HRM debate is largely about. In particular in knowledge 
and employee intensive organizations such as consultancy firms the performance of 
employees should clearly (if anywhere) influence organizational performance. Pfeffer 
has argued that  
“[h]aving better-trained and more-carefully screened employees working a 
system that permits and, indeed, encourages them to use their skills results 
in higher levels of organizational performance” (1997, p. 172). 
This is still largely a hypothetical inference with no explicit empirical (nor in fact any 
specific generally agreed upon theoretical) foundation275. We propose the following 
hypotheses related to the direct relations depicted in our model 
Hypothesis 12a: The quality and efficiency of employee performance will 
be positively related to organizational profitability. 
Hypothesis 12b: The quality and efficiency of employee performance will 
be positively related to organizational performance in terms of quality and 
customer satisfaction. 
Hypothesis 12c: The innovative behavior of employees will be positively 
related to organizational profitability. 
                                               
274 Obviously organizational performance is affected neither only by the performance of a limited 
sample of employees in any organization nor only by the performance of current employees. We make 
the crucial assumptions that we are observing equilibrium phenomena and that our (limited number of) 
respondents represent an adequate sample of employees in general in the studied organizations. 
275 Whatever the intellectual capital or core competence etc required for organizational performance it 
should be reflected in the criteria for evaluating employee performance in terms of quality, efficiency 
and/or innovativity. However, it is of course conceivable that employees in an organization might 
exhibit high levels of these properties but because the organization has not been able to focus on 
strategically adequate competencies and behaviors, and evaluate employee performance according to 
them, managerial perceptions of high employee performance does not have any organizational 
performance consequences. The lack of such a relationship might also be due to the fact that the 
interpretations of quality, efficiency and innovativity varies between organizations. These weaknesses 
of our conceptualization simply reflect the absence of any agreed upon relevant criteria for employee 




Hypothesis 12d: The innovative behavior of employees will be positively 
related to organizational performance in terms of quality and customer 
satisfaction. 
In addition to this understanding of organizational performance, employee turnover 
has often been used in HRM studies as an organizational performance measure. It has 
however mostly been measured so that no distinction between voluntary and 
involuntary turnover has been made. This seems a crucial limitation and reduces the 
information the evidence conveys. We will try to capture voluntary turnover. Huselid 
(1995) showed some, albeit as noted in our review above, weak evidence for the fact 
that employee turnover mediated an HRM influence on organizational performance. 
We will explore this possibility although we will mainly try to analyze a potential 
mediated influence of HRM on (voluntary) employee turnover. One would expect that 
an HRM influence on (voluntary) employee turnover would be mediated at least by 
the focal attitudes in terms of affective organization commitment and continuance 
commitment as well as organizational citizenship behavior. However, the effect of 
psychological empowerment and employee performance on voluntary employee 
turnover is already much less clear. Empowered and/or excellent performers may (in 
particular in our population) be leaving organizations due to attractive job offers. To 
the extent that excellent performers also on average are more prevalent in well 
performing organizations this tendency might be amplified because competitors might 
be looking for or willingly hire employees in particular from such organizations276. 
Nevertheless, when controlling for available job opportunities, career prospects, 
organizational image and prospects, one would still expect that both high 
psychological empowerment and high employee performance will on average be 
related to relatively low levels of voluntary employee turnover. Here we put forward 
the following direct relationships:  
Hypothesis 12e: The quality and efficiency of employee performance will 
be negatively related to voluntary employee turnover. 
Hypothesis 12f: The innovative behavior of employees will be negatively 
related to voluntary employee turnover. 
7.3 WHAT IS A THEORY 
The proposed theorizing belongs to a family of multilevel theories which  
“begin to bridge the micro-macro divide, integrating the micro domain’s 
focus on individuals and groups with the macro domain’s focus on 
organizations, environment and strategy...[These theories acknowledge] 
the influence of the organizational context on individuals’ actions and 
perceptions and the influence of individuals’ actions and perceptions on 
the organizational context” (Klein, Tosi and Cannella, 1999, p. 243).  
The focus of the proposed theorization tested in this thesis is the same as the 
dominating focus within multilevel organizational literature, i.e. on “two levels of 
theory and analysis – individuals and organizations...(ibid., p. 247). As outlined, we 
will analyze the relation between individual employees’ perceptions of the 
                                               
276 Thus different and even partly contradictory direct and indirect effects of HRM on voluntary 




organizational level processes in terms of HRM practices and the individual level 
attributes in terms of these employees’ psychological empowerment, organizational 
commitment and organizational citizenship behavior as well as general work 
performance. We will further analyze the relationships between these individual level 
attributes and organizational level performance.  
Developing multilevel theory usually requires research to  
“draw from both organizational behavior and organization theory, and 
often from these fields’ parent disciplines – psychology, sociology, 
antropology, political science and economics – as well. Accordingly the 
first barrier to multilevel theory building is simply the mass of potentially 
relevant research and theory...” (ibid., p. 244).  
This is clearly an issue HRM research confronts. The drawing on different disciplines 
is complicated by the fact that most theories in most of the above disciplines 
themselves are in a stage of development and under critical debate. One potentially 
relevant example is social exchange theory (Cook, 1987). It might therefore be 
necessary to develop multilevel theories in any one field which is sensitive to as much 
as possible in the debates in connecting fields of inquiry without explicitly relying too 
much on any such theories. The same problem confronts researchers even in more 
closely related fields of research.  
We have only to a necessarily limited degree discussed “potentially relevant research 
and theory”, mainly in terms of a critique of the RBV, the conceptualization of 
strategy and thus strategic fit, as well as some general ethical and 
epistemological/ontological issues. We have also reviewed general arguments about 
the notion of organizational performance as well as arguments related to 
psychological empowerment, organizational commitment and organizational 
citizenship behavior. In connection to the discussion on control variables we will 
continue to reflect upon the role of these constructs. 
Another problem with multilevel theorizing is the  
“task of multilevel data collection. Rigorous tests of multilevel theories 
may require the researcher to gather data from multiple individuals across 
multiple units and organizations. The single-organization study, so 
common within micro-organizational behavior, may not suffice, nor may 
the single observation-per-organization study, so common within macro-
organizational research. As our field embraces multilevel organizational 
theory, we may be forced to relax some of our research standards, 
recognizing, if temporarily, the tradeoffs sometimes necessary when 
researchers begin work in a new area” (ibid., p. 244).  
As will become clear, we have made compromises in our study, mainly related to the 
number of observations per organization as well as the number of organizations. We 
assume that the sampled employees’ work performance as well as the sampled 
employee attributes reflect those of the employees’ in general in the organizations. 
This assumption is clearly a weak link but has at least some plausibility considering 
that the overall number of employees’ in most of the studied organizations is fairly 
low. In addition, the studied category of employees can also a priori be considered the 





Sutton and Staw argue for the importance (as well as frequent lack) of providing 
adequate causal logics to any hypotheses. Sutton and Staw argue generally that “[a] 
theory must...explain why variables and constructs come about or why they are 
connected” (1995, p. 375). These answers to the question of why is what constitutes 
theory. Pace Dimaggio, this does not amount to a rejection of the view “that theories 
should consist of covering laws” (DiMaggio, 1995, p. 391). Any hypotheses always 
include a proposed (implicit or explicit) causal logic. There are however always 
potentially more detailed causal logics and limiting conditions to be 
pursued/postulated and which may have to be pursued in order to find generalizable 
(more or less transient) nomological relationships capable of replication277. Interesting 
suggestions for such causal logics are as important as the testing of more general 
exploratory causal logics. Even if causal arguments are provided they have lesser 
value to the extent that researchers do not then succeed at testing those explicit causal 
logics. What seems to be a danger in organization science is the postulating of loose 
causal logics which are not really tested in empirical studies either because 
operationalizations do not adequately reflect such causal mechanisms or because of 
inadequate utilization of control variables. Thus, as much as the postulation of causal 
logics, a real challenge for organizational science is often to produce convincing 
empirical evidence or counter evidence for any suggested (explicit or implicit) causal 
logics.  
In this study we are mainly interested in providing such evidence or counter evidence 
for the (loose) logic of arguments which claim that the HRM practices have an effect 
on organizational performance. However, as Guest argues also lower level causal 
logics needs to be pursued in HRM research (1997, p. 268). We have tried to “spell 
out” the general logic of soft strategic HRM as well as some more specific causal 
logics for the relation between HRM and our intermediate variables.  
The general ‘logic’ of the proposed theorization is deceptively simple. Employees’ 
perceptions of organizational level HRM (processes) will reflect the adequacy of these 
processes. This adequacy will influence certain employee attributes. These are 
hypothesized to influence employee work performance which in turn will influence 
organizational performance.  
“Our collective preoccupation with theoretical novelty often leads 
organizational researchers to overlook crucial if banal patterns in their data 
(sometimes even omitting “dull” variables at the cost of misspecifying 
statistical models” (DiMaggio, 1995, p. 393)278.  
The preoccupation with novelty is (only) partly dictated by the dynamics in the 
research objects. This preoccupation seems at least as big a problem in organization 
science as, and apparently closely related to, the lack of detailed causal reasoning. The 
most serious underlying problem might however lie in the complexity of the research 
object and the difficulty of (experimentally) reducing this complexity in relevant and 
                                               
277 As already argued in section 2.3, pace Tsang and Kwan (1999, p. 762), there is no need to evoke 
any form of (problematical, question begging, etc) realism in order to make this point. 
278 Also Tsang and Kwan (1999, pp. 760-761) note the problem of an overvaluation of “originality and 




adequate ways. This is why convincing knowledge production in this field is 
extremely difficult279.. 
In any event, Weick seems obviously right in arguing that “[p]roducts of the 
theorizing process seldom emerge as fullblown theories” (1995, p. 385). It is evident 
that research of HRM's influence on organizational performance is at a stage of 
“theorization” rather than “fullblown theory”. The ‘looking for’ an HRM theory of 
performance is bound to involve a great deal of (hopefully informed) trial and error 
search for proper variables280. 
7.4 THE MODEL AND SOME OBJECTIONS 
One focused critical discussion of HRM as a theory can be found in Noon, 1992. 
Through our conceptualization we are arguably able to (at least begin to) meet Noon’s 
critique in terms of the problem of parsimoniousness in HRM theorizing.  
“[T]he variables associated with just one of the HRM policies are likely to 
be numerous, and the possible relationship to the outcomes plentiful, so, if 
all the variables of the ‘theory’ were taken into account, its complexity 
would be awe-inspiring”(ibid., p. 21).  
In the model, we have tried to eliminate some factors, combine some and postulate 
some traditional HRM phenomena as outcomes rather than primary causes without 
“threatening its comprehensiveness” (ibid., p. 21). The general line of problems Noon 
refers to are however extremely difficult and will require more emphasis in the HRM 
literature. Also Wright and Gardner point to the problem of complexity and choice of 
elements to be included in an HRM theorization of organizational performance (2000, 
pp. 4-7). The complexity is not only due to the multifaceted nature of HRM and its 
possible outcomes, it is also due to the multitude of potential "external" causes of 
most conceivable outcomes of HRM281. 
We do not see the “evident logical contradiction between individualism and 
cooperation“ which Noon (1992, p. 23) claims exist. There may well be tensions but 
no necessary (logical) contradictions. Our conceptualization should be sensitive to 
potential tensions between different elements in the HRM system as well as between 
its outcomes.  
                                               
279 The complexity has been extensively dealt with under different descriptions in philosophy of social 
science. In chapter 2 we tried to convey our understanding of this complexity and its consequences for 
social and organizational science. 
280 It is also important to bear in mind that any theory which conceptualizes antecedents of 
organizational performance only says that, ceteris paribus, companies which adopt or achieve Y and Z 
will also tend to achieve X. The ceteris paribus condition among other things will include the condition 
that not significantly more competing companies are successfully adopting Y and Z (Numagami, 
1998). Such a law can be corroborated only as long as there is relevant empirical diversity (March and 
Sutton, 1997, p. 699). It can be called a law as long as we remember that X, Y and Z are relative 
phenomena. X of organization A will be relatively higher compared to X of organization B to the 
degree that A more successfully implements Y and Z. 




We also argue that the potential contradiction between commitment (quality) and 
flexibility is no necesseary one. Noon argues only that “there may be occasions when 
these are incompatible” (1992, p. 23). He suggests that  
“quality performance may depend on building up expertise over a period of 
time, yet the firm’s requirement for functional flexibility (for congruence 
and cost reasons) may reduce competence levels” (ibid., p. 23).  
Our conceptualization should also be sensitive to the consequences of such 
contradictions. Noon further claims that  
“the notion of commitment may be totally undermined by factors outside 
the control of the committed workers” (ibid., pp. 23-24).  
This is true but the “totally” is still a theoretical/empirical question. We also claim 
that there is no ‘logical’ inconsistency in our model related to a strong culture on the 
one hand, and flexibility or adaptability on the other  (ibid., p. 24). A strong culture 
may for example be a culture emphasizing dynamism and change or diversity. Neither 
is there in our theorizing a ‘logical’ inconsistency related to the idea of strategic fit 
(ibid., p. 24), nor anything which dictates approaching “the design of HRM systems in 
an overly rational way” (Hendry and Pettigrew, 1990, p. 35, cited in Noon, 1992, p. 
24).  
The unitarist assumption critisized by Noon (ibid., p. 24) is an empirical question 
where it may turn out that in many contexts something even close to the ideal of HRM 
is difficult to achieve. But this is also a theoretical/empirical question. Noon discusses 
the potential instrumentality of HRM mainly arguing that it increases the employers’ 
manipulative possibilities without a true adherence to the ideal of soft HRM (ibid., pp. 
25-26). We argue that our model is sensitive to such issues.  
Noon continues by discussing theoretical utility. We do not think that HRM 
theorizing is absurd or necessarily irrelevant (ibid., p. 22). Only partly do we agree 
with the claim that “HRM is often stating the obvious” (ibid., p. 22).  
“[T]hat is interesting...is the...response that the theorist is looking for 
because it suggests that the conjecture is challenging the already held 
assumptions in a plausible manner” (ibid., p. 22).  
In the case of HRM such a response might be prompted for several reasons. First, 
many people believe that investing in people is the way to go. But very little in 
management thinking is based on scientifically well justified beliefs. To the extent 
that HRM research can offer plausible evidence or counter-evidence for some 
antecedents and outcomes, it is interesting from this perspective. Second, that HRM 
does have an influence on some outcomes is ‘almost obvious’. But being able to say 
through what more specific mechanisms it might have effects on organizational 
performance seems to be an interesting question. As responses to competitive 
demands may also have negative consequences (e.g. work stress, decreased 
employment security, etc) this makes it even more interesting to develop and test 
proper HRM theories of organizational performance. Third, it seems of considerable 
interest to test the potential explanatory power of an HRM theory of organizational 
performance in different contexts. Fourth, something for which theory development 




Noon seems to be more eager to point to all the possible difficulties confronting HRM 
theorizing than discussing possibilities. He points to two more problems in such 
theorizing.  
The generalizability of any HRM theory (ibid., pp. 26-27) is a question which we 
dealt with earlier and it is a highly relevant one. Pfeffer (1994) takes a more positive 
stance on this than e.g. Guest (1989), MacDuffie (1995) or Legge (1995). Only 
empirical evidence and experimentation on behalf of organizations can really answer 
such questions.  
Noon also discusses (philosophical) assumptions of human nature and contrasts two 
understandings of this nature.  
“Modern man can be influenced by manipulating the ‘laws’ (physical, 
psychological and social) which determine the process of being. 
Hermeneutical man, however, is self-bound rather than law-bound and 
consequently he or she creates organizational reality and structures rather 
than responds to them. The implications for management of people are 
profound” (ibid., p. 27).  
Noon implies that constructing a theory which explains employee behavior is 
contradictory to the notion of hermeneutical man. As discussed in chapter 2, we do 
not claim that any (known) laws fully determine human behavior and neither do we 
claim that human beings never respond (in predictable ways) but always create (new 
responses). In addition, the fact that employees partly create organizational reality and 
that this creation is important is something we try to consider through our 
conceptualization/operationalizations. Thus the ‘dichotomous opposition’ outlined by 
Noon above seems unnecessary. That “HRM uses the language of individual self-
fulfilment and self-creation but sets boundaries to both” (ibid., p. 28) seems to be a 
problem only to the extent that somebody would imagine that self-fulfilment and self-
creation can be ‘boundary-less’ within organizations.  
In summary, Noon argues that  
“HRM ‘theory’...fails on two accounts: first, in terms of ‘adequacy’ 
because of the logical inconsistencies; and second, in terms of ‘reality’ 
because it does not model the empirical world” (ibid., p. 28).  
We argue that we have avoided the first problem and that the second is still an open 
theoretical/empiricial question. Noon ends by claiming that “the danger of 
reconceptualizing HRM as a theory is that it raises its status and denies its history” 
(ibid., pp. 29-30). We see no a priori and necessary problem with either 
consequences. 
7.5 PARTICULAR METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
Wright and Sherman point out the problem of “wrong level or mixed level of 
analysis” in many studies (Wright and Sherman, 1999, p. 65). In our study the 
organizational performance variables are related to either a relatively small domestic 
(consultancy) firm, a relatively small foreign (consultancy) subsidiary or a relatively 
small (consulting) unit of a larger organization. We have measured the HRM 
practices, the intermediate phenomena as well as most control variables only with 




units. Clearly there may be other offices (or even subgroups within any one office) 
where some of these phenomena might differ. Thus the postulation of relationships 
between the organizational performance measures and the other elements of our 
model is far from being completely straightforward. The problem referred to by 
Wright and Sherman is thus clearly not avoided. However, in terms of the fairly small 
size of most of the organizations and the homogeneous kind of employees and 
operations in different branches of these organizations, there is at least some 
justification for the assumption that our variables refer to consistent levels of analysis.  
Although basically formal measures of HRM practices have been used in earlier 
studies they have nevertheless in many cases also necessitated different degrees of 
perceptual judgement. Most of the earlier studies have been based on HRM data from 
single (HR) manager contacts. 
Huselid and Becker claim that they  
“believe the chief human resource officer (CHRO) within each firm is in 
the best position to describe the combination of both policy and 
practice”(1996, p. 416, footnote 8).  
Somewhat depending on the measures used, we think that HRM managers in fact are 
likely to bias the results quite a lot. Some indication of problematical differences in 
perceptions between functional managers and HRM managers are evident in Guest 
and Peccei (1994). Also the empirical evidence offered by Truss et al. (1997) can be 
interpreted to support two things: (1) it is conceptually dubious to draw any 
conclusions concerning performance effects based only on managerial information or 
company policy statements on HRM practices, and (2) we need more research of their 
implementation, their reception and interpretation. At least it seems clear that in the 
absence of many studies using multiple respondents we need studies with different 
kinds of respondents. As already noted, we have tried to motivate and will use 
interpretations by general employees, the objects of the HRM practices, as data 
concerning the implementation of these practices. 
We are however far from having provided a satisfactory solution to the reliability 
problem (Wright and Sherman, 1999, p. 64). Our employee and firm performance 
variables are measured through single respondents only. In addition, as already 
mentioned we are making inferences about the sophistication of organizational HRM 
practices based upon individual perceptions of 2-3 general employees per 
organization282. To the extent that the intra-organizational perceptions of the HRM 
practices and their intermediate consequences do not exhibit any consistent 
relationships we should not find evidence for any systematic organizational 
performance effects. Thus, with reference to organizational performance effects of 
                                               
282 As already argued the respondents are part of an overwhelmingly dominating but still fairly (in 




HRM we arguably introduce a kind of quasi-reliability "hurdle". With reference to the 
intermediate variables the reliability problems are smaller283. 
In addition to questions of reliability, there is a general problem in terms of a lack of 
agreement on the validity and adequacy of operationalizations and constructs 
related to most phenomena in organization studies, including those included in our 
model. On this point, see also Wright and Sherman (1999, p. 64). With reference to 
the HRM practices in particular it can be argued that  
“[t]oo much emphasis on objective measurement runs the risk of omitting 
some practices that lie at the heart of HRM. Too much scope for personal 
judgement risks reducing the reliability of responses” (Guest, 2001, p. 
1098). 
We have also argued that too much emphasis on the objectivity of measures may not 
only omit some important HRM practices but also potentially the aspects of (all) 
practices which may be causally efficacious (see section 3.4 above). We will try to 
further discuss these issues in connection to the presentation of the operationalizations 
below. 
Simultaneity bias (reverse causality) at the non-perceptual level is a major concern. 
Becker and Huselid remark that  
”The potential for simultaneity bias is a common reservation in this 
literature, the concern being that more profitable firms can afford more of 
these policies and any positive HRM-firm performance relationship is 
therefore positively biased.” (1998b,  p. 5).  
But following this they claim that the alternative bias is equally plausible, that  
”less profitable firms have a greater need for high performance HRM 
strategies and are therefore more likely to pursue them” (ibid., p.5).  
However we would argue that as any more robust positive organizational performance 
effects of HRM are not well established by research, perhaps even less part of 
common conviction in companies, the positive bias is likely to be stronger. This could 
very well be a consequence of slack resources, image etc. Further, it seems often 
repeated that in bad times one of the first cost cutting efforts are directed at the 
personnel department and personnel practices284.  
                                               
283 The debate concerning respondents and measurement errors has, since the writing of this, been 
intensified as more evidence of potential problems has emerged (see Gerhart et al., 2000a; 2000b and 
Becker and Huselid, 2000). 
284 The foremost perhaps being training and development (as noted by Evans, 1999, pp. 333-334) and 
employment security. The only empirical study of this issue we have found did not produce evidence 
for the fact that performance differences in either way predicts the adoption of HRM practices (Frits 
and MacDuffie, 1996). Although the study gave some indication that worse performing organizations 
tended to be more likely to adopt HRM practices this result was not statistically significant (ibid., pp. 
441-442). On the basis of their evidence, prior existence of the practices as well as complementary 
HRM practices is what is decisive with reference to increased adoption of HRM practices (ibid., pp. 




Becker and Huselid continue by offering three arguments for the fact that there is  
”little theoretical or empirical reason to believe that contemporaneous 
measures of firm performance pose a fundamental problem” (ibid., p.5) 
285.  
Of the three arguments the third more or less assumes what research is still trying to 
establish286, the second seems misdirected as the establishment of HRM practices 
costs money and other resources which arguably are scarce during times of bad 
performance287. Their first argument seems more relevant but needs to be considered 
in detail. The argument is that prior research has found no evidence of meaningful 
simultaneity bias in these relationships. They refer to the test of lagged effects in 
Huselid and Becker (1996) whose unsatisfactory nature was suggested in our review 
of empirical studies above. In addition they refer to Huselid (1995) who tested for a 
simultaneity bias. However, Huselid commented that there is controversy related to 
the adequacy of one of the methods he used. He reports that he also used another 
method in terms of “two-stage least squares models for each dependent variable as a 
formal correction for simultaneity” (1995, p. 666). The description of this method is 
so scarce that we are unable to form a judgement as to its adequacy and there are no 
references to evaluations of the adequacy of this method for testing simultaneity bias. 
In addition, Huselid did not present any of these tests in his article288. 
Simultaneity bias is not something that can be argued away (once and for all). A 
convincing refutation of it can only be established by proper designs of research (each 
time). The more positive relationships research is able to establish through cross-
sectional research, the more encouraged researchers should perhaps be to engage in 
                                                                                                                                      
study cannot be considered to have offered a refutation of the hypothesis postulating a simultaneity bias 
nor to have indicated a bias in the opposite direction. 
285 Becker and Huselid offer a fourth argument, i.e. they assume that they are observing equilibrium 
effects (ibid., p. 5). However, this argument refers to prior evidence of lagged effects (=Huselid and 
Becker, 1996). As noted in our review of prior empirical research (chapter 6), this evidence is weak. 
286 The third argument is that “the elements of the HRM system...are expected to increase productivity 
and profitability, and therefore will presumably pay for themselves” (ibid., p. 5). This conviction would 
have to be shared by the low performing organizations. 
287 The second argument is that “many of the elements of a high performance HRM strategy are not 
inherently more expensive than “low performance” practices” (ibid., p. 5). This is only true for a few of 
the practices and design and implementation will still cost money and other resources. 
288 Becker and Huselid also refer to Ichniowski, C. (1990). This is a working paper which we have not 
been able to consult. However, Ichniowski et al. tried to exclude a possible simultaneity bias with a 
fixed-effects model (1997, pp. 7-8), but in the last instance ended up justifying their model with proper 
controls (ibid., p 8). More than addressing the specific question of reverse causality (simultaneity bias 
in our interpretation) their tests address the general problem of heterogeneity bias. This bias is nothing 
else than the problem of adequate mechanisms and relevant controls, whereas simultaneity bias is more 




longitudinal studies utilizing lagged data in order to put the arguments to the most 
solid tests we can pragmatically imagine289.  
As already noted, a somewhat different but closely related concern has been explored 
in terms of a potential heterogeneity bias related to unobserved latent and correlating 
causes of firm performance (Huselid and Becker, 1996, pp. 403-404). As is the case 
with reverse causality (simultaneity bias), heterogeneity biases cannot be tested for 
once and for all and generalized290. There is arguably no better way of excluding such 
biases than developing specific intermediate mechanisms and appropriate controls in 
terms of other influencing variables. This is also more or less the conclusion reached 
by Huselid and Becker (1996, p. 420).  
Both a simultaneity bias and a heterogeneity bias is somewhat less likely in our study 
due to our integrated model. The integrated model specifies the “route” such a biasing 
latent effect on performance would have to take. However, intermediate variables 
alone cannot solve either the problem of simultaneity or the heterogeneity bias. The 
mechanisms would have to be very specific in order to do this. In our case, the 
proposed multilevel model makes it somewhat less likely, although still quite 
possible, that a latent cause might affect all our independent and dependent 
variables291. With the inclusion of a fairly extensive set of controls, in addition to the 
specified intermediate variables, we try to further diminish the risk of a heterogeneity 
bias.  
In many studies the amount of control variables have in fact been very limited. The 
problem has been acknowledged by e.g. Gerhardt and Becker (1996, 795). The 
controls that mostly have been used are organization age and size, industry, union 
status, (in some cases) business strategy, (in some cases) geographical area of the 
organizations or units studied, sometimes R&D and prior sales growth.  
                                               
289 However, the usual reference to the need to do longitudinal studies might not offer the salvation 
hoped for. It might be very difficult to detect small changes in organizational performance due to 
incremental improvements in a system level HRM measure. The noise of other things influencing 
changes in organizational performance and intermediate variables might in fact be too complex to 
overcome when we are looking for (small) changes in performance due to (small) changes in HRM. 
Yet such small changes is arguably the only thing we are going to get in large longitudinal samples 
analyzing within firm variation. Longitudinal studies will arguably not be able to solve the 
methodological problems related to cross-sectional studies unless we are analyzing such relationships 
between changes in variables. 
290 The fear of heterogeneity bias exemplifies the problematic lack of theory including ceteris paribus 
conditions. 
291 March and Sutton illustrate a phenomenon which might affect both our data on employee 
performance (in terms of managerial evaluations) and employee perceptions of HRM practices as well 
as the intermediate attitudinal outcomes in terms of psychological empowerment, organizational 
commitment and organizational citizenship behavior. “[S]tudents who were led to believe (falsely) that 
their groups had performed well in a financial puzzle game reported higher group cohesiveness, greater 
personal influence over the task solution, higher quality communication, more confrontation of ideas 
with teammates, and more openness of teammates than were students who were led to believe their 
group did poorly. Relative to students who were given negative feedback, they believed that they and 
their teammates had higher motivation and ability, that the task was more enjoyable, and that the 




When we talk about HRM it is important to remember that some kind of ”HRM” is 
always naturally taking place. What most empirical research try to test is the 
importance of certain specified kinds of HRM approaches. It is, however, never only 
outcomes of variations in the explicitly conceptualized types of HRM approaches that 
is being straightforwardly captured. In particular when utilizing formally specified 
HRM measures, the research question should thus always be: how much of any 
variation in outcomes can be explained by the hypothesized kinds of HRM practices 
when controlling for other kinds of HRM practices or HRM related phenomena. This 
problem is well illustrated by Guest when he argues, concerning certain databases, 
that   constructs with a fewer number of measures of the HRM practices appear to 
correlate very highly with a variable constructed from a larger number of such 
measures (2001, p. 1097). Guest argues that  
“this is fairly encouraging in suggesting that a smaller set of items might 
do the job just as well as a more comprehensive set of practices and is also 
more transparent” (ibid., p. 1097). 
The question then appears to become what aspects do we measure and what aspects 
may in fact be causally efficacious? Is it the measured properties (and/or the latent 
variables that they reflect) or is it the unmeasured ones or both? In a nutshell the 
question is, what is it that we are talking about when we, based upon a limited number 
of measures of HRM related phenomena, say that HRM affects organizational 
performance? It does not appear at all clear that limiting the number of items used to 
measure (e.g.) HRM makes research (results) more transparent. 
In any case, potentially relevant unmeasured HRM related phenomena might include 
other organizational routines or phenomena that are related to organizational culture 
which cannot be straightforwardly assumed elements or consequences of the 
measured HRM practices. Leaving out such controls would not be a problem if we 
would know which HRM practices, and what aspects of such practices, are relevant 
for performance and that other factors do not correlate with these practices. But as this 
is part of the research problem, such other organizational aspects should ideally either 
be properly controlled for or included in the models as intermediate variables. The 
problem seems to be parallell to the way analyses of the influence of individual HRM 
practices tend to inflate their influence (Becker and Huselid, 1998, p. 62; Ichniowski 
et al., 1997, p. 12). As Huselid and Becker (1996) have noted, the extent to which 
organizations tend to be consistently managed better or worse in many aspects is 
likely to inflate the resulting explanatory power of any specific more limited HRM 
practices292.  
Studies may also underestimate the general explanatory value of HRM approaches by 
limiting or wrongly specifying the “appropriate” approaches through formal 
definitions of HRM practices. As already noted, we will try to ameliorate these 
                                               
292 A problematical question of using an HRM system construct versus variables related to individual 
HRM practices was noted in the footnote in connection to the review of Delery and Doty (1996) in 
section 6.2.1. Thus, here we have another problematcal case of transparency. As discussed in section 
8.3.2.3, this latter problem of transparency may be soluble by using an aggregate model construct with 
cause indicators. This will however, not be attempted in this study. In addition, as discussed in that 




problems by not specifying and limiting the underlying forms the generic HRM 
practices take in organizations and by including a relatively extensive set of control 
variables. In general, a single industry sample is likely to reduce the problem of 
unmeasured variables related e.g. to general features of organizational culture and 
industries to the extent that “[f]irms within the same industry often share 
macrocultures” (Wright and Sherman, 1999, p. 66). However, as will be noted in the 
discussion of controls in chapter 8, this study still lacks many potentially important 
controls293. 
With reference to the issue of lagged effects we assume, as did Becker and Huselid 
(1998b), that we on average are observing equilibrium levels of our variables. The 
risk of underestimating HRM’s influence due to lagged effects can be further 
diminished by controlling for recent changes in HRM system variables. For this 
purpose we include a still somewhat unsatisfactory variable related to radical changes 
in the HRM system during the past year294.  
Most of the prior empirical studies have drawn conclusions about strong direct HRM 
or direct strategy-HRM interactional links with performance and thus the importance 
of HRM based largely on the statistical significance of such links (Becker and 
Gerhardt, 1996, p. 790). The fact is that in most studies the explanatory power of 
HRM constructs have been fairly low in terms of explained variance (R2) in the 
dependent variables295. The explained variances have been low in spite of very 
moderate amounts of control variables used. This would at least indicate a less 
decisive (and at least not unique) role in producing superior performance for HRM as 
practiced in the studied organizations. However, low explained variances may also be 
the result of misspecifications in terms of measured variables.  
Considering explanatory power in relation to the measures used reveals that in most 
cases its practical interpretation is close to impossible as most studies use interval 
scaled data either in the independent or dependent or both variables (Becker and 
Gerhardt, 1996, p. 790). However, even to the extent that we use interval scaled data, 
with proper controls we could at least receive an indication of the relative explanatory 
                                               
293 In fact, to the extent that organizations tend to be consistently better or worse managed, and 
researcher include only a small amount of very general control variables, it enables researchers from 
many fields of specialization in organization science to show correlational evidence in simplistic 
models for the “effect” of variables in their sub-disciplines. The result could be a happy family of 
organization researchers where too many hypotheses related to various performance outcomes are 
confirmed. Evidently the question of control variables represent a general and serious problem in 
organization research. Proper attention to it should also stimulate theoretical development. 
294 In fact, this variable also has the function of controlling for potential upward biases in many of the 
employee perceptions due to recent positive experiences. 
295 Becker and Huselid defend the claim that “it is the regression coefficients which give us the laws of 
science” (1998, p. 69). However, the argument that “[a]ttention to explained variance, or incremental 
R2, as a measure of importance miss the point...” (ibid., p.69) seems outright wrong. Surely both 
incremental explained variances and effect sizes are of interest. No matter how large the effect size is, 
it is of lesser relevance the smaller the incremental explained variance is. This does not mean that very 





power and importance of HRM in terms of both effect size and incremental variance 
explained296. 
In most of the quantitative studies the response rate have been between 10-30%.  
“The important methodological challenge to the use of survey data in this 
context is whether or not the resulting estimates from these samples are 
hopelessly compromised by response bias” (Becker and Huselid, 1998, p. 
67).  
Huselid (1995) attempted to test for the existence of a response bias. However, as 
Becker and Huselid acknowledge there is really no way to determine independently 
whether there is a response bias on relevant unmeasured dimensions (1998, p. 67), 
including any items of specific interest identified only in the survey questionnaire. In 
our study this problem is ameliorated due to a response rate of 52%/45 % (see section 
8.1). 
A problem which has barely been dealt with in HRM research is common method 
bias. It has been shown to be a potentially very serious (and complex) biasing factor 
affecting much of organizational research (Williams and Brown, 1994)297. To 
somewhat ameliorate the problem of common method errors, we randomized the 
order of all the questions in the questionnaire send to employees298. We have also 
collected data from two different sources, i.e. consultants and their superiors.  
The analyses in our study are essentially exposed to common method errors 
concerning the HRM system variable, our intermediate focal theoretical constructs 
and most of our control variables. Any common method errors between our focal 
theoretical constructs and the controls could diminish rather than increase significant 
relations between our focal theoretical variables. On the other hand, our analyses are 
also exposed to common method bias vis á vis the variables related to employee work 
performance, strategic fit, HR professionalism, persistency of HRM investments, and 
organizational performance. Here however the format of the questions should 
somewhat ameliorate the biases. Due to different respondents there is no common 
method bias with reference to the HRM system and the antecedents of HRM including 
strategic fit. Nor do we face such problems with reference to the relations between 
either the HRM system or the theoretical intermediate attitudinal variables on the one 
hand, and either employee work performance or organizational performance on the 
other hand. 
                                               
296 As Becker and Huselid note, “R2s and incremental R2s are largely a function of the “other” 
influences on the dependent variable that constitute the residual variance in the model” (1998, p. 68). In 
particular both significance and the incremental R2 are a function of proper controls. 
297 Common method bias has to do with “respondents’ consistency motifs and transient mood states, 
illusory correlations, item similarity, and social desirability” (ibid., p. 185) and/or “negative affectivity, 
cognitive ability etc.” (ibid., p. 187). 
298 Williams and Brown note that correlations among questionnaire items are influenced by the number 
and content of intervening items, ordering of items, temporal spacing of measures, and format of 
questions” (1994, p. 206). While the format of our questions could be argued to increase common 




Although our ratio of respondents/organization is minimal for that purpose, we will 
try to perform some indicatory analyses following the procedure described in 
Caldwell, Chatman and O’Reilly (1990, p. 249; 253). This procedure involves the 
constructing of organizational level variables “calculated for each individual based on 
the aggregate of the other [individual perceptions] in the firm, but eliminating the 
focal individual’s own score” (ibid., p. 253). In principle, such a procedure would 
allow us to achieve HRM system variables as well as some control variables which 
are uncontaminated by common method error with reference to our intermediate 
individual level attributes.  
However, this method also has its downsides. The problem with following Caldwell et 
al.’s procedure is that we may underestimate the relations, as the authors note (1990, 
pp. 255-256). Thus, when following their procedure it is not only common method 
error which is removed. We also remove theoretically relevant variance299. 
Nevertheless, what is most often of interest in HRM research is whether some general 
organizational level HRM approach has positive consequences. Thus, with enough 
respondents per organization, perceptual “organizational level” measures of the HRM 
practices (corrected for common method bias) would seem to constitute an 
appropriate HRM system variable. However, due to the limited number of 
observations per organization in this study, we will only use this method as an 
exploratory check on any significant relationships300. 
Common method bias has to be distinguished from another form of potential bias 
involved which might be called attributional simultaneity bias. The responses by 
the superiors may be biased also by an unwarranted association from firm 
performance to employee work performance, strategic fit and HR professionalism. 
Correspondingly the responses by the non-managerial employees may be biased by 
such an unwarranted association from firm performance and/or work performance to 
the perceptions of the HRM practices. Such a bias might also be present in the 
attitudinal responses. This problem of reverse causality at the level of 
perceptions/cognitions cannot be corrected e.g. by different respondents for firm 
performance and employee work performance301. As many of the phenomena 
organizational research deals with are perceptual, it would seem to be close to 
                                               
299 It is likely that there are individual differences in perceptions of one and the same HRM practice. 
Accounting for the potential relevance of individual differences may thus be theoretically important for 
identifying the potential of HRM's influence. In addition, we also note, but do not in this study comply 
with, the argument that the closer analyses of individual differences can also be considered an ethically 
important issue (Townley, 1994, pp. 156-157).  
300 Caldwell et al. also performed analyses where they did not correct for common method error. They 
argue that their analyses “demonstrate the importance of removing common-method bias” (ibid., p. 
256). In Caldwell et al.’s study, while the explained variance increased a lot in their equations related to 
value commitment (but not instrumental commitment) when common method errors were allowed, the 
pattern of significant relationships remained “virtually identical” (ibid., p. 256) with the two 
procedures. Williams and Brown's (1994) simulations, however, indicate more serious potential 
consequences of common method errors. 
301 March and Sutton refer to what they call “retrospective bias” (1997, p. 701) but 




impossible to remove such associative biases from any potentially more justified 
causal relations302. 
                                               
302 When analyzing HRM's relationship with the intermediate outcomes we will however try to control 
for both a straightforward simultaneity bias (by including organizational performance as a control) and 
perceptual or attributional forms of of reverse causality by including both organizational performance 
variables and perceptions of (e.g.) organizational image and prospects of its performance. By including 
concurrent organizational performance variables as controls we will be able to reduce the risk of 
undetected effects of  reverse causation although we at the same time may underestimate the 
relationships. We will also include some other variables which should control for perceptual biases 





In order to test the model and hypotheses presented in chapter 7 we conducted a 
quantitative empirical study. We attempted to give general justification for this choice 
of methodology in chapter 2, in particular in sections 2.4, 2.7 and 2.8. Particular 
methodlogical challenges involved with this choice of methodology were discussed in 
section 7.5. In sections 8.4, 8.4.1 and 8.4.2 we discuss aspects of validation and in 
section 8.5 we offer a general description  of the structural analyses. The 
methodological importance of control variables and the validity of constructs is 
further discussed in section 9.3.4. 
8.1 SAMPLE AND DATA COLLECTION 
The empirical study is based upon data collected from the management and IT 
consultancy industries in Sweden and Finland, with the bulk of the data coming from 
organizations based in Sweden in the area in or near Stockholm. The data was 
collected during the winter/spring 1998. The sample was chosen based on several 
reasons. Firstly, we wanted to identify an industry which had an as dominating 
homogeneous workforce as possible in order to minimize problems concerning any 
inferences from employee perceptions of HRM practices (and other employee 
attributes) to organizational performance. Secondly, we also wanted to identify an 
industry which would satisfy the criteria put forward as critical conditions of strategic 
HRM. Such conditions were listed in section 1.5. Thirdly, we also wanted to include 
more or less only one industry in order to control for between industry differences. 
Fourthly, we wanted to include as many similar organizations from more or less the 
same geographical area in order to identify a sample where organizations would have 
more or less the same pool of available labour. Only 8 of 46 participating swedish 
organizations did not have their office in the larger Stockholm area. Only 1 of 16 
participating finnish based organizations did not have its office in the larger Helsinki 
area.  
One initial selection criteria for organizations was a minimum of 20 consultants in the 
organization based on information from ‘www.konsultguiden.se’ with reference to 
Sweden based organizations and the periodical ‘Talouselämä’ (3/97) as well as 
‘www.tipal.fi’ with reference to Finland based organizations. We later came to 
include also 10 organizations with slightly less than 20 employed consultants and one 
with as few as 13. We began by contacting the chief executive officer by phone in 
order to present our research plan and discuss the possibilities and willingness of the 
organizations’ participation.  
The discussion with the chief executive officer usually led to a managerial level 
contact in the organization. This manager (or employee in a superior position) was 
subsequently contacted by phone. When agreement on participation was reached, we 
mailed this person a questionnaire concerning some aspects of the HRM processes in 
the organization, the individual work performance of three consultants of her/his 
choice in relation to which she/he was a superior, as well as some other questions 
including the performance of the organization303.  
                                               




This contact person was also asked to pick out and provide the three subordinate 
consultants whose performance she/he evaluated with separate questionnaires. The 
consultants, who had to have a minimum of 2 years of work experience within the 
organization, were asked by the contacted superior to fill in separate questionnaires 
and send them directly back to us in included return envelopes. Anonymity was 
guaranteed both concerning the organizations and the employees304.  
We contacted 130 organizations by phone. 8 organizations were not willing to 
participate. Based upon the initial telephone discussion, 10 organizations were 
considered ill suited for the study either because of a recent or soon upcoming merger 
or because of a lower number of employees than was indicated by our public 
information. Thus, 112 organizations accepted participation on the bases of the initial 
phonecall and were provided with the questionnaires. We then contacted some of 
these organizations up to three times either by email or phone in an attempt to receive 
all the four questionnaires in return. Nevertheless, 50 organizations did either not 
answer our questionnaires at all or only the superiors returned their questionnaire. We 
obtained responses of three subordinate consultants from 43 organizations, two 
subordinate consultants from 15 organizations. We also used the data with reference 
to 4 organizations from which we only obtained responses from one subordinate 
consultant. Thus the data includes responses from 164 subordinate consultants 
working in 62 different organizations. Judged on the basis of the number of contacted 
organizations, which were deemed suitable for participation, the response rate is 
62/120 = 52%. Measured by the number of responding subordinate consultants (out of 
the 3x120) the response rate was 164/360 = 45%. 
The questionnaire was in English in order to facilitate the same questionnaire being 
send to both Swedish and Finnish organizations. The questionnaire was first pretested 
on a number of colleagues. Subsequently we conducted a pilot study in two 
consultancy organizations where the researcher was present during the filling in of all 
the questionnaires (by three consultants and one superior per organization). The 
respondents were asked to indicate where the questions seemed ambiguous or did not 
make sense. Some corrections were subsequently made to the questionnaires.  
All items except the age, prior work experience, tenure as well as the size of the 
organization were Likert scale questions on a scale of 1–7 where 1 was named 
“Strongly disagree” and 7 was named “Strongly agree”305.  
The variables measuring strategic fit, longterm investment in HRM, HRM 
professionalism, organization size, strategy and organizational performance are in fact 
based upon only 62 observations. We have simply included the same observation of 
these organizational level phenomena for all individuals coming from the same 
                                               
304 We later accepted also 14 consultants with only 1,5 years of tenure within the current organization 
as well as 1 consultant with less than 1 year of tenure. The questionnaire sent to the consultants is 
exhibited in appendix 2. In order to reduce common method errors the order of all items in the 
questionnaire sent to the general consultants were randomized. It can be noted that both of the 
questionnaires include additional data which was not used in this thesis. 
305 However, also the above mentioned variables were turned into Likert scale variables by grouping 




organization. It seems to us that this offers some additional control of the possibility 
that some personal level component which is related to the specific individual 
(employee) respondents produces a bias in correlations between our observations 
based upon employee responses and the above organizational level properties. It thus 
arguably provides an additional quasi-reliability hurdle in terms of the extent to which 
the employee-related measures reflect (common) organizational level properties. To 
the extent that the reliability is low we would not achieve good explanatory power 
using the individual level variables. 
The age of the subordinate consultants responding to the employee questionnaire 
varies between 25 and 62 with a median of 37 years Their tenure varies between 0 
and 24 years with a median of 3,5 years. (There is one subordinate consultant with 
less than a year's tenure and 14 such respondents with less than 2 year's tenure with 
their current organization). The number of these consultant's earlier employers varied 
between 0 and 18 with a median of 2. The gender of the responding subordinate 
consultants is overwhelmingly male ( = 80% male) and the nationality of the 
organizations is 80% Swedish. The size of the organizations in terms of the number of 
consultants employed varied between 837 and 13 with a median of 50 consultants.  
The general descriptive statistics is presented in table 25b, section 8.5. Appendix 3 
presents an overview of all the constructs/variables used in this study. In addition to 
the items presented in appendix 3 the questionnaires also contain information not used 
in the current thesis. an interesting statistic would be a one-way anova analysis of the 
differences between within and between group (organizations) variances. However, 
with only three observations per organization this statistic would be quite unreliable 
and is therefore not exhibited. 
8.2 CONTROL VARIABLES  
8.2.1 Controls related to psychological empowerment.  
Spreitzer has argued that span of control and sociopolitical support (1996, pp. 487-
488) should influence psychological empowerment. Sociopolitical support, in addition 
to involving and being a result of HRM practices, would arguably include more 
general influences of e.g. leadership (Conger and Canungo, 1988, p. 478) and justice 
related phenomena. We will include control variables related to organizational, 
superior and co-worker support as well as distributive, procedural and interactional 
justice. In trying to sort out the “direct” effects of the HRM system, we will try to 
include these variables as controls even if it may be argued they should be influenced 
by HRM. We have selected items from scales of these phenomena which should 
measure elements as distinctive from the HRM practices as possible but which 
conceptually seem capable to substantially influence psychological empowerment306. 
                                               
306 In fact, it may be that the support related variables are important, or even crucial mediators of 
HRM's influence on psychological empowerment. Thus, although HRM may be able to contribute to 
psychological empowerment it may not be able to do this independent of the support related 
phenomena. We will pursue such mediational relationships only to the extent that we cannot find 




Also global assessments and individual interpretative styles are likely to influence 
psychological empowerment (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990). HRM practices should 
however influence processes of global assessments and individual interpretative 
styles.  
"[O]ne approach to global empowerment is through the alignment of 
organizational processes and structures to consistently enhance individuals' 
task assessments" (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990, p. 679). 
Referring to Organ (1990), Moorman and Blakely argue that  
"dispositional causes primarily drive an employee's OCB in the early 
stages of employment until that employee is able to appraise the type of 
exchange (either social or economic) which defines his/her relationship 
with the organization" (Moorman and Blakely, 1995, p. 139).  
This argument should apply also to any (individual) dispositional causes of other 
employee attitudes and behaviors, including psychological empowerment. As we have 
a control for tenure this should function at least as some control for the influences of 
dispositional causes in terms of individual interpretative styles307. 
It also seems likely that at least age and the number of earlier employers (experience) 
would influence psychological empowerment. Workload could also influence the 
experience of empowerment. Therefore these are included as controls. In addition it 
seems likely that there might be “Hawthorne effects” in relation to all the dimensions 
of psychological empowerment. Therefore we will also use a control related to recent 
radical improvements in the HRM practices308. Also perceived organizational 
prospects as well as perceived organizational image might influence psychological 
empowerment309. Organizational hierarchy is likely to influence psychological 
                                               
307 The potential influence of individual interpretative styles on psychological empowerment (Thomas 
and Velthouse, 1990) is comparable to the person related antecedent in terms of cynicism which Van 
Dyne et al. argue is relevant for organizational citizenship behavior (1994, p. 772) and the phenomenon 
of negative/positive affectivity which have been included in research on organizational commitment 
(Iverson and Buttigieg, 1999). We have no such direct individual trait controls. This is a weakness of 
the present study.  
308 Arguing that this variable controls for a "Hawthorne effect" is perhaps somewhat ambiguous. What 
the Hawthorne studies showed and did not show is a complex and much debated issue (see e.g. Bramel 
and Friend, 1981; Sonnenfeld, 1986). One of the things the set of studies arguably showed was that 
employees (human beings) are affected primarily by the meaning of events and not events "in 
themselves". What we want to control for with this variable is the probable short term effects that any 
radical improvement in conditions may have on employee attitudes and behavior but which may 
whither away by time. The Hawthorne studies did not show that such whithering away was the case but 
they can be interpreted to have indicated that any increased attention given to employees can have 
positive effects at least in the short term. It is in this sense we use the term, i.e. as a term for the 
possibility that "paying attention and showing interest in work groups would itself lead to productivity 
increases" (Beardwell and Holden, 1997, p. 181). Such productivity increases are likely to cease or at 
least diminish after such "new" attention have ceased. It also seems a common-sense fact that human 
beings can be more or less momentarily inspired by meaningful events. Excluding such potential short 
term effects should at least make it somewhat more likely that any identified influences of the HRM 
practices are more stable in nature. 
309 One might argue that both organizational image and prospects should be influenced by the HRM 




empowerment. We include a control for this in terms of the extent to which pay and 
benefits are determined by hierarchical position. In addition, in the consultancy 
industry in particular perceived possibility of becoming a partner in the organizations 
might have a large effect on psychological empowerment. This influence might be an 
attributional influence based on the subjective perceptions of this possibility. It might 
also be due to special treatment by superiors because of truly better performance and 
attitudes. Thus it should be a relevant control when we are studying HRM’s general 
influence on psychological empowerment310. The extent to which an organization 
focuses on a high quality strategy could influence psychological empowerment, both 
positively through the experience of being part of an organization focused on high 
quality as well as negatively through more demanding work tasks in high quality 
organizations. As psychological empowerment may also vary between organizations 
of different size, we will also include organizational size as a control variable. 
Finally, we argue that all of the variables relevant as controls when analyzing the 
relation between HRM and psychological empowerment are also potentially relevant 
when analyzing the relation between the latter and employee work performance. 
8.2.2 Controls related to organizational commitment 
The complexity is great but the importance of controls in research on antecedents and 
consequences of organizational commitment is clear. Concerning research related to 
commitment, job involvement and employee turnover, Huselid and Day argued that  
“previous research has not controlled for a number of variables that have 
consistently been found to be important influences on turnover. For 
example [it has been found that]...salary, age, sex, organizational tenure, 
educational attainment, perceptions of job mobility, met expectations, 
work-group cohesion, opportunities for advancement, and job 
performance...[are] highly related to turnover. If these omitted variables 
are in turn correlated with organizational commitment and job 
involvement, the effects of organizational commitment and job 
involvement on turnover will be confounded” (1991, p. 381)311.  
                                                                                                                                      
might have both a direct effect on employees' psychological empowerment as well as an indirect effect 
in terms of attracting competent and motivated employees. 
310 All these perceptual phenomena might also influence employees perceptions of the organizations' 
HRM systems. Thus, these perceptual variables function both as more traditional control variables with 
respect to the relations between the independent and the dependent variables as well as controls for 
attributional biases in the independent variable.  
311 It is clear that job performance could influence organizational commitment rather than vice versa as 
we hypothesized above. This is one example of the complexity of feedback-loops noted by March and 
Sutton’s (1997, pp. 700-701). Such feedback-loops or partial reverse causalities are evidently plausible 
also with reference to psychological empowerment and organizational citizenship behavior. Thus while 
there might be detectable correlations, we must not conclude that the the relationships are 
unidirectional. In order to diminish the effect of such feed-back loops we will also try to control for 
employee work performance when analyzing the relationship between HRM and organizational 
commitment (as well as HRM and psychological empowerment and organizational citizenship 





Ogilvie (1987) mentions studies that have explored a wide range of variables 
influencing OC. Relevant control variables thus seem to be perceptions of fairness 
(ibid., p. 340), work load, age, tenure, position in the hierarchy312 (ibid., pp. 341-
342). It is also clearly possible that time horizons can affect organizational 
commitment313. 
McFarlin and Sweeney found some support for the fact that both procedural and 
distributive justice are related to organizational commitment (1992, p. 632). In 
addition they found a significant interaction effect of these variables in predicting 
organizational commitment. Also Iverson and Buttigieg’s arguments (1999, p. 313) in 
terms of a general reward-cost paradigm indicate that both aspects of justice and 
support are important controls314. Based on this line of argumentation we thus use 
distributive, procedural and interactional justice as well as coworker, superior and 
organization support as potentially important controls.  
In general, social involvement, group attitudes toward the organization and optional 
social interactions have been argued to influence OC. Ogilvie argues that  
“[t]heoretically, the work group can provide acceptance, aid in mastery of 
the job environment, and affect investment/cost exchanges. Laboratory 
studies...have also found that social cues of coworkers influence job 
attitudes” (ibid., p. 341).  
To the extent that we are interested in aspects of organizational commitment, 
supportive supervisory behaviors should also be accounted for because  
“it appears as though some individuals develop strong loyalties to specific 
supervisors and feel less loyalty to the organization if that supervisor 
leaves” (ibid., p. 352).  
Also Becker et al. (1996) suggest the importance of coworker and superior support 
related controls when analyzing the direct relationship between HRM and 
commitment. They argue that  
“norms regarding in-role behaviors are often established by such local foci 
as supervisors and work groups [ibid., p. 466]...[In general] 
psychologically proximal factors in an environment should have a 
                                               
312 In our study we largely control for the hierarchical position in that our respondents are all general 
consultants working under superiors. In addition, age, tenure and prospects of becoming a partner can 
arguably be considered as partial controls for hierarchical position. 
313 In addition it is possible that “time horizons may differ with respect to the different components of 
organizational commitment” (Fenton et al., 1997, p. 597). We will however not account for such 
differences and will rather only control for differences in time horizons mainly through the variables 
related to tenure, perceptions of the possibilities to gain partnership in the future as well as the 
prospects of organizational performance.  
314 Referring to Farrell and Rushbult (1981) they argue that "rewards and costs are viewed as the 
discrepancy between the extent to which individuals value certain job properties and what job 
properties they actually receive on the job” (Iverson and Buttigieg, 1999, p. 313). In our study we will 
simply assume that certain elements (e.g. aspects of justice and support) related to the job are 




dominant effect on behavior. We suspect that, for most employees, local 
foci are psychologically more proximal than are global foci. Further, 
because of their proximity and regular interaction with employees, local 
foci are probably more effective than global foci in monitoring, rewarding, 
and influencing employee behavior" (ibid., p. 467). 
On the basis of their evidence and with reference to organizational outcomes Hunt and 
Morgan argue  
“that global organizational commitment is a key mediating concept and the 
constituency-specific commitments...lead to, bring about, or result in 
global organizational commitment” (1994, p. 1581) 315.  
Their evidence further emphasizes the importance to control for some kind of 
supportive relationships between respondents and co-workers, superiors and 
organizations when analyzing the relationship between HRM and forms of 
organizational commitment. Alternatively such variables could be used as mediating 
variables316.  
Setton, Bennett and Liden’s arguments and evidence support the possibility that the 
most important control when analyzing antecedents to organizational commitment is 
perceived organizational support rather than leader-member-exchange relationships 
(1996, p. 220). This is thus in some opposition to the arguments related to proximity 
offered by Becker et al. (1999) (see above)317. 
In addition to the above mentioned controls, we argue that at least recent radical 
improvements in HRM (“Hawthorne effect”) is an interesting control (see footnote 
308 above). Also prior work experience is likely to influence forms of organizational 
commitment as this indicates some more informed choice when joining an 
organization as well as some knowledge of the extent to which the grass is greener on 
the other side of the fence. We will measure prior work experience by a variable 
related to the number of earlier employees. Based on Fenton O'Creevy ey al. (1997) 
also prospects for the organizations future performance and perceived prospects of 
                                               
315 The constituency specific commitments they identified concerned workgroups, supervisors and top 
management. The fit indices they report are very close between their mediational and non-mediational 
structural models (ibid., p. 1577). They basically justify the mediating model based on more significant 
parameter estimates and a measure of parsimoniusness (ibid., p. 1581). The outcomes they found global 
organizational commitment to be related to were two aspects of organizational citizenship behavior, 
altruism and conscientousness, as well as two variables measuring intent to quit and non-idleness 
respectively (ibid., p. 1580). They used no control variables in testing the relationships which means 
that the significance of any of the relationships should be treated with adequate caution. 
316 As in the case of psychological empowerment, in order to try to sort out the direct influence of 
HRM on the different forms of organizational commitment, we will primarily try to use the support 
related variables as controls even if it may be argued that they should also be influenced by HRM and 
further influence forms of organizational commitment, both in terms of affective value commitment 
(identification and involvement) as well as affective continuance commitment (loyalty). 
317 Also here one could argue in parallell to Hunt and Morgan (1994) that constituency specific support 
and exchange relationships may mediate more global support and exchange relationships. Some 
support for this argument can be retrieved from the fact that leader-member-exchange relationships 




becoming a partner are interesting control variables when exploring HRM’s 
relationship with forms of organizational commitment. Further, based upon Mayer 
and Shoorman (1998, pp. 19-20) organizational prestige is a relevant control. For this 
phenomenon we use a variable related to the perceived image of the organization. 
Based on Iverson and Buttigieg’s (1999, p. 313) arguments also workload (or stress) 
seems an important control. Further, also based on Iverson and Buttigieg, 
opportunities for alternative employment is a relevant control (1999, pp. 323; 324) 318.  
Our model also includes the hypothesis that affective continuance commitment is 
influenced by affective value commitment319. Therefore, when analyzing the direct 
relationship between HRM and continuance commitment we will use affective value 
commitment as a control. This is also in line with the arguments by Huselid and Day 
(1991) that neither of these aspects of commitment should be studied in isolation. 
Ogilvie refers to studies reporting influences on commitment in terms of participation 
in decision making, decentralization, role ambiguity and personal importance 
(Ogilvie, 1987, p. 341). Such results arguably represent evidence for a hypothesis that 
psychological empowerment should be viewed as influencing organizational 
commitment. This is in line with our postulated model. In analyzing the direct 
relationship between HRM and both forms of commitment we will thus also try to use 
psychological empowerment as a control. 
Organization strategy and organization size are also interesting organizational level 
controls in that it may be the case that employees tend to identify more strongly with 
small organizations pursuing high quality strategies.  
                                               
318 One distinction which the authors show is potentially relevant is that between “the ease to which 
respondents can find a job as good, better, or much better than their current one (=job 
opportunities)...and the costs associated with leaving the organization given the loss of side bets 
(available alternatives and sacrifice of leaving)” (ibid., p. 321). Although the constructs ‘job 
opportunities’, ‘low perceived alternatives’ and 'high sacrifice of leaving' would seem to be 
conceptually close, in Iverson and Buttigieg the correlations between the first and the latter two were 
only -0.27 and -0.28 respectively (ibid., p. 320). In both Iverson and Buttigieg (ibid., p. 320) and Meyer 
et al. (1989, p. 154) the variables related to perceived alternatives and sacrifice of leaving correlated 
with 0.51. Iverson and Buttigieg also showed some evidence (although scarce information is given and 
the p-value for the chi-square statistics seems to have been low) of the discriminant validity of the 
respective constructs (ibid., pp. 321-322). In Iverson and Buttigieg tenure is correlated (0.17) with low 
perceived alternatives. In Meyer et al. (1989) the correlation between tenure and a composite scale of 
continuance commitment (consisting of both the components of sacrifice of leaving and low perceived 
alternatives) is 0.31. It is also reported that the correlation between tenure and the two subscales of 
continuance commitment was "almost identical to that of the full scale" (ibid., p. 154). Age was not 
included in Iverson and Buttigieg's study and in Meyer et al. age was not significantly correlated with 
(the composite scale of) continuance commitment. In any case, to the extent that we control for age, 
tenure and alternative job opportunities, all potential indicators of side bets influencing the ease of 
movement (Iverson and Buttigieg, 1999, p. 208), we would arguably at least partly control for “wrong” 
continuance commitment or continuance commitment with potential negative performance 
consequences. However, although we include some controls which should tap the ease of movement 
aspect of loyalty, we note that the lack of explicit controls related to low perceived alternatives and the 
sacrifice of leaving is a weakness in this study. 
319 In section 7.2.4.2 we argued that the relationships between the components of (affective) 




Finally, we argue that all of the variables relevant as controls when analyzing the 
relation between HRM and organizational commitment are also potentially relevant 
when analyzing the relation between the latter and employee work performance. 
8.2.3 Controls related to organizational citizenship behavior 
Important control variables when analyzing the potential (direct) effects of HRM on 
OCB include tenure (Van Dyne et al., 1994, p. 774) and hierarchical job level (ibid., 
p. 773)320. In addition, workload would seem to be an interesting control as the 
possibility to engage in many aspects of organizational citizenship behavior would 
seem at least partly to be reduced with increased workload. Also prior work 
experience would seem to influence the ability to engage in OCB. We will measure 
this by a variable related to the number of earlier employees. The influence of 
employee age is difficult to hypothesize about but clearly it may be related to OCB. 
Young and eager employees may engage more in OCB. On the other hand they may 
concentrate on their core work duties and individual careers whereas older employees 
may be more prone and able to engage in OCB. In any case we will control for 
employee age.  
Van Dyne et al. argue for the influence of “socially desirable workplace values” 
(1994, p. 772-773). Such values or phenomena would arguably include also concepts 
such as distributive, procedural and interactional justice in addition to co-worker, 
superior and organization support related variables. Further, and related to “socially 
desirable workplace values”, according to Eisenberger et al. perceived organizational 
support  
“would be influenced by various aspects of an employee’s treatment by the 
organization and would, in turn, influence the employee’s interpretation of 
organizational motives underlying that treatment” (1986, p. 501).  
Eisenberger et al. suggested more straightforwardly that  
“positive discretionary activities by the organization that benefited the 
employee would be taken as evidence that the organization cared about 
one’s well-being” (1990, p. 31)321. 
This argumentation, together with Van Dyne et al.'s argumentation about the 
importance for OCB of feeling valued and valuing the relationship with an 
organization (1994, p. 768) as well as Becker et al.'s argument about the relevance of 
proximity (1996, pp. 466-467), clearly indicates that different forms of perceived 
justice and support should influence OCB.  
                                               
320 As already noted, hierarchical job level is mainly controlled for in this study by the choice of 
sample and respondents. In relation to the discussion of controls for psychological empowerment we 
also argued that the lack of a control in terms of cynicism (ibid., p. 772) is a  partial weakness in our 
study.  





Empirical research has also supported a relationship between perceived organizational 
support and dimensions of OCB as well as “a robust relationship between perceptions 
of procedural justice and OCB” (Moorman, Blakely and Niehoff, 1998, p. 351). For 
example, Niehoff and Moorman (1993, p. 547) found support for the fact that formal 
procedural justice was positively related to (some aspects) of OCB whereas 
interactional procedural and distributive justice were not. However, Moorman (1991, 
p. 852) found support for the fact that interactional procedural justice but not formal 
procedural nor distributive justice was related to all but one dimension of OCB 
included in their study. Niehoff and Moorman offer an explanation for these different 
results.  
“Interactional justice would be more likely [than formal procedural justice] 
to influence OCB if managers and subordinates were required to work 
closely together” (1993, p. 550).  
The samples in the two studies were different on this dimension. Clearly, in our 
sample interactional procedural justice should, based on this argument and evidence 
be a potentially more important control than procedural justice322. 
Drawing on the literature, Moorman et al. proposed that perceived organizational 
support could mediate and explain the relationship between procedural justice and 
OCB (1998, p. 351). They argue that  
“among possible antecedents, perceptions of procedural fairness could be 
part of an employee’s evaluation of the discretionary actions taken by an 
organization or its agents” (ibid., p. 352).  
Their research provided some support for these relationships (ibid., p. 355). At least 
this confirms the fact that procedural justice is a relevant control variable in our 
study323. 
Wayne, Shore and Liden (1997) and Settoon, Bennet and Liden (1996) empirically 
confirm the importance of including both superior and organization support related 
variables as controls. Wayne et al. found support for a relationship between both 
                                               
322 In the above studies there may have been multicollinearity related problems because of high 
correlations between the dimensions of justice (Moorman, 1991, p. 851; Niehoff and Moorman, 1993, 
p. 545). High correlations, close conceptual linkages as well as interactional effects have been found 
also elsewhere (McFarlin and Sweeney, 1992, p. 633). There may also be causal relations between the 
components of procedural and distributive justice (Leventhal, 1980; Greenberg, 1987 and Moorman, 
1991). As we shall see, in apparent distinction to Moorman (1991, p. 848) our items related to 
interactional, formal and distributive justice (when all items were included) did not produce a 
satisfactory confirmatory model. However, although Niehoff and Moorman provide very limited 
information on their item level confirmatory factor analyses related to the different dimensions of 
justice, the p-value for the chi-square statistic concerning their items level confirmatory factor analysis 
indicates that also they received a bad model fit (1993, p. 541). In their structural analyses Niehoff and 
Moorman opted for scale scores of the items for each dimension of justice ( ibid., p. 542). The 
properties of discriminant and convergent validity concerning these different dimensions of justice 
seem still not to have been clearly identified. As we shall see, in an attempt to increase the discriminant 
validity of these dimensions we have left out some items from the original measurement instruments. 
323 Their study was not exempted from the usual problems of common method bias (Moorman et al., 




perceived organization support and leader-member exchange (LMX) and OCB (p. 
101)324. Their results  
“suggest that researchers need to incorporate both types of exchanges 
(leader and organization) into predictive models of employee attitudes and 
behavior” (1997, p. 106)325.  
In some distinction to Wayne et al. (1997), Settoon et al.(1996) reported some 
evidence for the fact that LMX is a stronger mediator of the influence of procedural 
justice on OCB than perceived organization support326. Neither perceived leader 
support nor interactional justice were included in their study. Neither were they 
included in the study by Wayne et al. (1997). However, satisfaction with the leader 
has been shown to be positively related to LMX (Martocchios and Baldwin, 1997, p. 
60). Thus, the variable in terms of perceived leader support as well as the closely 
related variable in terms of interactional justice should at least partly substitute for the 
absence of an LMX variable in our study.  
Van Dyne et al. argue that job characteristics such as personal control, autonomy, 
meaningful work, the ability to affect change should all lead to a heightened sense of 
embeddedness and thereby to proactive behaviors like organizational citizenship 
(1994, pp. 773-774). This would seem to imply that psychological empowerment 
should be a robust predictor of organizational citizenship behavior as implied by our 
model. When analyzing the direct relationship between HRM and organizational 
citizenship behavior we will therefore try to use also psychologcial empowerment as a 
control.  
Van Dyne et al. also hypothesize and show some evidence for a mediating 
(antecedent) role of a complex variable including organizational commitment as well 
as superior and organizational support related items (ibid., p. 801). Moorman et al. 
argue that research has provided “support for a significant relation between OC and 
OCB” (1993, p. 210). However, in Williams and Andersson organizational 
commitment is not even correlated with either organizational directed nor individual 
directed OCB (1991, p. 615). They did not analyze the relationship between (different 
aspects of) organizational commitment and a global construct of organizational 
citizenship behavior. The difference between O’Reilly and Chatman (1986), where 
significant relations between organizational commitment and dimensions of 
organization directed citizenship behavior were found, and Williams and Anderson 
(1991) are discussed by the latter (1991, pp. 615-616). In addition to potential 
                                               
324 Their OCB construct contained only items related to altruism (or individual and organizational 
directed helping) (ibid., p. 95). 
325 Wayne, Shore and Liden also provided empirical support for the fact that developmental 
experiences and promotions affect perceived organization support which in turn affects both affective 
commitment and OCB (1997, p. 101). However, including only two aspects of HRM may have biased 
the results because of potential correlations between HRM practices. In any case, on the basis of 
Eisenberger et al.’s general argumentation above, the HRM system as a whole would seem to 
potentially influence perceived organization support.  
326 Also Settoon et al. included only the OCB dimensions in terms of interpersonal helping, in addition 




common method biases, they claim that the main difference is that in O’Reilly and 
Chatman the OCB measures were self-report measures327.  
The issue is however further complicated by the fact that both (different forms of) 
organizational commitment (Iverson and Buttigieg, 1999; Hunt and Morgan, 1994) 
and organizational citizenship behavior (Williams and Andersson, 1991) can have 
several different foci which might be differently interconnected. In any case, the 
mediating roles of affective organizational value and continuance commitment are 
also postulated by our model. When analyzing the direct relationship between HRM 
and organizational citizenship behavior we will therefore also try to use the two forms 
of commitment as controls328 
Yet another complication is related to job satisfaction. In Williams and Andersson 
aspects of job satisfaction were correlated with OCB and with organizational 
commitment (1991, p. 610). According to Moorman (1991), Organ (1988) suggested  
“that the cognitive component of job satisfaction that appears to be related 
to OCB probably reflects the influence of perceptions of fairness” 
(Moorman, 1991, p. 846). 
Moorman (1991) empirically found that job fairness, in the from of procedural justice, 
was more strongly related to OCB than job satisfaction. In fact, when the relationship 
between procedural justice and OCB was controlled, job satisfaction did not explain 
any significant variance in OCB (Moorman et al., 1993, p. 211). Moorman et al. 
further argue that, research has provided (replicated) support for  
“a relationship between job fairness and organizational 
commitment...Therefore, it seems plausible to suggest that perhaps both 
the relationships found between job satisfaction and OCB and 
organizational commitment and OCB might be better explained as part of 
an overall job fairness to OCB relationship” (ibid., p. 212).  
                                               
327 In Moorman et al. (1993) affective commitment was correlated with OCB behaviors but not 
significant in the analyses when procedural justice was included. In this study scale scores was used for 
all the constructs except procedural justice where ten single item indicators were used, 5 items 
depicting interactional justice and five items depicting procedural justice ( pp. 8-9). These differences 
in the construction of variables may have influenced the results. Williams and Anderson (1991), 
Moorman et al. (1993) and the present study all use different measures of organizational commitment 
as well as organization citizenship behavior. This further complicates comparisons. In addition, our 
OCB variable measures self-reported attitudes towards citizenship behavior whereas in the two studies 
mentioned above superior assessments of employees’ citzenship behaviors (differently conceptualized 
in the two studies) were obtained. 
328 Van Dyne et al. also argue that work place values in terms of quality, innovation, co-operation and 
participation (ibid., p. 772) will foster OCB. In this study we have no such overarching value related 
controls. However, Van Dyne et al.'s construct of organizational values is highly correlated with their 
construct of covenantal relationship which includes superior support and organizational commitment as 
well as items reminicent of organizational support (ibid., p. 801). Thus, to the extent that we include all 
these latter variables we arguably also to some extent control for the organizational values Van Dyne et 
al. identified. In addition, in terms of some of their items related to explicit strong organizational values 
of co-operation and participation (ibid., p. 801), the causal logic seems close to tautological. One may 
ask whether it is possible to describe an organization as exhibiting strong values of co-operation and 




The results of Moorman et al. (1993) thus indicate that perceptions of job fairness, in 
particular of procedural justice, when compared to job satisfaction and organizational 
commitment, is the more important predictor of OCB. In our study, we have left out a 
measure of job satisfaction partly due to the above empirical results and because the 
construct of job satisfaction seems to conflate issues of justice and satisfaction 
(Moorman, 1991, p. 846). In addition, the construct of job satisfaction seems to 
confound measures related to superior support, co-worker support, empowerment, 
HRM practices and job characteristics as can be seen from the items related to job 
satisfaction in Williams and Anderson (1991, p. 608)329. 
In addition to the above variables, based upon Moorman et al. (1993, p. 219) we will 
also use the more traditional elements of employee work performance in terms of 
quality/efficiency and innovativity as controls when analyzing the role of HRM as an 
antecedent to OCB. Perceived alternative job opportunities is also likely to affect all 
the dimensions of OCB. Further, perceived possibilities to gain partnership might 
affect OCB, although it may affect at least some of the dimensions in opposite 
directions. With reference to organizational phenomena it would seem that 
organization size, a high quality strategy, organizational hierarchy, organizational 
image and prospects of future organizational performance would affect the 
motivation and atmosphere conducive of OCB. We will therefore include also 
controls related to all the above phenomena. 
In summary, the complexity of research related to OCB is great. We still do not 
include all potentially relevant control variables. However, our controls do cover most 
of the ground that previous research has found relevant. In addition, we include some 
controls that have not been included in earlier studies. Finally, as long as researchers 
study the relations between antecedents and consequences of individual dimensions of 
OCB, which has been the case in all of the above studies, the talk about organizational 
citizenship behavior as opposed to organizational citizenship behaviors is really 
ambiguous. Researchers run the risk of setting up  
“research hypotheses at the construct level, conduct analyses at the 
dimension level, but make conclusions at the construct level (Law, Wong 
and Mobley, 1998, p. 749). 
8.2.4 Concluding remarks related to the intermediate variables 
Trying to put in perspective the current knowledge of the relationships between our 
focal intermediate variables, and between these and certain other variables, it might be 
argued that none of the mentioned studies have yet included an adequate set of control 
variables. The discussion of causal logics, most often in loosely social exchange 
theoretical terms, related to psychological empowerment, dimensions of 
                                               
329 Shore and Tetrick (1991, p. 639) support the fact that these facets of employee satisfaction do not 
form a (unidimensional) construct. This was the case despite the fact that the Cronbach’s alpha for all 
their items of employee satisfaction was as high as 0.92 (ibid., p. 639). In addition, their analyses were 
not able to clearly distinguish a construct of employee satisfaction from perceived organizational 
support. This gives a further reason for not including a construct of job satisfaction but rather for trying 
to use more specifc constructs. It may nevertheless be noted that by using a different more general 
measurement instrument of employee satisfaction, Eisenberger et al. (1997) were able to make some 




organizational commitment and organizational citizenship behavior usually make 
sense. However, any of the proposed causal logics usually apply also to other 
antecedents. Thus, in particular if the causal logics cannot be specified and 
differentiated, the relations of and between the constructs largely boil down to an 
exploratory empirical matter. Considering this, the fact that (still) fairly few controls 
have been used seriously reduces the epistemic status of current evidence. Studies 
have often faced high correlations between included constructs of employee attitudes 
and it may be expected that also other excluded attitudes consistent with the causal 
logics exhibit similarly high correlations.  
Causal directions is an additional problem as all the reviewed studies have been more 
or less cross-sectional. The fact that most of these studies have had the problem of 
common method errors between independent and/or between independent and 
dependent variables aggravates these epistemic problems. While we in the current 
study include more controls than most earlier research, we clearly face the problems 
of causal directions as well as common method errors. 
With reference to the relationship for example between organizational commitment 
and organizational citizenship behavior the evidence is also somewhat contradictory 
even excluding common method errors. In two out of four studies we know of where 
data on organizational commitment and organizational citizenship behavior have been 
collected from different respondents and which should thus be uncontaminated by 
common method errors, organizational commitment was not significantly biserially 
correlated with organizational citizenship behavior (Settoon et al., 1996, p. 223; 
Williams and Andersson, 1991, p. 610). The former analyzed their relationship 
without any controls. However, although Wayne and Shore did not analyze the 
relationship in more detail, in their study the constructs of affective commitment and 
organizational citizenship behavior were at least significantly biserially correlated 
(1997, p. 99). In Moorman et al. a construct of affective commitment was also 
correlated with five separate dimensions of organizational citizenship behavior and 
(instrumental) continuance commitment was correlated with three of them (1993, p. 
224). However, controlling for procedural justice and job satisfaction in their 
structural analyses, the authors did not find any significant relationships between 
commitment and OCB (ibid., p. 224). Somewhat different constructs were used in 
these studies except that Wayne and Shore (1997) and Settoon et al. (1996) shared 
more or less the same construct of organizational commitment. Settoon et al. (1996) 
and Williams and Andersson (1991) shared the same items for the organizational 
citizenship behavior construct but the latter formed two different constructs out of the 
same items. Despite these differences the four studies together indicate the instability 
of the findings so far. 
It can also be noted that in Wayne et al. perceived organizational support is both 
biserially correlated with organizational citizenship behavior and also significantly 
related to it in the structural analyses (1997, p. 101) whereas in Settoon et al. 
perceived organizational support is not even significantly correlated with 
organizational citizenship behavior (1996, p. 223). This represents further evidence of 
the instability of current knowledge and the continuous importance of including all 
potentially relevant constructs in future studies. 
Daft and Lewin argued that “[n]ormal science is concerned with internal validity...and 




validity (of constructs ) should be pursued by including many closely related but 
distinct constructs as controls. In the more holistic sense, i.e. in terms of nomological 
validity, external validity can be more reliably checked only by replication studies 
ideally performed by independent researchers in combination with the use of adequate 
controls. More hermeneutical studies of the understanding of the constructs by 
respondents in different contexts could perhaps further improve upon the external 
validity of both constructs and nomological relationships.  
Thus, what would be needed, in order to increase the epistemic confidence that 
research in this area tends to give rise to are independent replication studies with 
relevant controls using the same items and constructs both in relation to the same and 
different (kinds) of respondents. Before that is likely to take place more widely and 
fruitfully, however, the research community would have to exhibit more agreement on 
discriminantly valid constructs. Such agreement may still necessitate a fair amount of 
renewal of currently available measurement instruments. It is likely that when 
researchers begin to analyze more complex internal relations between the multitude of 
concepts concerning organizational behavior they will face problems of discriminant 
validities330. 
Most studies to date have provided only fairly limited evidence of discriminant 
validities either in terms of exploratory or confirmatory factor analyses331. Wayne et 
al. included a larger than usual number of constructs, including an impressive number 
of items, in an exploratory factor analysis (1997, pp. 96-97). However, also they 
performed two distinct factor analyses for antecedents and dependent variables [albeit 
also including one independent in the latter (ibid., p. 98)]. In the subsequent structural 
equation analyses the authors included only composite scores of all the variables 
except one (Wayne et al., 1997, p. 100). The prevalence of performing validating 
exploratory or confirmatory factor analyses, in particular partial ones, and then 
forming composite scores is still a less than ideally satisfactory procedure. However, 
analyzing relations between composite scores based upon validations in terms of 
partial confirmatory factor analyses is also to a large extent a liability in the present 
study. 
A final epistemic problem with reference to the reviewed research relates to model 
choices based upon comparisons of nested models. These choices seem less clear than 
indicated by some research and there seem to be no reason todate to exclude any 
variables based upon the results of such comparisons. Thus, e.g. the choice between 
some models exhibiting a fairly similar fit in Wayne et al. (1997) and Settoon et al. 
(1996) seems unfounded. The latter argue that  
“[i]n the comparison procedure, a nonsignificant chi-square difference 
between two models suggested that the more restricted model is a better 
                                               
330 Although there are a number of more specific measurement instruments, researchers in 
organizational behavior clearly still face problems analoguous to those of organization studies in terms 
of the definition and adequacy of utilized constructs (McKinley and Mone, 1998, pp. 175-176).  
331 In addition, based upon the reported results of confirmatory factor analyses many of the studies also 




model because greater parsimony is achieved without a significant 
decrease in the overall fit of the model” (1996, p. 222). 
A similar argument is offered by Andersson and Gerbing (1988) as referred to by 
Wayne et al. (1997, p. 103). Referring to James, Mulaik and Brett (1982), Settoon et 
al further argue that their procedure of nested-model comparisons "adresses the 
prediction that the constrained or restricted paths in the nested models hypothesized to 
be zero are indeed zero" (1996, p. 222). We would argue that insignificant changes in 
chi-square and model parsimony are only necessary but not sufficient criteria for 
excluding models. Parsimony is one criterion of scientific theories but it cannot be 
used in an ad hoc manner. Researchers should also be able to theoretically argue why 
certain additional paths should be excluded or constrained, in particular in cases 
where some theory apparently justifies also the additional paths. In the case of e.g. 
Wayne et al. there are surely equally good arguments to hypothesize e.g. model 3 
(1997, p. 103) as there are for the one hypothesized by the authors themselves. In 
Settoon et al. there seem to be equally good criteria for hypothesizing model 3 as the 
one they hypothesized (1996, p. 223). Parsimony could be achieved if we explicitly 
by controlling for other paths still could claim that a smaller amount of phenomena to 
a sufficient degree explain another phenomenon and that the model fit does not 
decrease if additional paths are constrained. Thus, what amounts to a sufficient degree 
would also have to be discussed in order to justify a parsimonious explanation. At 
least one would also like to see information on the R2's and the significance and 
largeness of the path coefficients related to excluded or constrained paths as well as 
information on the consequences for the other paths when the constrained paths are 
estimated and thus controlled for. 
In summary, although there are a number of open questions, our reviews above 
indicate that researchers have increasingly began to analyze the inter-relations of a 
range of concepts argued to be of importance in the literature on organizational 
behavior. Much more research with this purpose seems important. In particular, most 
studies that have involved the concepts of psychological empowerment, organization 
commitment and organizational citizenship behavior have tended to include only part 
of the elements that have been included in system level HRM research. An integration 
of these research streams seems important. At least system level HRM research has 
reached a point where it needs to get involved with the jungle of potentially relevant 
concepts mediating and/or moderating potential relationships between HRM and 
employee as well as organizational performance. We have attempted to take part in 
the beginning of this journey.  
It may be that  
“multiple exchange relationships are needed both by employees and by 
organizations. Employees secure different forms of resources and support 
from each exchange relationship, and organizations benefit from different 
desired employee attitudes and behaviors that are associated with each 
exchange relationship....[E]ach exchange relationship may be associated 
with different employee behaviors. This implies that the process of 
changing employee attitudes and behaviors may be even more complicated 
than originally thought...” (Settoon et al., 1996, p. 225). 
One complication is that many or perhaps even most exchange relationships may also 




behaviors. Despite the evidence by Settoon et al. (1996) and Wayne et al. (1997), 
criticized above, the differences between both antecedents and consequences of the 
different exchange relationships may ultimately be hard to identify. As noted, the 
sorting out of the complicated relationships exhibited by employee attitudes and 
behaviors is likely to necessitate a great deal of fine-tuning and adjustment of the 
concepts and constructs in order to form a consistent, meaningful and validated 
landscape of such behaviors and attitudes. By including more organization behavior 
related constructs than earlier studies we attempt to take a further step towards more 
integrated analyses of this conceptual landscape. In general, in our study we try to 
control for most of the variables which in earlier studies in a somewhat fragmentary 
manner have been empirically found and/or argued to be potentially important 
antecedents of our focal intermediate constructs. 
8.2.5 Controls related to employee work performance  
We have not found much research explicitly on antecedents to employee work 
performance. However, Settoon et al. argue that “[e]mpirical research has found 
perceived organizational support to be positively related to performance of 
conventional job responsibilities” (1996, p. 220). Based on the results of Settoon et al. 
with reference to LMX, also the at least partly related constructs of superior support 
and interactional procedural justice should be relevant controls for employee work 
performance. Also the results of Wayne et al. (1997, p. 101) indicate the importance 
of both leader and organization support related controls. The results of Moorman 
(1991) also indicate the importance of controlling for interactional justice (1991, p. 
852) since in their study it was related to conscientousness which may well be related 
to work performance. In general we argue that all our controls related to the 
intermediate attitudinal constructs are also of interest when analyzing the direct and 
mediated relationships between HRM and employee work performance. 
8.2.6 Controls related to organizational performance 
In order to achieve legitimate empirical evidence of the influence of HRM practices 
on firm performance we should of course have a good general understanding of other 
phenomena which influence this outcome. These should then be controlled for.  
MacDuffie (1995) and Ichniowski et al. (1997) tried to develop highly specialized 
controls for the specific context of their studies. In this sense they represent good 
examples. However, most of their controls are not relevant for our sample. Huselid 
and Becker (1996) refer to research where the following have been claimed to have an 
influence on organizational performance:  
“investments in physical (plant and equipment), intangible (R&D) and 
human assets (employment) and recent sales growth....firm specific risk, 
industry unionism, and industry market concentration” (1996, p. 406). 
As we study more or less one industry we have included degree of competition in the 
organizations’ market segments as a control instead of industry market concentration. 
We have also excluded the other industry related controls, such as capital intensity, 
stockprice variability and industry itself (Huselid et al., 1997, p. 178). 
In our study we acknowledge the limitation of not using R&D and investment in 




We have a slight problem with the control variable in terms of unionization. 
Unionization could arguably influence the adoption and utilization of the HRM 
practices but it is not clear to us how it could have an effect on performance 
independent of these practices. It seems a somewhat obscure and ambiguous variable 
to the extent that it is intended as a control for a different set of employee 
management practices than those HRM practices hypothesized to be effective. It has 
however repeatedly been found to affect firm performance (Delaney and Huselid, 
1996, p. 959). In any case, our sample should be an acceptable control for this 
phenomenon. 
We also have a slight problem with “the quality of other functional areas” (Becker 
and Huselid, 1998, p. 87) which has been used as a control variable. HRM should 
arguably influence the performance of all functional areas. The proper control would 
be some sort of specified phenomena (at least not directly influenced by HRM) related 
to these other functional areas which has been argued to be of importance by 
researchers in fields related to these functions. We have no such control. However, we 
have at least ameliorated this potential problem as the organizations under study 
arguably are dominantly dependent on the work of one group of employees in relation 
to which we have studied HRM. 
Becker and Huselid also used a control related to prior firm growth in sales (1998b, p. 
10). Differences in sales growth arguably belong to the phenomena which according 
to the "HRM paradigm" should be influenced by HRM. In fact, sales growth and 
productivity/profitability would arguably belong to the essential mechanisms through 
which HRM could influence market values of firms. However, many other things than 
HRM might influence sales growth, including prior sales growth. Controlling for prior 
sales growth may be important in order to isolate the direct influence of HRM. Also 
March and Sutton argue for probable feedback-loops of prior organizational 
performance (1997, p. 700-701)332. However, with the inclusion of proper controls 
and intermediate mechanisms the devastating role of such feed-back loops with 
reference to unidirectional causal interpretations should at least be ameliorated. It is 
nevertheless entirely conceivable that feedback loops in terms of organizational 
performance could affect all our variables. Partly, positive feedback loops within the 
model can be viewed as an example of (the complexity of) theoretically acceptable 
amplificatory mechanisms of potential HRM effects on employee and organizational 
performance (ibid., p. 700-701). Under the equilibrium assumption (Becker and 
Huselid, 1998b, p. 5) HRM should also, to the extent that it is as effective as implied 
in the literature, have been able to turn around "an emotional climate of failure, where 
interlocked cycles of declining performance and internal reactions lead to 
organizational demise" (March and Sutton. 1997, p. 700). In any case, although not 
                                               
332 Feedback-loops would seem to affect almost any social phenomena and is not a problem related 
only to research on organizational performance. We should therefore in social science in general be 
careful not to make too simplistic "unidirectional causal interpretations" (ibid., p. 701). Acknowledging 
such probably universal feed-back loops, one may begin to wonder what the assumption of observing 
equilibrium effects (Becker and Huselid, 1998b, p. 5) in fact can mean. As already noted, this 
assumption is also adopted by us. It can arguably mean only that in relative terms, on average, we 
assume that the practices have been more or less in place for an equally long and sufficient period of 
time in the studied organizations. But few things in organizations stay exactly the same way from year 




controlling for prior organizational performance, we will use a control in terms of 
organizational image. This should arguably represent one mechanism of feedback 
loops in terms of prior organizational performance. As is the case with prior 
organizational performance / growth in sales, organizational image might (or indeed 
should) be affected also by the organizational HRM system. However, we include this 
variable as a control as many other things than HRM might affect the image of an 
organization which in turn might affect both the quality of candidates applying for 
jobs as well as (in other ways) organizational performance333.  
March and Sutton also discuss potential negative feedback loops. In this study we 
cannot identify such potential feed-back loops between short versus long term 
performance (ibid., pp. 700-701). Nor can we identify such potential loops in terms of  
learning dynamics (ibid., p. 701)334.  
In summary, when analyzing the direct and mediated relationships between HRM and 
organizational performance, between the intermediate variables and organizational 
performance, and between employee performance and organizational performance we 
include the above mentioned controls in terms of image of the organization, and the 
competition within the organization's market segment. We also include controls in 
terms of the organizations' strategic focus on quality and organization size. Further, 
we include the controls in terms of all the other phenomena which might affect the 
perceptions of the HRM practices, the attitudinal phenomena, employee work 
performance and even organizational performance directly. These controls thus 
include employee age, tenure, number of earlier employers, probability to gain 
partnership335. We also control for workload, organizational hierarchy, prospects of 
organizational performance, recent radical changes in the HRM system, as well as 
distributive, procedural, and interactional justice and lastly coworker, superior and 
organizational support.  
There are many additional organizational and environmental phenomena which have 
been related to organizational performance by other researchers which thus should be 
controlled for. As one further specific example it is considered that “there is evidence 
of a clear link between the performance of a firm and the dynamism of its 
                                               
333 The variable is at the same time used as a control for the respondents' attitudinal biases. 
334 March and Sutton mention the potential causalities that "in response to failure decreases in slack 
and increases in search tend to improve performance in the short run", but when the performance is 
good the reverse will take place with reverse consequences (ibid., p. 701). With reference to learning 
dynamics they argue that "[s]uccess at using one technology, strategy, or behavior leads to increased 
use...[which] produces a competency trap which is detrimental in the long run" and that short term 
success "leads to an underestimation of danger and a degradation of safety" (ibid., p. 701). 
335 These four more clearly individual based controls are relevant because these individual 
characteristics may affect the relationships between our indepednent variables and organizational 
performance and the characteristics do not in our sample reflect any average workforce characteristics 
of the analyzed organizations. As earlier noted we make the strong assumption that the individual 
interpretations of the theoretically focal phenomena reflect general organizational characteristics, in 
particular as we control for the before mentioned individual characteristics as well as the other 
potentially biasing phenomena mentioned after this footnote which may reflect both individual as well 




environment (Chandler, Hagström &Sölvell, 1998; Malmberg, Sölvell & Zander, 
1996; Porter, 1994)” (Furu, 1999, p. 5). In fact, regardless of the truth of this claim, 
we have fairly well controlled for this specific variable through the choice of our 
sample. But there are many more claimed sources of organizational performance 
which we have not controlled for336. In addition to the HRM perspective, Pfeffer 
discusses four other perspectives on organizational performance, i.e. structural 
contingency theory, organizational ecology and “the social model with its emphasis 
on interorganizational linkages and structural position” (1997, p. 176). 'The social 
model' arguably refers to network-theoretical perspectives. It is clear that, in order to 
sort out HRM’s influence on organizational performance, researchers should 
ultimately try to control for essential variables related to these other perspectives on 
organizational performance. However, due to the limited development of relevant 
constructs there are considerable difficulties in doing this (McKinley and Mone, 1998, 
pp. 175-176). As many potentially relevant phenomena are still left out from the 
current research attempt, the link between HRM and organizational performance is 
going to be explored only in a cursory manner in this study. However, this is arguably 
not more cursory than previous research on organizational performance from any one 
perspective.   
Empirical studies which would legitimate an inference to effects on organizational 
performance are thus tremendously difficult to produce. In the meanwhile researchers 
continue to try to find significant correlations mostly between variables related to 
their subfields only and organizational performance. In so doing, the fact is that 
researchers in general cannot exclude the possibility that any relationships they come 
up with, no matter how well theoretically argued, might be partly or even completely 
spurious. 
March and Sutton argue (or warn) that  
“the emperor of organizational performance studies is for the most part 
rather naked...New enthusiasms succeed old ones, but the process appears 
to be less one of gradual accumulation of knowledge than of sequential 
substitution of new ideas for old ones” (1997, p. 702).  
There is however nothing which would indicate that the general line of problems 
March and Sutton describe are related to research on organizational performance 
alone. Explicit organizational performance studies merely represent the tip of the 
naked iceberg. Researchers in organizational science doing (qualitative or 
quantitative) research on any topic where explanations are offered seem to confront 
similar problems of complexity. Almost any area of research in organization science 
can more or less be characterized by a process where "new enthusiasms succeed old 
                                               
336 In order to be a relevant control, any one such a phenomenon need not even be highly correlated 
with HRM. There might be many phenomena which, although on their own only weakly correlated 
with the HRM system, (together) influence organizational performance to the extent that any distinct 




ones... [simply in terms of a] sequential substitution of new ideas for old ones" (ibid., 
p. 702)337.  
Although there seems to be no empirically well established and generally agreed upon 
or cumulatively built upon explanations of any organizational phenomena, the 
complexity of the history of earlier findings and the complexity of potential causal 
logics is no absolute reason for not continuing attempts to improve the understanding 
of the kind of phenomena included in our model. However, no matter what the 
empirical analyses suggest, we should clearly be careful in our interpretations as long 
as models and explanations (including control variables) in general remain at a fairly 
simplistic level. The larger question concerns the legitimacy, plausibility and 
fruitfulness of different forms of organizational research at large338.  
8.3 OPERATIONALIZATIONS: CONSTRUCTS, SCALES AND 
MEASURES 
8.3.1 Strategic fit and other antecedents to the HRM system 
We have taken our items for professional HRM capabilities among HRM staff 
members from Huselid et al. (1997, p. 176). Respondents were superiors in each 
organization. None of them were HRM managers. The variable consists of an additive 
composite score of all the items. The items are considered theoretically implied causal 
rather than reflective indicators339. The Likert scale items for this construct were 
                                               
337 This does not mean that there are not individual researchers or even larger groups of researchers 
who continue to develop certain hypotheses and theories. However, as we noted in chapter 2, 
researchers tend to work within relatively confined theoretical landscapes where due attention to 
alternative propositions is not paid (McKinley and Mone, 1998). 
338 In chapter 2 we argued at length that there are probably no a priori solutions to these larger 
questions. We have now tried to establish and understand the more specific complexity of the causal 
logics, the general lack of agreed upon constructs and measurement instruments, the frequent use of 
very limited controls in empirical research, as well as the often less than optimal research designs. 
Statistical analyses are made and conclusions drawn based upon confidence levels of 0.05 or 0.01. In 
fact, it is arguably often the case that changing a few items of constructs can lead to accepting or 
rejecting hypotheses. Reflecting on these arguable facts we may be lead to the conclusion that story-
telling (Czarniawska, 1995; 1997; 1999) rather than science is the name of the game regardless of 
whether the research approach is quantitative or qualitative. If this is the conclusion, outright story-
telling without the attempt to mimic the “hard” sciences seems to have much speaking in its favor.  
Nevertheless, quantitative data and analyses generated by several researchers might minimally serve 
the purpose of  more clearly showing how little we know. In this study we have chosen to pursue the 
quantitative approach still curious about what it involves and where it may lead. In order to pursue this 
we still need to settle for some operationalizations of the concepts involved in our theorization. To this 
issue we now turn.  
339 We will discuss the issue of reflective versus causal indicators in more detail in section 8.3.2.3 
dealing with the HRM system construct. Here we only claim that it makes no sense to believe that the 
items below would simply be different manifestations of one and the same construct such that 
professional HRM capability would cause each one of these items. It seems rather to be the other way 
around. As is argued in section 8.3.2.3 this implies that the items do not have to be correlated and that 




Your company has during at least 5 years had one or more HRM professionals, within or 
outside this company unit, who:  
-exhibit leadership for the HR function 
-define and communicates HR vision for the future 
-educate and influence superiors of core employees on HR issues 
-have broad knowledge of many HR practices 
-are knowledgeable about competitor's HR practices 
-focus on the quality of HR services 
-have experience in key business areas which your company is involved in 
 
The persistence in efforts to develop and sustain the quality of the HRM practices 
were measured as superior perceptions. The construct consists of a composite score of 
the perceived efforts related to the individual HRM practices. Also these items are 
considered theoretically implied causal rather than reflective indicators The Likert 
scale items for this construct were developed by us and were: 
During at least five years your company has made continuous efforts to sustain or develop the 
quality of 
-the criteria for determining consultants' bonus pay (or other additions to their base pay) 
-the way it allows consultants autonomy in doing their job 
-the training and development programs it provides consultants 
-its socialization process for new consultants 
-its internal communication and information sharing 
-the performance appraisals for consultants 
-the way it involves consultants in general planning and decision making concerning internal 
company issues 
-its selection process for consultants 
 
Becker and Huselid (1998b, p. 6) note that interaction terms has been the typical 
method employed to capture the central properties of external and internal fit (see 
e.g. Huselid, 1995; MacDuffie, 1995; Delery and Doty, 1996; Youndt et al., 1996)340. 
Becker and Huselid refer to Becker and Gerhardt who have pointed to limitations of 
this approach (1996, pp. 788-789). In essence these limitations concern both statistical 
aspects (multicollinearity) and interpretational aspects (for more on such 
intrepretational problems, see Venkatraman, 1989, pp. 427-428)341.  
Wright and Sherman (1999, pp. 56-58) try to offer a more comprehensive 
classification of the diverse conceptualizations/operationalizations of external (and 
partly also internal) fit utilized in the HRM literature. This classification is based on 
                                               
340 When the notion 'external fit' has been used in the HRM literature it has exclusively referred to the 
fit between HRM practices or HRM systems and organizational strategies. No quantitative HRM study 
so far has incorporated the external (environmental) appropriateness of an organization's strategy either 
into the strategy measure or as a separate control. 
341 Venkatraman also argues that multicollinearity does not pose an inextricable problem (ibid., p. 
427). However, we will review some divergent arguments with reference to the issue of 




the general framework provided by Venkatraman (1989). Venkatraman identifies two 
fundamental decisions with reference to the choice of a specific concept of fit. First,  
[i]n some cases, a precise functional form of the relationship between the 
underlying variables can be specified, but in other cases, certain variables 
are said to fit together, without describing a precise form...[Secondly, it 
may be desirable either] to anchor the concept (and tests) of fit to a 
particular criterion (e.g. effectiveness) or to adopt a criterion-free 
specification" Venkatraman, 1989, p. 424).  
Venkatraman argues that these dimensions of specificity of functional form and 
anchoring to a criterion can be employed "to identify six distinct perspectives of fit" 
(ibid., p. 424). Wright and Sherman claim that "[t]he HRM literature has examined fit 
using each of the [six] potential operationalizations offered in [Venkatraman's] 
framework" (1999, p. 56). However, we would argue that this is not exactly true. 
Further, some weaknesses in the appropriation of the different perspectives can be 
detected. This is in fact also more or less acknowledged by Wright and Sherman 
(1999, p. 58).  
In their review of operationalizations of fit in the HRM literature (ibid., pp. 56-58) 
Wright and Sherman group interaction-operationalizations under the perspective of 
“fit as moderation”. This perspective has both a precise functional form and is 
"intricately" (Venkatraman, 1989, p. 428) anchored to a specific criterion. This 
approach is exemplified by e.g. Huselid (1995). Here Huselid first computed 
aggregate measures of two dimensions of HRM, each based on (factor analyses of) a 
set of HRM practices. Then he analyzed the effects of interactions, i.e. the two HRM 
variables' interaction with each other (internal fit) and the interaction of each of these 
in turn with a measure of strategy (external fit). Arguably also McDuffie (1995) 
utilizes mainly this perspective in terms of his interaction tests. Both Huselid (1995) 
and MacDuffie (1995) analyzed only the form of moderation. Neither analyzed the 
strength of the moderation effects or quadratic effects (Venkatraman, 1989, pp. 424-
427) and thereby left the potential specification of the functional form somewhat 
open. In particular, according to Venkatraman the absence of controls for quadratic 
effects of the original variables "weakens the interpretations" (1989, p. 427) of 
interaction effects. Finally, an essential general limitation of this approach is "the 
inability to separate the existence of fit from the effects of fit" (ibid., p. 427). 
The “fit as mediation” perspective specifies intervening mechanisms and is according 
to Wright and Sherman exemplified by Snell (1991). As the view of fit as moderation 
this perspective is also characterized by being "anchored to a specific criterion 
variable. However, the functional form of fit is, viewed simply as indirect effects, less 
precise than [at least potentially] the moderation perspective (strength, form, quadratic 
effects, etc.)" (Venkatraman, 1989, p. 429).  
The view of “fit as matching” was also utilized e.g. by Huselid (1995) in terms of his 
"deviation score analysis" (Venkatraman, 1989, p. 431) of both internal and external 
fit. Limitations of this approach include the facts that "the reliability of a difference 
score...is less than the average reliability of its component parts...[and that the] 




of the original components [and may exhibit] weak discriminant validity [with 
reference to] its component parts" (ibid., p. 431)342.  
The “fit as gestalts” perspective is discussed by Venkatraman in terms of cluster 
analyses. He argues that this perspective is characterized by being criterion free and 
minimally precise (ibid., p. 432)343. Becker and Huselid (1998b) employed this 
perspective and combined it with regression analyses of performance differences 
between different clusters344. Also MacDuffie used cluster analysis identifying 
different sets of clusters (all different from the ones identified by Becker and Huselid, 
1998b) but analyzed the significance of performance differences between aggregated 
mean values of these clusters only by means of t-statistics. In so far as we only very 
broadly specify this perspective as defining fit in terms of "the degree of internal 
coherence among a set of theoretical attributes" (Wright and Sherman, 1999, p. 57) 
we could arguably include more HRM studies within this perspective. Wright and 
Sherman include e.g. Huselid (1995) in terms of his variable based on the explicit 
questionnaire item asking broadly "how consistently HR practices were applied across 
business and/or divisions" (Wright and Snell, 1999, p. 57). Such an operationalization 
thus allows analyses of the effects of an increasing loosely defined level of internal 
and/or external consistency or gestalt.  
“The profile deviation view of fit” conceptualizes fit as "the degree of adherence to an 
externally specified profile" (Venkatraman, 1989, p. 433). According to Venkatraman 
this perspective is "different from the gestalt perspective because the referent profile 
is anchored to a specific criterion (typically performance)" (ibid., p. 434). However, at 
least in HRM research, utilizing something like this approach, the profiles have not 
been anchored to a specific criterion any more than within the gestalt approach. The 
difference is thus more related to the fact that "the profile deviation view of fit" 
involves externally specified profiles whose functional form at least potentially is 
more precise than within the perspective of "fit as gestalts"345. The "profile deviation 
view of fit" was according to Wright and Sherman (1999) utilized by Delery and Doty 
(1996). However, Delery and Doty´s analyses are complex and their profiles were not 
"completely" externally specified. Rather they were partly based on empirical criteria 
(thus approaching cluster anlysis/the view of fit as gestalts). They developed their 
                                               
342 At least Huselid controlled for component parts in his analyses (1995, pp. 664-665) and should thus 
have avoided the possibility of spurious effects for the reasons identified by Venkatraman. 
343 The specificity can arguably be increased by identifying a proper dichotomization criterion (Law, 
Wong and Mobley, 1998, pp. 748-749). 
344 Venkatraman also argues that the number and stability of such gestalts or clusters as identified by 
Becker and Huselid would have to be demonstrated (1989, p. 433). Only the third criteria of descriptive 
validation identified by Venkatraman in terms of theoretical meaningfulness of the gestalts is to some 
extent met by Becker and Huselid in that they broadly argue that "at least three of the clusters are 
consistent with the HRM literature" (1998b, p. 9). As the HRM literature itself is not characterized by 
any notorious consistency this justification is also still somewhat vague. 
345 The fact that the functional form also of clusters can be more specified by identifying a 
dichotomization criterion (Law et al., 1998, pp. 748-749) indicates that the difference between "the 
profile deviation view of fit" and the view of "fit as gestalts" becomes somewhat blurred in terms of  




profiles by empircally identifying the mean of different variables in their sample. 
These mean values represented one profile. Two other profiles were developed "as 
plus or minus one standard deviation from the mean of each variable" (Delery and 
Doty, 1996, p. 817). In this way they developed three ideal profiles each for 
employment systems on the one hand and strategies on the other hand. In one 
application of the "profile deviation view of fit" Delery and Doty analyzed the effects 
of the deviation from the different ideal profiles of employment systems thus trying to 
capture effects of internal fit (see, ibid., p. 817)346. Further, Delery and Doty also 
applied a more complex "profile deviation view of fit" in their analyses of the 
deviations from the ideal employment system profiles which were deemed most 
appropriate for the ideal type strategy that the organizations´ strategies were closest to 
(see ibid., p. 817). This can arguably be understood as a combination of the profile 
deviation view of fit and the broader form of fit as gestalts discussed above. In 
addition, Delery and Doty extended their application of the profile deviation view of 
fit in their analyses of the explicit congruence of hybrid employment system profiles 
and hybrid strategic profiles (see ibid., p. 817). This analysis of Delery and Doty´s can 
be understood as "a deviation score analysis" (Venkatraman, 1989, p. 431) with 
reference to two profiles, i.e. as the matching of deviations from ideal type 
employment systems to deviations from ideal type strategies. This last approach in 
particular thus seems to exemplify a combination of the view of fit as matching and 
the profile deviation view of fit347.  
The covariation view of fit is defined by Venkatraman as "a pattern of covariation or 
internal consistency among a set of underlying theoretically related variables" (1989, 
p. 435). He argues that  
"gestalts are viewed as products of cluster analysis (grouping of 
observations based on a set of attributes), whereas covariation is modeled 
as factor analysis (grouping of attributes based on data from a set of 
observations)...[F]it as covariation differs from...the perspective of fit as 
gestalts...in relation to the degree of specification of the functional form. 
[Fit as covariation] requires a much greater precision in the pattern of 
logical consistency among the factors and the explication of the underlying 
logical link among the attributes" (ibid., p. 436).  
Wright and Sherman (1999, p. 58) allocate the configurational approach used by 
Delery and Doty (1996) to the perspective of "fit as covariation". This seems 
inappropriate. In addition, they allocate Huselid (1995) to this perspective. This is 
only partly appropriate in terms of Huselid's factor analysis of the HRM practices and 
thus only in terms of a partial form of internal fit. However, Huselid used indexes in 
the actual analyses and later abandoned the factor analytic approach altogether (see 
Huselid and Becker, 1996). We would argue that there are no good examples of this 
perspective in the HRM literature. In fact, based on the review of Law et al.'s (1998) 
                                               
346 Delery and Doty performed two versions of this internally focused "profile deviation" analysis. One 
analyzed the effects of deviations from the ideal type employment systems most clearly resembling 
each organizations´ employment system (see ibid., p. 823). The other analyzed simply the effects of 
deviations from the two "extreme" ideal type employment systems (see ibid., p. 824).  
347 With reference to their deviation scores Delery and Doty (1996, pp. 823-824) avoided, as did 




classification of constructs and the proper domain of factor analysis together with our 
considerations of the nature of the HRM construct (see8.3.2.3), this perspective of fit 
is hardly appropriate at all for conceptualizing either internal or external fit between 
HRM practices.  
Wright and Sherman argue that differences  
"in what is meant by fit and the ambiguity surrounding the concept of fit 
may account for a substantial portion of the lack of consistent support for 
the "fit" effect in the SHRM literature" (1999, p. 58).  
Based on our arguments in the chapter 3 we have drawn the conclusion that due to the 
many complexities and epistemological uncertainties involved we should use broad 
performative definitions of both HRM practices and fit. In this study we arguably 
exploratively introduce a combination of some of the above 
conceptualizations/operationalizations of fit which should be consistent with our 
earlier theoretical arguments. Our direct measure of internal/external fit is most 
closely related to the view of fit as gestalt in the broad sense discussed above. But we 
also use this conceptualization of internal/external fit within the view of fit as 
mediation in that we specify the HRM system, the employee attitudes and the 
employee work performance variables as mediators of the effects of internal/external 
fit.  
In addition to the uncertainty of the correct method of 
conceptualizing/operationalizing external fit per se, and the uncertainty of the correct 
conceptualization of strategy, Wright and Sherman also point out that the way the 
HRM practices themselves have been measured may have contributed to the scarce 
evidence of the “fit-oriented approaches”, in particular in terms of interaction effects. 
Wright and Sherman call for a much more detailed breakdown of measurements 
(1999, p. 69). Also Becker and Huselid call for more direct measures of the properties 
of external fit.  
“The researcher needs to measure the actual extent to which the HRM 
system is embedded in the firm’s operations in a way that is appropriate for 
that particular firm’s strategic goals” (1998, p. 66).  
This is also pointed out in Becker and Gerhardt (1996, p. 795) and many others as 
reviewed in the conceptual chapter above. In addition to the potential problems of 
misspecification of the HRM practices themselves in most of the earlier studies none 
of them, except Becker and Huselid (1998b), have made efforts to identify the 
implementational aspects of strategic fit. This deficiency is largely due to the 
problematic formal operationalizations of HRM practices (Truss and Gratton, 1994).  
Wright and Sherman argue that the way HRM practices have been measured  
"may account for why researchers are increasingly concluding that 
universalistic approaches to the relationship between HR practices and 
firm performance find more support than fit oriented approaches" (1999, p. 
69).  
However, as already noted, the conclusions about universalistic effects may also be 
due to simultaneity biases. Further, the way HRM practices have been measured may 




"correct" form of HRM practices may have been badly conceptualized/operationalized 
(ibid., p. 69). These points are equivalent to the critique offered by Ferris et al. (1999, 
p. 393) which we reviewed in section 3.4. 
With our measures, both of external/internal fit as well as of the general sophistication 
of the HRM system as loosely and performatively defined gestalts, we arguably 
provide one way of avoiding such problems of misspecification. However, our way of 
defining HRM makes us look explicitly for universal strategic soft HRM effects rather 
than identifying the detailed potential criteria for effective HRM practices with 
reference to different strategies (see ibid., pp. 68-69). 
In summary, by using performative operationalizations of the HRM system and 
strategic fit and by employing a mediational model we try (1) to avoid the problems 
inherent in the use of generic categories of strategy, (2) to avoid misspecifications of 
the "correct" form of HRM practices as well as (3) to capture the mechanisms of (4) 
an implemented strategic fit in terms of realized “HR interventions” (Wright and 
Sherman, 1999, p. 55). 
Our explicit measure of internal/external fit as loosely and performatively defined 
gestalts is intended to tie all the individual HRM practices directly to their perceived 
actual contribution to competences, attitudes and behaviors needed to achieve 
strategic business goals348. However,a clear weakness is that  the HRM practices 
whose strategic fit we try to capture are not identical to the practices included in our 
HRM system construct. In distinction to the latter, the construct of strategic fit also 
includes the phenomena of employee involvement and autonomy. In addition, it 
excludes employment security and general benefits simply because the latters' 
relevance in terms of strategic fit seems even more difficult to judge than the 
relevance of the other HRM practices349. The items related to the individual practices’ 
strategic fit are measured by perceptions of managers in superior positions whereas 
the general employees answered the questions measuring the general perceived 
sophistication of the HRM practices. Our construct of internal/external fit as 
loosely defined gestalts is an additive composite score of the items (considered as 
causal rather than reflective) of internal/external fit. The Likert scale items were 
developed by us and were: 
                                               
348 As also noted by Peck this measure of external fit should at the same time capture internal fit (or as 
we argued earlier, any relevant internal fit). "If each functional area is linked with the overall strategy 
then one assumes that the practices as a whole are relatively consistent" (Peck, 1994, p. 717). 
349 The difficulty of judging strategic fit is also indicated by the fact that the general employees' 
judgements seem to differ substantially from the judgements of the superiors in that the correlation 
between these judgements was only 0.13 and the significance of this correlation only 0.11 (two-tailed 
test). The general employees answered questions related to how well the HRM practices supported 
attitudes, competencies and behaviors demanded by the organization (Appendix 2, questions number 
137a-h). As shown below the superiors answered somewhat different questions concerning strategic fit. 
In any case, for the analyses we made the judgement that superiors should be better able to judge 
explicit strategic fit and thus used their answers for creating our construct of strategic fit. However, 
here we have a clear instance of a possible problem of both validity and reliability (compare the debate 




Think about the kind of employee behavior, competence and attitudes the company considers 
important for the achievement of its strategic business goals. The following practices in your 
company support these kinds of employee characteristics: 
-the kind of training and development programs the company provides consultants 
-[the way the company involves its consultants in more general planning and decision making 
concerning internal company issues] 
-the criteria for determining the consultants' bonus pay (or other additions to their base pay) 
-the content of the consultant's selection processes  
-[the way the company allows its consultants autonomy in doing their job] 
-the content of the consultant's performance appraisals 
-the content of company internal communication and information sharing 
-the content of the consultant's socialization processes at the beginning of their employments 
 
8.3.2 HRM  
Clearly, one of the great challenges in HRM research is to develop appropriate 
measures of the HRM practices (Huselid, 1995, p.645; Wright and Sherman, 1999, p. 
68). Also the question of the proper HRM system construct is open to debate (Becker 
and Huselid, 1998, pp. 63-64). In addition to these issues, however, the problem of 
different included HRM practices (Dyer and Reeves, 1995) continue to burden also 
the latest evidence in HRM research. We will discuss these issues in turn below. 
8.3.2.1 The HRM system 
To the problem of the specification of the correct number and identity of HRM 
practices to be included in an HRM system we have no clear solution (compare Dyer 
and Reeves, 1995). We have tried to include a set of generic practices which should 
cover the most central HRM areas exhibited in the conceptual literature and empirical 
work so far. The HRM practices we have directly or indirectly included in the model 
were listed in section 1.3. This list is still somewhat arbitrary and might depend on the 
kind of organizations we study. Becker and Huselid argue that it is ultimately an 
empirical issue which practices to include (1998, p. 76). We feel however that it is an 
important theoretical question which of course has to be settled empirically. Currently 
research in HRM is largely involved in an exploratory phase regarding this issue. 
We have excluded some practices or policies which have often been included in an 
HRM construct, e.g. quality circles. To the extent that such activities represent forms 
of involvement including a sense of self-determination and meaningfulness, the 
concept of empowerment should clearly reflect the existence of anything like quality 
circles. However, explicit quality circles are arguably not very prevalent in the kind of 
knowledge intensive contexts represented in our population. We argue that at least in 
a knowledge intensive, project-work oriented context such as our sample, the 
dimensions of involvement and self-determination should largely be informal 
consequences of the broad application of sophistication of the basic HRM practices 
included in our model.  
In addition to aspects of employee involvement we argue that autonomy (which is 
related to job design) is an important characteristic of strategic soft HRM. However 
also this aspect is, as an element of psychological empowerment, conceptualized as an 
outcome of the sophistication of the other generic HRM activities. We thus argue that 




for relatively large autonomy, also perceived autonomy should be an informal effect 
of the ‘basic’ HRM practices.  
To the extent that autonomy and involvement are formally organized and promoted, 
the other HRM practices are arguably prerequisites for their meaningful functioning. 
Although the simple provision of autonomy and possibilities for involvement should 
influence motivation and even competence at least in the long run, autonomy and 
involvement without additional motivation and competence would seem to be of 
lesser relevance both for individuals and organizations. In addition, to the extent that 
we would posit autonomy and involvement (as pursued by job design) as part of the 
independent HRM system variable we would clearly introduce a tautological element 
in the model with reference to the relationship between HRM and psychological 
empowerment. We prefer to analyze the extent to which the other HRM practices can 
explain psychological empowerment assuming that job design is fairly well controlled 
for by our sample. On average, the organizations we study do not have very classical 
job designs. Most often the consultants work in some sort of project oriented teams. 
We simply assume that job designs which might affect our outcome variables are 
fairly similar across the studied organizations and do not correlate with the quality of 
the measured HRM practices. 
In general we exclude innovative organizational designs (potentially influencing both 
autonomy and involvement) from our core model and assume that we fairly well 
control for such aspects by our sample. Nevertheless, a phenomenon related to 
organization design is the degree of hierarchy in the organization. Pfeffer (1994) 
argued that a low level of hierarchy is an important part of HRM. We include a 
control variable in terms of the degree to which pay and benefits are determined by 
hierarchy. 
We have not included a variable in terms of internal promotions because many of the 
organizations in our sample are so small that the possibilities for internal promotions 
will necessarily be fairly limited. In addition, the divergent views of whether such a 
policy belongs to a progressive HRM approach speaks for its exclusion (Becker and 
Huseldi, 1996, p. 784). Instead we include a control variable accounting for 
employees’ perceived possibilities to gain partner status. Such perceptions are likely 
to affect both employee attitudes, the employee’s opinions on organizational practices 
as well as the treatment of employees by managers and colleagues. 
We have also excluded an explicit measure of grievance procedures from our HRM 
system construct. However, to the extent that grievance procedures represents aspects 
of justice we have control variables comprising aspects of distributive, interactional 
and procedural justice. We have argued that these should not be included in a HRM 
theory of performance although we do include them as controls because they may 
clearly influence most of our outcome variables350.  
                                               
350 Clearly justice related constructs could however also be used as outcome variables e.g. in order to 
test whether HRM policies which potentially give rise to performance effects simultaneously tend to be 
detrimental to aspects of perceived justice within organizations. There does however not seem to be 




HRM planning processes have also been left out. Our HRM measures (as well as the 
measure of strategic fit) should reflect the relevance of any such planning but we do 
not include it as an explicit exogenous variable. 
Recruitment processes (as opposed to selection processes) have also been excluded. 
The recruitment processes which have been followed prior to the selection of 
individual employees are something which non-managerial employees might have 
severe difficulties in evaluating. We simply assume that the quality of recruitment 
processes prior to the selection process will be reflected in the perceived 
sophistication of the latter. 
As noted in the beginning, some definitions of HRM do not really limit the practices 
and processes to be included in an HRM construct at all. We have chosen to 
concentrate on practices which seem to be the most prevalent in earlier empirical 
studies and in particular the practices put forward in Guest's (1997) conceptual 
framework. However, a theoretically motivated agreement upon the correct number 
and identitity of practices constituting a HRM system construct is clearly needed. 
8.3.2.2 Operationalization of the HRM practices 
As noted the measurement of the HRM practices is a problematical issue (Wright and 
Sherman, 1999, p. 68). One problem with the operationalization of the HRM practices 
is that there does not seem to be very wide ranging agreement as to which kinds or 
versions of individual HRM practices actually are effective. “[S]cholars do not agree 
on the nature of particular HR practices” (Wright and Sherman, 1999, p. 68). For 
example Townley (1999) discusses the dubious virtue of performance appraisals. She 
argues that "the introduction of a formal [performance appraisal] procedure 
establishes an inherent conflict between a dynamic social institution and an artifical 
reality. A variation of the 'informal' argument is that appraisals fail to take into 
consideration the 'political' dimension of organizations" (ibid., p. 290). In relation to 
most individual HRM practices different researchers defend a wide range of 
alternative versions. Partly from this state of affairs we have drawn the conclusion 
that to test the general ideas of HRM theorizing we ought to include measures of more 
generic intangible properties of these practices. Thus, we have argued for the 
identification of differences in employee perceptions of general qualities of the HRM 
practices.  
In addition, as we have wanted to operationalize the idea of soft HRM, we have 
argued that the relevant data would be perceptions of the HRM processes by non-
managerial employees which are the ”objects” of these practices. The HRM practices 
are not necessarily well implemented in organizations and there is evidence that what 
managers say about HRM practices are not necessarily consistent with non-
managerial employees’ point of view (Truss and Gratton, 1997). We also often here of 
HRM interventions which are formally introduced and subsequently left to their own 
with no real impact on daily work (e.g. TQM and BPR, De Cock and Hipkin, pp. 565-
566; Legge, 1995, p. 214-218; 225).  
We have also reviewed arguments saying that a HRM system should be embedded in 
the management infrastructure and aligned with business strategies of organizations 
where all of the elements may exhibit idiosyncratic properties (Becker and Gerhardt, 




business strategies and competitive performance...is not unproblematic for a number 
of practical and conceptual reasons " (Mabey and Salaman, 1995, p. 145). We have 
argued that from a strategic soft HRM perspective employee perceptions of HRM 
practices should provide relevant measures of the adequacy of the embeddedness of 
implementations of HRM practices. See also Ferris et al. (1998, p. 245) on the 
importance of implementational aspects.  
Further, the objective content of these practices are likely to change with management 
fashions and developments of new versions of individual HRM practices. The 
dynamics of different versions of objectively defined HRM practices would seem to 
be difficult to handle appropriately in research on HRM from a systems 
perspective351. In light of the (potentially) fast-changing landscape of “best practices” 
it would seem that the only possibility to agree on some measures incorporated in a 
general HRM theory of performance, which could be used in more than one study and 
over a longer period of time, would be to focus on more abstract properties of the 
HRM practices. This is yet another reason for our attempt to suggest measures of such 
properties of the HRM system. 
These considerations thus reflect our judgement that phenomenological properties of 
the HRM practices as conceived by the objects of the practices can be viewed as more 
justified, consistent and universal proxies for any underlying causes of HRM-related 
outcomes than formally and managerially identified objective categories of HRM 
practices. Thus, based on ethical, epistemological and theoretical arguments outlined 
in more detail in chapter 3, we have developed measures of the HRM practices which 
should capture their implemented sophistication. Our measures of this sophistication 
are averages of items related to employee perceptions of the amount, quality and 
meaningfulness (or relevance) of each individual HRM practice. The Likert scale 
items we used to form our construct of HRM were developed by us and were352:  
Selection:  
Your selection353 procedure included a great variety of selection techniques (such as 
interviews with many persons, references, work simulation, personality tests, problem solving, 
etc.). 
Your selection process was of high quality. 
[Your personality has been of high relevance for your ability to work and function effectively 
within the company.] 
[Your specific competencies aquired before your current employment have been of high 
relevance for your ability to work and function effectively within the company.] 
                                               
351 De Cock and Hipkin note that “management innovations appear to be quite short-lived” (1997, p. 
559). Kessler argues e.g. that "very little work has been conducted on the effectiveness of recent pay 
schemes" (1995, p. 275). This is arguably a consequence of the dynamics of objectively defined HRM 
practices. When accumulated, an HRM system index based upon objective definitions of HRM 
practices may involve considerable misspecification of effective HRM practices.  
352 The quantity has been measured somewhat differently for each practice but we have exploratively 
tried to use relevant conceptualizations of quantity. In the next chapter we will argue for what kind of 
HRM system construct these items form. 
353 Because of potential lack of knowledge of the English terminology, we included a footnote stating: 






During a socialization process354 at the beginning of your employment you were given a lot of 
information about the company, its history and its employees. 
Your socialization process at the beginning of your employment was of high quality. 
Your socialization process at the beginning of your employment was very relevant in enabling 
you to get to know the company, its values and norms as well as its core people. 
 
Performance appraisal:  
Many dimensions of your work situation at the company are discussed during your 
performance appraisals355 (dimensions such as feedback, goalsetting, training and 
development needs, career prospects, etc.). 
Your performance appraisals are of high quality. 
Your current performance appraisals at the company are very meaningful to you.  
 
Training and development:  
The company has provided you with a large amount of training and development programs. 
The training and development programs the company has provided you are of high quality. 




Your average level of pay is very satisfactory. 
The criteria by which your bonus pay (or other additions to your base pay) is determined are 
very clearly designed and followed in practice. 
The criteria by which your bonus pay (or other additions to your base pay) is currently 
determined at the company are very meaningful to you. 
 
General benfits: 
The company offers you a large amount of general benefits and services. 
The general benefits and services offered to you are of high quality. 




You receive a large amount of information through company internal communication and 
information sharing. 
The information you receive through company internal communication and information 
sharing is of high quality. 
                                               
354 Because of potential lack of knowledge of the English terminology, we included a footnote stating: 
"By socialization process we mean the way, at the beginning of your employment, you were introduced 
to the company, its values, norms, its history, its employess, etc." 
355 Because of potential lack of knowledge of the English terminology, we included a footnote stating: 
"By your performance appraisals we mean formal personal discussions you have once, twice or three 
(etc.) times a year, with your superior or someone else in the company, concerning your performance 
and/or development needs etc. In case you do not have such formal meetings, please indicate the degree 




The information you currently receive through company internal communication and 
information sharing is of high relevance for you. 
 
Employment security:  
You consider your employment security at the company to be very high[356]. 
The employment security the company currently provides you with is very meaningful to you. 
 
These operationalizations of the HRM practices may be related to different kinds of 
underlying HRM practices in different organizational contexts. We argue that these 
measures offer theoretically meaningful ways of accounting for potential ethically 
acceptable implementational contingencies, equifinalities, idiosyncracies and 
flexibilities. 
Our conceptualizations and operationalizations seem to be compatible with an 
attenuated version of the RBV which was argued for above. The conceptualizations 
and operationalizations allow for a great deal of unexplained and potentially (in a 
universal sense) inexplicable ambiguity and causal complexity concerning what 
specific versions of the practices in what specific organizational contexts actually 
explain the identified properties of the HRM practices. The conceptualizations and 
operationalizations are simply sensitive to causal ambiguities and social complexities. 
However, they do not imply that the identified properties (high amount, quality and 
meaningfulness or relevance) are causally ambiguous or socially complex in the sense 
of Barney's (1991) definitions, and thus do not imply that the properties of the HRM 
practices are inimitable. 
It can be argued that these measures might not adequately reflect what are truly more 
effective HRM practices in terms of organizational performance. As noted earlier, we 
rely on the assumption that HRM practices cannot (in the long run) be effective unless 
employees perceive them to be well functioning. This seems as a particularly adequate 
assumption from the point of view of a strategic soft HRM approach. To the extent 
that we measure only managerial perceptions of HRM practices, we arguably run a 
greater danger of attributing effects to these practices where there are only 
correlations simply due to the plausible biased nature of managerial perceptions, in 
particular perceptions by HRM managers. Thus, we argue that by using our 
measurement methodology, we can tie any effects more closely to the causal power of 
the HRM practices357.  
The evident downside of our measures is that they do not provide information about 
any objective features of the individual HRM practices, only intangible properties. In 
this study it is the respondents who evaluate the extent to which the HRM practices 
are characterized by the properties defined as relevant by us.  
                                               
356 We conceived this as reflecting both "amount" and "quality" of employment security. 
357 Clearly also employee perceptions of the HRM practices can be biased due to a host of reasons. 




Thus, there are arguable advantages as well as disadvantages with our measures. We 
feel however that these measures at least offer important complements to the type of 
measures used in most earlier research. 
8.3.2.3 The HRM system construct 
Huselid (1995) was the first, according to Becker and Huselid, to try to identify ”an 
underlying set of dimensions for the HRM system” (1998b, p.6)358. However, the 
factor structure was conceptually somewhat ambiguous. In addition, the independent 
effects of the two factors identified by them were also statistically ambiguous 
(Huselid and Becker, 1996, p. 413). In their later analysis the factor analyses approach 
has been omitted and Huselid and Becker have confined themselves to the use of total 
HRM system indexes justified with Cronbach’s alpha (Huselid and Becker, 1996; 
Becker and Huselid, 1998b359). 
MacDuffie (1995) offers the following argument (echoed by Becker and Huselid, 
1998, pp. 73-74):  
“Factor analysis is best suited to identifying the interrelationships among a 
set of items in a scale, all designed to measure the same construct. It is less 
appropriate for assessing a “bundle”, which is not a scale but an 
index...consisting of a set of interrelated variables, each of which 
represents a different construct” (MacDuffie, 1995, p. 204).  
MacDuffie tried a factor analysis but abandoned it as “not readily interpretable”. He 
argued that the “factors were not used, since the indices can be more readily justified 
conceptually” (ibid., p. 210)360. Becker and Huselid identified the problem with factor 
analyses as the fact that  
“not all of the policies that might theoretically be expected to be part of a 
system that affects firm performance necessarily load on a specific factor” 
(Becker and Huselid, 1998, p. 73).  
If all the “theoretically expected” items do not load on a specific common factor there 
are two possibilities. (1) The theory or construct is misspecified in that all the items 
do not reflect one construct whose relations to other variables can be analyzed, or (2) 
the items are not reflective indicators of the construct at all. We will try to justify the 
latter conclusion below.  
                                               
358 In different ways Youndt et al. (1996), Delery and Doty, (1996), Ichniowski et al. (1997) have 
identified dimensions of HRM systems. However, their dimensions have represented different kinds of 
HRM systems. MacDuffie (1995) identified two dimensions (work systems and HRM policies) of one 
and the same HRM system. However, he used primarily conceptual rather than statistical means to 
distinguish them. Huselid (1995) on the other hand identified two dimensions of one and the same 
HRM system using exploratory factor analysis. 
359 Below we will reflect upon an alternative conceptualization in terms of the cluster analytic 
approach as developed by Becker and Huselid (1998b). 




Simply justifying HRM indexes with Cronbach's alpha, which has been the most 
prevalent form of validation in prior research, still involves the assumption that the 
HRM practices are reflective indicators of some kind of a latent model construct in 
terms of the HRM system. “Since the latent construct under the latent model is 
defined as the commonality among the dimensions, the dimensions of constructs 
under the latent model have to be correlated” (Law, Wong and Mobley, 1998, p. 747). 
An alternative might be to view the HRM practices as causal indicators of the HRM 
system which would then be an aggregate model construct. “[I]n the aggregate model 
the overall construct is [simply] the mathematical composite formed from the 
dimensions” (ibid., p. 747). In this case there is no requirement of the correlation of 
the indicators in order to analyze the relations between the construct and other 
constructs or variables (ibid., p. 747; Bollen, 1989, p. 223). However,  
“[u]nfortunately traditional validity assessments and classical test theory 
[under which Cronbach’s alpha belongs] do not cover cause indicators 
(Bollen, 1989, p. 222).  
Due to necessities of parsimony and/or limitations of the analytical techniques used, 
while viewing the individual HRM practice items as causal indicators we might still 
use an index or composite score as an HRM system construct instead of a true 
aggregate model construct361.  
Law et al. attempted a general classification of multidimensional constructs and 
argued 
“observed variances of a [multidimensional] variable can be partitioned 
into four elements: (1) common variances, (2) group variances, (3) specific 
variances, and (4) random variances...Under the latent model...we consider 
only common variances or covariances shared by all dimensions as true 
variances of the construct...Under the aggregate model...[s]pecific 
variances and group variances...are also part of  the true variance of the 
construct, and only random variances are considered as error 
variances...For the profile model...depending on the dichotomization 
criterion, the portion that is considered as true variances...may or may not 
cover the common variances, group variances, or specific variances of a 
specific dimension... [italics added].  
M]ultidimensional constructs defined under the three models are 
theoretically different constructs – different because the definition of the 
true variances of the constructs differ, and we cannot claim that they are 
only different operationalizations of the same construct...The relation 
between the construct and its dimensions is a necessary element in the 
definition of a multidimensional construct for at least three reasons: (1) 
definition of the research question, (2) theoretical parsimony, and (3) 
relations with other constructs...” (ibid., pp. 747-749).  
The importance of a justified conceptualization of the phenomenon of HRM seems 
clear as with reference to another construct 
                                               
361 From a methodological standpoint, simply analyzing a composite score is still much less 
satisfactory than including a true item level construct in the analysis. With composite scores the 




“Law and Wong [1999]...have demonstrated the differences in parameter 
estimates with different specifications of the relations between the 
dimensions and the overall multidimensional construct” (Law, Wong and 
Mobley, 1998, p. 750). 
What kind of constructs we specify has to be conceptually justified (ibid., p. 752). 
Law et al. use organizational citizenship behavior as an example and argue that it can 
“be defined under all three models of multidimensional construct” (ibid., p. 753). The 
empirical test of the validity of a construct involves minimally that  
with the correct specification of the relations between the construct and its 
dimensions, one should attain acceptable goodness-of-fit indices in the 
covariance structure analysis” (ibid., p. 753)362.  
According to Law et al. the theoretical prima facie adequacy of constructs should 
however be justified according to the criteria of relational level and form363. The 
authors argue that these are “exhaustive” criteria producing “mutually exclusive 
...models of multidimensional constructs” (ibid., p. 753).  
In some cases it is easy to argue for a relational level and a direction of causality 
between construct and its indicators.  
"For instance, suppose that we use race and sex as indicators of exposure 
to discrimination. Since exposure to discrimination does not change a 
persons race or sex, these two variables are cause indicators (Bollen, 1989, 
p. 65).  
In many cases it is not easy to identify the direction of causality (e.g. empowerment, 
organizational citizenship behavior, organizational commitment, organizational, 
leader and coworker support, distributive, procedural and interactional justice etc). 
Deciding on the causal direction between constructs and their indicators is in fact 
arguably in many cases impossible. Bollen asks us to  
"assume that the latent variable is self-esteem, and we ask the person to 
indicate his or her agreement with the statement: 'I feel that I am as good as 
the next person'. As a persons self-esteem increase we would expect the 
                                               
362 Law et al. also suggest that "under a correct definition...the construct should have expected relations 
with other constructs in its nomological network in a criterion validation sense" (ibid., p. 753). This 
formulation seems problematic as the position in a nomological network is an empirical question which 
should at least partly be settled independently of the definition of the construct. It may be that although 
we have an as relevant and correct specification of a construct as possible it may still not have the 
expected nomological relations. Then the model is simply not correct while the specification of the 
construct may be correct but unfruitful. 
363 Relational level concerns the question of whether "the multidimensional construct exist at the same 
level as its dimensions" (ibid., p. 743) or whether each dimension is a different manifestation or 
realization of the construct such that the multidimensional construct is "a higher-order abstraction 
underlying its dimensions" (ibid., p. 742). In the latter case the direction of causality is according to 
Law et al. from the construct to the indicators (ibid., p. 747). Relational form concerns constructs 
whose dimensions exist at the same level as the construct itself and the question is: "Can the 
dimensions be algebraically combined to form an overall representation of the construct" (ibid., p. 
743). If yes, then we have an aggregate model construct. If no, then we have a profile model construct 




agreement with the statement to increase, though his or her response has 
little influence on the latent construct" (1989, p. 65).  
Bollen argues that in this case the direction of causality is clearly from the latent 
construct to the indicator. However, to the extent that this is a good indicator it seems 
to us that we could just as well argue that the direction of causality is the reverse. The 
more one feels to be "as good as the next person", the better self-esteem it will lead to. 
The problem is that we have no way to identify self-esteem apart from the indicators 
of it. Thus it seems to us that we cannot know what the direction of causality "truly" 
is. The same seems to be true of the above mentioned intermediate constructs 
included in our model.  
We would argue that less than a question of causal direction between the construct 
and its dimensions the criteria of evaluation should be what variance in our construct 
our theory indicate that is important. With these limitations we can agree with Law et 
al. (1998).  
“Whether one should use the factor or composite view of multidimensional 
constructs should be theory driven” (1999, p. 156)364. 
In most research on the influence of HRM systems the norm has been to include all 
variances (error, specific, group and common) of the construct of HRM in the 
analyses365.  
In some distinction to most prior research Becker and Huselid (1998b) used a cluster 
analysis to order their data366. In general, a cluster analytic technique, producing a 
construct under the profile model, seems theoretically meaningful to the extent that 
we want to analyze the differential effects of different empirically determined HRM-
related clusters. In Becker and Huselid (1998b) this concerns combinations of a 
measure of HRM system utilization on the one hand and a measure of alignment with 
strategy and organizational logic on the other hand. Becker and Huselid argue that  
“[i]n contrast to factor analyses, which focuses on commonalities across 
individual practices, the emphasis in cluster analysis is on identifying 
commonalities across entire HRM strategies” (1998b, p. 8).  
                                               
364 By “composite view of multidimensional constructs” Law and Wong refer to aggregate model 
constructs and not composites in terms of additive indexes. 
365 Although we will argue that our intermediate attitudinal variables are best modelled as latent model 
constructs, these will be used only in our structural equation analyses while we will use composite 
scores of the items related to these variables in the regression analyses. Thus, strictly speaking these 
two analyses utilize "theoretically different constructs" (Law et al., 1998, p. 749).  
366 Becker and Huselid (1998b) are the only ones to date who have analyzed differences in the 
relationships between different HRM related clusters of organizations and outcome variables 
incorporating at least some control variables. As the reader is not informed about the use of any 
“dichotomization criterion” (Law, Wong and Mobley, 1998, pp. 748-749) we assume that Becker and 
Huselid in their analyses included all variances of their items, i.e. error, specific, group and common 




They also argue that cluster analysis has the advantage of allowing a test for 
complementarities without imposing  
“any a priori constraints on the nature of either the internal bundle of 
elements within each strategy or external mix of...the overall HRM 
strategy” (Becker and Huselid, 1998b, p. 12).  
Thus Becker and Huselid argue that through cluster analysis we can analyze outcomes 
of differences in emphasis on different empirically derived HRM profiles (or 
strategies) while through factor analyses we can analyze the effect of differences in 
one HRM system.  
As we believe that the possibility of any robust HRM effects on organizational 
performance will depend on the investment in the whole system (rather than different 
parts of it) the cluster analytic technique seems less relevant. As indicated, the 
evidence provided by Becker and Huselid in terms of the superiority of the “High 
Performance Cluster” offers some justification for this assumption. As already noted, 
we have gone another route in allowing for the relevance of different equifinalities, 
idiosyncracies including strategic alignments, and flexibilities. Thus we do not divide 
organizations according to different profiles of HRM investments but rather according 
to the general sophistication of a holistic HRM system or architecture. The question is 
now, what variance in such a phenomenon is the theoretically appropriate, i.e. what 
kind of construct is appropriate for such a phenomenon. 
We cannot say that an entity in terms of the HRM system causes the (perceptions of 
individual) HRM practices (Law, Wong and Mobley, 1998, p. 745). Saying this 
would imply that the individual HRM practices completely derive their relevant 
meaning from the system of HRM practices and that each HRM practice “is a 
different manifestation or realization of the [system] construct” (ibid., p. 742). The 
fact is that according to the hypothesis of (strategic soft) HRM the meaning of the 
HRM practices (as well as their effectiveness) is only partly constituted by their 
common variance (related to their internal/external fit). A construct of the HRM 
system should capture the meaning of the HRM practices which is due both to unique 
factors (or unique variances) of the HRM practices as well as all forms of relevant 
internal/external integration (group and common variances) compatible with strategic 
soft HRM. Thus according to Law et al.’s criteria of relational level (causal direction), 
it would be wrong to treat the HRM system variable as a latent model (factor) 
construct where  
“only common variances or covariances shared by all facets are considered 
as the true variance of the construct. Variances specific to one facet, 
covariances shared by some facets only, and random variances are treated 
as error variances in the factor model” (Law and Wong, 1999, p. 147). 
Instead, we would argue that the sophistication of the HRM system is a product of the 
sophistication of each HRM practice. Thus, an organization applies many differently 
sophisticated HRM practices which lead to or which all contribute to (the experience 
of) a sophisticated HRM system. This argumentation would lead us to conclude that 
the HRM construct should be conceptualized under the composite view (as an 




“Locke (1969; 330) clearly stated that a job is not an entity but an 
abstraction referring to a combination of facets. Since a job is not 
perceived or experienced as an overall entity, it cannot initially be 
evaluated as a single unit. In other words, the evaluation of different job 
facets will causally lead to an overall job satisfaction evaluation, but not 
vice versa” (Law and Wong, 1999, p. 147).  
Under this view an HRM system construct would have the following properties:  
“Variances specific to one facet or covariances shared by some facets 
are...part of the true variance of the construct. As a result only random 
variances are considered as error variances” (Law and Wong, 1999, p. 
147). 
Thus, we argue that unique variances, group variances as well as common variances 
are of interests in HRM research367. These are the variances that we would expect to 
influence organizational phenomena  and which should thus be incorporated in an 
HRM theory of organizational performance.  
The fact is that modelling indicators as causal in a true aggregate model construct as 
exemplified by Law and Wong (1999) will often affect the construct by way of 
multicollinearity problems. Law and Wong acknowledge this (ibid., pp. 157-158), but 
they do not discuss the possibility that it is this very property which largely affects the 
different results achieved when they modelled their focal construct based on the 
aggregate model and latent model respectively. Thus, because of such likely problems 
of multicollinearity we argue that none of the three multidimensional constructs 
identified by Law et al. (1998) are straightforward as a conceptualization of the HRM 
system. There is thus potentially an unremovable problem of creating a HRM system 
construct which would capture the HRM system level but at the same time be 
sensitive to distinct degrees of importance of different constituent HRM practices. 
Although we argue that researchers should pursue aggregate model constructs of the 
HRM system, in this thesis we will follow the “extant practice” (Becker and Huselid, 
1998b, p. 6) in the HRM literature.  
Operationalization of the HRM system construct. Consequently, we operationalize 
the HRM system construct by forming an index of the sophistication of the HRM 
system by first averaging all the items related to the respective 8 HRM practices (see 
section 8.3.2.1 above) and subsequently averaging also the resulting 8 variables for 
each of the HRM practices, in effect thus averaging all the items for all the above 
HRM practices. Apart from the questionable nature of this ("extant") practice, also the 
problem of measurement errors remains with reference to our variables368. 
                                               
367 This is not least the case because there are “deadly combinations” (Becker et al., 1997, p. 43) of the 
HRM practices. Our operationalizations together with a system variable accounting also for unique 
variances of the parts of the HRM system should be sensitive to such combinations. 
368 “Measurement error in the independent variables of interest is ubiquitous in economic and 
organizational research. Typically, it is either ignored or the researcher is able to make a reasonable 
assumption that, relative to the total variance of the measure, the impact of measurement error is 
modest” (Huselid and Becker, 1996, p. 405). The issue of measurement errors is almost not at all dealt 
with in HRM research (either concerning independent or other variables). Researchers have simply 




It has been argued that one advantage with the index measure is that there are multiple 
ways to increase the value of the index thus allowing for equifinality (Becker and 
Huselid, 1998b, p.6; Becker and Huselid, 1998, p. 64). Also a cluster analytic 
conceptualization would allow for equifinality while a true aggregate model construct 
as outlined by Law and Wong (1998) would not.  
In any case the concept of equifinality does not seem to have a very specific meaning 
in HRM research. At least it would seem that equifinality can exist in different 
dimensions. In which dimensions we account for its relevance depends both on our 
operationalizations of the individual HRM practices as well as on the chosen HRM 
system variable.  
Some general equifinalities seem more obvious than others, e.g. less training and 
development could perhaps in principle be offset by more investment in selection 
processes, although this has not been shown to be an empirical fact. Nevertheless, a 
priori it would seem that by doing both any effects would increase. Thus there seem at 
least to be no ultimate equifinality on this dimension. Quite in accordance with this an 
HRM index allows for some “intermediate” equifinality while implying that the most 
effective HRM strategy is always to invest in all the HRM practices to a maximum 
degree. This way an index is maximized 
The equifinalities accounted for by e.g. Huselid’s (1995), Huselid and Becker’s 
(1996) and Becker and Huselid’s (1998b) operationalizations of the HRM practices 
allow for combinations of two forms of intermediate equifinality. The first concerns 
different combinations of formally specified HRM practices on average affecting the 
same proportion of similar groups of employees. The second concerns the same 
combinations of the HRM practices on average affecting the same proportion but 
different groups or categories of employees. Delery and Doty's (1996) universal 
configurational operationalizations allowed for intermediate equifinality with 
reference to the extent of the internal fit of formal qualities of individual HRM 
practices affecting one and the same category of employees. In addition, their three 
ideal type employment systems configurational approaches allowed ultimate 
equifinalities with reference to the closeness to any of the three ideal types. Finally, 
Delery and Doty's (1996) contingency based configurational approaches also allowed 
for ultimate equifinalities with reference to a continuum of combinations of strategies 
and HRM practices.  
                                                                                                                                      
by Wright and Sherman there is considerable confusion as to the proper scales and criterions related to 
the measurement of HRM (1999, p. 68). That measurement errors can have serious consequences for 
structural and regression coefficients is clear (Bollen, 1989, p. 156). In order to use Cronbach's Alphas 
or factor analyses as reliability tests researchers would have to use several measures of each HRM 
practices, in fact of one and the same dimension of each HRM practice. In our case e.g. quantity, 
quality and relevance cannot be said to measure the same thing or the same dimension of each HRM 
practice. Researchers could also test intrarater and/or interrater reliability of indexes and items by test-
retest methods (Huselid and Becker, 1996, p. 415; Becker and Gerhardt, 1996, p. 795). This is seldom 
done but there are some indications that inter-rater reliabilties concerning raters from different 
hierarchical positions are far from good (Wright and Sherman, 1999, p. 64). This makes it all the more 
important to theoretically argue for the relevant raters of the HRM practices as well as to empirically 
explore consequences of ratings by different categories of employees. After the writing of this thesis 
we have noticed that the debate concerning these issues is escalating (see Gerhart, Wright, McMahan 




There are however also other dimensions of potential equifinalities. Underlying 
formal HRM practices and their more specific designs and implementations can 
probably exhibit some ultimate equifinality with reference to their perceived amount, 
quality and relevance. There is probably no contextually independent one best version 
or implementation of each HRM practice or combinations of them. However, any 
formal operationalizations simply assume that the more specific designs and 
implementations of the practices do not matter. They thus assume that specific designs 
and implementations exhibit perfect equifinality. This seems inadequate. 
In addition to accounting for equifinality, operationalizations of the HRM practices 
should also in some way take into consideration the rather undeveloped idea of 
idiosyncracy discussed earlier (see Becker and Gerhardt, 1996, pp. 787-788; Becker et 
al., 1997, p. 41; Becker and Huselid, 1998b, p. 6). Formally identified HRM practices 
(compounded into an HRM system variable ) cannot account for the relevance of any 
idiosyncracy per se. Thus e.g. Becker and Huselid’s (1998b) HRM system variable 
can only account for the differential consequences of having applied more of the 
HRM practices more or less widely. On the other hand, their perceptual 
Implementation Alignment variable can account for the relevance of idiosyncracies, 
as well as implementational equifinalities369. 
Equifinality and idiosyncracy both refer to differences in individual organizational 
applications of HRM. But they actually argue for quite different outcomes. The point 
of view of equifinality claims that there are many ways to combine and apply 
practices which lead to the same result. The point of view of idiosyncracy claims that 
it is differences in these combinations and applications which can explain differences 
in (sustained) outcomes. These are not incompatible points of views. We can conceive 
of the co-existence of some equifinalities and some idiosyncracies. At least at this 
stage of knowledge development we agree that operationalizations of a general system 
level HRM theory of performance should account, in a multitude of ways, for the 
potential relevance of both.  
Thus there may be two organizations which have invested identically in formal HRM 
practices but one of them has achieved better alignment due to some idiosyncratic 
features of its strategy and/or some other feature of its internal or external context. 
Here the theory would postulate performance differences due to idiosyncracies.  
There may also be two organizations which on average have invested equally widely 
and/or with equal average sophistication in the HRM practices but in different ways. 
Both of them may on average have achieved an equally good contextual alignment 
and specific strategic fit. Here the theory would postulate equifinality at the level of 
HRM practices and equifinality with reference to contextual fit. In this case the theory 
would postulate no performance differences.  
                                               
369 Becker and Huselid’s Implementation Alignment variable (largely) accounts for idiosyncracies in 
terms of the effectiveness of the practices. This effectiveness might be related to strategic fit and/or it 
might be related to other contextual elements of the organizations or the organizational logics. 
However, as already noted in connection to the review of earlier empirical research, their variable taps 




There may be organizations which on average have achieved an equally good 
strategic fit with reference to the content of the HRM practices, but with differences in 
the average extent of application and/or quality and/or meaningfulness of the HRM 
practices which is due to something else than strategic fit. Here the theory would 
postulate equifinalities with reference to (idiosyncratic forms of) fit but differences 
(and perhaps also idiosyncracies) at the level of practices and thus performance 
differences. This possibility is an indication of the fact that the degree of strategic 
(and larger contextual) fit may not be the only source of  the influence of HRM 
practices370.  
In summary, in our conceptualization and operationalization of the HRM practices 
there can thus be idiosyncracies and equifinalities both with reference to strategic fit 
and with reference to other elements of the organizational context (including 
implementational aspects). Our variable explicitly measuring strategic fit is intended 
to identify elements that are conceived to be of strategic importance in distinction to 
our HRM system variable intended to capture a more undifferentiated general 
contextual fit and general sophistication. 
Thus, in our understanding idiosyncracy refers to differential performance effects with 
reference both to an undefined locally identified contextual fit as well as to a more 
specific undefined locally identified explicit strategic fit. Equifinality refers both to 
the fact that there may be many different ways to achieve these forms of fit as well as 
to the fact that different HRM systems may have equal (equifinal) performance effects 
through some more general mechanisms. However, neither we nor e.g. Becker and 
                                               
370 Whether this is a logical consequence of the theory (and most operationalizations to date) depends 
on what we mean by strategic fit and what other potential mechanisms of the effects of HRM practices 
we can argue for. We could argue that any effects HRM is ever going to have depend on the strategic 
fit of the practices. Thus, e.g. employment security and extensive training and compensation could be 
claimed to be of no use if it is not strategically important to generally motivate employees ( to stay with 
the company, to induce trust in the employment relationship, to learn something new). On the other 
hand, we could argue that HRM in general has positive intermediate effects independent of strategy 
which are likely to influence also organizational performance. But what would these be? The general 
application of internally consistent practices (regardless of their strategic fit) might have universal 
motivational effects and all kinds of indirect effects in terms of the atmosphere in the workplace. It is 
not inconceivable that there are such general mechanisms in addition to any form of strategic fit. This is 
the kernel of the debate concerning universalistic versus contingency based HRM theorizations. In this 
thesis we have argued that it may well be the case that neither simply internally coherent (formal) 
HRM practices nor formally identified forms of fit translate into performance effects (see section 3.4). 
Thus, our operationalizations of the HRM practices are designed to holistically incorporate the 
elements of (idiosyncratic) and implemented strategic and/or more general contextual fit. Our explicit 
variable of strategic fit in principle allows us to analyze the role of this component in as well as extract 
it from the sophistication of the HRM system. By using variables which do not permit us to make a 
clear distinction between the HRM practices "themselves" and their (idiosyncratic) larger contextual fit 
our intention is to allow for (but not to test) the possibility that these properties of the HRM practices 
may be necessary but perhaps not sufficient for the causal effectiveness of the HRM system. 
Regardless of whether our conceptualization/operationalization leads to successful predictions and can 
also otherwise be deemed acceptable, as noted earlier, HRM theorizing clearly confronts a big 
challenge in spelling out and agreeing upon a causal logic of potential effects of the HRM practices 
(Guest, 1997). Our interpretation of the HRM discourse implies that whatever the “distinctiveness” that 
organization specific HRM systems may consist of, theoretically (and ethically) their effectiveness 
should be dependent on the HRM architecture or sophistication (the average quantity, quality and 




Huselid (1998b) really explicitly analyze the effects of either equifinalities or 
idiosyncracies. We simply allow them to play a role related to any hypothesized 
outcomes of HRM.  
We argue that our HRM system variable (as explicated in sections 8.3.2.1 and 8.3.2.2) 
in the form of an additive composite score of our items is conceptually motivated in 
that it  
(1) captures HRM at both the levels of individual practices and the common system, 
(2) accounts for variation at the level of implementation,  
(3) incorporates perceived relevant forms of embeddedness in the management 
infrastructure including the potential influence of internal/external fit,  
(4) takes into consideration the point of view of employees,  
(5) and thus captures the levels and dimensions where causality of strategic soft HRM 
ultimately should reside. Thus, we argue that our HRM system variable should 
show some, albeit undifferentiated, sensitivity to all the different levels of HRM 
practices identified by Becker and Gerhardt in terms of system architecture, policy 
alternatives and practice process (1996, p. 786). 
8.3.3 The construct of psychological empowerment  
We will essentially use the measurement instrument for psychological empowerment 
introduced and tentatively validated by Spreitzer (1995). As the dimensional items 
seemed to be very similar, verging on being identical as to their content, we used a 
shortened version of Spreitzer’s (1995) measures of psychological empowerment. We 
dropped one of the three items for each dimension from the questionnaire. The Likert 
scale items used were 
Meaning:  
The work you do is very meaningful to you 
Your job activities are personally important to you 
Competence:  
You are confident about your ability to do your job 
You are self-assured about your capabilities to perform your work activities 
Self-Determination 
You have significant autonomy in determining how you do your job 
You have considerable opportunity for independence and freedom in how you do your job 
Impact: 
Your impact on what happens in your department is large 
You have significant influence over what happens in your department 
 
Spreitzer argues that the four dimensions of her construct 
“combine additively to create an overall construct of psychological 
empowerment. In other words, the lack of any single dimension will 
deflate, though not completely eliminate, the overall degree of felt 




This would imply that we conceptualize the construct under the aggregate model or 
composite view (Law, Wong and Mobley, 1998; Law and Wong, 1999). Thus 
Spreitzer’s own argumentation would indicate that the factor analysis she performs is 
not theoretically justified. In some distinction Torbiorn argues that the dimensions of 
empowerment can be taken  
“to form necessary, but each of them, in itself, insufficient conditions [for 
high performance], i.e. performance is assumed to suffer to some extent if 
not all prerequisites are met” (Torbiorn, 1997a, p. 3).  
This is still somewhat ambiguous. He emphasizes that “[p]erformance, however, 
would not be “cancelled” if all conditions were not met. Rather, the quality or amount 
of it would suffer” (ibid., p. 5). This still seems largely compatible with Spreitzer's 
understanding. However, Torbiorn also more explicitly argues that  
“[t]he basic assumption of our model holds that performance would be the 
result of a gestalt containing all prerequisites in combination, and this in a 
way so that the more the prerequisites within such a gestalt are satisfied the 
better the performance” (ibid., p. 5)371.  
In line with this we argue that a construct of empowerment where we account for the 
common variance of the facets should be the most robust and theoretically motivated 
predictor of work performance. Thus we will attempt to use a latent model construct 
in our structural equation analyses372. Based upon our validation analyses (below) we 
will however in our multiple regression analyses also use a composite score of the 
items of the construct of psychological empowerment.  
8.3.4 The construct of organizational commitment  
We have essentially used The British Organizational Commitment Scale (BOCS) 
which includes the three components of identification, involvement and loyalty 
discussed in section 7.2.4.2. However based on evidence for the adequacy of a 
shortened version of this (Fenton et al., 1997) we will use such a version. The Likert 
scale items we used were:  
Involvement:  
In your work you like to feel you are making some effort not just for yourself but for the 
organization as well. 
To know your own work had made a contribution to the good of your organization would 
please you. 
Identification: 
You are quite proud to tell people that you work for this organization. 
You feel yourself to be part of the organization. 
                                               
371 In apparent congruence with this, Thomas and Velthouse argue that self-efficacy or competence “is 
not regarded as sufficient...[for intrinsic task motivation but is in their model] supplemented by [the] 
three additional task assessments [meaning, choice or self-determination, and impact] (1990, p. 667). 
372 Here the criteria for evaluating the construct is thus not causal direction between construct and 






Even if your organization were not doing too well financially, you would be reluctant to 
change to another employer. 
You sometimes feel like leaving this employment for good (reverse coded). 
 
Based upon our review of the literature on organizational commitment (above) it is to 
be expected that these items will produce (at least) two different constructs in terms of 
affective commitment involving the first two dimensions and continuance 
commitment involving the third. The dimensionality of the items will be analyzed in 
chapter 9. 
In our structural equation analyses we will conceptualize (both expected forms of) 
organizational commitment under the latent model (Law, Wong and Mobley, 1998; 
Law and Wong, 1999). We are interested in HRM’s influence on the common 
variance of the dimensions and items of these expected constructs. In the regression 
analyses we will use composite scores of the items for the dimensions that can be 
validated. 
8.3.5 The construct of organizational citizenship behavior  
Van Dyne and Ang argue plausibly that the ideal measure of organizational 
citizenship behavior would be provided by responses of peers (and not self-reports nor 
superior perceptions as has been obtained in most studies) (1997, p. 697). However, 
we obtained the measures as self-reports and they thus reflect attitudes towards 
organizational citizenship behavior rather than actual behavior.  
The items and dimensions of our OCB construct comprise a mix of Moorman and 
Blakely’s (1995) and Van Dyne et al.’s (1994) items and dimensions. We have 
included Moorman and Blakely’s dimension of 'individual initiative' (1995, p. 132) 
which comes fairly close to Van Dyne et al.’s 'advocacy participation' (Van Dyne et 
al., 1994, pp. 780-783) simply on the grounds of face validity with reference to our 
sample as well as with reference to its potential organizational relevance. We have 
also included Moorman and Blakely’s dimension of 'interpersonal helping' (1995, p. 
132) which we found more meaningful than Van Dyne et al.’s related concept of 
'social participation' (Van Dyne et al, 1994, pp. 780-783). We have further included a 
dimension in terms of 'loyal boosterism' choosing items both from Moorman and 
Blakely (1995) and from Van Dyne te al.'s related dimension of 'loyalty'. Finally we 
included the dimension of functional participation based upon Van Dyne et al. 
(1994).  
Of the dimensions identified by either Moorman and Blakely (1995) or Van Dyne et 
al. (1994) we clearly left out Van Dyne et al.’s items of the OCB dimension 
'obedience' (1994, pp. 780-783). We also left out the related dimension of 
'conscientiousness' used in Niehoff and Moorman (1993, p. 542). We considered the 
items for these dimensions less meaningful for our empirical objects of research. 
Further, we left out the dimension of 'personal industry' used in Moorman and Blakely 
(1995, p. 132). This dimension covered items of "core" work performance which we 
wanted to include separately as a potential outcome of HRM and the intermediate 




and Blakely (1995), and our separate work performance construct are closely 
related373. Our employee performance measures are also conceptually linked to what 
Williams and Anderson differentiate from OCB and conceptualize as intra-role 
behavior (IRB) (1991, p. 606). However, our variable of employee performance does 
not capture in-role behaviors per se, rather it is intended to capture the outcomes of 
such behavior. 
In summary, analoguously to Moorman, Blakely and Niehoff we thus modified “the 
original items to create more of a distinction between OCB and in-role behavior” 
(1998, p. 353). In face of the many conceptualizations and operationalizations also 
other researchers have chosen items based upon “face validity” in relation to their 
research questions (Bolon, 1997). We chose items and dimensions for our OCB 
construct paying attention to general face validity in relation to our empirical objects 
of research. In addition we chose items e.g. in order to distinguish the concept of 
organizational behavior from organizational commitment as Van Dyne et al. (1994, p. 
781) included items almost identical to some of the items reflecting organizational 
commitment374. 
Individual initiative: 
You encourage others to try new and more effective ways of doing their job (item from 
Moorman and Blakely, 1995). 
You frequently make creative suggestions to coworkers (item form Van Dyne et al., 1994, p. 
781). 
[You often motivate others in the company to express opinions (item from Moorman and 
Blakely, 1995)]. 
[You encourage hesitant or quiet coworkers to voice their opinions when they otherwise might 
not speak up (item from Moorman and Blakely, 1995)]. 
[You frequently communicate to coworkers suggestions on how the group can improve (item 
from Moorman and Blakely, 1995)] 
[For issues that may have serious consequences for the company you express your opinions 
even if others may disagree (item from Moorman and Blakely, 1995)] 
[You make considerable efforts to keep well informed on matters where your opinion might 
benefit the organization (item form Van Dyne et al., 1994375) ]. 
Interpersonal helping:  
You go out of your way to help coworkers with work related problems (item from Moorman 
and Blakely, 1995). 
You are always willing to listen to coworkers' problems and worries376. 
                                               
373 It has elsewhere been argued that both the dimensions of 'conscientousness' and 'personal industry' 
could probably both better be construed as in-role behaviors (Moorman and Blakely, 1995, p. 130). The 
same argument would apply to the dimension of 'obedience'. 
374 Although most of these items loaded as theoretically expected in a second order confirmatory factor 
analysis (below), the items in parentheses were excluded from our structural analyses primarily due to 
reasons of complexity. 
375 We added "make considerable efforts" to this item because we felt that simply keeping well-
informed is more or less obvious for our category of respondents. 
376 This item was developed by us and based on Moorman's (1993, p. 542) "Willingly gives of his/her 




[You voluntarily help new workers settle into the job (item from Moorman and Blakely, 
1995)]. 
Loyal boosterism (items from Van Dyne et al., 1994)377: 
You emphasize to people outside the organization the positive aspects of working for the 
organization. 
You defend the organization when outsiders criticize it. 
[You defend the organization when other employees criticize it].  
Functional participation (items form Van Dyne et al., 1994, p. 782): 
You often have difficulties to co-operate with your colleagues on projects. 
You avoid extra duties and responsibilities at work. 
[You never complain about changes in the organization378.]  
 
With reference to a proper construct of OCB Law, Wong and Mobley argue that  
“One can...define OCB as an algebraic function – or simple sum – of the 
...dimensions. However, one can also define OCB as the common latent 
factor underlying these...dimensions...Finally one can identify different 
profiles of employees’ expression of OCB and use these profiles to 
represent the multidimensional construct of OCB” (1998, p. 753) 
“However, there is no discussion in the literature on OCB about the 
relations between OCB as a multidimensional construct and 
its...dimensions” (ibid., p. 741).  
As with psychological empowerment and organizational citizenship behavior, we 
argue that regarding the HRM system as an antecedent of OCB, as well as any 
consequences of OCB, the most robust relations should theoretically exist between a 
latent model multidimensional construct of OCB and these other variables/constructs. 
Also Van Dyne et al. argue that “good citizenship behavior is demonstrated by high 
levels of all [their] three substantive categories of organizational citizenship behavior” 
(ibid., p. 780). ). In their view OCB should thus be conceptualized as a latent model 
construct. In our structural equation analyses we will attempt to use a latent model 
conceptualization of OCB. However, we also use a composite score of the items in 
our regression analyses.  
Although Van Dyne et al. (1994) conceptualize a construct of OCB they make no 
efforts to corroborate a second order multidimensional construct of some sort. 
Moorman and Blakely (1995) do not either make an effort to corroborate the 
adequacy of the talk about a coherent and valid concept of OCB in terms of a second 
order multidimensional construct. Without showing the actual results of the analyses 
Williams and Andersson claimed to have identified a second order construct. 
However, they argue that "because there were only three first-order factors...the 
second-order construct could not be distinguished from a simple confirmatory factor 
                                               
377 We have used very similar wordings but not the negatively formulated sentences included in Van 
Dyne et al., 1994, p. 781). Van Dyne et al. (1994) used the label 'loyalty' for this dimension. We feel 
the nature of this dimension is better reflected in Moorman and Blakely's (1995) corresponding term 
'loyal boosterism'. In addition, this label more clearly distinguishes this dimension from the dimension 
of 'loyalty' (or continuance commitment) included in our construct of organizational commitment.  
378 This item was developed by us as it seemed an interesting aspect of functional participation in a 




anlysis model" (1991, p. 613). It is somewhat unclear to us what they mean by "the 
second-order model replacing the three factor model correlations" (ibid., p. 613). It is 
not self-evident that first-order factors all load on a second order factor. This is 
indicated by the fact that in the case of organizational commitment this does not 
appear to be the case. Thus, there is independent interest in showing the second order 
factorial properties of the OCB construct379.  
8.3.6 Operationalizations of employee and organizational performance 
Our measures of employee work performance were taken from/modified based upon 
Becker et al. (1996, p. 470) and Moorman and Blakely's notion of personal industry 
(1995, p. 132). We argue that they can be viewed as abstract latent model constructs 
of employee work performance with reference to our respondents380. Respondents 
were the superiors of the consultants. The Likert scale items were: 
The consultant 
-often comes up with innovative suggestions for improving your company's products and 
services 
-[is very innovative in producing solutions to client's problems] 
-often comes up with innovative solutions to general organizational problems 
-is very efficient in his/her work 
-always meets or beats deadlines for completing work 
-performs his/her duties with unusually few errors 
-always produces high quality work 
 
Organizational performance: In our population we did not have access to objective 
financial performance data nor to market values. Thus, all performance characteristics 
in our study involve subjective measures. There is some (often cited) evidence for 
moderate to strong positive correlations between perceived and objective 
organizational performance measures (Dollinger and Golden, 1992; Powell, 1992) 
cited e.g. by Delaney and Huselid (1996, p. 954). To the extent that objective 
performance measures themselves are not very correlated, such evidence is however 
not very comforting. Our subjective perceptual measures are of course liable to all the 
problems described by Meyer and Gupta (1994) and partly discussed above (section 
7.2.5). 
Clearly there seem to be no ideal or agreed upon solutions to the problem of 
organizational performance measures. Nevertheless, our variables are at least partly 
consistent with “the business model” of performance as described by Meyer and 
                                               
379 Venkatraman argues that "a second-order factor model is merely a parsimonious explanation of the 
covariation among the first-order factors. Consequently, even if the second-order factor model 
effectively explains the covariation among first-order factors, the goodness of fit can never exceed that 
of the first-order factor model" (1989, p. 437). 
380 However, based on our exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses we distinguished two 
dimensions of employee performance. One is related to the items referring to the quality and efficiency 
of employee work performance. The other is related to items referring to more organizationally internal 




Gupta (1994). In this study organizational performance was conceptualized as 
follows. 
Organizational performance / Profitability: The respondents were the superiors. The 
one item Likert scale measure of this variable was formulated by us:  
During the last two years your consulting company's (if national subsidiary then this unit) 
profitability has been excellent. 
 
Organizational performance / Quality: The respondents were the superiors. We 
measured this variable with two Likert scale items formulated by us. The exact 
wordings of these were: 
During the last two years your consulting company's (if national subsidiary, then this unit) 
customers have been very satisfied. 
In your consulting market, your company's reputation for quality surpasses major competitors. 
 
Employee turnover: The respondents were the superiors. The one Likert scale item 
measure of this variable was formulated by us:  
During the last two years many good consultants have voluntarily left your company to join 
other employers. 
 
8.3.7 Operationalizations of control variables381  
Organizational support: Respondents were the general employees. This construct is, 
based upon our arguments in the chapter dealing with the HRM system construct, 
referring to Law et al. (1998), ideally conceptualized as a latent model construct. The 
items for this construct were taken from Eisenberger et al. (1986). We did not include 
all the items from their measurement instrument but, largely based upon face validity, 
chose 14 of their 36 items. The exact wording of these Likert scale items are 
presented below.  
The organization would understand a long absence due to your illness. 
The organization would fail to understand your absence due to a personal problem (reverse 
coded). 
It would take only a small decrease in your performance for the organizattion to want to 
replace you (reverse coded). 
The organization would forgive an honest mistake on your part. 
                                               
381 As will be shown in our validation analyses, and as was the case with the OCB construct, we ended 
up excluding a faire amount of our original items of many of our control variables. Some constructs 
include items which conceptually closely resemble items of other constructs. In addition, as will be 
discussed below, in line with most earlier research we had to exclude items also in order to reduce the 
number of parameter estimates in our structural equation analyses. Instead of simply averaging items 
we started out with identifying the constructs with all originally included items and then proceeded by 
including some items which loaded best on each latent construct. Thus we have tried, both in terms of 
face validitity and in terms of validation analyses, to include items which should maximise the 
convergent and discriminant validities of our constructs. Below we list all the items related to each 
construct included in our questionnaire. The items in parantheses were later excluded from the 




The organization strongly considers your goals and values. 
The organization cares about your general satisfaction at work. 
[If the organization could hire someone to replace you at a lower salary it would do so (reverse 
coded).] 
[The organization diregards your best interests when it makes decisions that affect you (reverse 
coded).] 
[The organization tries to make your job as interesting as possible.] 
[The organization is willing to help you when you need a personal favor.] 
[The organization takes pride in your accomplishments at work.] 
[If you decide to quit the organization would persuade you to stay.] 
[The organization cares about your opinions.] 
[Help is available from the organization when you have a problem.] 
 
Leader support: The respondents were the general employees. This construct is, based 
upon our arguments in the chapter dealing with the HRM system construct, referring 
to Law et al. (1998), ideally conceptualized as a latent model construct. The items we 
used for this construct have also been used in Nystedt et al (1995). We translated the 
questions to English from a questionnaire in Swedish obtained from the first author. 
We included 5 of the 6 items included in their measurement instrument. These Likert 
scale items were:  
Your superiors support you in your job in a constructive way. 
Your superiors show great understanding for and considers your requests, need and conditions. 
[You can talk to your superior when you have difficulties at work.] 
[It is difficult to get information from your superiors about issues which are important for 
doing your job (reverse coded).] 
[Your superiors clarify decisions and provide additional information when requested by you.] 
 
Co-worker support. The respondents were the general employees. This construct is, 
based upon our arguments in the chapter dealing with the HRM system construct, 
referring to Law et al. (1998), ideally conceptualized as a latent model construct. The 
items we used for this construct have also been used in Nystedt et al (1995). We 
translated the questions to English from a questionnaire in Swedish obtained from the 
first author. We included 4 of the 5 items included in this measurement instrument. 
These Likert scale items were:  
You and your colleagues help each other and support one another. 
You receive good support from your colleagues when things get complicated. 
[You enjoy working with your colleagues.] 
[The professional workgroups to which you belong perform effectively]382 
 
Distributive justice: The respondents were general employees. This construct is, 
based upon our arguments in relation to the HRM system construct, referring to Law 
et al. (1998), ideally conceptualized as a latent model construct. The items of this 
construct were based on Niehoff and Moorman (1993). We included 4 of the 5 items 
                                               
382 Later we realized that this item would in fact seem to be a performance measure of work-teams 




in their measurement instrument. However, we rephrased the questions to explicitly 
include the comparison to colleagues. The exact wording of the Likert scale items 
were:  
Compared to your collegues you consider your work load to be quite fair. 
Compared to your colleagues you think your level of pay is fair. 
Compared to your colleagues, overall the (monetary and non-monetary) rewards you receive 
are quite fair. 
Compared to your colleagues you think that your job responsibilities are fair. 
 
Procedural justice: The respondents were general employees. This construct is, based 
upon our arguments in relation to the HRM system constructs, referring to Law et al. 
(1998), ideally conceptualized as a latent model construct. The items of this construct 
were based on Niehoff and Moorman (1993). We included 3 of the 6 items in their 
measurement instrument. We also rephrased the questions to include a reference to 
'superiors' instead of 'general manager' to reflect the fact that many of our respondents 
work in different project teams under different superiors. The exact wording of the 
Likert scale items were:  
You are allowed to challenge or appeal job decisions made by your superiors. 
[Job decisions are made by your superiors in an unbiased manner.]383 
Your superiors make sure that all employee concerns are heard before job decisions are made. 
 
Interactional procedural justice: The respondents were general employees. This 
construct is, based upon our arguments in relation to the HRM system constructs, 
referring to Law et al. (1998), ideally conceptualized as a latent model construct. The 
items of this construct were based on Niehoff and Moorman (1993). We included 3 of 
the 9 items in their measurement instrument. We also rephrased the questions to 
include a reference to 'superiors' instead of 'general manager' to reflect the fact that 
many of our respondents work in different project teams under different superiors. 
The exact wording of the Likert scale items were: 
When decisions are made about your job, your superiors are sensitive to your personal needs. 
[Your superisors offer adequate justification for decisions made about your job.]384 
When decisions are made about your job, your superiors treat you with respect and dignity. 
 
Work load: The respondents were the general employees. This construct can, based 
upon our arguments in relation to the HRM system constructs and referring to Law et 
al. (1998), be conceptualized as a latent model construct. The items we used for this 
construct have been used in Nystedt et al (1995). We translated the questions to 
English from a questionnaire in Swedish obtained from the first author. We included 4 
                                               
383 Later we realized that this item in fact seems to measure the outcome of any procedural justice 
rather than the procedural justice itself. Our validation analyses (below) also favored the exclusion of 
this item. 
384 We later realized that this item in fact is conceptually indistinguishable from the items related to 
procedural justice. The low discriminant validity related to this item was also confirmed by our 




of the 5 items included in this measurement instrument. These Likert scale items 
were:  
It often happens that you have to work under great time pressure. 
You often have too much to do at work. 
You feel physically exhausted after a days work. 
Too big demands are put on your performance at work385. 
 
Perceived alternative job opportunities: The respondents were the general employees. 
This construct can, based upon our arguments in relation to the HRM system 
constructs, referring to Law et al. (1998), be conceptualized as a latent model 
construct. The items we used for this construct have been used in Nystedt et al (1995). 
We translated the questions to English from a questionnaire in Swedish obtained from 
the first author. We used three of the 8 items related to perceived job opportunities 
outside the current organization which were included in this measurement instrument. 
One of the items was slightly modified by us. These Likert scale items were:  
Your possibilities to receive a similar or better job position at another organization are very 
good. 
There are many attractive job positions which you could seriously apply for at other 
organizations. 
During the last year you have been offered another equally good or better job position at 
another organization.386 
 
Recent radical perceived improvements in HRM practices. We developed items 
related to all the HRM practices to measure recent radical improvements. The 
construct includes all the HRM practices included in our HRM system construct 
except socialization and selection processes which arguably were not able to bias the 
respondents current answers. In addition, this construct includes recent radical 
improvements in the involvement and autonomy of the employees. With this variable 
we wanted to control for HRM-related recent radical improvements which could give 
rice to "Hawthorne effects" in the perceptions of employees387. This control is 
conceptualized as an aggregate model construct, i.e. the indicators are viewed as 
causal. We use an additive composite score of the items. The exact wording of the 
Likert scale items were: 
During the last year the company has radically improved its pay policy in a way which affects 
you. 
During the last year the company has radically improved its performance appraisals in a way 
which affects you. 
                                               
385 This item is later shown to belong to a different construct. There is also conceptually a clearly 
understandable difference between this item and the other ones. 
386 This item is later shown to belong to another construct. Also conceptually the difference between 
this item and the other two is clearly understandable. 





During the last year your employer has radically improved the way it involves you in general 
planning and decision making concerning internal company issues.  
During the last year the company has radically improved the way it allows you autonomy in 
doing your job. 
During the last year the company has radically improved its internal communication and 
information sharing in a way which affects you. 
During the last year the company has radically improved its training and development policy in 
a way which affects you. 
During the last year the company has radically improved its policy on general benefits and 
services in a way which affects you. 
During the last year the company has radically improved its policy on employment security in 
a way which affects you. 
During the last year the company has radically reduced the degree to which the level of pay 
and other benefits among consultants (excluding partners) depend on hierarchical position. 
 
Perceived organizational image: Respondents were the general employees. This was 
measured with a an average of two Likert scale items formulated by us. The exact 
wordings of these were:  
Among professionals in your field of business, the image of your company is superior 
compared to your competitors. 
The customer image of your company is superior compared to your competitors. 
 
Perceived prospects of organizational performance: The respondents were the 
general employees. The one Likert scale item measure of this variable formulated by 
us was:  
The prospects of your company performance are very good. 
 
Perceived possibility to gain partner status: The respondents were the general 
employees. The one Likert scale item measure of this variable and formulated by us 
was: 
You have good chances to become a partner in the organization. 
 
We also include the straightforward controls in terms of years of age and tenure, as 
well as the number of prior employers. We subsequently developed (1-7) Likert scale 
variables of these items. The principle of translation for these items was to achieve a 
(close to) normal distribution of observations. 
Organization size. This was measured as the number of consultants in the 
organizations. Respondents were the superiors. We subsequently transformed these 
numbers into values on a Likert scale (1-5) using the principle of achieving a (close 
to) normal distribution of observations.  
Perceived competition in market segment: Respondents were the superiors. This was 
measured with one item formulated by us. The exact wording of the Likert scale item 
was:  





Business strategy: Respondents were the superiors. This was measured with one item 
referring to the extent that the company competes on price. The exact wording of the 
Likert scale item formulated by us was:  
Your company offers lower priced consulting products and services compared to your 
competitors (reverse coded). 
 
8.4 VALIDATION 
As noted by Stablein, 
“[r]research practice does not always live up to prescription...[According to 
a 1987] survey about two-thirds of published articles reported reliability 
evidence. A paltry 4,48 % of authors provided validity evidence. The 
failure to provide validity evidence is extremely important ...it is a failure 
to document two-way correspondence" (1996, p. 516)388.  
Stablein views what he calls two-way correspondence of constructs as essential. Two-
way correspondence requires a correspondence "between the data and the 
organizational reality the data represents" (ibid., p. 512), i.e. that the researcher is able 
"to map back from the symbolic system to the original empirical system of interest" 
(ibid., p. 513). The notion of two-way correspondence may but does not have to be 
seen as connected to the notion of "external validity" for which, according to Daft and 
Levin, quantitative research in general shows less interest (1990, p. 7; see also section 
5.3 in this thesis).  
It is somewhat unclear what Stablein means by "the original empirical system of 
interest". We might want to distinguish between correspondence to individuals' 
perceptions and correspondence to a reality independent of such perceptions. Both are 
however arguably problematical. In any case, Stablein argues that two-way 
correspondence necessitates evaluation in terms of convergent and discriminant 
validity in addition to reliability (1996, p. 516). As we will argue reliability and 
construct validity are related concepts/measures and only refer to the relations 
between constructs/composite scores and the items that are used to measure them. 
Neither reliability nor construct validity can justifiably establish correspondence 
between an independent organizational reality and the researcher's symbolic system.  
Discussions about the correspondence between a researcher's symbolic system and 
"meanings" of (or relationships between) phenomena completely independent of such 
a symbolic system exemplify, according to the neo-pragmatism outlined in chapter 2, 
a generally unfruitful way of talking. In particular, although researchers are able to 
establish reliability and construct (convergent and discriminant) validity they have 
only established a partial aggregate form of congruence with the "empirical reality" 
(most often based upon direct perceptions by human respondents). In principle the 
meaning attached to any concepts in a researchers quantified symbolic system versus 
                                               
388 Also Cliff argues that the effects on partial correlation analyses of "any lack of reliability or validity 
in the variables...[i]n many ways...resembles tuberculosis as it occurred a generation or two ago: They 
are widespread, the consequences are serious, the symptoms are easily overlooked, and most people are 




the (potentially many) meanings attached to, or the relationships between, phenomena 
in an organizational reality independent of the researcher can still differ.  
Ultimately, the justification of a researchers' symbolic system (quantified or not) is 
not even necessarily dependent on meanings as interpreted by human respondents. A 
fruitful explanation in some symbolic system may well serve to change elements of 
respondents' perceptions/structures of meaning. As already noted in chapter 2, human 
objects of research arguably do not necessarily have any epistemological primacy or 
priviledge although we can at least be said to have a moral duty to try to understand 
the relationship between any knowledge claim established by empirical science 
(quantitative or not) and the points of views of (at least) human objects of research 
(Rorty, 1980, p. 349). However, the old hermeneutical idea that we should be able to 
map back to a reality as truly conceived by the research objects can arguably in 
general be viewed as an unfruitful way of talking about what we are doing as social 
scientists. 
In any case, it should be more probable at least that we have a generalizable construct 
(which still does not mean that it is theoretically fruitful or meaningful) when it 
exhibits high reliability as well as convergent and discriminant validity in particular 
when fairly closely related but different constructs are included in the same analysis 
of validity. Both the measures of reliability and validity used in this thesis are 
however also dependent on the amount of error variances that the researcher allows to 
correlate in a confirmatory factor analysis as well as other more or less ad hoc 
modifications that the researcher introduces into a confirmatory factor model. As both 
reliability and validity are further dependent on the kind of measurement models in 
which the researcher includes any constructs, any analysis of construct validity thus 
appears at the most tentative in nature. 
Any type of quantitatively justifiable symbolic system from the point of view of a 
Rortyan neo-pragmatist (chapter 2) is, in addition to being dependent on reliability 
and construct validity, also essentially dependent on nomological validity. But even 
these together cannot establish correspondence. For a neo-pragmatist any form of 
correspondence is not something that can be differentiated from a well functioning 
explanation.  
Neo-pragmatism would thus suggest that the most justifiable way "to map back from 
the symbolic system to the original empirical system of interest" (Stablein, 1996, p. 
513) is to establish theoretically meaningful empirical relations between one validated 
construct and other validated constructs in some symbolic system. Such relations is 
what quantitative research pursues. The fruitfulness and justification for such "back-
mapping" is dependent on replications (and potential revisions) by other researchers 
with reference to similar and different populations. The overall justification of 
research using quantitative data is further potentially dependent on possible 
problematical evidence that can be established by e.g. qualitative research methods 
concerning the nature of, and relationships between, the constructs used in 
quantitative research (and ideally vice versa). In any case, any quantitative validation 
of constructs (including nomological relationships) in a symbolic system that a 
researcher is able to establish is arguably tentative in general, and particularly 




Below we will try to quantitatively test at least some aspects of validity and reliability 
of our constructs. Exploratory factor analyses including the items of several constructs 
have, usually in combination with Cronbach´s alphas for the factorial items, been used 
to validate constructs (e.g. Wayne et al., 1996). Bollen notes that the distinction in 
practice between confirmatory (CFA) and exploratory factor analysis (EFA) tends to 
be somewhat blurred (Bollen, 1989, p. 228). Nevertheless, when “hypotheses about 
plausible model structures exists, then exploratory factor analysis can frustrate 
attempts to test these ideas” (Bollen, 1989, p. 228). The disadvantages of exploratory 
factor analysis include the facts that  
“the technique does not allow the analyst to constrain some of the factor 
loadings to zero...[and it] does not allow correlated errors of measurement. 
This is problematic... [e.g. as] measurement errors may correlate because 
indicators come from the same source, because of response set bias in 
answering survey questions, or for some other reason. EFA confounds the 
correlated measurement errors with the latent factors, potentially leading to 
ambiguous and misleading solutions” (ibid., p. 232).  
These are clear dangers with reference to many of the variables used in the analyses 
below. Thus we have more or less clearly used confirmatory factor analysis to initially 
validate the constructs. However, before moving on to these validation analyses we 
will try to explicate the definitions and measures of validity and reliability used as 
well as our understanding of the meanings of these notions.  
8.4.1 Validity 
Bollen (1989) reviews different notions of validity. Content validity is “a qualitative 
type of validity where the domain of a concept is made clear and the analyst judges 
whether the measures fully represents the domain” (Bollen, 1989, p. 185). The 
qualitative validity-aspects of our HRM and intermediate attitudinal constructs have 
largely been discussed in the earlier chapters and we simply now assume these to be 
satisfactory. The same assumption applies to the rest of our variables. Criterion 
validity (ibid., p. 186) is for most variables not an issue here, i.e. it is not even in 
principle possible to assess it.  
Bollen describes some problems with traditional empirical means to measure 
construct validity389. According to Bollen the problems include the facts that the 
traditional measures 
“rely on correlations rather than structural coefficients...[and] that they use 
only observed measures rather than incorporating the latent variables into 
the analysis” (1989, p. 194). 
These and some other disadvantages are overcome by the alternative structural 
equation definition of construct validity provided by Bollen.  
                                               
389 Construct validity is generally conceived as consisting of trait validity and nomological validity. 
The latter can be evaluated only by structural analyses of relations between endogenous and exogenous 
variables/constructs. We return to these analyses below. Trait validity arguably consists of convergent 




“The validity of a measure xi of [a latent variable] ξj is the magnitude of 
the direct structural relation between ξj and xi....[T]he definition of a direct 
structural effect [or relation] depends on the model so this definition 
implies that the researcher has an explicit measurement model from which 
to evaluate validity” (ibid., p. 197)390. 
As a measure of validity so defined Bollen suggests several possibilities, two of which 
are the standardized and unstandardized validity coefficients (ibid., pp. 197-200). The 
former allows comparisons of indicators measured with different scales. Bollen argues 
that although in general both allow for comparisons of the relative influence of 
different latent variables on the indicators, the standardized coefficients allow for 
comparison of “the relative influence” of a latent variable on several indicators (ibid., 
p. 200). The standardized coefficients are however less useful in comparing different 
populations (ibid., p. 200). This parallells the advantages/disadvantages of 
standardized/unstandardized coefficients in regression analyses (ibid., p. 198). 
However, as Bollen notes, virtually all social science concepts have ambiguous units, 
including our constructs. Thus, the meaning of the unstandardized coefficients are 
uncertain (ibid., pp. 198-199). In addition, because all our items in the validation 
analyses involve 1-7 Likert scales (with the exception of two constructs with 1-5 
Likert scale items) there does not seem to be much difference between the two 
validity coefficients. Thus, we simply use the coefficients generated by LISREL 8.30 
on the basis of unstandardized observed items and unstandardized latent variables 
(Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1996, pp. 339-340).  
Explicit criteria for evaluating construct, convergent and discriminant validity so 
defined are not common. Bollen does not provide any. In fact he does not even 
explicitly discuss the relation of his structural equation measures of validity and the 
classical measures of convergent and discriminant validity.  
Nevertheless, we can arguably get an indication of our constructs´ validity, including 
convergent and discriminant properties by comparing and assessing the structure and 
levels of the coefficients in measurement models with acceptable general fit statistics. 
This is not a multimethod-multitrait approach to assess convergent and discriminant 
validity as described by Bollen (1989, p. 190-194). It is simply a multitrait multi-
indicator approach with the advantages over the classical approaches discussed by 
Bollen and noted above. We will assess convergent and discriminant validity by the 
criteria presented below (section 9.1.3). As long as these criteria are satisfied, there 
are not significant cross-loadings and the general fit statistics are acceptable, CFA’s 
would (in relation to their complexity) appear to bear witness of the convergent and 
discriminant properties of the proposed constructs based on the present data391. 
Bollen argues that correlation of error terms may be due to indicators coming “from 
the same source because of response set bias in answering survey questions or for 
                                               
390 We will analyze validities by several such measurement models. The most rigorous test is provided 
by the most complex measurement models. 
391 Discriminant validities can also be assessed by identifying differences in “nomological (or 
structural) relations between constructs (Nystedt et al., 1999, p. 50). The nomological relationsips will 




some other reason” (1989, p. 232). This might seem to imply that when including 
several constructs and their indicators in the same measurement model for assessing 
convergent and discriminant properties, correlations of error terms could be 
interpreted to include common method factors. However, this would arguably be the 
case only to the extent that we would have earlier robust evidence of the construct 
convergent and discriminant validities. Thus, pace Niehoff and Moorman (1993, p. 
538), in these analyses of validity we arguably cannot separate common method errors 
from bad convergent and discriminant properties392. 
Our validation analyses will be exhibited below, but first we will explicate our notion 
of reliability. 
8.4.2 Reliability 
Bollen explicates a structural equation definition of reliability as follows:  
“The [latent] variables with direct effects on xi [observed variable] are the 
systematic components of xi. All else is error. The stronger the systematic 
component, the greater is xi´s reliability. A straightforward measure of this 




According to Bollen, the advantages to more classical test theoretical measures of 
reliability (such as the Cronbach´s alpha) this structural equation definition of latent 
variable reliability makes “allowances for correlated errors of measurement” as well 
as for indicators “influenced by more than one latent variable” (ibid., p. 220-221)393. 
The advantages are thus parallell to the ones related to the measure of validity above. 
This measure of reliability is thus a measure of “the proportion of variance in a 
measure that is explained by the variables that directly affect xi” (ibid., p. 222). Bollen 
explicates the difference between his measure(s) of validity and reliability as follows:  
“[R]eliability measures all influences on variables – valid and invalid - on 
xi. Validity measures the strength of the direct effect of a particular ξj 
[latent variable] on xi” (ibid., p. 221). 
To the extent that we have only one latent variable influencing any observed variable 
in our measurement models, Bollen´s measure of reliability seems to be parallell to 
his measure of construct validity394.  
                                               
392 One (alternative) suggested procedure for evaluating convergent and discriminant properties is to 
compare a theoretically expected model with one in which "supposedly independent constructs...[are 
constrained] to be perfectly correlated and equally correlated with other constructs" (Kinicki, Prussia 
and McKee-Ryan, 2000, p. 95). Here the argument seems to be fairly weak, i.e. that if two constructs 
are not perfectly correlated they are discriminantly valid. We limit our analyses to concidering the 
statistics of the theoretically expected measurement models.  
393 However, just as the Cronbach´s alpha, Bollen´s measure of reliability does not apply to constructs 
with cause indicators (ibid., pp. 222-223). 
394 One might also argue that convergent validity as assessed by the level of the coefficients of the 




This brings out the fact that the distinction between reliability and validity as these 
phenomena are measured is not absolute. They are not completely independent 
measures. To the extent that convergent validity and discriminant validity are high 
also the measure of reliability will be high. This interdependent nature of the 
phenomena of validity and reliability is also exemplified by Bollen's measure of 
validity in terms of "unique validity variance" (1989, p. 200) which in fact is a 
function of reliability.  
This is in line with the claim above that it would be wrong to argue that construct 
validity (convergent and discriminant) is a measure of the extent to which a construct 
corresponds to reality or the extent to which it measures what it is supposed to 
measure, in any other sense than making a consistent distinction.  
The best measure for the relationship between a construct and "reality" would be to 
have a perfect criterion and criterion validity. Any form of "Platonic true scores" 
(Bollen, 1989, p. 188) are arguably unobtainable in general. But with reference to 
many (social) scientific concepts even empirical "true scores", i.e. criteria for 
assessing "concurrent validity" (ibid., p. 186) are not independently identifiable. With 
reference to such concepts or constructs the best quantitative alternative to perfect 
criterion validity we have is a set of nomological (predictive) validities in 
combination with evidence of construct validity and reliability. Replicable 
nomological validities are always likely to be dependent on construct validities and 
reliabilities but nomological validities including construct validities still operate at the 
level of meaning395. What we (should) refer to in a scientific discourse e.g. by 
'psychological empowerment' or 'HRM' (if we are able to successfully refer with these 
constructs at all) depends on what concepts or constructs give rise to the best 
nomological validities. Thus, (scientific questions) of empirical reference are 
ultimately simply a fallout of the best available empirical theories (Rorty, 1980, p. 
294). The interdependence between nomological validity and fruitful valid and 
reliable constructs is parallell to the ultimate interdependence of the phenomena of 
meaning and reference (see section 2.3.1). As suggested in section 2.3.1, these two 
cannot be fruitfully assessed independently. Nevertheless, before even getting 
involved with analyses of nomological validities and thus the potential theoretical 
fruitfulness of our constructs we need to establish some form of construct validities 
and reliabilities. 
In the next section we will thus exhibit the results of our measurement models 
(confirmatory factor analyses) of different combinations of our constructs where we 
assess reliabilities as well as convergent and discriminant validities as discussed 
above. 
                                                                                                                                      
and measures are included would be a measure more reminicent of the classical reliability measure for 
example in the form of Cronbach´s alpha. 
395 In the last instance this is of course true for any validity assessments in the sense that any interesting 




8.4.3 Analyses of validity and reliability 
The complexity of the CFA’s involving the more or less closely related different 
(attitudinal) constructs included in this study seems quickly to become unprecedented 
in earlier research. Therefore, before moving on to more complicated validation 
analyses we wanted to analyze/corroborate the basic empirical structure of the 
constructs in separate or simpler CFA’s. Some criteria for judging confirmatory factor 
model satisfaction are discussed by Jöreskog and Sörbom, (1993). The fit statistics we 
will use and the general criteria regarded as indicating satisfactory model fit are: R2 
(for the item)≥ 0,20; t-values (for item estimate)≥ 2,00; p-value for the chi-square 
statistic (of general model) ≥ 0,05; RMSEA ≤ 0,08; CFI ≥ 0,90; GFI ≥ 0,90; Critical 
N ≥ N.  
In line with Bollen's suggestion (above) for a definition of reliability we will thus 
provide the squared multiple correlation coefficient for xi's despite the fact that we 
have seen no specific criteria for evaluating them. In connection to the simpler CFA's 
we also provide Cronbach’s alpha coefficients which are generally used as indicators 
of the reliability of construct-items as reflectors of their respective constructs The 
Cronbach's alphas for most constructs used in this study are above or right at the .70 
threshold recommended by Nunally (1978).Three exceptions are 'procedural justice' 
and 'affective continuance commitment', and 'job opportunities'. However, in this 
study the scales for these constructs consist of only two variables each. Since the 
Cronbach’s alpha is sensitive to the number of items of any construct and since the 
CFA’s of these constructs are acceptable we regard the latter as more adequate 
evidence of the acceptable nature of these constructs. 
Thus, through a simple confirmatory factor analysis we could corroborate a second 
order multidimensional construct of psychological empowerment, with significant 
theoretically expected factor loadings, no cross-loadings and acceptable fit statistics. 
The Cronbach's alpha is 0.82. The results of this CFA are exhibited in table 2 396. 
                                               
396 This confirmatory factor analysis is in line with the only other one we know of (Spreitzer 1995, p. 
1457) although the loadings of the different dimensions are not exactly corresponding. The loadings 





Constructs, dimensions and indicators λ R2 t-value
Competence
Q128 0.79 0.64 8.25
Q92 0.92 0.84 -
Meaning
Q150 0.84 0.70 6.80
Q89 0.73 0.54 -
Impact
Q50 0.88 0.77 10.42
Q38 0.99 0.99 -
Autonomy
Q41 1.00 1.00 -
First
order
Q10 078 0.60 13.71
PSYCHOLOGICA L EMPOWERMENT
Competence 0.75 0.56 7.68
Meaning 0.81 0.65 6.34
Impact 0.60 0.36 6.51
Second
order
Autonomy 0.75 0.56 7.24
MODEL FIT: χ2 =28.6; df=15; p-value for χ2 =0.03;  RMSEA=0.08; CFI=0.98; GFI=0.95;
CN=133





A three dimensional second order construct of affective commitment did not exhibit 
acceptable λ's. Neither did a two dimensional second order construct of affective 
commitment involving the dimension of loyalty. However, in line with the arguments 
about the two different aspects of commitment (section 7.2.4.2), our data/analyses 
indicate the existence of two separate constructs, i.e. one second order construct of 
affective commitment (Cronbach's alpha = 0.70) and one first order construct of 
continuance commitment (Cronbach's alpha = 0.50). The properties of a first order 
factor analysis involving all the three dimensions of commitment, and thus also the 
first order construct of continuance commitment, is exhibited in table 3a. The 
properties of the second order construct based upon a CFA involving also the second 
order construct of psychological empowerment (due to reasons of identification) is 
exhibited in table 3b397.  
                                               
397 In fact, we have nowhere seen it empirically established that affective commitment or any other 
form of a multidimensional construct of commitment actually produces a second order construct. This 





Constructs, dimensions and indicators λ R2 t-value
Identification
Q28 0.75 0.56 8.46
Q85 0.67 0.45 7.56
Involvement
Q76 0.76 0.58 8.40
Q119 0.86 0.73 9.39
Affective continuance commitment (Loyalty)
Q47 0.75 0.56 7.02
First
order
Q87 0.54 0.29 5.42











Constructs, dimensions and indicators λ R2 t-value
Competence
Q128 0.80 0.65 8.80
Q92 0.96 0.91 -
Meaning
Q150 1.00 1.00 -
Q89 0.43 0.54* 5.85
Impact
Q50 0.89 0.79 13.50
Q38 0.99 0.99 -
Autonomy
Q41 0.92 0.85 7.68
Q10 0.82 0.67 -
Identification
Q28 0.67 0.45 -
Q85 0.75 0.56 6.64
Involvement
Q76 0.82 0.67 -
First
order
Q119 0.83 0.67 8.27
PSYCHOLOGICA L EMPOWERMENT
Competence -0.68 0.47 -7.65
Meaning -0.69 0.48 -8.21
Impact -0.70 0.48 -8.15
Autonomy -0.61 0.37 -5.53
AFFECTIVE VA LUE COMMITMENT
Identificat ion 0.90 0.80 6.74
Second
order
Involvement 0.71 0.52 6.77
MODEL FIT: χ2 =59.8; df=43; p-value for χ2 =0.06;  RMSEA=0.05; CFI=0.98; GFI=0.93;
CN=140
ERROR CORRELATIONS: (+)Q89/Q128; Q89/Q50; Q92/Q38;
                                               (-)Q119/Q38
CROSS LOADINGS: Q89 = 0.42 (4.72) x Involvement
*Includes cross loading item
METHOD: ML
N = 125
We could also establish a second order construct of organizational citizenship 
behavior. However, we excluded the "extra-item" introduced by us since it did not 
load on any of the dimensions. Further, including all the "original" items the first 
order constructs of 'advocacy participation' and 'functional participation' cross loaded 
on item 'OCB 25' producing an unacceptable λ between 'advocacy participation' and 
this item. The result of the CFA excluding 'OCB 25' is exhibited in table 4a The 




acceptable properties (Cronbach's alpha = 0.83). In table 4b we also exhibit the 
properties of a shortened second order construct of organizational citizenship behavior 
with only two items per first order construct (Cronbach's alpha = 0.66)398. 
Table 4a
Constructs, dimensions and indicators λ R2 t-value
Advocacy Participation
Q56 0.67 0.44 -
Q64 0.70 0.49 8.17
Q52 0.47 0.22 4.66
Q91 0.69 0.48 6.54
Q138 0.79 0.62 7.19
Loyal Boosterism
Q37 0.77 0.60 -
Q116 0.89 0.80 9.17
Q13 0.63 0.40 6.94
Interpersonal Helping
Q70 0.51 0.27 -
Q73 0.46 0.21 3.95
Q140 0.76 0.57 5.27
Functional Participation
Q86 0.84 0.76 4.53
First
order
Q60 0.49 0.24 -
ORGANIZATIONAL CITIZENSHIP BEHAVIOR
Advocacy Participation 0.92 0.84 7.14
Loyal Boosterism 0.76 0.57 6.98
Interpersonal Helping 0.97 0.95 5.49
Second
order
Functional Part icipation 0.85 0.72 4.42
MODEL FIT: χ2 =90.2; df=60; p-value for χ2 =0.03;  RMSEA=0.05; CFI=0.95; GFI=0.91;
CN=122





                                               
398 Also these CFA's have some independent interest since we have seen no prior evidence for the fact 






Constructs, dimensions and indicators λ R2 t-value
Advocacy Participation
Q56 0.78 0.61 -
Q64 0.82 0.68 7.47
Loyal Boosterism
Q37 0.77 0.59 -
Q116 0.89 0.79 6.69
Interpersonal Helping
Q70 0.66 0.44 -
Q73 0.59 0.35 3.84
Functional Participation
Q60 0.48 0.23 -
First
order
Q86 0.85 0.73 4.53
ORGANIZATIONAL CITIZENSHIP BEHAVIOR
Advocacy Participation 0.82 0.67 6.90
Loyal Boosterism 0.67 0.44 5.42
Interpersonal Helping 0.68 0.47 4.76
Second
order
Functional Participation 0.95 0.90 4.44







Our initial simple CFA’s indicate that, as expected, leader support (Cronbach's alpha 
= 0.86) and co-worker support (Cronbach's alpha = 0.71) exhibit uni-dimensional 
factor structures. However, including all the items of leader support did not produce a 
model with acceptable fit statistics. Excluding item 'PLSQ148' resulted in a CFA with 
(relatively) good fit statistics. All the items for the construct of co-worker support 
resulted in a uni-dimensional construct. However, since the degrees of freedom with 
only five and respectively four items is very small we show a CFA where both these 
constructs are included. Thus, the CFA exhibited in table 5 indicates that these two 





Constructs, dimensions and indicators λ R2 t-value
PERCEIVED CO-WORKER SUPPORT
Q145 0.72 0.51 8.33
Q14 0.73 0.53 8.52
Q77 0.71 0.50 8.21
Q123 0.54 0.29 5.88
PERCEIVED LEADER SUPPORT
Q109 0.79 0.62 10.21
Q106 0.79 0.63 10.31
Q93 0.82 0.67 10.78
Q126 0.87 0.76 11.94
First
order
Q151 0.65 0.42 7.77







We were not able to corroborate an expected uni-dimensional construct of 
organization support even as the Cronbachs's alpha (0.87) indicate good reliability of 
all the items. The result of a CFA constraining the items to load on the same construct 
is exhibited in table 6a. Still including all the original items but exploratively 
distinguishing between three conceptually arguably meaningful dimensions which we 
labeled ‘respect’, ‘forgiving climate’, and ‘tolerance’ resulted in better loadings and 
somewhat better but still not acceptable fit statistics (table 6b). Taking two of the best 
loading items from the dimension 'respect' and the two items for each of the other 
dimensions produced a model of three first order factors with acceptable fits statistics 
while not exhibiting acceptable uni-dimensional properties. These items also 
produced a second order construct with good fit statistics with the exception of a 
somewhat high RMSEA (Cronbach's alpha = 0.73). The second order CFA is 
exhibited in table 6c. In fact the fit statistics would have been even better would we 
have taken the two best loading items reflecting 'respect' in the CFA exhibited in table 
6b but these seemed conceptually almost identical and thus less meaningful399.  
                                               
399 Eisenberger and Huntington present some evidence for the unidimensionality of their construct of 
organization support. This evidence is in the form of a principal component analysis, an exploratory 
factor analysis and Cronbach’s alpha (1993, p. 503). The Cronbach's alpha (= 0.87) for all the items 
included in the present study also indicate unidimensional reliability while an exploratory factor 
analysis does not. Although we did not include all the original items of the construct of perceived 
organization support, the indication provided by our data and CFA that at least a subset in terms of the 
included items of this construct may not be unidimensional and may form a meaningful three 
dimensional second order construct has some independent interest. It may also be noted that a CFA 
testing the unidimensionality of the measurement instrument for POS with all 17 items has produced 
questionable fit statistics elsewhere (Shore and Tetrcik, 1991, p.639). These authors did not report the p-





Constructs, dimensions and indicators λ R2 t-value
PERCEIVED ORGANIZATION SUPPORT
Q59 0.55 0.30 6.32
Q80 0.46 0.21 5.19
Q88 0.75 0.57 9.56
Q103 0.74 0.54 9.26
Q120 0.85 0.72 11.36
Q45 0.64 0.41 7.63
Q81 0.58 0.34 6.80
Q11 0.59 0.35 6.95
Q33 0.53 0.28 6.13
Q48 0.44 0.19 4.91
Q53 0.48 0.23 5.44
Q54 0.43 0.18 4.78
Q84 0.48 0.23 5.38
First
order
Q142 0.73 0.54 9.23










Constructs, dimensions and indicators λ R2 t-value
Tolerance
Q59 0.88 0.77 9.35
Q53 0.76 0.58 8.17
Forgiving climate
Q80 0.60 0.37 5.73
Q84 0.61 0.37 5.73
Respect
Q88 0.76 0.58 9.68
Q103 0.75 0.56 9.50
Q120 0.85 0.72 11.43
Q45 0.63 0.40 7.53
Q81 0.57 0.32 6.64
Q11 0.60 0.36 7.06
Q33 0.53 0.28 6.06
Q48 0.43 0.19 4.85
Q54 0.42 0.58 4.63
First
order
Q142 0.74 0.17 9.29







Constructs, dimensions and indicators λ R2 t-value
Tolerance
Q59 0.86 0.73 -
Q53 0.78 0.61 5.70
Forgiving climate
Q80 0.62 0.39 -
Q84 0.59 0.35 3.63
Respect
Q103 0.70 0.49 -
First
order
Q120 0.97 0.94 6.17
PERCEIVED ORGANIZATION SUPPORT
Tolerance 0.58 0.33 4.48
Forgiving Climate 0.68 0.46 3.95
Second
order
Respect 0.91 0.83 4.49










While the three dimensional construct of interactional justice exhibits acceptable 
properties (Cronbach's alpha = 0.79), including all our three items of the construct of 
procedural justice did not result in an acceptable factor structure. Table 7a exhibits a 
CFA which provides evidence of this (together with the construct of affective 
continuance commitment in order to increase the degrees of freedom somewhat). 
Also, conceptually the item not loading significantly on 'procedural justice' would 
seem to reflect the results of any procedural justice rather than procedural justice 
itself. When we excluded this item the CFA exhibited satisfactory fit statistics 
although the items reflecting procedural justice still exhibits lowish but still 
acceptable λ:s (Table 7b). The Cronbach's alpha for the two items related to 
procedural justice is only 0.38. 
Table 7a
Constructs, dimensions and indicators λ R2 t-value
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
Q17 0.44 0.19 3.98
Q83 0.48 0.23 4.20
Q74 0.03 0.00 0.34
INTERACTIONAL JUSTICE
Q34 0.83 0.69 10.74
Q149 0.85 0.72 11.01
Q105 0.70 0.49 8.42
AFFECTIVE CONTINUANCE COMMITMENT
Q47 0.71 0.51 5.85
First
order
Q87 0.56 0.32 5.08










Constructs, dimensions and indicators λ R2 t-value
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
Q17 0.45 0.20 4.10
Q83 0.48 0.23 4.33
INTERACTIONAL JUSTICE
Q34 0.83 0.69 10.76
Q149 0.85 0.72 11.01
Q105 0.70 0.48 8.41
AFFECTIVE CONTINUANCE COMMITMENT
Q47 0.71 0.50 5.83
First
order
Q87 0.57 0.32 5.09






While the Cronbach's alpha for all the items related to distributive justice is 
acceptable (= 0. 69), in distinction to some earlier research our data/analyses indicate 
that this construct is best conceived of as a two-dimensional second order construct 
with first order constructs related to the nature of rewards and nature of work 
respectively rather than a uni-dimensional one. The results of a uni-dimensional CFA 
are exhibited in table 8a. The factor loadings, p-value for the chi square statistic, 
RMSEA and the Critical N indicate bad model fit. With only two items per first order 
factor a CFA of all the justice related constructs exhibited very good fit statistics 
when using a two factor structure of distributive justice while the fit statistics were not 
acceptable when constraining the latter to a uni-dimensional construct. The former 
analysis is exhibited in table 8b below400. The result of a second order CFA with the 
two dimensional contruct of distributive justice (for identifcatory reasons together 
with the construct of organization support) is presented in table 8c. 
                                               
400 This evidence is in some conflict with Moorman (1991, p. 850) as well as Niehoff and Moorman 
(1993, p. 541). A disturbing element in evaluating the difference between our CFA and these other two 
CFA’s is, apart form the fact that we did not use all the items included in the latter two, that both 
Moorman (1991) and Niehoff and Moorman (1993) report p-values of the chi-square statistic of less 
than 0.001 in fact indicating that their CFA’s did not exhibit a very good fit. In fact, to the extent that 
we use all the items for the justice related constructs except the item for procedural justice which both 
on conceptual and statistical grounds was discarded above and a unidimensional construct of 
distributive justice we could corroborate the findings of Niehoff and Moorman (1993). The CFI in such 
a CFA was 0.92 while theirs was 0.92 (ibid., p. 541). The p-value for the chi-square statistic based 
upon the current data was 0.00016 while Niehoff and Moorman's was < 0.001. In order to increase the 
p-value over the completely acceptable level of 0.05 two error correlations and one cross loading had to 
be allowed. With the two first order factors for distributive justice the fit statistics are better with only 
one free error correlation, the p-value for the chi square statistic then being 0.02 and the other fit 





Constructs, dimensions and indicators λ R2 t-value
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Q9 0.84 0.71 10.03
Q16 0.32 0.10 3.43
Q29 0.93 0.87 11.33
First
order
Q51 0.51 0.26 5.71







Constructs, dimensions and indicators λ R2 t-value
Distributive justice/Rewards
Q9 0.80 0.63 9.47
Q29 0.97 0.97 12.05
Distributive Justice/Work
Q16 0.45 0.20 4.31
Q51 0.83 0.69 6.29
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
Q17 0.47 0.22 4.23
Q83 0.46 0.22 4.22
INTERACTIONAL JUSTICE
Q34 0.84 0.70 10.94
Q149 0.85 0.71 11.01
First
order
Q105 0.70 0.49 8.50
MODEL FIT: χ2 =35.4; df=20; p-value for χ2 =0.02;  RMSEA=0.08; CFI=0.96; GFI=0.94;
CN=125









Constructs, dimensions and indicators λ R2 t-value
Tolerance
Q59 0.88 0.78 -
Q53 0.76 0.57 5.93
Forgiving climate
Q80 0.59 0.35 -
Q84 0.62 0.39 3.59
Respect
Q103 0.70 0.49 -
Q120 0.97 0.94 6.51
Distributive justice/Rewards
Q9 0.83 0.69 -
Q29 0.95 0.90 8.07
Distributive Justice/Work
Q16 0.43 0.19 -
First
order
Q51 0.87 0.75 3.14
PERCEIVED ORGANIZATION SUPPORT
Tolerance 0.64 0.41 5.67
Forgiving Climate 0.70 0.50 4.10
Respect 0.83 0.68 5.19
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Distributive justice/Rewards 0.70 0.49 5.22
Second
order
Distributive Justice/Work 0.82 0.68 2.99






Finally, the less well established constructs of workload and alternative job 
opportunities did not form good uni-dimensional constructs as expected. Rather, as 
shown by the CFA in table 9 one item from each scale formed both conceptually and 
statistically justifiable distinct variables. The unexpected distinct variables were 
labeled 'too big demands' and 'job offers' respectively. The CFA also exhibits the 
properties of the construct of organizational image. Cronbach's alpha for the three 
items reflecting workload is 0.69, for the two items reflecting job opportunities it is 





Constructs, dimensions and indicators λ R2 t-value
JOB OPPORTUNITIES
Q49 0.98 0.97 8.38
Q117 0.62 0.38 6.10
JOB OFFERS
Q39 1.00 1.00 -
WORKLOAD
Q44 0.53 0.28 4.90
Q57 0.65 0.42 6.16
Q71 0.71 0.50 6.66
DEMANDS
Q18 1.00 1.00 -
PERCEIVED ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE
Q19 1.00 1.00 -
First
order
Q111 0.74 0.55 12.42
MODEL FIT: χ2 =33.7; df=19; p-value for χ2 =0.02;  RMSEA=0.08; CFI=0.95; GFI=0.94;
CN=132




Finally, our items related to employee work performance formed two conceptually 
justifiable distinct constructs, one four item construct in terms of quality/efficiency of 
employee performance (Cronbach's alpha = 0.83) and one two item construct in terms 
of employee innovativity concerning products and processes (Cronbach's alpha = 





Constructs, dimensions and indicators λ R2 t-value
EMPLOYE PERFORMANCE: QUALITY/EFFICIENCY
SQ0B 0.77 0.59 9.63
SQ0E 0.84 0.70 10.77
SQ0C 0.82 0.68 10.53
SQ0H 0.68 0.46 8.14
EMPLOYE PERFORMANCE: INTERNAL INNOVATIVITY
SQ0G 0.76 0.57 6.88
First
order
SQ0A 0.89 0.84 7.89
MODEL FIT: χ2 =12.5; df=7; p-value for χ2 =0.07; RMSEA=0.08; CFI=0.98; GFI=0.97;
CN=184




In line with our expectations, the organizational performance items did not form an 
acceptable unidimensional construct. Rather, the items measuring perceived customer 
satisfaction and the perceived quality of products and services formed one construct 
we labeled organizational performance in terms of quality (Cronbach's alpha = 0.72) 
distinct from the one item variable tapping organizational profitability. The evidence 
is exhibited in Table 11. Due to the otherwise very low degrees of freedom the CFA 
includes also the employee performance constructs. With one free error correlation 
and one cross loading between the construct of organizational quality and one item 
primarily reflecting employee performance in terms of quality/efficiency the CFA 





Constructs, dimensions and indicators λ R2 t-value
EMPLOYE PERFORMANCE: QUALITY/EFFICIENCY
SQ0B 0.76 0.58 9.59
SQ0E 0.83 0.70 10.76
SQ0C 0.82 0.67 10.52
SQ0H 0.64 0.51* 7.85
EMPLOYE PERFORMANCE: INTERNAL INNOVATIVITY
SQ0G 0.81 0.66 8.09
SQ0A 0.83 0.72 8.51
ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE: QUALITY
SQ6 0.65 0.42 9.54




SQ10 1.00 1.00 -
MODEL FIT: χ2 =37.7; df=21; p-value for χ2 =0.01;  RMSEA=0.08; CFI=0.96; GFI=0.94;
CN=118
ERROR CORRELATIONS: (+) SQ0A/SQ0B
CROSS LOADINGS: SQ0H = 0.21 (3.12) x Organizational Perfo rmance: quality
* Includes cross-loading item
METHOD: ML
N = 125
In summary, with a reasonably limited degree of item deletions and modifications, the 
above outlined criteria for model evaluation in terms of R2 values, t-values, factor 
loadings and general fit statistics in terms of p-value, RMSEA, CFI, GFI and Critical 
N are satisfied for mostof the above shown fairly simple CFA's. This thus gives some 
initial credibility to the data and the constructs used. However, more proper analyses 
of validities can only be established by including several (or ideally all) constructs in 
the same analyses. 
Concerning stuctural equation analyses Niehoff and Moorman note that 
“researchers attempting to model relationships among a large number of 
latent variables have found it difficult to fit such models to predictions with 
even strong theoretical support...Therefore [they argue], steps are needed 
that decrease the number of indicators used yet maintain the estimation of 
measurement error given by using multiple-item indicators” (1993, p. 538). 
Because of our medium sample size401 and the large number of parameters to be 
estimated we also needed to reduce the number of parameters in our structural 
equation analyses. This is most often noted as the reason for researchers forming 
composite scores of at least some of the variables in their structural equation analyses 
(e.g. Moorman, Blakely and Niehoff, 1998, p. 607; Settoon, Bennett, and Liden, 1996, 
                                               
401 Bollen notes that a “sample size of 138 is neither conspiciously small nor large” (1989, p. 269). 




p. 222; Niehoff and Moorman, 1993, p. 538; Wayne, Shore, and Liden, 1997, p. 100). 
However, the extent to which there may also often be problems with discriminant 
validities is in most cases not adequately shown. Below we shall analyze the extent to 
which this is the case in our data. Both Niehoff and Moorman (1993, p. 538) as well 
as e.g. Settoon et al. (1996, p. 222) follow procedures of creating scale scores or 
manifest indicators for latent variables by averaging the items for each scale related to 
uni-dimensional constructs and for each subscale related to multidimensional 
constructs. These procedures will also be utilized by us402. Further, although much 
debated, the method of using only a limited amount of all the items included in 
original measurement instruments for any latent variables has been recommended e.g. 
by Hayduk (1987, p. 218)403. By these procedures we have attempted to use as many 
latent model constructs as possible instead of composite scores in our structural 
equation analyses/complex CFA's. Based on these more complex CFA's we will then 
also create the ultimate scale scores to be used in the regression analyses.  
The (first) reduction of complexity is based on the separate confirmatory factor 
analyses described above. We averaged the items of each dimensions of psychological 
empowerment and affective value commitment and used these scales to create and test 
the respective first order multidimensional constructs. The results are exhibited in 
table 12.  
                                               
402 These or very similar procedures of data reduction are more or less standard in the research 
literature as is evidenced e.g. also by Moorman, Blakely and Niehoff (1998, p. 607) and Wayne, Shore, 
and Liden (1997, p. 100). 
403 Hayduk argues that we should begin with "the single best indicator...[or] the fewest variables for 
which the most is known " (ibid., p. 218). We will not strictly follow the rule of beginning with "the 
single best indicator" nor be able to claim that there are any specific variables reflecting our constructs 
"for which the most is known". We will however, in order to simplify the analyses, follow the general 
recommendation of using a fewer number of indicators than included in some original measurement 
instruments. We will broadly choose indicators which seem both conceptually meaningful and, if 
possible at all, allow us to achieve acceptable properties of convergent and discriminant validity. 





Constructs, dimensions and indicators λ R2 t-value
PSYCHOLOGICA L EMPOWERMENT
Competence 064. 0.41 7.41
Meaning 0.71 0.51 8.41
Impact 0.64 0.41 7.33
Autonomy 0.54 0.29 6.02
AFFECTIVE VA LUE COMMITMENT
Identificat ion 0.69 0.47 7.77
First
order
Involvement 0.68 0.46 7.63






Following these procedures we were also able to validate a simplified first order 
factor structure of organizational citizenship behavior. However, at this simplified 
level, only a three-dimensional construct of organizational citizenship behavior 
exhibited satisfactory statistics while the λ for the item 'functional participation' was 
low (=0.26). These three and four dimensional constructs are exhibited in table 13. 
We will use the three dimensional construct in the more complex analyses below of 
convergent and discriminant properties of the constructs. The Cronbach's alpha for the 
original six items of this construct is 0.71. 
Table 13
Constructs, dimensions and indicators λ R2 t-value
ORGANIZATIONAL CITIZENSHIP BEHAVIOR
Interpersonal Helping 0.48 0.23 4.40
Loyal Boosterism 0.74 0.54 5.66
First
order
Advocacy Participation 0.60 0.36 5.09






Using the same method of creating scale scores on the basis of our analyses of the 
multidimensional second order nature of our constructs of perceived organization 
support and distributive justice we were also able to validate first order versions of 
these multidimensional constructs. In order to further reduce the complexity we were 




0.76), co-worker support (Cronbach's alpha = 0.72) and interactional justice 
(Cronbach's alpha = 0.70). Evidence for the validity of these constructs is presented 
below. 
Robust convergent and discriminant properties of the attitudinal organizational 
behavior constructs used in this thesis are far from having been established by earlier 
research and including all of them in the same analyses based upon the current data 
did not produce an acceptable confirmatory factor model. In order to further probe the 
degree of validity of our constructs we thus performed a set of more overall 
confirmatory factor analyses including several (combinations) of our reduced 
constructs. The results of these more complex CFA’s are exhibited below.  
We begin with a CFA including the focal theoretical attitudinal constructs. With the 
exception of a low λ for 'interpersonal helping' this CFA exhibits acceptable statistics 
(table 14). The model includes three free error correlations which considering the 
theoretical affinity of the constructs and in particular the conceptual closeness of some 
of the items and the potential common method errors involved does not appear to be 
unreasonable. In addition, the model involves two cross loadings in that 'affective 
continuance commitment' loads on both 'identification' and 'loyal boosterism'. 
However, the construct of affective continuance commitment nevertheless appears to 
be clearly distinct from the constructs of affective value commitment and 
organizational citizenship behavior in that, with these modifications and cross-






Constructs, dimensions and indicators λ R2 t-value
PSYCHOLOGICA L EMPOWERMENT
Meaning 0.65 0.44 8.23
Competence 0.63 0.39 7.52
Impact 0.66 0.44 8.03
Autonomy 0.47 0.22 5.49
ORGANIZATIONAL CITIZENSHIP BEHAVIOR
Interpersonal Helping 0.26 0.07 2.81
Loyal Boosterism 0.66 0.74* 8.28
Advocacy Participation 0.72 0.52 8.41
AFFECTIVE CONTINUANCE COMMITMENT
Q47 0.74 0.54 8.07
Q87 0.52 0.27 5.65
AFFECTIVE VA LUE COMMITMENT
Involvement 0.75 0.57 8.41
First
order
Identificat ion 0.60 0.79* 7.55
MODEL FIT: χ2 =48.5; df=33; p-value for χ2 =0.04;  RMSEA=0.06; CFI=0.95; GFI=0.93;
CN=120
ERROR CORRELATIONS: (+) Meaning/Competence; Meaning/Q87; Involvement/Loyal
                                                    Boosterism
CROSS LOADINGS: Identification = 0.64 (6.68) x CONTINUANCE COMMITMENT
                                    Loyal Boosterism = 0.53 (5.78) x CONTINUANCE
                                    COMMITMENT
* Includes cross loading item
METHOD: ML
N = 125
Next we performed a CFA including all the support and justice related constructs 
(table 15). With three free error correlations this model exhibits good statistics. Also 
these error correlations seem acceptable and potentially at least partly due to common 





Constructs, dimensions and indicators λ R2 t-value
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Distribut ive just ice: Rewards 0.70 0.49 5.87
Distribut ive Just ice: Work 0.64 0.41 5.57
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
Q17 0.50 0.25 4.56
Q83 0.44 0.19 4.17
INTERACTIONAL JUSTICE
Q149 0.83 0.69 10.58
Q105 0.76 0.57 9.36
PERCEIVED CO-WORKER SUPPORT
Q145 0.70 0.48 7.56
Q14 0.79 0.63 8.58
PERCEIVED LEADER SUPPORT
Q109 0.88 0.77 11.78
Q106 0.78 0.61 10.01
PERCEIVED ORGANIZATION SUPPORT
Respect 0.94 0.87 12.47
Tolerance 0.48 0.23 5.53
First
order
Forgiving Climate 0.44 0.19 5.02
MODEL FIT: χ2 =66.7; df=48; p-value for χ2 =0.07;  RMSEA=0.05; CFI=0.97; GFI=0.93;
CN=138




We continued by performing three separate CFA's with all the justice and support 
related constructs in combination with, in turn, 'psychological empowerment', the two 
commitment constructs and lastly 'organizational citizenship behavior'. 
The CFA including 'psychological empowerment' demanded a large amount of free 
error correlations (table 16). These error correlations may be seen as being due to the 
conceptual closeness of the constructs, common method errors and partly as purely 
technical and thus not really justified. Since we have seen no CFA's including such a 
large set of related constructs of organizational behavior we simply want to show 
what is needed if we want to argue that these constructs at least on the basis of the 
current data are both theoretically and empirically distinguishable. In addition to the 
error correlations there is also one cross loading. This is only indicatory since the 
cross loadings are dependent on the nr. of free error correlations allowed'. Despite the 
somewhat problematical nature of this CFA we claim that it nevertheless indicates 





Constructs, dimensions and indicators λ R2 t-value
PSYCHOLOGICAL EMPOWERMENT
Meaning 0.51 0.27 5.78
Competence 0.40 0.16 4.26
Impact 0.83 0.68 9.64
Autonomy 0.48 0.23 5.45
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Distribut ive just ice: Rewards 0.84 0.70 7.52
Distribut ive Just ice: Work 0.49 0.24 5.24
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
Q17 0.51 0.27 4.97
Q83 0.44 0.20 4.43
INTERACTIONAL JUSTICE
Q149 0.82 0.67 10.59
Q105 0.76 0.59 9.73
PERCEIVED CO-WORKER SUPPORT
Q145 0.76 0.58 8.63
Q14 0.67 0.54 7.49
PERCEIVED LEADER SUPPORT
Q109 0.88 0.77 11.91
Q106 0.78 0.61 10.09
PERCEIVED ORGANIZATION SUPPORT
Respect 0.95 0.89 12.80
Tolerance 0.47 0.21 5.40




Index 1.00 1.00 -
MODEL FIT: χ2 =132.1; df=95; p-value for χ2 =0.03; RMSEA=0.05; CFI=0.96; GFI=0.90;
CN=123
ERROR CORRELATIONS: (+) Meaning/Competence; Meaning/ Q149; Meaning/Q145;
                                                     Autonomy/Distr.Justice: work; Autonomy/Q17
                                                (-) Distr.Justice: rewards/Q83; Meaning/Tolerance




The corresponding analysis including 'affective value commitment' and 'affective 
continuance commitment' exhibits a clearer structure in that much less free error 
correlations are needed (table 17). The free error correlations in this model should be 
regarded as clearly acceptable. The model also involves three crossloadings but all the 
original items appear to properly reflect their respective constructs. Thus, this model 






Constructs, dimensions and indicators λ R2 t-value
AFFECTIVE VALUE COMMITMENT
Ident ificat ion 0.67 0.76* 7.58
Involvement 0.73 0.54 7.26
AFFECTIVE CONTINUANCE COMMITMENT
Q47 0.81 0.65 7.44
Q87 0.43 0.32* 4.50
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Distribut ive just ice: Rewards 0.75 0.57 7.47
Distribut ive Just ice: Work 0.55 0.31 5.67
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
Q17 0.51 0.26 4.66
Q83 0.44 0.19 4.19
INTERACTIONAL JUSTICE
Q149 0.84 0.70 10.85
Q105 0.75 0.57 9.37
PERCEIVED CO-WORKER SUPPORT
Q145 0.92 0.85 9.24
Q14 0.57 0.51* 6.27
PERCEIVED LEADER SUPPORT
Q109 0.91 0.80 12.32
Q106 0.77 0.60 10.00
PERCEIVED ORGANIZATION SUPPORT
Respect 0.93 0.85 12.29
Tolerance 0.49 0.24 5.61




Index 1.00 1.00 -
MODEL FIT: χ2 =127.8; df=93; p-value for χ2 =0.06; RMSEA=0.04; CFI=0.96; GFI=0.91;
CN=124
ERROR CORRELATIONS: (+) Q83/Respect; Identificat ion/ Q106; Q109/Q87;
                                                     IPJ149/PLS109
CROSSLOADINGS: Q14 = 0.38 (4.31) x Distributive Justice
                                   Q87 = 0.32 (3.47) x Perceived Co-Worker Support
                                   Identification = 0.60 (6.08) x Affective Continuance Commitment




The corresponding analysis including the construct of organizational citizenship 
behavior exhibits acceptable statistics with the exception of the clearly low λ and 
corresponding R2 for 'interpersonal helping' (table 18). The model thus arguably 






Constructs, dimensions and indicators λ R2 t-value
ORGANIZATIONAL CITIZENSHIP BEHAVIOR
Interpersonal Helping 0.40 0.16 4.32
Loyal Boosterism 0.92 0.85 10.08
Advocacy Participat ion 0.48 0.23 5.21
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Distribut ive just ice: Rewards 1.00 1.00 -
Distribut ive Just ice: Work 0.45 0.21 5.66
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
Q17 0.42 0.34* 4.30
Q83 0.49 0.24 4.46
INTERACTIONAL JUSTICE
Q149 0.84 0.71 10.78
Q105 0.75 0.56 9.26
PERCEIVED CO-WORKER SUPPORT
Q145 0.74 0.55 8.53
Q14 0.72 0.61* 8.66
PERCEIVED LEADER SUPPORT
Q109 0.89 0.78 12.06
Q106 0.77 0.60 9.92
PERCEIVED ORGANIZATION SUPPORT
Respect 0.94 0.88 12.45
Tolerance 0.47 0.22 5.44




Index 1.00 1.00 -
MODEL FIT: χ2 =115.3; df=89; p-value for χ2 =0.03; RMSEA=0.05; CFI=0.97; GFI=0.90;
CN=129
ERROR CORRELATIONS: (+) Q83/Respect; Q106/Q149;
CROSSLOADINGS: Q14 = 0.23 (2.79) x Distributive Justice
                                   Q17 = 0.37 (3.68) x Distributive Justice




Finally we also performed three CFA's to test convergent and discriminant properties 
of the attitudinal constructs and the constructs of employee and organizational 
performance. Since the question of the distinctiveness of organizational citizenship 
behavior and "in-role" performance has explicitly been discussed as noted in section 
7.2.4.3, we performed two CFA's with our actual work performance constructs and 
the constructs of organizational citizenship behavior, one with the latter as a second 
order construct (table 19a) and one with the shortened first order version of this 
construct (table 19b). Both of these analyses exhibit acceptable statistics again 
however with the exception of a low λ for 'interpersonal helping' with reference to the 





Constructs, dimensions and indicators λ R2 t-value
EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE: QUALITY/EFFICIENCY
SQ0B 0.75 0.58 9.58
SQ0E 0.83 0.69 10.74
SQ0C 0.82 0.67 10.51
SQ0H 0.68 0.47 8.17
EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE. INTERNAL INNOVATIVITY
SQ0G 0.85 0.72 9.02
SQ0A 0.79 0.67 8.87
Advocacy Participation
Q56 0.79 0.63 -
Q64 0.81 0.66 7.80
Loyal Boosterism
Q37 0.77 0.61 -
Q116 0.88 0.77 6.57
Interpersonal Helping
Q70 0.68 0.46 -
Q73 0.58 0.34 3.74
Functional Participation
Q60 0.48 0.23 -
First
order
Q86 0.85 0.73 4.54
ORGANIZATIONAL CITIZENSHIP BEHAVIOR
Advocacy Participation 0.86 0.73 7.46
Loyal Boosterism 0.65 0.42 5.37
Interpersonal Helping 0.67 0.44 4.77
Second
order
Functional Participation 0.93 0.86 4.44
MODEL FIT: χ2 =87.0; df=69; p-value for χ2 =0.07;  RMSEA=0.05; CFI=0.96; GFI=0.91;
CN=131









Constructs, dimensions and indicators λ R2 t-value
EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE: QUALITY/EFFICIENCY
SQ0B 0.76 0.58 9.64
SQ0E 0.83 0.70 10.76
SQ0C 0.82 0.68 10.52
SQ0H 0.68 0.47 8.16
EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE. INTERNAL INNOVATIVITY
SQ0G 0.82 0.72 9.25
SQ0A 0.82 0.67 9.73
ORGANIZATIONAL CITIZENSHIP BEHAVIOR
Advocacy Participat ion 0.93 0.87 6.86
Loyal Boosterism 0.48 0.23 4.56
First
order
Interpersonal Helping 0.32 0.11 3.27
MODEL FIT: χ2 =40.5; df=23; p-value for χ2 =0.01;  RMSEA=0.08; CFI=0.96; GFI=0.93;
CN=134





We then performed six further CFA's in order to probe the distinctiveness of the other 
attitudinal constructs and both the employee and organizational performance 
constructs. 'Psychological empowerment', 'affective value commitment', the justice 
and support related constructs appear to be clearly valid constructs in these analyses 
as shown in tables 20, 21, 24 and 25. The CFA including 'organizational citizenship 
behavior' exhibits a very low λ for 'interpersonal helping' as well as a lowish Critical 
N and p-value for the chi-square statistic but more clearly accceptable RMSEA, CFI 
and GFI (table 23). The CFA including 'affective continuance commitment' exhibits a 
lowish Critical N and p-value for the chi-square statistic as well as a lowish λ for one 





Constructs, dimensions and indicators λ R2 t-value
EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE: QUALITY/EFFICIENCY
SQ0B 0.75 0.57 9.53
SQ0E 0.82 0.68 10.77
SQ0C 0.83 0.69 10.68
SQ0H 0.68 0.47 8.29
EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE. INTERNAL INNOVATIVITY
SQ0G 0.84 0.70 8.77
SQ0A 0.80 0.68 8.79
ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE: QUALITY
SQ6 0.64 0.40 4.71
SQ11 0.98 0.97 5.55
PSYCHOLOGICAL EMPOWERM ENT
Meaning 0.52 0.27 5.19
Competence 0.45 0.20 4.39
Impact 0.82 0.67 7.78
First
order
Autonomy 0.51 0.26 5.10
MODEL FIT: χ2 =56.9; df=44; p-value for χ2 =0.09;  RMSEA=0.05; CFI=0.97; GFI=0.93;
CN=147
ERROR CORRELATIONS: (+) SQ0B/SQ0A; SQ11/SQ0H; SQ0E/Impact;









Constructs, dimensions and indicators λ R2 t-value
EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE: QUALITY/EFFICIENCY
SQ0B 0.77 0.60 9.66
SQ0E 0.83 0.69 10.72
SQ0C 0.82 0.67 10.51
SQ0H 0.65 0.43 8.07
EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE. INTERNAL INNOVATIVITY
SQ0G 0.77 0.59 7.29
SQ0A 0.88 0.82 8.32
ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE: QUALITY
SQ6 0.87 0.76 7.84
SQ11 0.73 0.54 7.11
AFFECTIVE VALUE COMMITMENT
Involvement 0.47 0.22 6.00
First
order
Ident ificat ion 1.00 1.00 -
MODEL FIT: χ2 =42.4; df=27; p-value for χ2 =0.03;  RMSEA=0.07; CFI=0.97; GFI=0.94;
CN=140
ERROR CORRELATIONS: (+) SQ0B/SQ0A; SQ11/SQ0H;






Constructs, dimensions and indicators λ R2 t-value
EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE: QUALITY/EFFICIENCY
SQ0B 0.73 0.57 9.47
SQ0E 0.83 0.69 10.69
SQ0C 0.82 0.67 10.50
SQ0H 0.68 0.47 8.23
EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE. INTERNAL INNOVATIVITY
SQ0G 0.92 0.85 9.01
SQ0A 0.72 0.56 7.72
ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE: QUALITY
SQ6 0.66 0.44 4.50
SQ11 0.95 0.92 5.08
AFFECTIVE CONTINUANCE COMMITMENT
Q47 0.40 0.16 4.88
First
order
Q87 1.00 1.00 -
MODEL FIT: χ2 =50.2; df=28; p-value for χ2 =0.006; RMSEA=0.08; CFI=0.94; GFI=0.93;
CN=110









Constructs, dimensions and indicators λ R2 t-value
EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE: QUALITY/EFFICIENCY
SQ0B 0.75 0.58 9.63
SQ0E 0.83 0.69 10.67
SQ0C 0.82 0.68 10.57
SQ0H 0.68 0.46 8.18
EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE. INTERNAL INNOVATIVITY
SQ0G 0.83 0.69 9.55
SQ0A 0.81 0.69 9.73
ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE: QUALITY
SQ6 0.70 0.49 4.82
SQ11 0.89 0.81 5.27
ORGANIZATIONAL CITIZENSHIP BEHAVIOR
Advocacy Participat ion 0.95 0.90 6.83
Loyal Boosterism 0.47 0.22 4.48
First
order
Interpersonal Helping 0.32 0.10 3.21
MODEL FIT: χ2 =63.6; df=36; p-value for χ2 =0.003; RMSEA=0.08; CFI=0.94; GFI=0.91;
CN=108









Constructs, dimensions and indicators λ R2 t-value
EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE: QUALITY/EFFICIENCY
SQ0B 0.77 0.60 9.70
SQ0E 0.83 0.69 10.69
SQ0C 0.82 0.68 10.56
SQ0H 0.66 0.45 8.13
EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE. INTERNAL INNOVATIVITY
SQ0G 0.75 0.57 7.26
SQ0A 0.89 0.84 8.53
ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE: QUALITY
SQ6 0.82 0.67 7.04
SQ11 0.76 0.59 6.86
PERCEIVED CO-WORKER SUPPORT
Q145 0.67 0.46 7.25
Q14 0.82 0.67 8.65
PERCEIVED LEADER SUPPORT
Q109 0.87 0.75 11.47
Q106 0.77 0.60 9.85
PERCEIVED ORGANIZATION SUPPORT
Respect 0.95 0.90 12.29
Tolerance 0.45 0.21 5.15
First
order
Forgiving Climate 0.41 0.17 4.58
MODEL FIT: χ2 =93.2; df=73; p-value for χ2 =0.06;  RMSEA=0.05; CFI=0.97; GFI=0.91;
CN=131









Constructs, dimensions and indicators λ R2 t-value
EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE: QUALITY/EFFICIENCY
SQ0B 0.78 0.60 9.77
SQ0E 0.83 0.69 10.69
SQ0C 0.82 0.68 10.59
SQ0H 0.67 0.46 8.16
EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE. INTERNAL INNOVATIVITY
SQ0G 0.73 0.53 7.33
SQ0A 0.93 0.92 9.25
ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE: QUALITY
SQ6 0.69 0.48 5.93
SQ11 0.90 0.83 6.94
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
Distribut ive Just ice: Rewards 0.60 0.36 5.51
Distribut ive Just ice: Work 0.75 0.57 6.36
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
Q17 0.50 0.25 4.42
Q83 0.43 0.18 3.97
INTERACTIONAL JUSTICE
Q149 0.86 0.73 10.06
First
order
Q105 0.74 0.54 8.52
MODEL FIT: χ2 =82.4; df=60; p-value for χ2 =0.03;  RMSEA=0.06; CFI=0.96; GFI=0.91;
CN=129





Summary. The results of our validation analyses can be summarized as follows. Most 
of the theoretically expected constructs could be identified individually. Most of them 
could also be corroborated in simpler overall CFA’s. This however already in certain 
cases necessitated some free correlations between error terms. Freeing correlations 
between error terms of items related to the same construct is generally not considered 
as a serious problem. As many of our constructs tap phenomena which are 
conceptually fairly closely related and the constructs are based upon the same source 
and survey questionnaire (Bollen, 1989, p. 232) also some freeing of error correlations 
between items related to different constructs should be acceptable. In summary, while 
indicating certain problems and instabilities, these analyses give some justification of 
pursuing our structural analyses. We assume that the somewhat ambiguous properties 
of validity are not a problem related only to our data but probably more general in 
nature. We have seen no earlier study which have included the same amount of 
organizational behavior related constructs in the same analyses. By freeing up several 




complex models404. Since we performed many respecifications in these CFA's which 
in each time were "based upon the results of the initial model" many of these CFA's 
clearly are rather exploratory in nature (Bollen, 1989, p. 296).  
"A consequence is that the probability levels for the tests of statistical 
significance for [these] models must be regarded as approximations. And 
the need to replicate the final model[s] becomes even more important" 
(ibid., p. 296).  
Our analyses do thus indicate the need to pursue more rigorous validation analyses 
and potentially more general agreement on relevant conceptual landscapes in 
organization studies, in particular as e.g. CFA's (not shown here) with all the four 
focal intermediate attitudinal constructs as well as the support and justice related 
constructs included did not even approach acceptable fit statistics. In any case, based 
upon the above analyses we will e.g. in the regression analyses include all constructs 
together in order to see what can be concluded keeping in mind the problematical 
nature of overall construct validity. Nothing seems to indicate that the validities of our 
constructs would be essentially worse than they are in organization studies in general. 
It may be noted that even if studies in general do not include a similar number of 
related constructs, the complexity is arguably there although unnoticed. It may also be 
noted that some of our control variables might in fact improve the discriminant 
validities between some of the constructs. An analyses of such influences will 
however not be attempted. 
For the multiple regression analyses and some LISREL analyses we formed 
composite scores of all the items reflecting the shortened versions of the constructs 
that were included in the above CFA’s. As will be argued below, the LISREL 
analyses with these composite scores will essentially be used only to generate 
indicative significance tests of indirect effects.  
8.5 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE STRUCTURAL ANALYSES 
Forward selection. We will test all of our hypotheses related to direct effects with 
linear multiple regression analyses. To simply include all of our more or less relevant 
(partly exploratory) control variables in one equation could provide limited 
information. We want to test how many and what combinations of our control 
variables HRM is able to stand up to, in case it does not stand up to all of them. We 
thus face the problem of choosing the correct or most illuminating models. 
Cooper and Weekes describe a procedure known as forward selection where “the 
single best explanatory variable is chosen and a succession of models is fitted each 
with one more explanatory variable than the last” (Cooper and Weekes, 1983, p. 202). 
The different possible versions of this procedure is described in some more detail by 
Everitt and Dunn (1991, pp. 147-148). Everitt and Dunn argue that one can add 
variables or sequences of variables, keeping the most significant, “until there is no 
                                               
404 Judged by the recommended sample-size-to-parameter ratio of 5 or more for reliable estimates in 
maximum likelihood estimation (Bentler, 1985, cited in Settoon et al., 1996, p. 222), this should not be 




further improvement in the fit of the model” (ibid., p. 148). Everitt and Dunn also 
suggest that  
“variables already included in the model can be considered again in turn at 
each of the stages in the process to see if they still make a significant 
contribution to the fit of the model. If not they can be deleted” (ibid., p. 
148).  
Because we are not as interested in a (fully) correct and optimally parsimonious 
overall model as we are in the explanatory power of our focal theoretical variables as 
well as in potential theoretical development, we will follow an adaptation of forward 
selection. We will include control variables which may have theoretically intelligible 
mediating and/or moderating roles only after we have included all the other control 
variables, regardless of the former variables´ explanatory power. This allows us to test 
whether HRM has detectable influences independent of these particular variables405. 
Control variables seem to be able to affect the significance of hypothesized 
relationships even if they are not in themselves significant. Thus, if the variables have 
an effect on our focal theoretical variables we will not remove them even if they do 
not make a significant contribution to the fit of the total model.  
In summary, as the present study largely is an exploratory one we will attempt to use 
(these adaptations of) forward and backward selection as methods of showing how 
robust our focal theoretical variables´ explanatory power is in relation to the 
sequential inclusion of more and more relevant controls as well as the elimination of 
insignificant controls. We will thus try to highlight controls of particular theoretical 
interest which may be devastating to our hypotheses. To the extent that there are such 
variables we will then consider if and how they can be incorporated into a theorization 
of HRM´s influence.  
Beta coefficients. Because there is no agreement on the unit of measurement for most 
of our variables and constructs there is little idea in reporting raw beta coefficients in 
order to enable interpretations of the β-coefficients in any more substantial terms 
(compare the arguments in relation to validity measures in structural equation 
analyses by Bollen, 1989, p. 198-199). We will use the standardized beta coefficients 
in all our regression analyses. 
Multicollinearity. Many of our variables can be expected to exhibit multicollinearity. 
Everitt and Dunn note that indicators of multicollinearity problems include instances 
where  
                                               
405 In effect, we will also utilize a form of backward selection (Everitt and Dunn, 1991, pp. 148). We 
will delete (in steps) the most insignificant variable in a sequence of backward selected models. When 
having reached models with (more or less) only significant or weakly significant variables we will try 
at least the most central variables in turn to see whether they improve the fit of the models. While this 
form of backward selection does not test all possible combinations of variables it ought to be conceived 
as an adequate approximation. Whereas our full models in many cases will include a number of 
variables which makes us violate the often suggested ratio of variables to number of observations 




“the statistical significance of variables [is] very dependent on the order in 
which they are added to the model, and the resulting parameter estimates 
[are] very unstable” (1991, p. 141).  
The above dependence is to be understood as a dependence on the kind of models the 
variables are entered into. Cooper and Weekes note with reference to multicollinearity 
that  
“[t]he severity of its presence may usually be identified by inspection of 
the correlation matrix and the effect on the regression coefficients and their 
standards errors as a result of changing the mix of explanatory variables” 
(1983, p. 196)406. 
Here “changing the mix of explanatory variables” corresponds to the formulation of 
“the order in which they are added to the model” by Dunn and Everitt (above). 
However, the statistical significance and parameter estimates should be very 
dependent on the order in which the variables are added to the extent that we have 
conceptually motivated relevant but correlated control variables. Also effects on the 
regression coefficients and their standard errors would be perfectly acceptable to the 
extent that the controls are adequate. Without the theoretically motivated controls, 
independent of whether they give rise to multicollinearity or not, the estimates would 
be biased. Severe multicollinearity between independent and control variables is 
simply an indication of the fact that we cannot really know what in fact may influence 
what. 
Multicollinearity is a difficult problem407. Judging whether the reason for any 
insignificant hypothesized relationships are problems of “pure” statistical 
multicollinearity which should somehow be removed (Cooper and Weekes, 1983, p. 
197) or corrected or (also) the result of effective and important control variables is 
fundamentally a theoretical issue. Evaluations of multicollinearity can make us 
cautious as to any results of regression analyses and thus inspire researchers to apply 
more rigorous data collection and/or statistical methods to sort out any (causal) 
relationships. It might e.g. be the case that future research would have to find data 
only from organizations which exhibit stable characteristics in terms of some variable, 
which in a general sample exhibits high multicollinearity with a variable of focal 
theoretical interest. Such data are often very difficult to come by. It may also 
sometimes be the case that highly correlated variables should be ordered under one 
and the same higher order construct. 
In diagnosing potential problems of multicollinearity we have focused on the VIF 
values and Conditions indexes (Maddala, 1988, pp. 227-230) as well as standard 
errors. We will report these in connection to each regression analysis408.  
                                               
406 Maddala (1988, pp. 223-224), on the other hand, argues that the prevalent diagnostical focus on 
bivariate correlations is simply misguided. 
407 A sympton of the difficulty is the lack of (clear) criteria for acceptable levels of multicollinearity. 
408 It can already here be noted that in none of the analyses do the VIF values reach alarming levels 
which would indicate severe problems of multicollinearity. Only in very few models do they at the 




Mediated relationships/Regression analysis. We will also analyze the mediating 
relationships postulated by our model. Baron and Kenny (1986) have proposed a 
three-step mediated regression approach referred to in research closely related to this 
study (e.g. by Van Van Dyne, 1994, p. 786-787 and Huselid, 1995, p. 662). This 
procedure involves the following steps:  
“First, regressing the mediator on the independent variable; second, 
regressing the dependent variable on the independent variable; and third, 
regressing the dependent variable on both the independent variable and the 
mediator....To establish mediation, the following conditions must hold: 
First, the independent variable must affect the mediator in the first 
equation; second, the independent variable must be shown to affect the 
dependent variable in the second equation; and third, the mediator must 
affect the dependent variable in the third equation. If these conditions all 
hold in the predicted direction, then the effect of the independent variable 
must be less in the third equation than in the second. Perfect mediation 
holds if the independent variable has no effect when the mediator is 
controlled” (1986, p. 1177) 409. 
Baron and Kenny argue that caution in interpreting the above kind of mediational 
analyses is required by the fact that  
“[t]he use of multiple regression to estimate a mediational model requires 
the two following assumptions: that there be no measurement error in the 
                                                                                                                                      
coefficients are clearly dependent on the model they are entered into but behave more or less in an 
orderly and conceptually/theoretically meaningful fashion in the different equations. In most models 
the condition index reaches levels far above those recommended e.g. by the SPSS 10 "Results coach" 
(i.e. < 15). However, the condition index appears to be quite sensitive to the number of variables. 
Considering the amount of variables included in our models and the fact that there appear to be no 
other indications of severe multicollinearity problems, we regard the high conditions indexes as a 
minor problem. In line with the suggestions by Everitt and Dunn (1991, pp. 147-148) we will also 
remove the control variables which are insignificant in the more complex analyses. In the backward 
selected models the condition indexes tend to be somewhat lower although in most cases still fairly 
high. However, from the point of view of multicollinearity the removal of variables seem to be of 
limited interest as there are no other indications of severe problems of multicollinearity. Thus, although 
the high condition index should clearly be noted, we argue that there seem to be no alarming problems 
of multicollinearity.These comments apply to all of our regression analyses (below). 
409 Baron and Kenny (1986) argue the phenomena of mediation and moderation denote “two often-
confused functions of third variables: (a) the moderator function of third variables, which partitions a 
focal independent variable into subgroups that establish its domains of maximal effectiveness in regard 
to a given dependent variable, and (b) the mediator function of a third variable, which represents the 
generative mechanism through which the focal independent variable is able to influence the dependent 
variable” (Baron and Kenny, 1986, p. 1173). In other words, “[w]hereas moderator variables specify 
when certain effects will hold, mediators speak to how or why such effects occur” (ibid., p. 1176; see 
also Venkatraman, 1989, pp. 428-429). With reference to research closely related to the present study, a 
confusion between mediation and moderation effects is arguably exemplified e.g. in Van Dyne et al. 
(1994). There the influence of some of their independent variables would clearly more plausibly be 
understood as being moderated rather than mediated by at least parts of their complex ”mediation” 
variable. Although we will treat (at least) our focal intermediate variables in terms of affective 
commitment, psychological empowerment, organizational citizenship behavior and employee 
performance as mediators, some of them could also be conceived of as moderators. In addition, as 
already noted some of our control variables could also well be argued to be conceptually plausible 




mediator and that the dependent variable not cause the mediator” (ibid., p. 
1177).  
In fact, these seem to be normal criteria which apply to any independent and 
dependent variables in regression analysis. As is so often the case in organizational 
research, neither of these possibilities can be excluded with reference to our variables.  
In any case, at least LISREL 8.30 which is mainly used as a tool for mediational 
analyses in the current study, can report significant indirect relationships even if the 
direct relation between the independent variable and the dependent variable is not 
significant. This indicates that simply utilizing LISREL 8.30 does not amount to a test 
of a mediational hypothesis in line with the additional criteria above provided by 
Baron and Kenny (1986). As noted above, the latter require that also the direct 
relationship between the independent and dependent variable is significant while 
excluding the mediator and further that the coefficient/significance of the former 
relationship are reduced when including the mediator.  
The adequacy or necessity of these additional criteria for mediated effects can be 
questioned410. Why would we be interested in these criteria over and above a 
significance test of the indirect relationship based upon the direct relationships 
between the independent variable and the mediator as well as the relationship between 
the mediator and the dependent variable when also the independent variable is 
included in the equation? Baron and Kenny (1986) do not tell us why and, for 
example, in his discussion of mediated effects Venkatraman does not require the 
additional criteria (1989, p. 429)411.  
The additional criteria could be argued to provide an additional test of the plausibility 
that the mediator in fact mediates an effect of the dependent variable and that the 
indirect effect is not only a spurious correlation which is artificially created by the 
intermediate direct relationships. To the extent that we do not apply these additional 
criteria it might be argued that we allow for the possibility the “indirect relationship” 
may be completely due to correlated exogenous influences on the mediator. However, 
the probability of such exogenous influences could arguably be excluded by a 
significance test together with proper controls for the relationship between the 
independent variable and the mediator as well as the mediator and the dependent 
variable. 
Thus, in fact it might be argued that Baron and Kenny's additional criteria are 
superfluous to the extent that researchers include proper controls. In fact the 
additional criteria can even be considered as misleading. It appears conceivable that 
there might be an indirect effect through a third variable (which does not reduce the 
direct effect but) which simply represents a different and additional effect. In fact, it 
                                               
410 As noted above, they have however been used in other publications related to the current research.  
411 Baron and Kenny (1986) also refer to Judd and Kenny (1981). Considering the fact that 
Venkatraman (1989) does not require the additional criteria, we did not try to get hold on the former 





also appears quite conceivable that there can be a positive indirect effect without any 
detectable direct effect at all or even a negative direct effect.  
In summary, the following should arguably provide a reasonable cross-sectional test 
of the existence of indirect relationships: (1) including at least some controls relevant 
also for all the mediating variables; (2) establishing the direct relationships between 
the independent and mediator variables as well as between the mediator and the 
dependent variables when including the independent variable; and finally (3) 
conducting a significance test of the indirect effects412.  
Significance levels for indirect relationships are not always reported in the literature 
(e.g. Van Dyne et al., 1994; Huselid, 1995). Moorman et al. (1998) and Hunt and 
Morgan (1994), for example, do report significance levels in their structural equation 
analyses of indirect effects. However, both analyses are performed essentially without 
control variables. We will attempt to report significance levels for the indirect 
relationships including all our relevant controls. Baron and Kenny (1986, p. 1177) 
present a formula for testing the significance of indirect effects which in principle can 
be applied based upon separate regression analyses (assuming recursivity of the 
complete model). They argue that they present a more exact formula than that 
reported by Sobel (1982). However, in fact the formula presented in Baron and Kenny 
(1986) seems to be an erroneous one. Another variant of this formula can be found in 
Venkatraman (1989, p. 430) although also this formula seems to include typing errors.  
In any case, in order to test the significance of indirect relationships including 
multiple mediators such a formula becomes much more complicated. Instead of 
applying any such formula to the results of a set of multiple regression analyses we 
will use a LISREL analysis with composite scores to evaluate the significance of 
indirect and total relationships. Using LISREL analysis with composite scores 
uncorrected for any measurement errors essentially corresponds to using ordinary 
least squares regression analysis with the difference that all the paths are estimated at 
the same time. (There are however in general in the field of business studies 
differences in the reporting cultures concerning fit statistics between applications of 
multiple regression analyses and applications of structural equation analyses). In the 
LISREL analysis with the simplified composite scores (where the indicators of each 
construct are averaged) we will concentrate only on the significance of the indirect 
relationships in order to arrive at at least a rough idea of the possible existence of such 
relationships.  
In probing the significance of mediation effects we will thus combine multiple 
regression analyses with LISREL analysis. Utilizing the former we will analyze how 
all the direct relationships postulated by our mediational model fare with reference to 
all control variables. We will also use LISREL analyses with latent model constructs 
but no exogenous control variables. Finally, we will use an overall LISREL analysis 
with the simplified composite scores where we will try to include all and only those 
                                               
412 In structural equation analyses researchers generally do not explicitly control for the direct 
relationship between the "independent" variable and the "dependent" variable when testing the 
relationship between the mediator and the "dependent" variable. However, indirectly structural 
equation analyses allow tests of structural relationships where everything which does not improve 




controls which are significant in the partial regression analyses. However, with 
reference to this methodology we cannot really account for measurement error (Baron 
and Kenny, 1986, p. 1177). Further, we will in particular in the regression analyses 
simply assume recursivity, i.e. we will at least initially assume all the postulated uni-
directional causal relationships such that at all stages of the suggested model 
dependent (mediator) variables do not causally influence independent (mediator) 
variables. We will thus in the regression analyses proceed by testing for lower level 
mediating relationships without including higher level mediators in the regression 
equations. Such assumptions of recursivity can naturally be questioned just as they 
can be so questioned in many (if not most) other quantitative analyses of social 
phenomena413. However we pursue the analyses testing whether the postulated 
relationships can be confirmed even under these generous asssumptions.  
Structural equation analyses. In order to minimize problems related to measurement 
errors as well as to provide further justification for our overall model specification we 
will also attempt to use the structural equation approach with latent model constructs. 
We will pursue evidence that the basic postulated relations hold in a structural 
equation analysis with multiple indicators estimating all the relationships at the same 
time (without controls). Such evidence would arguably offer some further justification 
for a correct model specification and the application of the regression and LISREL 
analyses. However, it has to be noted that these two sets of analyses involve different 
although closely related constructs. 
Structural equation analyses with latent model constructs arguably (potentially) 
involve a more rigorous and adequate test of any relationships in that at least some 
latent variables as well as their indicators are included in the structural analyses. 
Bollen notes some major features in relation to which 
“structural equations with latent variables are distinct from the standard 
regression approach. The models are more realistic in their allowance for 
measurement error in the observed variables...The error in measuring one 
variable can correlate with that of another. Multiple indicators can measure 
one latent variable. Furthermore, researchers can analyze the relation 
between latent variables unobscured by measurement error.” (Bollen, 
1989, pp. 19-20)414. 
However, as already alluded to, in most studies (including the current one) the 
potential advantages of structural equation analyses are not fully utilized either 
because of low sample sizes, too much complexity, inadequate convergent and/or 
discriminant validities or a combination of such elements (compare e.g Moorman, 
Blakely and Niehoff, 1998, p. 353; Niehoff and Moorman, 1993, p. 538; Settoon, 
                                               
413 In fact, most relationships in our analyses are likely to involve complex feedback processes (March 
and Sutton, 1997, p. 700-701). This should evidently make us cautious with reference to any 
interpretations of the evidence in terms of "unidirectional influences". 
414 As noted by Gerhart, Wright, McMahan and Snell (2000a, p. 803), there are different sources of 
measurement error, or simply different types of measurement error, i.e. systematic and random dito. A 
LISREL analysis with latent variables may (and arguably usually does) still include systematic 
measurement error. In fact, this is not unlikely to be a serious problem in HRM research (see also 




Bennet and Liden, 1996, p. 222; Wayne, Shore and Liden, 1997, p. 100). Due to the 
above mentioned kinds of limitations we can only perform structural equation 
analyses with latent model constructs which in terms of controls are much more 
limited in nature than our regression analyses and the simplified LISREL analyses415. 
In addition to these problems, the non-normal distribution of the variables might often 
affect both regression analyses and structural equation analyses (Bollen, 1989, 415-
418). The distribution of the data is almost never analyzed or reported in publications 
in organizaton research. We will follow this standard. However due to the lack of 
                                               
415 Measurement error in a structural equation analysis with latent model constructs do contain both 
measurement error and systematic variance in the indicator which is unrelated to the latent variable, or 
in other words, unexplained by the latent variable. When using scale scores in structural equation 
analyses these properties can only be approximated by imposing an error term. In multiple regression 
analyses not even such approximation is possible. In structural equation modelling such approximation 
has been pursued by some researchers by "setting the path from the latent variable to the scale score 
equal to the product of the square root of the scale reliability and its standard deviation and by setting 
the error variance equal to the product of the variance of the scale score and one minus the reliability" 
(Niehoff and Moorman, 1993, p. 538, italics added). While following the same procedure to calculate 
the error variance, Settoon et al. apparently followed another procedure for setting the path between the 
latent variable and the manifest indicator: "The path from the latent variable to its manifest indicator 
was set to the square root of the reliability of the measured variable... " (Settoon et al., 1996, p. 222). 
Regardless of how this perhaps should be done, employing scale scores corrected by such error terms 
will arguably not affect correlations between constructs and thus not significance levels nor slope 
coefficients. On the other hand, employing the actual latent model constructs with several indicators 
and their individual error terms will arguably produce different variables whose correlations with other 
variables may differ compared to scale scores. Therefore we will not in the simplified structural 
equation analyses utilize any method to approximate measurement error for the composite scores. 
Therefore also, the structural analysis with latent model constructs and the regression analyses are not 
fully comparable. They involve theoretically and empirically different variables. The employment of 




such analyses our results should be treated with fair cautiousness. Non-normal 
distributions in combination with the prevalent use of non-continuous Likert scale 
type data may be further misleading (ibid., p. 433; p. 436). Concerning categorial or 
close to categorial variables (e.g. Likert scale variables) Bollen remarked that “the 
robustness research of structural equation techniques...is at an early stage of 
development” (ibid., p. 438). When using structural equation analyses Bollen´s advice 
is to compare e.g. maximum likelihood and weighted least squares estimation 
techniques where the latter is less sensitive to non-normal distributions of the data 
although it in turn has some other drawbacks (1989, p. 432). However, in this thesis 
we will limit our structural equation analyses to the maximum likelihood estimation 
techniques. Further complications of the analyses involve the fact that any suggested 
model may be nested in less restrictive models or that a more constrained model may 
be nested in the suggested one (Bollen, 1989, pp. 291-296; Hayduk, 1987, p. 164; 
172; 208). We will not engage in comparisons of such potential models. Rather, in 
this thesis we will only attempt to show evidence of the consistency of a theoretically 
suggested model with the data. All these remarks only serve as yet another reminder 
of the openness and tentative nature of any achieved results in our analyses. 
Descriptive statistics. The general descriptive statistics are presented in Table 25b. It 




Table 25b.  Means, Standards Deviations and Correlations
Variables Means s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
1.HRM 4,46 ,82
2.Strategic fit 4,91 ,96 ,24
3.Psych. empowerment 5,65 ,81 ,44 ,25
4.Value  commitment 5,94 ,75 ,51 ,11 ,69
5.Cont. commitment 4,35 1,38 ,33 ,10 ,23 ,36
6.Citizenship behavior 5,21 ,81 ,46 ,03 ,65 ,62 ,28
7.Empl. perf.: innov. 4,54 1,39 ,09 ,12 ,26 ,09 ,10 ,24
8.Empl. perf.: qual/eff 5,45 ,96 ,13 ,10 ,19 ,07 ,12 ,02 ,41
9.Org.perf: qual 5,53 ,90 ,33 ,25 ,10 ,24 ,10 ,03 ,16 ,25
10.Org. perf: profit. 5,31 1,67 ,15 ,18 -,08 ,07 -,06 -,13 -,07 ,14 ,27
11.Empl. retention 4,64 2,00 ,06 ,08 ,15 ,15 ,20 ,19 -,10 -,03 -,06 -,07
12.Long. investm. HRM 4,98 ,87 ,27 ,33 ,07 ,23 ,02 ,03 ,03 ,18 ,40 ,21 ,17
13.HRM proffessional. 3,81 1,80 ,19 ,19 -,13 ,03 -,03 -,06 ,09 ,07 ,21 ,31 -,23 ,35
14.Organ. support 5,37 ,83 ,48 ,05 ,50 ,53 ,42 ,36 ,12 ,31 ,13 ,07 ,07 ,14 -,06
15.Coworker support 5,64 ,96 ,46 ,14 ,43 ,44 ,36 ,48 -,01 ,11 ,03 -,05 ,12 ,05 -,06 ,48
16.Leader support 4,97 1,15 ,56 ,19 ,54 ,45 ,39 ,35 ,04 ,21 ,24 ,02 ,07 ,14 -,01 ,62 ,43
17.Interactional justice 5,08 1,06 ,49 ,18 ,52 ,51 ,28 ,31 ,07 ,23 ,15 ,08 -,02 ,17 ,13 ,66 ,36 ,70
18.Procedural justice 4,59 1,12 ,36 ,20 ,39 ,34 ,30 ,24 ,04 ,07 ,15 ,09 ,17 ,19 ,03 ,47 ,31 ,59 ,57
19.Distributive justice 5,08 ,98 ,39 -,10 ,17 ,32 ,29 ,20 -,11 ,01 ,14 ,10 ,16 ,10 ,09 ,34 ,21 ,27 ,25 ,31
20.Earlier employers 2,46 1,10 -,03 ,17 ,29 ,14 ,16 ,13 ,19 -,08 ,10 -,14 ,09 -,04 -,13 -,06 -,12 ,13 ,05 ,17 -,12
21.Employee age 3,91 1,39 -,05 ,10 ,25 ,10 ,15 ,15 ,10 ,01 ,03 -,14 ,03 -,04 -,08 -,05 -,01 ,12 ,09 ,14 ,00 ,64
22.Employee tenure 3,04 1,10 -,08 -,04 ,07 -,02 ,00 ,00 -,05 ,17 -,01 ,00 ,00 -,01 -,04 ,11 ,04 ,08 ,12 ,09 ,07 ,13 ,49
23.Job opportunities 5,72 1,23 ,17 -,01 ,22 ,17 ,01 ,20 ,01 ,18 ,01 -,05 ,05 ,13 -,01 ,21 ,05 ,07 ,07 -,03 ,07 -,25 -,26 -,16
24.Recent job offers 4,62 2,46 ,13 ,05 ,18 ,18 ,02 ,15 -,03 ,00 ,07 ,00 -,05 ,19 ,02 ,05 ,00 ,06 ,11 ,02 -,03 ,02 -,04 -,03 ,30
25.Partnership status 4,02 2,25 ,39 ,09 ,39 ,47 ,40 ,34 ,17 ,17 ,28 ,04 ,19 ,05 -,10 ,31 ,16 ,37 ,36 ,29 ,22 ,22 ,13 ,03 ,02 ,07
26.Workload 4,96 1,10 ,14 ,13 ,31 ,13 -,18 ,36 ,20 ,01 ,00 -,15 ,04 ,11 -,15 ,01 ,07 ,02 -,03 -,09 -,14 -,05 -,10 -,09 ,10 ,06 ,11
27.Demands 3,21 1,50 -,07 -,01 -,08 -,19 -,19 -,04 ,11 -,04 -,14 -,07 ,07 ,06 ,07 -,30 -,21 -,17 -,17 -,20 -,17 ,01 -,04 -,10 -,07 ,12 -,06 ,38
28.Rec. rad. impr. HRM 3,24 1,06 ,43 ,22 ,16 ,13 ,20 ,09 ,06 ,01 -,01 -,02 ,02 ,09 ,21 ,16 ,17 ,18 ,16 ,17 ,03 -,10 -,11 -,13 -,03 ,19 ,12 ,11 ,20
29.Hierarchy 4,00 1,72 ,12 -,08 -,06 -,04 -,14 -,01 -,09 -,16 -,14 -,11 -,05 ,02 ,05 -,18 ,11 -,07 -,06 -,11 -,04 -,18 -,17 -,10 ,15 ,04 -,13 ,11 ,14 ,07
30.Org. prospects 5,32 1,03 ,40 ,22 ,36 ,41 ,30 ,40 -,13 ,00 ,15 ,17 ,21 ,00 -,05 ,24 ,41 ,34 ,23 ,28 ,23 -,02 -,01 -,03 ,04 ,04 ,29 ,16 -,23 ,14 -,03
31.Org. image 4,99 1,32 ,36 ,30 ,33 ,25 ,22 ,35 ,02 -,02 ,27 ,07 ,17 ,06 ,12 ,18 ,21 ,29 ,26 ,20 ,06 ,12 ,09 -,01 ,01 ,14 ,26 ,23 ,00 ,30 ,04 ,35
32.Strategy 5,22 1,62 -,03 ,01 -,14 ,02 -,16 ,09 ,07 -,17 ,11 ,07 -,03 ,02 -,06 -,13 ,00 -,15 -,16 -,17 -,12 -,08 -,12 -,11 -,13 ,02 -,14 ,18 ,02 -,13 ,11 ,02 -,02
33.Competition 5,59 1,43 ,11 -,02 ,00 ,09 ,07 -,01 ,09 ,14 ,40 ,02 -,05 ,12 ,13 ,17 ,01 ,07 ,09 ,04 ,11 -,04 ,00 ,06 ,01 -,11 ,10 -,20 -,09 -,10 -,16 -,07 -,01 -,10
34.Organization size 2,37 ,99 -,04 ,15 -,26 -,20 ,02 -,28 -,01 ,13 ,09 ,23 -,20 -,15 -,01 ,01 -,05 -,08 -,07 -,12 -,09 -,19 -,16 ,03 ,10 -,21 -,11 -,21 -,22 -,13 ,05 ,07 -,02 ,08 ,11





9.1 ANTECEDENTS TO HRM 
The results of our tests of hypotheses 1 and 2 postulating a longterm investment in 
HRM and HRM professionalism respectively as sufficient antecedents to HRM 
sophistication are exhibited in Table 26. 
Table 26.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 2b
Variables
β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF
Constant -1,77** ,689 - -,890 ,735 ∅ -.18 .508 -
Number of earlier employers ,092 ,062 2.2 -,004 ,068 2,1 ∅ ∅ ∅
Employee age -,006 ,052 2,5 -,018 ,058 2,5 ∅ ∅ ∅
Employee tenure -,058 ,052 1,6 -,088 ,057 1,6 -.118** .045 1.0
Perceived job opportunities ,086 ,046 1,5 ,041 ,050 1,5 ∅ ∅ ∅
Recent job offers -,007 ,022 1,4 ,048 ,023 1,3 ∅ ∅ ∅
Workload ,063 ,054 1,7 ,014 ,058 1,6 ∅ ∅ ∅
Too big demands -,010 ,039 1,6 ,072 ,042 1,5 ∅ ∅ ∅
Rec. rad. improve. in HRM ,288*** ,051 1,4 ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
Hierarchy ,105** ,030 1,2 ,144** ,033 1,3 .163*** .030 1.1
Prospects of organiz. perf. ,095* ,057 1,6 ,093 ,063 1,6 ∅ ∅ ∅
Organizational image ,021 ,042 1,4 ,087 ,045 1,4 .132** .040 1.2
Prob. of partnership status ,150** ,024 1,4 ,145** ,027 1,4 .142** .024 1.2
Strategy ,088* ,031 1,2 ,049 ,034 1,2 ∅ ∅ ∅
Organization size ,075 ,054 1,4 ,008 ,061 1,4 ∅ ∅ ∅
Interactional justice ,091 ,072 2,8 ,093 ,077 2,7 ∅ ∅ ∅
Procedural justice -,098 ,056 1,9 -,070 ,062 1,9 ∅ ∅ ∅
Distributive justice ,232*** ,055 1,4 ,243*** ,060 1,4 .226*** .055 1.2
Organization support ,058 ,094 2,9 ,122 ,102 2,9 .124* .081 1.9
Coworker support ,154** ,062 1,7 ,133** ,069 1,7 .166*** .061 1.5
Leader support ,238** ,064 2,6 ,234** ,070 2,6 .270*** .057 1.9
Long-term investm. in HRM ,119** ,061 1,3 ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
HRM professionalism ,113** ,031 1,5 ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅








F for R2 / R2  / Adj. R2 / CI♣ 9.5 0,65 0,58 73 7,4 0,56 0,48 68 17,7 0,54 0,51 38
  One-tailed sig. test:*p<.10  /  **p<.05  /  ***p<.001  /  β = stand. coeff.  /  ♣CI = Condition Index  /
  ∅ = Variable not included in model
 
Model 1 shows evidence supporting hypotheses 1 and 2 in terms of an influence on 
HRM sophistication of a long-term investment in the HRM practices and HRM 
professionalism416. It is reasonable that a long-term investment in HRM and HR 
professionalism at least each on their own should be significantly correlated with the 
sophistication of the HRM system. Rather than conceptualizing them as simply 
                                               
416 To the extent that we include each of these variables in turn 'Long-term investment' is significant at 
p = .004 (one-tailed test) and 'HRM professionalism' at p = 0.0006 (one-tailed test). These analyses are 




competing explanations it might be argued that a longterm investment should mediate 
the influence of HR professionalism. In any case, in particular as the data on the 
independent and dependent variables were obtained from different respondents, it also 
gives some common sense “validity check” on our construct of HRM sophistication 
when including the controls. 
Model 2 provides some support for hypothesis 3 in terms of a relation between 
Strategic fit and HRM sophistication. In this model we have not included 'Recent 
radical improvements in HRM' since it may be argued that this is an irrelevant control 
for the current strategic fit of the HRM practices. (Including the variable makes 
'Strategic fit' insignificant). Model 2b exhibits the result of applying backward 
selection based upon Model 2 as explicated in section 8.5. 
The evidence in terms of Models 2 and 2b provide some justification for continuing to 
test our model in line with the hypotheses which posits that the influence(s) of 
strategic fit should be mediated by HRM sophistication (see the theorization in section 
3.3.2.3). These results at least indicate that strategic fit and (soft) HRM sophistication 
do not appear to be outright contradictory phenomena which does not mean that they 
may not have certain opposite influences417. 
9.2 HRM AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE: THE DIRECT 
RELATIONSHIP  
As a first more or less corroborative test we analyze three models (exhibited in Table 
27), one of each of the organizational performance variables in which we at this stage 
exclude the intermediate variables included in the suggested overall model.  
                                               
417 However, the fact that this relationship is not stronger might be due to several reasons. Strategic fit 
may be an elusive phenomenon to judge for superiors. Strategic fit might not play a strong role in the 
sophistication of HRM as judged by general employees. Organizations may not have reached very 
sophisticated levels of strategic fit. Superiors' evaluations of strategic fit might be systematically biased 
somehow. The implementation of strategic fit (reflected in employee perceptions of HRM 
sophistication) might not correspond to the intended strategic fit and the latter might be what superiors 
on average evaluate etc.. In any case, as already noted at the end of section 8.3.1 the superior's and 
subordinate consultant's judgements about strategic fit appear to have fairly little in common at least in 
terms of bivariate correlations. This should obviously make us cautious in interpreting the results of 
these analyses. Nevertheless, we will proceed by assuming that the superior's judgements about explicit 





Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Variables
β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF
Constant 2,83 ** 1,00 - 5,6 ** 2,13 - ,604 2,6 -
Number of earlier employers ,029 ,087 2,2 -,196 ** ,184 2,2 ,09 ,222 2,2
Employee age -,073 ,073 2,5 -,104 ,154 2,5 -,114 ,186 2,5
Employee tenure ,014 ,073 1,6 ,051 ,154 1,6 ,082 ,186 1,6
Perceived job opportunities -,046 ,065 1,5 -,137 * ,136 1,5 ,186 ** ,164 1,5
Recent job offers ,107 * ,030 1,3 ,037 ,063 1,3 -,182 ** ,077 1,3
Workload ,027 ,075 1,7 -,242 ** ,159 1,7 -,178 ** ,191 1,7
Too big demands -,120 * ,054 1,6 ,116 ,114 1,6 ,218 ** ,137 1,6
Rec. rad. improvem in HRM -,142 * ,078 1,7 -,207 ** ,166 1,7 -,066 ,200 1,7
Hierarchy -,083 ,043 1,3 -,113 ,090 1,3 -,022 ,109 1,3
Prospects of organiz. perf. -,061 ,080 1,7 ,163 * ,169 1,7 ,187 ** ,204 1,7
Organizational image ,169 ** ,058 1,4 ,055 ,122 1,4 ,162 ** ,147 1,4
Prob. of partnership status ,132 * ,034 1,4 ,003 ,072 1,4 ,147 * ,087 1,4
Strategy ,148 ** ,044 1,3 ,049 ,093 1,3 ,056 ,112 1,3
Competition ,368 *** ,049 1,2 -,092 ,103 1,2 -,053 ,124 1,2
Organization size ,039 ,078 1,4 ,119 ,164 1,4 -,262 ** ,198 1,4
Interactional justice -,132 ,099 2,7 -,008 ,208 2,7 -,243 ** ,251 2,7
Procedural justice ,036 ,079 1,9 ,095 ,166 1,9 ,158 * ,200 1,9
Distributive justice ,041 ,089 1,5 -,016 ,171 1,5 ,101 ,206 1,5
Organization support -,118 131 3,0 ,113 ,278 3,0 ,108 ,334 3,0
Coworker support -,130 * ,088 1,8 -,228 ** ,185 1,8 ,074 ,223 1,8
Leader support ,161 * ,091 2,7 -,158 ,192 2,7 -,071 ,232 2,7
HRM sophistication ,281 ** ,128 2,7 ,305 ** ,270 2,7 -,110 ,325 2,7
Strategic fit ,171 ** ,079 1,4 ,187 ** ,166 1,4 ,108 ,200 1,4




F for R2 / R2  / Adj. R2 / CI♣ 3,7 0,43 0,31 80 1,7 0,26 0,11 80 1,6 0,24 0,09 80
  One-tailed sig. test:*p<.10  /  **p<.05  /  ***p<.001  /  β = stand. coeff.  /  ♣CI = Condition Index  /
  ∅ = Variable not included in model
 
Here we only note that Model 3 supports hypotheses 4a and 4b and that Model 4 
supports hypotheses 5a and 5b. These hypotheses concern the direct relationships 
between strategic fit/HRM sophistication and organizational performance in terms of 
quality and profitability respectively. Although somewhat difficult to compare due to 
the different conceptualizations/operationalizations, the results appear compatible 
with much of the research as reviewed in chapter 6.  
Model 5 does not give support for either hypothesis 4c or 5c, i.e. for a direct 
relationship between either strategic fit or HRM sophistication and employee 
retention. It may also be noted that Model 5 is only weakly significant overall 
indicating that the variables as a whole do not adequately explain the variation in 
voluntary employee turnover. The same argument applies to Model 4. These results 
are not incompatible with earlier research. Huselid found only a weakly significant 
relationship between one of his HRM variables and voluntary and involuntary 
employee turnover (1995, p. 657). Arthur found a statistically significant difference in 
correlations between what he called control (HRM) systems versus commitment 
(HRM) systems and voluntary and involuntary employee turnover. The bivariate 




high but insignificant (ibid., p. 681). Again however, these results are somewhat 
difficult to compare due to different conceptualizations/operationalizations. In 
addition to the theoretically different nature of the employee turnover variables in 
these two studies and the current one, the sampled contexts may also be very different 
with reference to this particular outcome.  
That our analyses at least with reference to the organizational performance variables 
in terms of quality and profitability are compatible with earlier research arguably 
indicates a certain relevance with reference to earlier studies of our 
conceptualizations/operationalizations. For now we will leave these results and return 
to them later418.  
9.3 HRM´S RELATIONSHIPS WITH INTERMEDIATE ATTITUDES  
HRM and psychological empowerment. The results of our tests of hypothesis 6 
postulating HRM sophistication as a sufficient antecedent to psychological 
empowerment are exhibited in Table 28. In these equations we also test a potential 
direct relationship between 'Strategic fit' and 'Psychological empowerment'. 
 
                                               
418 It may be noted that some of the employee related controls in these equations are 
superfluous/inadequate in relation to the variable 'Strategic fit' and may lead to wrong estimates of the 
relationships between the latter and the outcome variables. This would perhaps most clearly concern 
employee age and tenure. The rest of the variables are treated here as reflecting organizational 
phenomena. However, we include all controls since also age and tenure arguably are relevant "validity 
increasing" variables with reference to 'HRM sophistication'. In fact, excluding 'age' and 'tenure' does 





Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 10b
Variables
β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF
Constant 1,87 ** ,610 - 2,8 *** ,625 - 2,6 *** ,638 - 2,6 *** ,633 - 1,5 ** ,666 - 1.59 *** .441 -
Number of earlier employers ,178 ** ,064 2,1 ,147 * ,069 2,0 ,132 * ,069 2,0 ,128 * ,069 2,0 ,155 ** ,066 2,2 .226 *** .046 1.1
Employee age ,118 ,055 2,4 ,092 ,059 2,4 ,084 ,059 2,4 ,088 ,059 2,4 ,116 ,056 2,5 ∅ ∅ ∅
Employee tenure -,036 ,054 1,5 -,027 ,058 1,5 -,019 ,058 1,5 -,008 ,058 1,5 -,042 ,055 1,5 ∅ ∅ ∅
Prob. of partnership status ,045 ,025 1,4 ,079 ,027 1,4 0,83 ,027 1,4 ,058 ,027 1,4 ,057 ,026 1,4 ∅ ∅ ∅
Workload ,344 *** ,054 1,5 ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
Too big demands -,123 ** ,039 1,5 ,001 ,040 1,3 -,004 ,040 1,3 -,002 ,039 1,3 ,059 ,038 1,3 ∅ ∅ ∅
Rec. rad. improvem in HRM ,058 ,052 1,3 ,037 ,056 1,3 ,021 ,057 1,3 -,032 ,061 1,6 -,035 ,057 1,6 ∅ ∅ ∅
Hierarchy ,006 ,030 1,1 ,016 ,032 1,1 ,026 ,032 1,1 ,002 ,032 1,1 ,036 ,032 1,3 ∅ ∅ ∅
Prospects of organiz. perf. ,158 ** ,057 1,4 ,235 *** ,060 1,4 ,221 ** ,061 1,4 ,196 ** ,061 1,4 ,160 ** ,060 1,6 .159 ** .052 1.2
Organizational image ,029 ,044 1,4 ,090 ,046 1,4 ,071 ,047 1,4 ,063 ,046 1,4 ,057 ,044 1,4 ∅ ∅ ∅
Strategy -,118 ** ,055 1,2 -,188 ** ,058 1,2 -,211 ** ,059 1,2 -,215 ** ,059 1,2 -,207 ** ,056 1,3 ∅ ∅ ∅
Organization size -,104 ** ,031 1,1 -,056 ,033 1,1 -,061 ,033 1,1 -,075 ,033 1,1 -,077 ,031 1,1 -.227 *** .051 1.1
Interactional justice ,392 *** ,059 1,7 398 *** ,064 1,7 ,388 *** ,064 1,7 ,337 *** ,067 1,9 ,163 ** ,075 2,6 .224 ** .058 1.7
Procedural justice ,000 ,057 1,7 -,027 ,062 1,7 -,038 ,062 1,7 -,032 ,061 1,7 -,091 ,060 1,9 ∅ ∅ ∅
Distributive justice ,056 ,057 1,3 ,005 ,060 1,3 ,020 ,061 1,3 -,027 ,064 1,4 -,033 ,061 1,5 ∅ ∅ ∅
Strategic fit ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ,107 * ,062 1,3 ,092 ,062 1,3 ,115 ** ,059 1,4 .130 ** .054 1.2
HRM sophistication ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ,169 ** ,095 2,3 ,048 ,095 2,6 ∅ ∅ ∅
Organization support ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ,146 ** ,067 1,7 .238 ** .079 1.9
Coworker support ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ,271 ** ,096 2,6 .174 ** .061 1.5














F for R2 / R2  / Adj. R2 / CI♣ 10,0 0,54 0,49 51 7,8 0,47 0,41 47 7,5 0,47 0,4 49,6 7,3 0,49 0,42 52 7,9 0,56 0,49 65 20,9 0,52 0,49 31




We begin the analyses by formulating a preliminary control equation presented in 
Model 6. It can be noted that if we exclude 'Interactional justice' in Model 6, then 
'Procedural justice' is significant. These results are fully in line with the argument that 
in work-settings involving frequent interactions with superiors, interactions are likely 
to be more important than procedures in determining employee attitudes (Moorman, 
1991, p. 852). In Model 6 'Workload' has a significant positive relation with 
'Psychological empowerment'. Since the purpose and meaningfulness of 'Workload' in 
this context was to control for the potential negative impact of workload we will 
exclude this variable from further analyses. The assumed negative impact seems to 
captured by one component of the original construct of workload which in our 
validation analyses turned out to be a separate variable, i.e. 'Too big demands'. Thus it 
seems that workload as exhibited in the sample is largely compatible with 
psychological empowerment but, quite plausibly, when the demands on employees 
(which may include other things than work-load or amount of work) reaches a certain 
limit then such demands begin to have a negative influence. Our basic control 
equation is thus exhibited in Model 7419. 
In Model 8 'Strategic fit' is significant. It can be noted that excluding 'Interactional 
justice' in Model 8 makes 'Strategic fit' significant at the 0.05 level420. 
                                               
419 We can note that 'Too big demands' is insignificant if we exclude 'Workload' from the equation. 
Thus, the potential systematic influence of too big demands on psychological empowerment seems to 
be significantly discernible only when we control for the general positive relationship between 
'Workload' and 'Psychological empowerment'. Also the variable 'Strategy' becomes insignificant if 
'Workload' is left out. Thus, also the (somewhat unsuspected) negative relationship between 
'Psychological empowerment' and 'Strategy' only seems to become discernible when we in (in addition 
to all the other controls) control for workload. In other words, also this relationship seems to "drown" 
under the general positive relationship between 'Workload' and 'Psychological empowerment'. 
Although not of immediate concern in this study, the tendency for a negative relationship between a 
high quality strategy and psychological empowerment is interesting (even apparently paradoxical) in 
itself. (This result is however interesting only if we interpret workload to causally influence 
psychological empowerment. As our a priori reason for including workload was that we assumed it to 
be negatively causally influential but it turned out positive, we will in these analyses interpret it as 
merely correlational). In any case, since the evidence indicates that both a high quality strategy and too 
big demands on employees may tend to have a negative impact on psychological empowerment we will 
keep these two controls even if they turned insignificant without the control of general workload. It can 
also be noted that if we exclude 'Number of earlier employees', then 'Employee age' becomes 
significant. As a starting point we want to pay some attention to these results, only remotely related to 
our hypotheses, because in general these results show how sensitive results are to different controls. 
This only bears witness to the fact that the conceptual/theoretical justification of including/excluding 
controls is of great importance. Controls may not only render some correlations insignificant. They 
may also bring to light latent correlations (Cliff, 1987, p. 109).  
420 Although we could establish some discriminative validity between 'Interactional justice' and 'Leader 
support' (when controlling for random measurement and systematic error of the manifest variables), 
these constructs are conceptually very closely related. In fact it might be argued that 'Interactional 
justice' does not measure solely the justice related components of interactions but includes more 
general leader support. However, in the following analyses we will attempt to treat 'Interactional 
justice' as a valid measure, i.e. as measuring what it should measure. Thus, although it could be treated 
as a variable concerned with sociopolitical support on par with the explicit sociopolitical support 
variables ('Organization support', 'Leader support' and 'Coworker support') we will treat it separately in 




In Model 9 we included also 'HRM sophistication'. This construct is significant and 
thus offers some initial tentative support for hypothesis 6. While the results indicate 
that 'Strategic fit' has no direct significant relationship with 'Psychological 
empowerment', Models 2 and 9 together offer some tentative initial evidence, in line 
with our overall model, of the (possibly significant) but arguably weak influence of 
'Strategic fit' as mediated by 'HRM sophistication'421. 
In Model 10, where we included the controls in terms of sociopolitical support, 'HRM 
sophistication' is no longer significant. Although not shown here 'HRM sophistication' 
is not significant even when excluding 'Strategic fit'. Thus, with the full set of our 
controls there is no support for either hypothesis 6 or for the mediated effect of 
strategic fit as postulated by our model. 'HRM sophistication' is in fact insignificant 
even if we only include any one of the support-related variables separately. This is the 
case even if we exclude all the insignificant controls in Model 10. Thus, we cannot 
say that HRM sophistication has any sufficient significant direct effect on 
psychological empowerment independent of our controls422. 
It is interesting to note that the weak significance exhibited by 'Strategic fit' in Model 
8, and the non-significance in Model 9 in fact increased when we include the 
sociopolitical controls in Model 10423. Thus after all, the result of Model 10 gives 
some support for a direct relationship between strategic fit and psychological 
                                               
421 When excluding all the insignificant controls the analyses again indicate that this mediated 
influence may be stronger. However, including the controls seems to us more correct. 
422 It can be argued that it would be relevant and interesting to include our employee performance 
constructs and our organizational performance constructs as controls when analyzing the antecedents to 
our focal intermediate attitudinal constructs. The performance of individual employees and 
organizational performance might very well influence (bias) the attitudes of the employees. They may 
also differently influence (bias) the attitudes of the employees towards the sophistication of the HRM 
system. The performance variables should according to our model be related to (i.e. causally dependent 
on) both HRM and psychological empowerment. However, to the extent that we could achieve 
significant relations between our HRM variables and our intermediate variables (e.g. psychological 
empowerment) independent of employee and organizational performance, we could at least rule out 
that such potential (either substantially and/or attributionally biasing) reverse causations might fully 
explain any relationships between HRM and our intermediate attitudes (e.g. psychological 
empowerment). The meaningfulness of such controls depends on the assumption that HRM explains 
more of the variation in the intermediate variables than in the more ultimate (employee and 
organizational performance) dependent variables. This seems as a fair assumption. Thus, controlling 
for employee and organizational performance may clearly lead to under-estimations of the 
hypothesized relationships between HRM and our intermediate attitudinal variables. However, it may 
even be that a relationship between e.g. HRM and psychological empowerment only becomes 
discernible when we control for such potential reverse causations (biases), in particular as the 
attributionally biasing reverse causation on psychological empowerment might be considerable. There 
may clearly also be such an attributionally biasing reverse causation from organizational performance 
to the evaluations of employee performance. Below when reaching some more substantial, albeit 
exploratory, results we will thus include also these performance variables as controls.  
423 When excluding 'HRM sophistication' in Model 10 the significance of 'Strategic fit' is 0.045 as 
opposed to 0.053 when including the former. The relatively small difference (again) shows that the 
strategic component included in 'HRM sophistication' is small. As a consequence, also when we are 
interested exclusively in the role of strategic fit (as judged by superiors) the HRM system construct 




empowerment. It is interesting that the variable most responsible for causing this 
increase in significance is 'Organizational support'. We will return to an interpretation 
of these results concerning strategic fit in section 9.3.5 below. Finally, Model 10b is 
the result of applying backward selection (see section 8.5) to Model 10. Model 10b 
supports the same theoretically relevant relationships as does Model 10. The main 
difference is that ‘Strategic fit’ is more significant in Model 10b. 
We will now proceed by analyzing the direct relations between HRM and our other 
focal intermediate attitudinal constructs. After that we will return to some reflections 
upon the results of the tests for HRM's direct influence on all the postulated 
intermediate attitudinal constructs.  
HRM and affective value commitment. The results of our test of hypothesis 8a 
postulating HRM sophistication as a sufficient antecedent to affective value 
commitment are exhibited in Table 29. In these equations we also test a potential 






Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 16b
Variables
β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF
Constant 2,17 *** ,065 - 3,31*** ,575 - 3,13*** ,592 - 3,20*** ,586 - 2,19*** ,625 - 1,54** ,573 - 1.93*** .490 -
Number of earlier employers ,120 * ,006 2,1 ,082 ,064 2,1 ,084 ,064 2,1 ,080 ,064 2,1 ,115* ,062 2,2 ,045 ,056 2,2 ∅ ∅ ∅
Employee age ,050 ,054 2,4 ,026 ,055 2,4 ,027 ,055 2,4 ,031 ,054 2,4 ,062 ,053 2,5 ,010 ,048 2,5 ∅ ∅ ∅
Employee tenure -,064 ,054 1,5 -,088 ,054 1,5 -,089 ,054 1,5 -,077 ,054 1,5 -,107* ,052 1,5 -,088* ,046 1,5 -.067 .038 1.1
Prob. of partnership status ,223 ** ,025 1,4 ,223** ,025 1,4 ,222** ,025 1,4 ,193** ,025 1,4 ,195** ,024 1,4 ,169** ,022 1,4 .163** .021 1.3
Perceived job opportunities ,155 ** ,047 1,4 ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
Recent job offers ,041 ,,022 1,3 ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
Workload ,075 ,054 1,6 ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
Too big demands -,131 ** ,039 1,5 -,108 ,037 1,3 -,108* ,037 1,3 -,105* ,036 1,3 -,048 ,036 1,6 -,075 ,032 1,3 -.087* .030 1.2
Rec. rad. improvem in HRM ,054 ,052 1,3 ,050 ,052 1,3 ,052 ,053 1,3 -,009 ,056 1,5 -,022 ,054 1,4 -,066 ,048 1,6 ∅ ∅ ∅
Hierarchy ,012 ,029 1,1 ,030 ,029 1,1 ,029 ,030 1,1 ,002 ,030 1,1 ,028 ,030 1,1 ,011 ,027 1,3 ∅ ∅ ∅
Prospects of organiz. perf. ,208 ** ,056 1,4 ,225** ,056 1,4 ,226** ,056 1,4 ,197** ,057 1,4 ,180** ,056 1,3 ,107* ,052 1,6 .130** .046 1.4
Organizational image -,025 ,043 1,4 -,003 ,043 1,3 ,000 ,043 1,4 -,010 ,043 1,4 -,010 ,041 2,6 -,035 ,037 1,4 ∅ ∅ ∅
Strategy ,144 ** ,032 1,2 ,114** ,031 1,1 ,115** ,031 1,1 ,099* ,031 1,1 ,090 ,030 1,9 ,125** ,027 1,1 .112** .025 1.1
Organization size -,155 ** ,056 1,3 -,167** ,053 1,2 -,165** ,055 1,2 -,169** ,054 1,2 -,164* ,052 1,5 -,071 ,049 1,3 -.083* .046 1.2
Interactional justice ,355 *** ,058 1,7 ,382*** ,059 1,7 ,383*** ,059 1,7 ,324*** ,062 1,9 ,240** ,070 1,3 ,166** ,064 2,7 .128* .059 2.4
Procedural justice -,070 ,056 1,7 -,088 ,057 1,7 -,086 ,057 1,7 -,080 ,057 1,7 -,088 ,056 2,6 -,047 ,051 1,9 ∅ ∅ ∅
Distributive justice ,154 ** ,056 1,3 ,147** ,056 1,3 ,145** ,056 1,3 ,091 ,059 1,4 ,078 ,057 2,6 ,093* ,051 1,5 ∅ ∅ ∅
Strategic fit ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ,013 ,058 1,3 -,031 ,058 1,3 -,014 ,056 1,7 -,065 ,051 1,4 -.082** .046 1.2
HRM sophistication ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ,195** ,088 1,3 ,137* ,090 2,7 ,115* ,081 2,6 .142* .066 1.8
Organization support ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ,263** ,090 2,6 ,140* ,083 2,8 .174** .072 2.2
Coworker support ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ,140** ,063 1,7 ,074 ,057 1,8 ∅ ∅ ∅
Leader support ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ -,130* ,066 2,7 -,167** ,059 2,7 -.168** .056 2.5
















F for R2 / R2  / Adj. R2 / CI♣ 7,7 0,52 0,46 59 8,3 0,48 0,42 47 7,7 0,48 0,42 50 7,6 0,50 0,43 52 7,8 0,55 0,48 65 10,7 0,64 0,58 67 17,9 0,63 0,59 47




Model 11 exhibits our basic control equation without the sociopolitical controls. As in 
our analyses of the relationship between HRM and psychological empowerment, the 
negative effect of workload is again picked up by the variable 'Too big demands'. It 
can further be noted that 'Recent job offers' is not significant at all but becomes 
positively weakly significant (one-sided test at the 0.1 significance level) if we 
exclude 'Perceived job opportunities'. Because the meaning of including 'Workload', 
'Perceived job opportunities' and 'Recent job offers' was to control for their potential 
negative influence on 'Affective commitment' we will exclude them from further 
analyses424.  
It can be noted that in distinction to what was the case with reference to 
'Psychological empowerment' interestingly 'Distributive justice' is significant in 
relation to 'Affective commitment'. This indicates that in so far as employees tend to 
be affectively value committed they are more concerned about distributive justice 
compared to employees who tend to be psychologically empowered. This may also 
offer some understanding of the different relations to performance exhibited by 
affective value commitment and psychological empowerment (below)425. In similar 
distinction it is also interesting to note that a high quality strategy plausibly seems to 
be positively related to 'Affective commitment'. Finally, 'Interactional justice' is also 
in this case highly significant and relatively a lot more important predictor than 
'Procedural justice'. Again this result supports the arguments provided by Moorman 
(1991, p. 852) noted in connection to the analyses of antecedents to 'Psychological 
empowerment'. Our basic control equation for 'Affective commitment' is exhibited in 
Model 12. It can be noted that 'Too big demands' stays significant even when 
excluding 'Workload'. This provides plausible evidence for the fact that 'Too big 
                                               
424 In line with Everitt and Dunn (1991, pp. 147-148) we will test whether any of these variables 
becomes significantly (negatively) related to 'Affective commitment' in the following analyses. If they 
do, they will be reported. Although against our expectations, it is intelligible and interesting that the 
phenomena related to job opportunities seem to be positively related to affective value commitment. To 
the extent that an employee feels the presence of alternative job opportunities it may induce a feeling of 
being well at ease with the current situation which in turn may plausibly lead to, or at least be 
congruent with, affective value commitment. This is in apparent sharp contrast to Iverson and Buttigieg 
(1999) where the (LISREL) correlation between their notion of affective commitment and job 
opportunities was -.30 (ibid., p. 320). The zero-order correlation coefficients between the 
corresponding composite scores in our study are 0.18 for perceived job opportunities and 0.15 for 
recent job offers. Allen and Meyer refer to evidence of varying degrees of correlations (both positive 
and negative) between unidentified measures/samples of "perceived alternatives" and ACS but no 
significant positive correlations (1996, p. 265). The difference between our correlations and that 
reported by Iverson and Buttigieg (1999) may be due to the different samples. Iverson and Buttigieg 
studied employees working at different locations of a fire fighter and rescue service in Australia (ibid., 
p. 315). It may well be that the different contexts, e.g. the general availability of potential alternative 
jobs and general satisfaction with the work may explain the different correlations. The somewhat 
different constructs of affective commitment as well as the differences in the control variables may also 
contribute to these differences. In any case the above differences are striking. On the other hand, the 
bivariate correlations between our notion of affective commitment and organization support, supervisor 
support, interactional justice and procedural justice are more or less in line with evidence of 
correlations between the latter variables and ACS in earlier research as reported in Allen and Meyer 
(1996, p. 265).  
425 This evidence is in conflict with at least some reported evidence the details of which we do not have 
(Moorman and Niehoff, 1993). More in line with earlier evidence is the fact that compared to 




demands' is a more robust predictor/explanatory factor of 'Affective commitment' than 
of 'Psychological empowerment'. Thus, while some correlations taken at face value 
are different than corresponding ones in earlier studies, we argue that in general these 
results are intelligible and represent evidence as to the "face validity" of our data. 
In Model 13 we included 'Strategic fit'. The result shows that 'Strategic fit' is not 
significant even excluding the controls in terms of sociopolitical support. The 
inclusion of the sociopolitical controls does not change this result as it did with 
reference to 'Psychological empowerment'.  
In Model 14, still without the sociopolitical support variables, we included 'HRM 
sophistication'. It is clearly significant. In fact, its significance is not affected by 
excluding 'Strategic fit' which simply reflects the fact that the component of strategic 
fit in 'HRM sophistication' does not have any explanatory role with reference to 
'Affective commitment'. In any event these results give some initial tentative support 
for hypothesis 8a. 
When we include the sociopolitical support variables in Model 15 'HRM 
sophistication' is only weakly significant (one-tailed test, p = 0.087) thus providing 
only weak indicative support for a direct relationship between 'HRM sophistication' 
and 'Affective commitment'. It can be noted that the importance of leader-behavior for 
affective value commitment is accounted for by 'Interactional justice' rather than 
'Leader support'. As noted earlier these are conceptually closely related to each other. 
However, 'Leader support' is simply highly insignificant if we exclude 'Interactional 
justice' whereas excluding 'Leader support', 'Interactional justice' is still significant 
and positive. In fact, 'Leader support' is not significant even if we in addition to 
'Interactional justice' also exclude 'Organization support' and 'Coworker support'. In 
the latter case the correlation is however positive426. 
In Model 16 we included 'Psychological empowerment'. In line with our arguments 
(see section 8.2.2) the results show that 'Psychological empowerment' seems to have a 
strong direct relationship with 'Affective commitment'. In Model 16 'HRM 
sophistication' is still only very weakly significant (one-tailed test, p = 0.097) thus 
offering only very weak support for a direct relationship between 'HRM 
sophistication' and 'Affective commitment'. However, the backward selected Model 
16b supports a direct relationship between ‘HRM sophistication’ and ‘Affective 
                                               
426 The somewhat implausible weakly (and in the next equation more strongly) significant negative 
apparent influence of 'Leader support' must be interpreted with caution. It reflects its residual relation 
to 'Affective commitment' when also accounting for all the other relationships in the model. The 
discriminative validity between 'Leader support', 'Coworker support', 'Organization support', Procedural 
justice' and 'Interactional justice' is far from perfect. Although our validity-analyses gave support for 
some discriminative validity between these constructs, in the studied organizations the respondents' 
interpretations of support from "colleagues" or coworkers might e.g. also include perceptions of at least 
some of the support received from superiors etc.. Nevertheless, severe multicollinearity problems are 




commitment’. The combined evidence of Models 16 and 16b is thus somewhat 
ambiguous with reference to hypothesis 8a427. 
HRM and affective continuance commitment. The results of our test of hypothesis 
8b postulating HRM sophistication as a sufficient antecedent to affective continuance 
commitment are exhibited in Table 30428. In these equations we also test a potential 
direct relationship between 'Strategic fit' and 'Continuance commitment'. 
 
                                               
427 Again, when excluding the other support related variables and/or 'Interactional justice' then 'Leader 
support' is simply insignificant.  
428 In these analyses the standard errors tend to be larger. Rather than being the result of problems 
related to multicollinearity this is arguably the result of the fact that the standard deviation of 





Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 Model 22b
Variables
β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF
Constant ,983 1,40 - 1,05 1,42 - 1,15 1,44 - -,522 1,44 - -.49 1.425 - -,841 1.46 - .04 .915 -
Number of earlier employers ,071 ,136 2,1 ,074 ,137 2,1 ,071 ,138 2,1 ,094 ,132 2,2 .144 * .135 2.4 ,14 * .135 2.3 .146* .114 2.1
Employee age ,111 ,115 2,4 ,113 ,116 2,4 ,114 ,116 2,4 ,135 ,111 2,5 .168 * .111 2.6 ,17 * .111 2.5 .162* .099 2.5
Employee tenure -,081 ,115 1,5 -,084 ,116 1,5 -,081 ,116 1,5 -,123 * ,111 1,5 -.129 * .110 1.6 -,12 * .110 1.5 -.122* .092 1.5
Prob. of partnership status ,259 ** ,053 1,3 ,257 ** ,054 1,3 ,249 ** ,055 1,4 ,257 ** ,052 1,4 .269 *** .051 1.4 ,25 ** .053 1.5 .273*** .044 1.3
Perceived job opportunities -,041 ,083 1,4 -,041 ,084 1,4 -,039 ,084 1,4 ,039 ,082 1,5 .058 .101 1.7 ,06 .101 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅
Recent job offers -,198 ** ,116 1,5 -,195 ** ,117 1,5 -,198 ** ,118 1,5 -,239 ** ,112 1,6 .002 .045 1.3 ,00 .045 1.3 ∅ ∅ ∅
Workload ,059 ,100 1,4 ,059 ,100 1,4 ,052 ,102 1,4 ,010 ,098 1,5 -.181 ** .117 1.8 -,17 ** .118 1.8 ∅ ∅ ∅
Too big demands -,036 ,048 1,3 -,036 ,048 1,3 -,035 ,048 1,3 -,003 ,045 1,3 .030 .081 1.6 ,04 .081 1.6 -.179** .083 1.2
Rec. rad. improvem in HRM ,173 ** ,111 1,3 ,178 ** ,113 1,3 ,159 ** ,123 1,6 ,141 * ,117 1,6 .147 ** .116 1.7 ,15 ** .116 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅
Hierarchy -,064 ,063 1,1 -,067 ,063 1,1 -,074 ,064 1,1 -,035 ,064 1,3 -.035 .064 1.3 -,04 .064 1.3 .143** .086 1.1
Prospects of organiz. perf. ,150 ** ,120 1,4 ,152 ** ,121 1,4 ,144 * ,123 1,4 ,101 ,121 1,6 .125 * .121 1.7 ,11 .122 1.7 ∅ ∅ ∅
Organizational image ,061 ,091 1,3 ,065 ,093 1,4 ,063 ,093 1,4 ,060 ,088 1,4 .064 .087 1.4 ,07 .087 1.4 .129** .097 1.3
Strategy -,016 ,070 1,2 -,015 ,070 1,2 -,021 ,071 1,2 -,024 ,067 1,2 -.033 .066 1.2 -,05 .068 1.3 ∅ ∅ ∅
Organization size ,049 ,119 1,3 ,055 ,123 1,3 ,054 ,123 1,3 ,063 ,118 1,4 .030 .119 1.5 ,04 .120 1.5 ∅ ∅ ∅
Interactional justice ,034 ,125 1,6 ,037 ,125 1,6 ,020 ,133 1,8 -,182 * ,150 2,7 -.136 .151 2.8 -,15 * .153 2.8 ∅ ∅ ∅
Procedural justice ,022 ,120 1,7 ,026 ,121 1,7 ,027 ,122 1,7 -,045 ,119 1,9 -.054 .118 1.9 -,05 .118 1.9 ∅ ∅ ∅
Distributive justice ,152 ** ,119 1,2 ,149 ** ,120 1,3 ,133 * ,129 1,5 ,122 * ,123 1,5 .127 * .121 1.5 ,12 * .122 1.5 .103* .099 1.2
Strategic fit ∅ ∅ ∅ -,026 ,123 1,3 -,031 ,124 1,3 -,002 ,119 1,3 .015 .119 1.4 ,02 .119 1.4 ∅ ∅ ∅
HRM sophistication ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ,056 ,191 2,3 -,077 ,190 2,6 -.084 .188 2.6 -,10 .189 2.6 ∅ ∅ ∅
Organization support ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ,285 ** ,198 2,9 .322 *** .199 3.0 ,30 ** .201 3.0 .243** .132 1.7
Coworker support ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ,195 ** ,133 1,7 .234 ** .135 1.8 ,23 ** .135 1.8 .231** .107 1.4
Leader support ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ,108 ,138 2,7 .128 .137 2.7 ,15 * .139 2.8 ∅ ∅ ∅
Psych. empowerment ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ -.224 ** .202 2.9 -,28 ** .222 3.5 -.210** .153 2.0
















F for R2 / R2  / Adj. R2 / CI♣ 3,7 0,34 0,25 58 3,5 0,34 0,24 61 3,3 0,34 0,24 65 4,0 0,43 0,33 74 4,0 0,45 0,34 76 3,9 0,46 0,34 84 9,1 0,41 0,36 39




Model 17 represents our basic control equation. Interestingly, in distinction to what 
seemed to be the case with reference to psychological empowerment and affective 
commitment, the general level of workload seems plausibly to be significantly 
negatively related to continuance commitment. Further it is interesting to note the 
fairly strong influence recent radical improvements in HRM might tend to have on 
perceptions of continuance commitment. In equal distinction to what was the case 
with reference to 'Psychological empowerment' and 'Affective commitment', 
'Interactional justice' is not significant when included in this equation. These results 
also represent a further indication of the earlier established distinct nature of 
'Affective commitment' and 'Continuance commitment'. Although not shown here, 
'Job opportunities' and 'Job offers' are not significant even when excluding 'Too big 
demands' and 'Workload'. These results thus, in some apparent distinction to the 
results of Iverson and Buttigieg (1999, p. 323) offer no support for the fact that 
affective continuance commitment in this sample would be relatively highly 
dependent on available job alternatives429. That some sort of "ease of movement" has 
an influence on continuance commitment, is however supported by the fact that ‘Age’ 
is significant if we in Model 17 exclude the related construct 'Number of earlier 
employers' (compare Mayer and Shoorman, 1998, p. 19).  
In Model 18 we included 'Strategic fit'. The results show that this construct is not 
significantly related to 'Continuance commitment’. This result is not affected by the 
inclusion of the sociopolitical controls, 'Psychological empowerment' or even 
'Affective commitment'.  
In Model 19 we included 'HRM sophistication' which is not significant even 
excluding the sociopolitical controls. The inclusion of further control variables in the 
following equations does not change this result. Although not shown here, ‘HRM 
sophistication’ is not significant even if we exclude ‘Strategic fit’. Thus, there seem to 
be no support for a direct relationship between HRM sophistication and affective 
continuance commitment. This evidence offers no support for hypothesis 8b. 
In Model 20 we entered the sociopolitical controls. The results indicate that at least 
'Organization support' and 'Coworker support' are significantly related to 'Continuance 
commitment'. When entered without the other sociopolitical controls also 'Leader 
support' is significant. 
Interestingly, in Model 21 'Psychological empowerment' is negatively and 
significantly related to 'Continuance commitment'. On the basis of current theorizing 
this seems somewhat unexpected (see section 8.2.2). The result indicates that some of 
the objectives of organizational policy might be mutually difficult to realize, i.e. to 
empower individuals and simultaneously to increase their desire to stay with the 
organization. The result might be interpreted as being due to the fact that, given the 
                                               
429 Iverson and Buttigieg used two subscales for continuance commitment in terms of low perceived 
alternatives and high sacrifice of leaving (1999, p. 315; 319). In their analyses job opportunities were 
negatively related to both of these sub-scales (ibid., p. 323). More evidence of negative relationships 
between continuance commitment as measured by CCS and perceived alternatives is reported in Allen 
and Meyer, 1996, p. 265. However, all this evidence involves constructs of continuance commitment 
which completely lack the potential positive aspects of continuance commitment which our construct 




other influences on affective continuance commitment controlled for, psychologically 
empowered individuals simply feel more independence from any one organization. 
This interpretation is supported by the fact that 'Perceived job opportunities' is highly 
significant and positively related to 'Psychological empowerment’ (β = 0.244; Sig. = 
0.000) when entered into Model 6. Also the Pearson correlation between 
'Psychological empowerment' and 'Recent job offers' as well as the former and 
'Perceived job opportunities' are both positive. Although these are not correlated with 
'Continuance commitment' nor significantly related to it in the above analyses, their 
correlation with 'Psychological empowerment' give some additional support for the 
interpretation that psychologically empowered employees feel more independence 
and thus less continuance commitment.  
In Model 22 we included also 'Affective commitment' which at least with these 
controls is insignificant, and thus not in line with what the overall postulated model 
and the argumentation in section 7.2.4.2 suggests. Model 22 also provides further 
evidence of the discriminant nature of the two constructs of commitment as well as 
both of these two with reference to 'Psychological empowerment'430. Finally, the 
backward selected Model 22b supports all the theoretically relevant relationships 
which are significant in Model 22.  Based on Models 19-22b we reject hypothesis 8b. 
HRM and organizational citizenship behavior. The results of our test of hypothesis 
10 postulating HRM sophistication as a sufficient antecedent to organizational 
citizenship behavior are exhibited in Table 31. In these equations we also test the 
potential direct relationship between 'Strategic fit' and ‘Organizational citizenship 
behavior. 
 
                                               
430 Organizational citizenship behavior could be argued to influence continuance commitment and not 
(only) the other way around as we have hypothesized in our model. To the extent that we would treat it 
as reflecting organizational level phenomena, (as we do later in the analyses with reference to all our 
other variables) it could thus be argued to be an interesting control variable in this context. We will 





Model 23 Model 24 Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 Model 29
Variables
β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF
Constant .74 .734 .95 .736 1.24** .723 .43 .718 .65 .721 .66 .685 .28 .695
Number of earlier employers .034 .071 2.1 .054 .071 2.1 .039 .069 2.1 .100 .066 2.2 .046 .064 2.3 -.023 .063 2.4 -.029 .062 2.4
Employee age .174 ** .060 2.4 .187** .060 2.4 .189** .058 2.4 .175** .055 2.5 .153** .053 2.3 .108 .051 2.6 .106 .050 2.6
Employee tenure -.030 .060 1.5 -.042 .060 1.5 -.031 .058 1.5 -.047 .055 1.6 -.002 .054 2.5 .000 .051 1.6 .015 .051 1.7
Prob. of partnership status .103 * .028 1.4 .093 .028 1.4 .053 .027 1.4 .068 .026 1.4 .053 .025 1.6 .042 .024 1.5 .002 .024 1.6
Perceived job opportunities .244 *** .052 1.4 .246*** .052 1.4 .213*** .051 1.5 .218*** .049 1.5 .226*** .047 1.5 .153** .047 1.7 .150** .046 1.7
Recent job offers -.027 .025 1.3 -.024 .025 1.3 -.018 .024 1.3 .000 .023 1.3 .013 .022 1.6 .002 .021 1.3 -.007 .020 1.3
Workload .240 *** .060 1.6 .258*** .060 1.6 .242*** .059 1.6 .234*** .056 1.6 .187*** .055 1.3 .109* .054 1.8 .125** .054 1.9
Too big demands -.052 .044 1.5 -.051 .043 1.5 -.043 .042 1.5 .004 .041 1.6 .001 .039 1.7 .017 .037 1.6 .025 .037 1.6
Rec. rad. improvem in HRM -.016 .058 1.3 .007 .058 1.4 -.081 .062 1.6 -.082 .059 1.7 -.099* .056 1.6 -.107* .053 1.7 -.101* .053 1.7
Hierarchy -.008 .033 1.1 -.021 .033 1.1 -.054 .032 1.2 -.084 .032 1.3 -.084* .031 1.7 -.088* .030 1.3 -.089* .029 1.3
Prospects of organiz. perf. .227 *** .063 1.4 .240*** .062 1.5 .202*** .061 1.5 .136** .060 1.6 .180*** .059 1.3 .131** .057 1.8 .110* .057 1.8
Organizational image .133 ** .048 1.4 .153** .048 1.4 .143** .046 1.4 .145** .044 1.4 .148** .042 1.7 .140** .040 1.4 .148*** .039 1.4
Strategy .165 *** .036 1.2 .169*** .036 1.2 .141** .035 1.2 .133** .033 1.2 .095* .033 1.4 .113** .031 1.3 .086* .031 1.4
Organization size -.227 *** .062 1.3 -.193*** .063 1.4 -.200*** .062 1.4 -.165** .059 1.4 -.172*** .057 1.3 -.117** .055 1.5 -.103* .055 1.6
Interactional justice .146 ** .065 1.7 .157** .065 1.7 .077 .066 1.9 .057 .075 2.7 .064 .072 1.5 -.006 .070 2.8 -.034 .069 2.9
Procedural justice .003 .063 1.7 .021 .063 1.8 .028 .061 1.8 .020 .060 1.9 -.006 .057 2.7 .010 .055 1.9 .022 .054 2.0
Distributive justice .095 * .062 1.3 .078 .062 1.3 .002 .064 1.5 .010 .061 1.5 .020 .059 1.9 .007 .056 1.6 -.007 .056 1.6
Strategic fit ∅ ∅ ∅ -.140** .063 1.3 -.164** .062 1.3 -.175*** .059 1.4 -.170*** .057 1.6 -.195*** .055 1.4 -.187*** .054 1.4
HRM sophistication ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ .272*** .095 2.3 .200** .095 2.6 .177** .091 1.4 .194** .087 2.6 .171** .086 2.7
Organization support ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ .036 .099 2.9 .018 .096 2.6 -.030 .092 3.1 -.066 .092 3.2
Coworker support ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ .313*** .066 1.8 .316*** .064 3.0 .257*** .062 1.8 .244*** .061 1.9
Leader support ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ -.089 .069 2.7 -.049 .067 1.8 -.085 .064 2.8 -.052 .063 2.9
Psych. empowerment ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ .343*** .095 3.0 .247*** .103 3.7
Aff. value commitment ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ .200** .098 2.9
Aff. continuance com. ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
Empl. perf: quality/efficacy ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ -.144** .062 1.5 -.138** .058 1.6 -.125** .058 1.6
















F for R2 / R2  / Adj. R2 / CI♣ 6,5 0,48 0,40 58 6,4 0,49 0,42 61 6,8 0,52 0,45 65 7,5 0,59 0,51 74 8,0 0,63 0,55 80 9,0 0,67 0,60 82 9,2 0,68 0,61 92





Model 30 Model 30b
Variables
β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF
Constant .33 .696 .35 .559
Number of earlier employers -.040 .062 2.5 ∅ ∅ ∅
Employee age .092 .051 2.6 .098* .035 1.4
Employee tenure .024 .051 1.7 ∅ ∅ ∅
Prob. of partnership status -.017 .025 1.7 ∅ ∅ ∅
Perceived job opportunities .145** .046 1.7 .155*** .039 1.4
Recent job offers -.007 .020 1.3 ∅ ∅ ∅
Workload .140** .054 1.9 .147*** .044 1.4
Too big demands .023 .037 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅
Rec. rad. improvem in HRM -.114** .053 1.7 -.087* .046 1.4
Hierarchy -.087* .029 1.3 -.092* .027 1.3
Prospects of organiz. perf. .098* .057 1.8 .105** .051 1.6
Organizational image .141** .040 1.5 .140*** .037 1.4
Strategy .092* .031 1.4 .086* .028 1.3
Organization size -.105* .055 1.6 -.097** .048 1.4
Interactional justice -.022 .070 2.9 ∅ ∅ ∅
Procedural justice .027 .054 2.0 ∅ ∅ ∅
Distributive justice -.018 .056 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅
Strategic fit -.189*** .054 1.4 -.196*** .049 1.3
HRM sophistication .181** .086 2.7 .148** .072 2.1
Organization support -.090 .094 3.3 -.099* .071 2.1
Coworker support .224*** .063 2.0 .254*** .055 1.7
Leader support -.066 .064 2.9 ∅ ∅ ∅
Psych. empowerment .275*** .106 3.9 .222*** .093 3.3
Aff. value commitment .187** .098 3.0 .199*** .086 2.5
Aff. continuance com. .085 .043 1.9 ∅ ∅ ∅
Empl. perf: quality/efficacy -.124** .058 1.6 -.125** .052 1.5






F for R2 / R2  / Adj. R2 / CI♣ 8,9 0,69 0,61 96 15,4 0,68 0,64 69
  One-tailed sig. test:*p<.10  /  **p<.05  /  ***p<.01  /  β = stand. coeff.  /  ♣CI = Condition Index  /
  ∅ = Variable not included in model
 
Again Model 23 represents our basic control equation excluding the sociopolitical 
control variables as well as 'Psychological empowerment', 'Affective commitment' 
and 'Continuance commitment'. Of the several significant relations we can note that 
workload (at the levels represented in the sample) seems to be compatible with 
organizational citizenship behavior. It is a priori quite plausible that 'Workload' at 
least up to some limit should be positively related to 'Organizational citizenship 
behavior'. However, in this sample not even too big demands on the employees seem 
to negatively influence such behavior. Perceived job opportunities seems in this 
sample to be positively related to organizational citizenship behavior. This result can 




perceived competence or ability which should also plausibly be related to perceived 
job alternatives431.  
In Model 24 we added 'Strategic fit'. Interestingly it is significant and negatively 
related to 'Organizational citizenship behavior'. We will give an interpretation of this 
result below in connection to the discussion of strategic fit including its earlier noted 
positive relation to 'Psychological empowerment' and its negative relationship to 
‘Organizational support’.  
In Model 25, we added 'HRM sophistication'. It is significant and positive thus 
offering some initial tentative support for hypothesis 10. 
In Model 26 we added also the sociopolitical support related constructs. The results 
show that 'HRM sophistication' is still significant thus offering more robust support 
for hypothesis 10. Plausibly the results also indicate that coworker support is highly 
significantly and positively related to organizational citizenship behavior. 
In Model 27 we entered the employee performance variables in order to control for 
"in-role" behavior. Of these the external employee performance measure is perhaps 
more clearly "in-role". We note that even with these controls 'HRM sophistication' is 
significant and positively related to 'Organizational citizenship behavior' thus 
providing further indication of the robustness of the earlier results. It is interesting to 
note that while the employees reporting higher organizational citizenship behavior 
quite plausibly also are ranked as exhibiting more innovative behavior internal to the 
organization their performance in terms of effectiveness and quality seems to be 
negatively related to organizational citizenship behavior. This indicates that high 
performers, evaluated according to more "traditional" criteria of performance, might 
exhibit a more individualistic focus and engage less in organizational citizenship 
behavior. Thus also here we find indications of some potential problems of mutually 
pursuing the organizational goals in terms of employees performing with more 
"traditional" high efficiency and quality as well as exhibiting organizational 
citizenship behavior432. 
                                               
431 This interpretation is supported by the fact that the dimension of 'Psychological empowerment' in 
terms of (perceived) 'Competence', a variable which is not shown in the correlation table, is positively 
related to both 'Perceived job opportunities' (r = 0.317; Sig. [two-tailed] =0.000) and 'Recent job offers' 
(r = 0.163; Sig. [two-tailed] =0.038). Of the three other dimensions of 'Psychological empowerment' 
only one, i.e. 'Meaning', is related to only one of the variables measuring perceived job opportunities, 
i.e. 'Perceived job opportunities' (r = 0.214; Sig. [two-tailed] =0.006). Even this relationship is smaller 
than the one between 'Competence' and the latter. However, as we shall see the data indicates that while 
("perceived") psychological empowerment may contribute to organizational citizenship behavior, 
interestingly employee performance in terms of quality/efficiency tends to be negatively rather than 
positively related to organizational citizenship behavior. This does not necessarily contradict the 
arguments concerning competence above but it indicates a complexity in the relationships. 
432 The (interpretation of the) results with reference to the relationship between employee "in-role" 
performance and organizational citizenship behavior is in some contradiction to Williams and 
Andersson (1991, p. 610-611). However, their study involved common method errors between their 
two variables related to organizational citizenship behavior and their in-role employee performance 
measure. In addition, their (two) construct(s) of organizational citizenship behavior(s) were different 




In Model 28 we entered 'Psychological empowerment'. In line with our earlier 
conceptual arguments(section 8.2.3) the results indicate that it is a significant 
predictor of organizational citizenship behavior. When controlling for 'Psychological 
empowerment' we may note that the significance of 'HRM sophistication' seems to be 
increased rather than reduced. Thus, there appears to be a direct relationship which is 
more clearly discernible when we control for 'Psychological empowerment'.  
In Model 29 we entered also 'Affective commitment'. It is significant and positive. 
The results indicate that 'Affective commitment' might be a mediator both of the 
influence of 'HRM sophistication' and the influence of 'Psychological empowerment' 
on 'Organizational citizenship behavior. This is in line with our earlier conceptual 
arguments (section 8.2.3) as well as much earlier theorizing and evidence as reviewed 
above433.  
The further inclusion of 'Continuance commitment' in Model 30 does not change any 
of the focal results obtained in the earlier analyses and simply indicates that this 
variable is not a significant predictor of 'Organizational citizenship behavior’. The 
significance of 'HRM sophistication' seems to increase rather than decrease when we 
include 'Continuance commitment' indicating that at the margin there is a direct 
relationship between 'HRM sophistication' and 'Organizational citizenship behavior' 
which is more clearly discernible when we control for 'Continuance commitment'. The 
backward selected Model 30b essentially supports the significant theoretically central 
relationships exhibited in Model 30. One main difference is however the (difficult to 
understand) weakly significant negative relationship between ‘Organization support’ 
and ‘Organizational citizenship behavior’ in Model 30b. In any case, ‘HRM 
sophistication’ is clearly significant in Models 30 and 30b. This offers robust support 
for hypothesis 10. 
9.3.1 The direct relationships: summary of the results  
Thus, in summary our analyses have indicated that, when all our control variables are 
included, there is no direct significant relationship between 'HRM sophistication' and 
'Psychological empowerment' (Model 10 and 10b), nor between 'HRM sophistication' 
and 'Continuance commitment' (Models 19-22b) and a more ambiguously significant 
relationship between 'HRM sophistication' and 'Affective commitment' (Models 16 
and 16b)434. However, we found a strongly significant direct relationship between 
                                               
433 It is again interesting to note that in further apparent contradiction to our results, Williams and 
Andersson found no significant relationship between organizational commitment and their (two) 
construct(s) of organizational citizenship behavior(s). With reference to this relationship, a crucial 
difference, in addition to the different constructs of organizational citizenship behavior, is that our 
study involved common method errors while their did not. Further, their construct of organizational 
commitment was different from our constructs of commitment. Finally, we include a much larger 
number of control variables in our analyses. This last point, however, appears not to be a crucial 
distinctive factor with reference to this issue since already the correlations between these variables in 
these two studies are significantly different. These observations together with those in footnote 432 
provide some further indications of the role common method errors might have in the results of 
different studies (Brown and Williams, 1994). However, the comparison of the studies is made difficult 
by the different types of constructs used. 
434 It would clearly be important to corroborate these results with data uncontaminated by common 




'HRM sophistication' and 'Organizational citizenship behavior' (Models 25-30b). With 
reference to our intermediate attitudinal constructs these are the main hypothesis-
related results of the analyses so far. 
In addition we found an interesting strongly significant positive relation between 
'Strategic fit' and 'Psychological empowerment' (Models 8, 10 and 10b) as well as a 
negative one between 'Strategic fit' and 'Organizational citizenship behavior' (Models 
24-30b) to which we will return in section 9.3.5 below.  
We also found some potential problems in achieving psychologically empowered 
employees who are also affectively continuance committed (Models 21-22b) as well 
as achieving employees who engage in organizational citizenship behavior and at the 
same time perform their "core work" with high quality/efficiency (Models 27-30b)435. 
In addition we have found some indicative and partial support of the suggested 
mediational relations between our focal intermediate constructs in terms of 
'Psychological empowerment', and 'Affective commitment' (Models 16 and 16b) and 
both of these and 'Organizational citizenship behavior' (Models 28-30b).  
However, on the basis of the above analyses HRM sophistication appears to be more 
or less cut off from these anticipated mediational relationships since we found no 
more unambiguous (strong) support for a direct relationship between HRM 
sophistication and either psychological empowerment or affective value commitment. 
Even so, the above results are no falsification of the idea that HRM, as conceptualized 
in this thesis, might have a sufficient and robust influence on psychological 
empowerment, affective value commitment, affective continuance commitment as 
well as in fact exhibit an even stronger overall relationship with organizational 
citizenship behavior.  
We are still left with at least one possibility,  (even more) exploratory but fully in 
line with earlier theorizing, to develop the ideas of proper controls and potential 
causal mechanisms (mediators), which could make HRM´s sufficient influence on our 
focal intermediate constructs more robust in plausible and intelligible ways. Thus, 
before we continue with our hypothesis-based analyses of HRM´s potential mediated 
(and thus explained) influence on employee performance and potential mediated (and 
thus explained) influence on organizational performance, we will consider whether 
there might be other routes of HRM´s influence in line with the hypotheses implied by 
our general model. We have found that without the socio-political controls 'HRM 
sophistication' is significantly and positively directly related to all focal intermediate 
attitudinal constructs except to 'Continuance commitment' (to 'Psychological 
                                                                                                                                      
However, with many control variables it appears possible that common method errors (in particular in 
combination with low discriminant validities) may lead to under-estimations of potential direct 
relationships between variables. Such effects would be due to the increased multicollinearity produced 
by common method errors. Nevertheless, as we shall argue below there is still some justification for 
believing that the HRM system alone is not sufficient to influence psychological empowerment. 
435 As we shall see below the negative relationship between organizational citizenship behavior and 
employee performance in terms of quality/efficiency is however not significant when we do not control 




empowerment' in Model 9, to 'Affective commitment' in Model 14, and to 
'Organizational citizenship behavior’ in Model 24 but not to 'Continuance 
commitment' in Model 19). These results suggest some potential developments of our 
general postulated model.  
9.3.2 An exploratory extension of the general model 
As an exploratory attempt, within the constraints of the current data, we will pursue 
the possibility that the influence of the general sophistication of the HRM system on 
the focal intermediate phenomena may be mediated by the sociopolitical support 
related phenomena. These mediational possibilities were partially indicated already at 
the end of (section 3.4) as well as further justified in connection to the discussion of 
control variables (section 8.2). 
Thus, we exploratively propose to test whether our data is consistent with a 
mediational framework which involves Strategic fit, HRM, the support related 
variables, psychological empowerment, affective value commitment, affective 
continuance commitment, organizational citizenship behavior as well as the 





























This framework is largely consistent with earlier theorizing and evidence as reviewed 
above. In section 8.2. we argued for the (mediational) relationships between 




and 'Organizational citizenship behavior436. We still need to conceptually/theoretically 
justify the additional relationships included in the above exploratory model.  
HRM and the support related variables. In arguing for these mediation effects, we 
have to assume at least two things. (1) First, we have to assume that the current 
qualities of the HRM practices, or similar ones in relative terms, have been present in 
the organizations long enough to influence the qualities of coworkers and leaders. 
This assumption is more or less incorporated in the assumption of "equilibrium 
relationships" (Becker and Huselid, 1998b, p. 5). (2) A related assumption of ours is 
that the variable 'HRM sophistication' more or less "correctly" reflects the qualities of 
the organizational HRM systems. On average these assumptions, considering also the 
control variables included, should be considered acceptable for exploratory purposes. 
In fact, as already noted, the plausibility that HRM as we have operationalized it 
could have an influence on organizational performance, as mediated by our 
intermediate variables, requires this assumption for all our focal attitudinal variables 
(compare sections 7.3 and 7.5).  
With these assumptions, a relationship between HRM and both leader support and 
coworker support would theoretically (causally) seem to make sense. A sophisticated 
HRM system should over time in various ways affect the qualities of coworkers and 
leaders. Such qualities should at least enable them to give support. An exchange 
theoretical argument would also provide an explanation for the hypothetical fact that 
depending on the sophistication of organizations´ HRM systems, coworkers and 
leaders in fact also tend to give such support. Such support and the importance of it 
might naturally vary depending on organizational contexts. In a “knowledge 
intensive” sample such as ours the importance of these relations should however be 
accentuated437. 
With reference to HRM´s indicated (indirect) relation to organization support it would 
seem plausible (also here on the basis of loose exchange theoretical reasons) that 
sophisticated selection, training, performance appraisals, communication, 
compensation, socialization, employment security and even general benefits (on 
average at least) would lead to such a climate. More sophisticated HRM could also 
make mutual respect, tolerance and aptitude for forgiving (i.e. organization support) 
more likely because of the general quality of employees it should contribute to. 
                                               
436 Although we received some complicating results with reference to these we will stick to the 
originally argued relationships. Thus, despite the contradictory evidence in terms of Model 21 and 22 
we continue to stick with the hypothesis of a positive relationship between psychological 
empowerment and affective continuance commitment. It may still hold when employee and 
organizational performance is controlled for. We also stick to our original model in terms of a 
relationship between affective value commitment and affective continuance commitment despite the 
evidence of Model 22, as well as between the latter and organizational citizenship behavior despite the 
lack of evidence in Model 30. 
437 In the HRM literature something close to leader support has been conceptualized as an important 
part of HRM (e.g. Storey, 1995, p. 6). However, it would seem that leader support is not something 
which organizations can simply mobilize by arguing that it is an important aspect of HRM. Leaders 
need to be qualified. HRM would thus naturally seem to form at least part of the organizational 
processes which (over time) influence qualities of the leaders rather than leader involvement in HRM 




Clearly there may also be opposite influences in terms of increased rivalry between 
more or less equally qualified employees. Social exhange theoretical consideration 
should nevertheless on average lead to increased organizational support as it is 
conceptualized/operationalized in this thesis. 
That HRM should affect the support-related variables is also in line with the 
(alternative) social context theory of the influence of human resource management 
suggested by Ferris et al. (1998). Appendix 4 exhibits a schematic outline of the 
latters' theorization. 
Co-worker/leader support and organizational support. In order that the 
relationship between coworker/leader support and organization support would be 
plausible, we have to assume that organization support is evaluated holistically by the 
respondents in terms of the respect, forgiving attitudes and tolerance shown by 
coworkers and leaders rather than by something more abstract in terms of the 
organization. Though perhaps somewhat in contradiction to the original aims of the 
construct of organization support (e.g. Eisenberger et al., 1986), we argue that with 
the content we have given to it in our study, this is a plausible assumption. In addition, 
we rely on a generalization of the argument that  
"because of their proximity and regular interaction with employees, local 
foci are probably more effective than global foci in...influencing employee 
behavior" (Becker et al., 1996, p. 467).  
This argument should apply also with reference to employee attitudes. With these 
assumptions, leader support and coworker support should plausibly translate into or 
lead to a perceived climate of respect, tolerance and aptitude for forgiving, i.e. 
organization support as operationalized in our study. In particular in an organization 
where team- and project-work are prevalent it would seem plausible that coworker 
support, together with leader support would contribute to a climate in terms of 
organization support438. 
Social support and Psychological empowerment. In general, these exploratory 
mediation effects are in line with Spreitzer's arguments about the importance of socio-
political support for psychological empowerment. "Social networks define the social 
fabric of an organization, providing members with key channels for getting work 
done"(Spreitzer, 1996, p. 488)439. Increased supportive "social exchange with key 
                                               
438 In the regression analyses we will not pursue the evident possibility that also Leader support should 
in turn influence Coworker support. We will instead control for this possibility. 
439 Based on the results so far it seems that 'Interactional justice' is more important than 'Leader 
support' with reference to both 'Psychological empowerment' and 'Affective commitment'. A 
relationship between interactional justice and psychological empowerment is also in line with 
Spreitzer´s arguments. Justice related variables in general are also likely to affect judgements of the 
HRM practices, or perhaps rather be a (potentially important) element of the HRM practices. However, 
in line with what we argued in the beginning of the thesis (at the end of section 1.3), by using justice 
related variables as controls in these analyses we explicitly try to distill the influence of various forms 
of justice from the influence of the HRM system. We do this because we want to analyze whether 
HRM could be said to have other influences than the potential ones in terms of (or through) properties 




organizational constituences" should influence "a sense of personal power" (ibid., p. 
488) which in turn should influence all the dimensions of psychological 
empowerment. In summary, employees' psychological empowerment (i.e. their 
perceptions of their empowerment) would seem to depend on the social context. With 
low support, in any of the three forms included in the model above, one would hardly 
feel as empowered as with high (contextual) social support. In fact as noted, 
independent of such support 'HRM sophistication' seems not to have a significant 
(sufficient) relation to 'Psychological empowerment'. 
Social support and Organizational commitment. The mediational relationships are 
also in line with the argument that "employees develop global beliefs concerning the 
extent to which the organization values their contributions and cares about their well-
being" (Eisenberger et al., 1986, p. 501). As noted also by Wayne et al. such beliefs 
should "underlie employees' inferences concerning their organizations commitment to 
them...which in turn [should] contribute to the employees' commitment to their 
organizations"(1997, p. 83).  
Social support and Organizational citizenship behavior. The postulated mediation 
effects are also in line with arguments for the importance of what has been called non-
controversional socially desirable workplace values for organizational citizenship 
behavior (and "attachment" and thus arguably commitment) (Dyne et al., 1994, pp. 
772-773). Non-controversial socially desirable workplace values would seem clearly 
to include values related to sociopolitical support and such phenomena would seem to 
be best manifested in perceptions of the behavior of colleagues. 
One might argue that the sociopolitical support related variables should be conceived 
of as moderator variables rather than mediator variables with reference to the 
influence of HRM. In fact, in social science interaction effects would appear ”to be 
the rule rather the exception” (Jaccard et al., 1993, p. 8). However, firstly, the 
postulation only of moderation effects would seem to be theoretically deficient.  
Secondly, a test of moderation effects in terms of our correlated variables in question 
would arguably confront (quite generalizable) statistical problems at least in 
knowledge intensive contexts comparable to the one studied in this thesis440. 
MacDuffie, in his study reviewed above, faced conditions similar to ours. To reduce 
the multicollinearity between his moderating variables he used a method of ”linear 
transformation known as ”centering” in which the mean value for a variable is 
subtracted from each score” (1995, p. 213).  
The method of centering is recommended e.g. by Jaccard, Turrisi and Wan (1993, pp. 
28-29). Against some critics, they argue in principle that interval scaled data do not 
pose problems for the use of ”centering” (Jaccard et al., 1993, pp. 28-29) and that this 
                                                                                                                                      
positive influences of the HRM system. In other words, these analyses thus (in principle) enable us to 
tell whether HRM can have the postulated effects independent of the explicitly justice-related aspects. 
440 When trying some analyses of moderation effects (with uncorrected variables) we faced severe 
multicollinearity problems. In fact, Baron and Kenny argue that ”it is desirable that the moderator 
variable be uncorrelated with both the predictor and the criterion (the dependent variable) to provide a 




method can be used to overcome multicollinearity problems (ibid., pp. 30-31). On the 
other hand, technical methods of reducing multicollinearity, have been criticized 
(Maddala, 1988, pp. 234 -247). With reference to ridge regressions, which seems to 
correspond to the method of ”centering”, Maddala cites the slogan: ”Use less precise 
data to get more precise estimates” (ibid., p. 236).  
In summary, there appears to be a general disagreement among statisticians about the 
possibilities to pursue analyses (of moderation effects) with highly correlated 
variables. Maddala seems to argue that technical solutions to the multicollinearity 
problem seem in general to be non-satisfactory and suggest that the best and perhaps 
only real solution to multicollinearity problems appears to be to find more data 
(Maddala, 1988, p. 247). Such data would have to be ”tailor made” to overcome the 
problems. With reference to our variables, which should arguably also be causally 
related, finding such data would seem to pose severe problems. In any case, regardless 
of the acceptability of the method of centering it will not be utilized in the current 
thesis. 
What we also could do is to enlarge our concept of HRM by forming a very complex 
index of our HRM variable and the support related variables (compare McDuffie´s 
Production Organization Index [1995, p. 208]441. In our case, forming such an index 
out of HRM and the support related variables would arguably be in line with much of 
what has been written on HRM and the ”mutual gains” organization, e.g. the 
argument that ”[t]he new HRM model is composed of policies [and praxis] that 
promote mutuality – mutual goals, mutual influence, mutual respect, mutual rewards, 
mutual responsibility” (Walton, 1985b). However, we prefer to use constructs which 
have been at least somewhat more generally validated. 
The above possibilities and problems are simply indications of the complexity 
involved in performing both theoretically and statistically adequate tests of many a 
priori plausible hypotheses.  
Thus, although we would at least agree that it would be theoretically quite plausible to 
posit that the support related variables would function both as mediators and 
moderators of HRM effects (in line with the general framework of such possibilities 
discussed by Baron and Kenny [1986, p. 1179]), in this thesis we limit our analyses to 
exploring a mediational framework. 
9.3.3 Testing the extended model 
We will test the exploratively suggested model in steps and begin by performing a 
structural equation analysis (with latent model constructs but without control 
variables) of the mediational intermediate framework to test its general plausibility. 
We will then continue by performing a set of regression analyses with all the controls 
where the additional direct relationships involved in our extended model are tested442. 
                                               
441 Also Dyne et al. (1994, p. 801) formed such a complex index to measure their covenantal 
relationship. 
442 Why do we not simply add the controls to the structural equation model(s)? When we include the 
controls the LISREL models simply do not exhibit acceptable fit statistics. Here we face the question of 




All the direct relationships involved will be tested once again, this time including also 
controls in terms of employee and organizational performance. Then we move to an 
analysis of the postulated relationships between HRM and employee/organizational 
performance, this time in distinction to Models 3-5 including all our intermediate 
mechanisms and again utilizing both structural equation analyses and ordinary least 
squares regression analyses. Lastly we will also perform an overall structural equation 
analyses with composite scores in order to gain some understanding of the 
significance of the potential indirect relationships while including the most important 
control variables. 
Structural equation analysis. Figure 5 exhibits a structural equation model (Model 
31a) of the postulated intermediate relationships to the exclusion of organizational 
citizenshipbehavior443 
 
                                                                                                                                      
no answer to this question. Using regression analysis and basically paying attention only to the 
significance of the overall model together with the significance of variable specific estimates are 
acceptable criteria for evaluating claims to knowledge in the field of organization studies and social 
science at large. We will therefore utilize such analyses and such criteria if for no other purpose than to 
offer the possibility to compare such analyses with the results of earlier studies.  
443 The model does not exhibit acceptable fit if the construct of organizational citizenship behavior is 
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Although lacking all the control variables, Model 31a provides some general support 
for a structure largely consistent with the exploratively postulated intermediate 
attitudinal relationships. The model is also largely compatible with the regression 
analyses above. Thus, Model 31a and Model 10 and 10b both bear witness to a 
significant positive relationship between 'Organization support' and 'Psychological 
empowerment'. Model 31a and Model 16 both bear witness to a significant positive 
relationship between 'Psychological empowerment' and Affective commitment' but no 
positive strongly significant (p ≤ 0.05) direct relationship between either 'Organization 
support' or 'Leader support' or 'Co-worker support' and 'Affective commitment'. 
However, in Model 16b ‘Organization support’ is strongly significantly (one-tailed 
test) related to ‘Affective commitment’. Finally, Model 31a and Model 22 and 22b 
bear witness to a significant positive relationship between 'Organization support' and 
'Continuance commitment' but no positive direct relationship between either 
'Psychological empowerment' or 'Affective commitment' and 'Continuance 
commitment'.  
As reported we had to free a fair amount of error correlations in order to gain 
acceptable fit statistics for the model. As noted earlier, freeing error correlations 
between items related to the same construct seems fairly unproblematic. However, all 
these constructs are conceptually fairly closely related. There would thus seem to be 
some justification for freeing error correlations also between items pertaining to 
different constructs. With these modifications the model at least approaches an 
acceptable fit. Nevertheless, albeit offering some support for the postulated structural 
relationships, the fit statisticts of this analysis implies that we should be cautious in 
interpreting it.  
Compared to our postulated model the structural equation model (just as regression 
Models 22 and 22b) thus suggests a direct positive relation between 'Organization 
support' and 'Continuance commitment' rather than one between either 'Psychological 
empowerment' or 'Affective commitment' and 'Continuance commitment'. In addition, 
the structural equation analysis also indicates an additional relation and mediation 
from 'Leader support' to 'Coworker support'444.  
In Appendix 5 we also exhibit simpler models with 'Psychological empowerment' 
(Model 31b), 'Affective commitment' (Model 31c) and 'Organizational citizenship 
behavior' (Model 31d) entered in turn while ‘Continuance commitment’ is included in 
all of them. These models exhibit more or less acceptable (fit) statistics and they all 
exhibit the same basic structural relationships with reference to the other variables 
                                               
444 The question of nested models appears in this case to be complex. For example, the model seems 
largely unaffected if the relationship between 'Organization support' and 'Continuance commitment' is 
constrained and a relationship between 'Leader support' and 'Continuance commitment' is estimated 
instead. The relationships between either 'Affective commitment' or 'Psychological empowerment' and 
'Continuance commitment' are both positive and significant (in some contrast to Model 22!) when 
estimated separately and instead of the one between 'Organization support' and 'Continuance 
commitment'. However, both of these two variations somewhat reduces the fit of the model. In (further) 
contrast to Model 22, if we estimate all these relationships at once they all become insignificant. We do 
not engage in testing whether differences in fit of such different models are statistically significant or 





(except for 'Strategic fit') as in Model 31a. These simpler models offer some more 
support for the relationships postulated by our exploratively extended model of the 
influence of HRM on the focal intermediate variables. These models also confirm 
that, without the other controls, the only focal intermediate variable which 'HRM 
sophistication' appears directly (at least weakly) significantly related to is 
'Organizational citizenship behavior'445. In line with Models 2b and 30b Model 31d 
also indicates that ‘Coworker support’ rather than ‘Organization support’ is 
significantly related to ‘Organizational citizenship behavior’. Further, in line with 
Models 21-22b also Model 31b indicates that ‘Psychological empowerment’ tends 
toward a negative relationship with ‘Continuance commitment’. This relationship was 
interpreted in relation to Model 21 above446. 
 
Regression analyses. Below we shall present a set of regression analyses testing 
whether the structure of direct relations between HRM and the intermediate variables 
exhibited in the extended overall model (Figure 4), and initially more or less 
supported in Models 31a-31d, can be corroborated including all the control variables. 
In these regression models we will also include the controls in terms of employee and 
organizational performance. As already noted, in so doing we may underestimate the 
relationships in that our general model also postulates that the independent, 
mediational and focal intermediate constructs should influence employee and 
organizational performance. However, in so far as they are not perfectly related the 
performance controls are still meaningful. By including them we can at least diminish 
the possibility that all our mediational and intermediate relationships may be due to a 
common cause in the sense of reverse causations either from employee or 
organizational performance (see footnote 422 above and compare March and Sutton, 
1997, pp. 700-701)447. 
                                               
445 The latter models also confirm the fact that the most serious problems of discriminant validity 
appears with reference to the construct of psychological empowerment. 
446 However, comparing the significance level and the β-coefficient of this relationship may be an 
indicator of some kind of statistical problems. 
447 This amounts to an acknowledgement of a possible violation of the assumption of recursivity in the 




First level of mediation: HRM and the support related variables. We begin by 
analyzing the postulated relationships between 'HRM sophistication', 'Leader support', 
'Coworker support' and 'Organization support'. These ananlyses are exhibited in Table 
32. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
might thus criticize our inconsistent treatment of the performance related variables. We invite such a 
criticizer to reflect upon the assumptions of unidirectional causal relationships between variables in 




Model 32 Model 32b Model 33 Model 33b Model 34 Model 34b
Variables
β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF
Constant -1.08 1.064 - -1.36** .611 - 3.25*** 1.092 - 3.34*** .529 - 1.33 ** .737 - 1.76*** .553 -
Number of earlier employers .082 .091 2.3 .091** .060 1.2 -.197** .096 2.3 -.170*** .062 1.1 .065 .063 2.3 ∅ ∅ ∅
Employee age .014 .075 2.5 ∅ ∅ ∅ .033 .079 2.5 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.150 ** .052 2.5 -.091* .034 1.1
Employee tenure -.010 .076 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅ .027 .081 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅ .090 * .053 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅
Prob. of partnership status -.002 .036 1.5 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.041 .038 1.5 ∅ ∅ ∅ .007 .025 1.5 ∅ ∅ ∅
Perceived job opportunities .023 .067 1.5 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.074 .071 1.5 ∅ ∅ ∅ .135 ** .046 1.5 .122** .039 1.2
Recent job offers -.031 .031 1.3 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.032 .033 1.3 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.023 .021 1.3 ∅ ∅ ∅
Workload .015 .078 1.7 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.033 .083 1.7 ∅ ∅ ∅ .109 * .054 1.7 .089* .045 1.3
Too big demands .017 .055 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.125* .058 1.5 -.076 .045 1.1 -.161 *** .038 1.6 -.137*** .033 1.3
Rec. rad. improvem in HRM -.025 .082 1.7 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.067 .086 1.7 ∅ ∅ ∅ .091 * .056 1.7 ∅ ∅ ∅
Hierarchy -.048 .043 1.2 ∅ ∅ ∅ .090 .045 1.2 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.193 *** .029 1.2 -.181*** .027 1.2
Prospects of organiz. perf. .059 .084 1.7 .067 .069 1.4 .233*** .087 1.6 .233*** .071 1.3 -.104 * .058 1.7 ∅ ∅ ∅
Organizational image .021 .061 1.5 ∅ ∅ ∅ .046 .065 1.5 ∅ ∅ ∅ .010 .042 1.5 ∅ ∅ ∅
Strategy -.013 .047 1.3 ∅ ∅ ∅ .059 .050 1.3 ∅ ∅ ∅ .020 .032 1.3 ∅ ∅ ∅
Organization size .006 .081 1.5 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.099 .085 1.4 ∅ ∅ ∅ .069 .056 1.5 ∅ ∅ ∅
Interactional justice .389*** .088 2.0 .389*** .076 1.9 .013 .102 2.4 ∅ ∅ ∅ .334 *** .066 2.4 .374*** .058 2.0
Procedural justice .234*** .079 1.8 .222*** .068 1.6 .061 .087 2.0 ∅ ∅ ∅ .054 .057 2.0 ∅ ∅ ∅
Distributive justice -.025 .083 1.5 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.024 .088 1.5 ∅ ∅ ∅ .112 ** .057 1.5 .102** .049 1.2
Strategic fit -.036 .082 1.4 ∅ ∅ ∅ .087 .087 1.4 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.125 ** .057 1.4 -.089* .049 1.1
HRM sophistication .232*** .133 2.8 .198** .098 1.9 .317*** .141 2.8 .244*** .099 1.6 .048 .094 2.9 ∅ ∅ ∅
Organization support ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
Coworker support .100* .088 1.7 .106*** .078 1.5 ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ .232 *** .061 1.7 .208*** .053 1.4
Leader support ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ .162* .099 2.7 .226*** .071 1.6 .191 ** .065 2.7 .197*** .056 2.2
Empl. perf: quality/efficacy .091 .090 1.7 .107* .073 1.3 .117 .095 1.7 ∅ ∅ ∅ .071 .062 1.7 .088* .049 1.2
Empl. perf: innovativity -.087 .059 1.5 -.079** .049 1.3 .000 .063 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅ .059 .041 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅
Organizat. perf: quality .071 .092 1.6 .093** .074 1.3 -.148** .097 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.062 .064 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅
Organizat. perf: profitability -.091* .046 1.4 -.109* .040 1.2 -.152** .049 1.3 -.161*** .041 1.1 .045 .032 1.4 ∅ ∅ ∅
DEPENDENT VARIABLE Leader support Leader support Coworker support Coworker support Organization support Organization support
F for R2 / R2  / Adj. R2 / CI♣ 8,1 0,63 0,56 84 22,8 0,62 0,60 37 3,2 0,41 0,28 81 12,0 0,34 0,31 23 9,2 0,67 0,60 86 19,9 0,62 0,59 45
  One-tailed sig. test:*p<.10  /  **p<.05  /  ***p<.01  /  β = stand. coeff.  /  ♣CI = Condition Index  /  ∅ = Variable not included in model
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In Model 32 we show that 'HRM sophistication' is significantly and positively directly 
related to the mediator in terms of 'Leader support' also when we, in addition to the 
other controls, control for ‘Coworker support’. The backward selected Model 32b 
confirms this result. 
In Model 33 we show that 'HRM sophistication' is significantly and positively directly 
related to the mediator in terms of 'Coworker support' also when we, in addition to the 
other controls, control for ‘Leader support’. The backward selected Model 33b 
confirms this result. 
Model 34 provides evidence supporting the fact that both 'Leader support' and 
'Coworker support' are significant in relation to ‘Organization support’. This offers 
further evidence of the possibility that they may mediate a relationship between 
‘HRM sophistication’ and ‘Organization support’. Again, the backward selected 
Model 32b confirms this result. 
We can also note that in the above analyses 'Strategic fit' did not have significant 
relationships with either 'Leader support' or 'Coworker support'. However, the 
relationship between 'Strategic fit' and 'Organization support' is in Models 34 and 34b 
weakly significantly negative. As already noted, we will return to an interpretation of 
the role and context of 'Strategic fit' in a separate discussion of strategic fit in section 
9.3.5. 
Second level of mediation: Organizational support and psychological 
empowerment. We now move to an analysis of the postulated relationships between 
the support related variables and 'Psychological empowerment'. In one version Model 
10, together with the above analyses, already bears witness to such relationships. 
However, now we include also the additional controls in terms of employee and 





Model 35 Model 35b Model 36 Model 36b Model 37 Model 37b
Variables
β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF
Constant 1.54** .723 - 1.37*** .469 - 1.30** .626 - 1.34*** .461 - -.16 1.576 - .25 1.160 -
Number of earlier employers .132* .065 2.3 .198*** .045 1.2 .033 .056 2.3 ∅ ∅ ∅ .112 .136 2.5 .116 .123 2.2
Employee age .088 .055 2.5 ∅ ∅ ∅ .028 .047 2.6 ∅ ∅ ∅ .140* .110 2.6 .145* .105 2.5
Employee tenure -.022 .055 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.086* .046 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.101 .111 1.7 -.100 .103 1.5
Prob. of partnership status .038 .026 1.5 ∅ ∅ ∅ .167*** .022 1.5 .157* .021 1.4 .230*** .053 1.6 .246*** .049 1.5
Perceived job opportunities ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ .034 .102 1.7 ∅ ∅ ∅
Recent job offers ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ .017 .045 1.4 ∅ ∅ ∅
Workload ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ -.210*** .119 1.9 -.203*** .096 1.3
Too big demands .022 .038 1.4 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.050 .032 1.4 ∅ ∅ ∅ .030 .081 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅
Rec. rad. improvem in HRM -.057 .057 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅ .026 .048 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅ .100 .118 1.8 .129* .090 1.1
Hierarchy .034 .032 1.3 ∅ ∅ ∅ .027 .027 1.3 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.052 .064 1.4 ∅ ∅ ∅
Prospects of organiz. perf. .194*** .060 1.6 .208** .051 1.3 .087 .052 1.7 .100** .045 1.4 .148* .125 1.8 .179*** .107 1.5
Organizational image .087 .044 1.5 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.082 .037 1.5 ∅ ∅ ∅ .113* .089 1.5 ∅ ∅ ∅
Strategy -.078 .032 1.2 ∅ ∅ ∅ .097** .027 1.2 .102*** .025 1.2 -.048 .068 1.4 ∅ ∅ ∅
Organization size -.212*** .055 1.3 -.226*** .049 1.1 -.064 .049 1.4 ∅ ∅ ∅ .043 .120 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅
Interactional justice .158** .073 2.7 .227*** .056 1.7 .173** .063 2.7 .127* .057 2.4 -.175* .152 3.0 ∅ ∅ ∅
Procedural justice -.087 .059 1.9 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.065 .050 1.9 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.031 .118 2.0 ∅ ∅ ∅
Distributive justice .000 .060 1.5 ∅ ∅ ∅ .066 .051 1.5 ∅ ∅ ∅ .131* .121 1.6 .108* .105 1.3
Strategic fit .119** .059 1.4 .117** .053 1.2 -.091* .051 1.5 -.109* .045 1.2 .063 .121 1.5 ∅ ∅ ∅
HRM sophistication .061 .097 2.8 ∅ ∅ ∅ .055 .083 2.8 .107** .064 1.8 -.041 .196 2.9 ∅ ∅ ∅
Organization support .211** .095 2.8 .211*** .077 1.9 .180** .082 2.9 .218*** .069 2.1 .272*** .202 3.2 .275*** .148 1.8
Coworker support .125* .066 1.8 .171*** .059 1.5 .101* .057 1.8 ∅ ∅ ∅ .183** .137 2.0 .175** .122 1.6
Leader support .110 .070 2.8 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.179** .059 2.9 -.190*** .054 2.5 .174* .141 3.0 ∅ ∅ ∅
Psych. empowerment ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ .510*** .079 2.5 .540*** .069 1.9 -.373*** .230 3.9 -.291*** .193 2.9
Aff. value commitment ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ .200** .219 3.1 .113 .194 2.5
Aff. continuance com. ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
Organizat. citizenship beh. ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
Empl. perf: quality/efficacy .020 .065 1.7 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.111* .055 1.7 -.099* .049 1.4 .043 .132 1.8 ∅ ∅ ∅
Empl. perf: innovativity .199*** .042 1.5 .216*** .035 1.1 -.053 .037 1.6 -.084* .034 1.4 .125* .087 1.6 .111* .074 1.3
Organizat. perf: quality -.095* .066 1.6 -.062 .053 1.1 .151*** .057 1.6 .141*** .051 1.4 -.122* .136 1.7 -.085 .112 1.3
Organizat. perf: profitability -.029 .033 1.3 ∅ ∅ ∅ .069 .028 1.3 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.125* .067 1.4 -.108* .059 1.2
DEPENDENT VARIABLE Psych. empowerment Psych. empowerment Aff. Value commitment Aff. Value commitment Aff. Cont. commitment Aff. Cont. commitment
F for R2 / R2  / Adj. R2 / CI♣ 7,4 0,60 0,52 79 19,0 0,56 0,53 36 9,7 0,67 0,60 82 19,3 0,64 0,61 48 3,8 0,49 0,36 96 6,7 0,44 0,38 61




Model 38 Model 38b
Variables
β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF
Constant 1.39** .672 - .76 .568 -
Number of earlier employers -.092 .060 2.3 ∅ ∅ ∅
Employee age .055 .050 2.6 .094* .035 1.4
Employee tenure .015 .050 1.7 ∅ ∅ ∅
Prob. of partnership status .002 .024 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅
Perceived job opportunities ∅ ∅ ∅ .147*** .038 1.4
Recent job offers ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
Workload ∅ ∅ ∅ .133*** .044 1.4
Too big demands .052 .034 1.4 ∅ ∅ ∅
Rec. rad. improvem in HRM -.186*** .052 1.7 -.126** .046 1.5
Hierarchy -.091* .028 1.3 -.113** .027 1.3
Prospects of organiz. perf. .113* .056 1.8 .103** .050 1.6
Organizational image .201*** .040 1.5 .180*** .037 1.5
Strategy .103** .029 1.3 .101** .027 1.3
Organization size -.096* .052 1.4 -.101** .047 1.4
Interactional justice -.101 .068 2.8 ∅ ∅ ∅
Procedural justice .027 .053 2.0 ∅ ∅ ∅
Distributive justice -.027 .055 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅
Strategic fit -.139** .054 1.5 -.168** .049 1.4
HRM sophistication .281*** .087 2.8 .213*** .074 2.3
Organization support -.062 .090 3.1 -.118*** .070 2.1
Coworker support .158** .061 1.9 .230* .055 1.7
Leader support -.052 .064 3.0 ∅ ∅ ∅
Psych. empowerment .318*** .101 3.6 .183*** .092 3.4
Aff. value commitment .250*** .100 3.1 .241*** .086 2.6
Aff. continuance com. .031 .042 1.9 ∅ ∅ ∅
Organizat. citizenship beh. ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅
Empl. perf: quality/efficacy -.058 .059 1.8 -.082*** .053 1.6
Empl. perf: innovativity .197*** .039 1.6 .213** .035 1.5
Organizat. perf: quality -.158*** .062 1.7 -.162*** .055 1.6






F for R2 / R2  / Adj. R2 / CI♣ 9,4 0,68 0,61 90 15,6 0,70 0,65 71
  One-tailed sig. test:*p<.10  /  **p<.05  /  ***p<.01  /  β = stand. coeff.  /  ♣CI = Condition Index  /
  ∅ = Variable not included in model
 
Model 35 supports the fact that 'Organization support' is significantly related to 'Psychological 
empowerment' and may thus mediate both the relationship between 'Leader support' and 
'Psychological empowerment’ and that between 'Coworker support' and 'Psychological 
empowerment'. This is in congruence with regression Models 10 and 10b as well as structural 
equation Models 31a (and 31b)448. 
With the performance controls, there is also in this analysis a direct relationship between 
'Strategic fit' and 'Psychological empowerment' which is somewhat stronger than in Model 10 
                                               
448 These results are somewhat different from the ones obtained in the structural equation analyses above in that 
based upon Model 35 there appears also to be be a weakly significant direct relationship between 'Coworker 
support' and 'Psychological empowerment'.  
361 
 
but in line with Model 10b in both cases of which the performance controls were not included. 
As noted, we will comment explicitly on the role of strategic fit below. The relationships 
between 'HRM sophistication', the mediating variables in terms of support and 'Psychological 
empowerment' are essentially unaffected by 'Strategic fit'. 
Unexpectedly organizational performance in terms of quality appears to be negatively rather 
than positively related to 'Psychological empowerment' in this analysis. Here a one-tailed 
significance test is thus clearly problematical. We will return to this relationship below. All 
these relationships are also supported by Model 35b which is the result of including the 
employee and organizational performance controls in Model 10b and then applying backward 
selection. 
Third level of mediation: Organization support/psychological empowerment and 
affective value commitment. Models 16 and 16b already bears witness to a relationship 
between 'Psychological empowerment' and ‘Affective commitment' but no direct relationship 
between the latter and 'Organization support'. However, now we include also the additional 
controls in terms of employee and organizational performance. This analysis (Model 36) is 
exhibited in Table 33. 
Model 36 shows that including the employee and organizational performance controls, and 
thus controlling for possible reverse causations from these directions, there is a significant 
positive relationship between 'Psychological empowerment' and 'Affective commitment' 
offering more support for the overall model (Figure 4). In addition, Model 36, in some 
contrast to Model 16 but in line with Model 16b, indicates that there is a strongly significant 
positive relationship between 'Organization support' and 'Affective commitment' as well as a 
strongly significant negative relationship between 'Leader support' and 'Affective 
commitment'449. 
Thus based on all the above analyses 'HRM sophistication' appears to be (potentially 
significantly) positively related to 'Affective commitment' partly as mediated by 'Coworker 
support', 'Leader support', 'Organization support' and 'Psychological empowerment'. This is in 
line with the exploratively postulated extended overall model (Figure 4) and the structural 
equation Models 31a and c.  
Unexpectedly employee performance in terms of quality/efficiency appears to be (weakly) 
negatively rather than positively related to affective value commitment in this analysis. Here a 
one-tailed significance test is thus problematical. We will return to this relationship below. All 
these results are also confirmed by Model 36b which is the result of including the employee 
and organizational performance related variables in Model 16b and then applying backward 
selection. 
Fourth level of mediation: Organization support/psychological empowerment/affective 
value commitment and affective continuance commitment. Models 22 and and 22b as well 
as Models 31a and 31c already indicate that the only theoretically focal variable with which 
‘Continuance commitment’ stands in a significant direct relationship appears to be 
‘Organization support’, perhaps also ‘Coworker support’.  However, in addition to all the 
                                               
449 The positive influence of leader behavior is here, as in Models 15 and 16, accounted for exclusively by 
'Interactional justice' (compare footnote 420 above). Again, the direct relationship between ‘Affective 
commitment’ and ‘Organization support’ is distinct from the results of the structural equation Model 37. 
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other controls we now include also the controls in terms of employee and organizational 
performance. This analysis (Model 37) is exhibited in Table 33. 
Model 37 shows that including the employee and organizational performance controls, and 
thus controlling for possible reverse causations from these directions, there appears to be a 
positive relationship between 'Continuance commitment' and 'Affective commitment' which 
was not detectable when the performance controls were excluded (compare Models 22 and 
22b). This offers indicative support for the (exploratively) postulated model. In addition, as in 
Models 21, 22 and 22b, 'Continuance commitment' also exhibits a strongly significant 
negative relationship with 'Psychological empowerment' which we interpreted in connection 
to Model 21 above. This confirms a contradictory element in the proposed model/theorizing. 
This negative relationship was also weakly significant in structural equation Model 31b. 
Further, in Model 37 'Continuance commitment' exhibits a significant positive relationship 
with 'Organization support' and 'Coworker support' as well as a weakly significant positive 
relationship with 'Leader support'. This is compatible with Models 31a-d and indicates that 
HRM may have a positive indirect influence on continuance commitment as mediated directly 
by several of these variables rather than only by 'Organization support' and 'Affective 
commitment' as suggested in our extended overall model. However, somewhat different 
relationships are supported by Model 37b which is the result of including the employee and 
organizational performance related controls in Model 22b, then applying backward selection 
and finally including ‘Affective commitment’. In line with Model 22b, Model 37b supports 
significant relationships between ‘Continuance commitment’ and both ‘Organization support’ 
and ‘Coworker support’. In line with Models 22 and 22b Model 37b does not confirm a 
significant relationship between ‘Affective commitment’ and ‘Continuance commitment’ nor 
even a weakly significant one between the latter and ‘Leader support’.    
From all the above analyses we can thus conclude that HRM sophistication may have some 
(potentially significant) positive indirect effects also on continuance commitment but only 
marginally in accordance with the postulated extended model.  
Unexpectedly both of the organizational performance variables appears to be negatively rather 
than positively related to 'Continuance commitment' both in Models 37 and 37b. Here a one-
tailed significance test is thus again problematical. We will return to these relationships 
below. 
Fifth level of mediation: Organization support/psychological empowerment/affective 
value commitment/affective continuance commitment and organizational citizenship 
behavior. We will now analyze whether there are direct significant relationships between 
'Organization support', 'Psychological empowerment/'Affective commitment'/Continuance 
commitment and 'Organizational citzenship behavior' as suggested by our overall model. In 
one version Model 30 already bears witness to such effects with the exception of a 
relationship between 'Continuance commitment' and 'Organizational citizenship behavior'. 
However, now we will include also  the additional controls in terms of organizational 
performance. This analysis is exhibited in Table 33. 
Model 38 indicates that, including also the organizational perfomance controls, and thus 
controlling for possible reverse causations from these directions, a large part of HRM´s total 
influence on organizational citizenship behavior appears to be (potentially significantly) 
indirect. This is the case since there is a direct relationship between 'Psychological 
empowerment' and 'Organizational citzenship behavior' and a direct relationship between 
'Affective commitment' and 'Organizational citizenship behavior'. However, not even with the 
organizational performance controls is there a direct positive relationship between 
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'Organization support' and 'Organizational citizenship behavior' (compare Models 26-30b). 
However, there appears to be a direct relationship between 'Coworker support' and 
'Organizational citizenship behavior'. These relationships are essentially similar to the ones in 
Models 30 and 31d and thus independent of whether we control for organizational 
performance or not. Also Models 30b and 38 b confirm these relationships with the difference 
that if anything, they indicate a (difficult to understand) negative residual relationship 
between organization support and organizational citizenship behavior450.  
Unexpectedly, Model 38 indicates a negative relationship between both of the organizational 
performance variables and 'Organizational citizenship behavior' whereas in Model 38b only a 
negative relationship between ‘Organizational citienship behavior’ and the variable tapping 
organizational performance in terms of quality is confirmed. These results are in contrast to 
the literature on the importance of organizational citizenship behavior. We will return to this 
issue when analyzing antecedents to organizational performance.  
9.3.4 Reflections on the evidence for the exploratively extended model 
We have to remember that in partial correlation analysis we look for significant partial 
correlations where the influence of the other included (control) variables have been partialed 
out and their causal influence thus more justifiably ruled out. Thus,  
"[a] partial correlation between two variables is the correlation between those parts 
of the variables that are not predictable from the control variables" (Cliff, 1987, p. 
110). 
In this thesis we try to show what we can say when we rule out a set of possible alternative 
explanations, most of which have been argued to be relevant by other researchers. However, 
someone might still want to argue that some theoretically relevant lower- or zero-order 
correlations are ruled out if as many control variables are included as in the above analyses. 
The possible correlations shared by our focal theoretical variables and our controls do not rule 
out additional causal influences of the focal variables. Nevertheless, any lower-order 
correlations would clearly only represent evidence in a weaker sense. Thus, the less control 
variables used, the more "ornamentational" is the evidence. The partial (residual) correlations 
which can be brought forward together with an as adequate set of control variables as possible 
represent the most justified cross-sectional evidence of possible distinct causal relations.  
The question of relevant controls is clearly a theoretically important question. The controls 
are not part of a theory but can be considered as necessary for a theory to imply any 
predictions/explanations (Putnam, 1974/1991, p. 124). Controls are part of the auxiliary 
statements needed when testing a theory. This has as a consequence that a theory itself cannot 
be straightforwardly falsified even by a set of unsuccessful predictions (explanations). If an 
empirical test of a theory does not yield acceptable predictions (explanations) then we cannot 
be sure whether there is something wrong with the theory or with the auxiliary statements, 
e.g. included or excluded control variables (Putnam, 1974/1991, pp. 124-127). Auxiliary 
statements also include the operationalizations and everything else which is involved in 
carrying out the empirical test.  
                                               
450 Model  38b is the result of including the organizational performance variables in Model 30b and then 
applying backward selection. 
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Summarizing all the above analysis of the extended overall model it can be concluded that the 
data is more or less consistent with the exploratively postulated understanding of the 
potential mechanisms of HRM´s influence on our focal intermediate attitudinal constructs.  
One clear contradictory element with reference to the relationships between the intermediate 
attitudes is, based upon the regression analyses, that psychological empowerment seem to be 
negatively related to continuance commitment (Models 21-22b; 37-37b). Thus HRM appears 
to have both some positive and some negative (potentially significant) indirect influence on 
continuance commitment. In fact, the evidence for possible influences of HRM on 
continuance commitment appears to be only marginally in accordance with our expectations.  
The latter fact is due to another related element not consistent with reference to the suggested 
overall model. In the structural equation Models 31a and 31b it turned out that the best fit was 
achieved by constraining the relationships between both 'Psychological empowerment' and 
'Continuance commitment' as well as, in Models 31a and 31c, 'Affective commitment' and 
'Continuance commitment' and instead estimating the direct relationship between 
'Organization support' and 'Continuance commitment'. The strong relationships between the 
support related variables, in terms at least of ‘Coworker support’ and ‘Organization support’ 
and affective continuance commitment is also supported by the regression analysis (Models 
20-22b; 37-37b). However, in contrast to Models 31a and 31c as well as Models 22, 22b and 
37b, Model 37 supported a suggested relationship between affective value commitment and 
affective continuance commitment. Nevertheless, the marginal significance of this 
relationship indicates that HRM's relationship with continuance commitment as mediated by 
affective commitment will not be significant. Even though supported by only one Model this 
relationship will be included in the overall structural equation test of the significance of direct 
and indirect relationships below.  
We have also found some evidence for a potentially significant marginal and arguably 
implausible negative indirect influence of HRM on affective commitment through leader 
support (Models 15-16b; 36-36b). Further, we found some evidence, difficult to understand, 
for a negative residual direct relationship between ‘Organization support’ and ‘Organizational 
citizenship behavior’ (Models 30b and 38b). 
Although all these analyses naturally would have to be corroborated. The above analyses at 
least seem to offer fairly intelligible explanations of (some of) the ways HRM might be 
related to the focal theoretical attitudinal  constructs, and in extension, possibly employee and 
organizational performance451. However, we already noted also a preliminary set of 
unexpected and complicating correlations between the intermediate attitudes and 
employee/organizational performance. In any case, so far the following direct relationships 
(exhibited in Figure 6) have been supported when controlling for all the potential exogenous 
influences as well as employee and organizational perfomance452. 
                                               
451 The corroboration/replication of a complex model (together with a large number of control variables) is 
clearly less probable than the corroboration of a simpler analysis. Thus it might be argued that we should keep 
our analyses simple. However, we see no reason to keep the analyses simple only to increase the probabilities of 
corroboration/replication if keeping them simple more or less obviously goes against all sound judgement about 
the complexity of the domain of interest. 
452 The thick lines denote theorized relationships. The whole lines denote relationships with a strong support 
(Sig. ≤ 0.05; one-tailed test). The dashed lines denote relationships with only a weak support (Sig. ≤ 0.10; one-




HRM and individual employees always exist within a larger social structure, in particular in 
organizations like those under study where team- and project work is prevalent. 
Considerations of this structure in terms of the support related variables indicate that HRM, 
independently of this social structure, appears unable to explain variation in psychological 
empowerment, affective continuance commitment and only somewhat ambiguously in 
affective value commitment. Our argument is in general that no matter how sophisticated the 
HRM system is, psychological empowerment, affective value commitment, affective 
continuance commitment and also organizational citizenship behavior exemplify phenomena 
which are fundamentally and largely influenced by a broader social context.  
There could very well be individuals who, and contexts where individuals tend to, care more 
exclusively e.g. about their individual compensation, benefits, employment security and 
development programs. In such cases it is conceivable that the above mentioned attitudinal 
phenomena would be directly influenced by HRM. These analyses also naturally do not rule 
out that HRM might in itself directly affect our focal intermediate constructs if one introduces 
them e.g. in a low-support-organization. However, on average it seems after all plausible that 
                                                                                                                                                   
(a) In Model 35 only weakly significant;  
(b) In Model 16 only weakly significant;  
(c) There is a significant relation between aff. value and continuance commitment in Model 37 but not 37b.  
(d) Strongly significant only in the backward selected Model 36b 


































these phenomena are more strongly holistically influenced by the broader social context and 
that HRM´s influence on them is largely indirect.  
This would also be in line with the long-term nature of effects of HRM investments, because 
at least part of HRM´s influence would involve its contribution to the creation of a whole 
social setting or organizational culture if you will. The analyses also appear consistent with, 
although not exactly testing, Mueller´s arguments suggesting that HRM effects are dependent 
on the more holistic (social) context as well as his arguments against HRM as a simple or 
“quick fix” (1996, p. 771 ). Mueller conceptually argues that  
“what is truly valuable is the ´social architecture´ that results from ongoing skill 
formation activities, incidental or informal learning, forms of spontaneous co-
operation, the tacit knowledge that accumulates as the – often unplanned – side 
effect of intentional corporate behavior. Thus corporate prosperity typically rests in 
the social architecture that emerges slowly and incrementally over time, and often 
predates the tenure of current senior management. The social architecture is created 
and re-created not only or even primarily at senior management levels in the 
organization, but at other levels too, including at workgroup level on the shop-floor” 
(ibid., p. 777). 
Independent of how valuable any such an architecture de facto is for corporate prosperity, our 
mediational arguments and evidence are consistent with the possibility that HRM, which is 
deemed adequate by employees, can contribute to a kind of social architecture. Our evidence 
is also congruent with the fact that HRM through such a social architecture may lead to some 
additional attitudinal consequences in terms of psychological empowerment, affective value 
commitment, organizational citizenship behavior and perhaps even affective continuance 
commitment. These results are also fairly congruent with the social context theorization of 
HRM's influence proposed by Ferris et al. (1998). As we shall see, our analyses below will 
however also pose a considerable challenge to the more or less implicitly assumed meaning 
and value of these attitudes and behaviors (and the social architecture identified by us) in 
terms of their performance effects. 
In general our results so far seem to underscore the observation (whatever “originally 
thought” refers to) that 
“the process of changing employee attitudes and behaviors may be even more 
complex than originally thought” (Settoon et al, 1996, p. 225). 
Both Settoon et al. and Wayne et al. (1997) refer to their evidence for differential effects of 
leader-member-exchange and organization support on organizational citizenship behavior, 
organizational commitment and in-role employee behaviors (a kind of evidence which we 
criticized in section 8.2.4). Our analyses are however more or less indicative of a complexity 
in the internal network of relationships with a more or less common direction. The existence 
of such relationships are also potentially latent in the results of both Settoon et al. (1996) and 
Wayne et al. (1997). Wayne et al.'s analyses for example, although not explicitly noted by the 
authors, indicate the possibility of an effect of leader-member-exhange relationships on 
affective commitment and organizational citizenship behavior mediated by organization 
support (1997, p. 101). This is in line with our results. 
However, as noted above, our results also indicate some potential conflicts in "the process of 
changing employee attitudes", i.e. in terms of achieving both affective commitment and better 
employee performance in terms of quality/efficiency (Models 36 and 36b), both psychological 
empowerment and continuance commitment (Models 37 and 37b), as well as both 
organizational citizenship behavior and employee performance in terms of quality/efficiency 
367 
 
(Models 27-30b and 38b). The question whether these incoherent elements should be viewed 
as indications of problems with current theorizing, with our data, or multicollinearity 
problems will be further pursued below where we deal also with the additional conflicting 
evidence, notably in terms of the relations that organizational performance bears to 
psychological empowerment, organizational citizenship behavior as well as affective 
continuance commitment respectively. The problematic nature of these relationships were 
already indicated in Models 35-35b, 37-37b and 38-38b. 
With reference to earlier research on the intermediate phenomena, our data and analyses also 
indicate for example, in contradiction to e.g. Wayne et al. (1997, p. 101) and Moorman, 
Blakely and Niehoff (1998, p. 547), that organizational support is not significantly distinctly 
and directly and positively related to organizational citizenship behavior (Models 26-30b; 38b).  
Our results further indicate that the relationships between interactional justice and 
organizational citizenship behavior found by Moorman (1991, p. 852) would be in need of 
considerable theoretical and empirical backup. Our results (Models 23-24) confirm 
Moorman's findings that "interactional justice was the only source of justice related to OCB" 
(ibid., p. 852). However, when we then added the HRM variables (Model 25), 'Interactional 
justice' became insignificant. This insignificance was also supported by the backward selected 
Models 30b and 38b. Of course, there are possibilities to argue for more detailed mediational 
effects including 'Interactional justice' but these would have to be argued for and tested in 
more complex models.  
Based on our data a similar conclusion apply to the relation between procedural justice and 
organizational citizenship behavior found by Niehoff and Moorman (1993, p. 547) and 
Moorman, Blakely and Niehoff (1998, p. 355).  
In line with earlier research, our analyses (Model 15) suggests a relationship between 
organization support and commitment which in our case means 'Organization support' and 
'Affective commitment' (compare e.g Setton et al, 1996, p. 224). However, our analyses also 
indicate that at least in knowledge intensive and interactive contexts this relationship may at 
least partly be mediated by psychological empowerment. In Model 16 'Organization support' 
is only weakly significant in terms of a one-tailed significance test and Model 31a and c 
indicates no direct relationship. In Model 36, however, where we control also for employee 
and organizational performance, the direct relationship between 'Organization support' and 
'Affective commitment' is strongly significant. This is the case also in the backward elected 
Models 16b and 36b. 
Comparisons such as the above tell us much less than they could do if researchers would be 
able to agree upon using the same (validated) constructs. Some of the above comparisons are 
even more liable to the accusation of comparing "apples and oranges" in that in some of the 
above mentioned research separate dimensions of e.g. organizational citizenship behavior 
have been used in the analyses instead of a multidimensional construct. Any of the above 
comparisons are thus at the most indicative already for this reason.  
The evaluation of our results is inextricably connected to the question of the adequacy of our 
controls/mediators. This is as it should be. The question of proper controls/mediators is an 
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important theoretical question which arguably should be pursued more rigorously453. Here we 
have only (largely based on earlier research in addition to our own intuitions) included 
controls which at least seem to be relevant. It may also still be the case that other (exogenous) 
organizational processes account for any or even all of the positive relations in our models. 
Such possibilities have to be theoretically and empirically pursued by future research. We 
have also tried to show what our data indicates under certain fairly simplistic assumptions 
about the direction of main effects largely consistent with earlier theorizing and evidence.  
Our analyses and the comparisons of our results with those of earlier research clearly do 
indicate that HRM theorizing, and research on organizational behavior in general, is in need 
of theoretical development. The most widely adopted loose exchange theoretical arguments 
seem insufficient to distinguish and produce order among the multiple potential relationships 
between the many constructs related to organizational behavior.  
In order for research to be able to further explore these relationships our validation analyses 
indicate that the field also needs the sharpening of measurement instruments and constructs. 
Although more and more efforts in this direction are discernible, our analyses thus indicate 
that the exhortation by Schwab (1980) is still highly relevant, i.e. organizational behavior 
researchers need to"emphasize construct validity more strongly in their research activities" 
(cited in Nystedt et al., 1999, p. 40). As difficult as it may be such emphasis should apparently 
involve not only the presentation of validities and reliabilities of a fairly limited amount of 
constructs (in isolation) in connection to ongoing empirical research. It should also involve 
the explicit development (and testing) of an arsenal of relevant and valid constructs. Such 
testing should try to exclude common method errors which may cause many of the validity 
problems for example in our study. Until such development and testing has been more 
thoroughly carried out, researchers may be fumbling more or less in the dark (compare 
Pfeffer, 1993).  
However, one can argue that such development is exactly what is slowly taking place and that 
there are no shortcuts to good constructs. As already noted above, convergent and 
discriminative validity are not the only criteria for good theoretical constructs (sections 8.4.1 
– 8.4.2). Such constructs also have to exhibit interesting nomological validities. Neither of 
these two aspects of constructs should be pursued in complete isolation. Compare Rorty's 
argument (discussed in more detail in section 2.3.1)  
"that the truth of an utterance depends on just two things, what the words mean and 
how the world is arranged...[and] these two inquiries cannot be conducted separately 
(1991, p. 138). 
This twofold inquiry necessarily involves a large amount of trial and error. In particular 
concerning social science it is conceivable that it involves an endless series of such trials and 
errors which will never lead to larger scale agreement on commendable truths and falsities. 
However, the emphasis on issues of convergent and discriminant validities (as well as 
reliabilities) should arguably still be further stressed454.  
                                               
453 As noted earlier, if such pursuit is not undertaken, the generally substantial correlations between many of the 
constructs of organizational behavior may produce a happy family of researchers where too many hypotheses are 
supported.  
454 There is a fairly intense ongoing debate concerning at least the construct/s of organizational commitment and 
its/their dimensions. However, also here it seems that much of this research is taking place fairly independent of 
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The need for validated and theoretically motivated and agreed upon constructs becomes more 
apparent the more we dive into the intricacies of the issue and mechanisms of HRM´s possible 
importance including the complex interrelations between organizational behavioral 
phenomena. The problems of this intricacy, complexity and ambiguity seems to exist 
regardless of whether researchers pay explicit attention to it in their models or not. This 
research is largely motivated by exploring the complexities and ambiguities involved. At least 
as much as our analyses and arguments suggest certain relations and directions of influence 
our results also challenge both the HRM and the organizational behavior research 
communities to more rigorous conceptual/theoretical development. 
9.3.5 The issue of strategic fit and the intermediate attitudes.  
Based upon the regression analyses 'Strategic fit' appears to have a direct significant 
relationship with 'Psychological empowerment' (Model 10 and 10b). The structural equation 
models 31a (but not 31b) also bears witness to such a significant positive direct relationship. 
In addition, the latter models provide evidence for a significant positive indirect relationship 
between these two variables (β = 0.12; t-value = 2.45 which, utilizing a one-tailed test, here 
means p ≈ 0.01) in line with our exploratively postulated overall model and the theorizing in 
section 3.3.2.3.  
'Strategic fit' also appears to have a distinct but only weakly significant negative relationship 
with ‘Affective commitment’ when we control for employee and organizational performance 
(Model 36). This relationship was not detectable at all when all the other control variables 
except those related to employee and organizational performance were included (Models 13-
16), nor in the structural equation Models 31a or 31c. The relationship between ‘Strategic fit’ 
and ‘Affective commitment' was however strongly significant inthe backward selected Model 
16b as well as weakly significant in the backward selected Model 36b.  Thus, it appears that 
the negative relationship between 'Strategic fit' and 'Affective commitment' becomes most 
discernible when organizational performance is controlled for. This could be due to reverse 
causation from organizational performance to either one or both of the former variables. 
However, Models 31a also provides evidence of a positive indirect relationship between 
'Strategic fit' and 'Affective commitment' (β = 0.24; t-value = 2.98 which, utilizing a one-
tailed test, here means p ≈ 0.005) which is partly the result of the positive direct relationship 
between 'Strategic fit' and 'Psychological empowerment'. Finally, Model 31c provides 
evidence also of an indirect relationship between 'Strategic fit' and 'Affective commitment' (β 
= 0.09; t-value = 2.16 which, utilizing a one-tailed test, here means p ≈ 0.05) in line with our 
exploratively extended model (Figure 4) and the theorizing in section 3.3.2.3.  
Based upon the regression analyses 'Strategic fit' appears to have no significant direct 
relationship with 'Continuance commitment' (Models 18-22b and 37-37b). However, based on 
the structural equation Model 31a, c and d, where we do not allow for the negative direct 
relationship between 'Psychological empowerment' and 'Continuance commitment', 'Strategic 
fit' appears to have a significant positive indirect relationships with 'Continuance commitment' 
(β = 0.10; t-value = 2.45 which, utilizing a one-tailed test, here means p ≈ 0.01). This indirect 
relationship is (only) partly in accordance with the exploratively extended overall model 
                                                                                                                                                   
many other organizational behavior related constructs already in existence and in relation to which a fruitful 
construct of organizational commitment arguably should display adequate discriminative validity. At least such 
independence seem to be the case based upon an arbitrary check with some of the articles which indicate the 
validity of three different constructs of organizational commitment as reported by Allen and Meyer (1996).  
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(Figure 4). In addition, in Model 31b, where we do allow for direct relationship between 
'Psychological empowerment' and 'Continuance commitment', 'Strategic fit' does not stand 
even in a significant indirect relationship with 'Continuance commitment' (β = 0.04; t-value = 
0.72).  
Models 24-30b and 38-38b provide evidence of a significant negative relationship between 
‘Strategic fit’ and ‘Organizational citizenship behavior’. However, Model 31d also provides 
evidence of a positive indirect relationship between 'Strategic fit' and 'Organizational 
citizenship behavior' (β = 0.14; t-value = 2.25 which, utilizing a one-tailed test, here means p 
≈ 0.05) which is partly in line with the exploratively extended model. Even if we constrain the 
direct relationship between 'HRM sophistication' and 'Organizational citizenship behavior' in 
this model, the indirect relationship between 'Strategic fit' and 'Organizational citizenship 
behavior' is significant as mediated by 'HRM sophistication' and further by the support related 
variables455.  
The above regression analyses do invite some interesting reflections on the role and context of 
strategic fit. When controlling for HRM sophistication as well as a host of other phenomena, 
excluding the support related variables, 'Strategic fit' does not in addition to 'HRM 
sophistication' appear to have any direct (distinct) significant relationship with 'Psychological 
empowerment' based upon Model 9. However, a distinct direct relationship between 'Strategic 
fit' and 'Psychological empowerment' becomes significantly positive when we in addition to 
'HRM sophistication' also control for the support related variables (Models 10 and 10b). In 
particular, although not shown in the exhibited analyses, this relationship becomes significant 
when we add 'Organizational support' to the equation. This relationship is also significant 
when we control for employee and organizational performance (Model 35 and 35b). 
Further, 'Strategic fit' appears, based upon Models 32-32b and 33-33b, to have no significant 
direct relationship with either 'Leader support' or 'Coworker support' (irrespective of whether 
we control for the other support related phenomena or not). However, interestingly 'Strategic 
fit' appears to have a (weakly significant) negative direct relationship with 'Organization 
support' (Models 34 and 34b)456.  
The results with reference to psychological empowerment and the support related variables 
might be interpreted to indicate that also something closer to “hard HRM”, on the margin, 
positively influences psychological empowerment. This aspect of the results seems at least to 
some extent to remind us of the kind of organizational context described by Keenoy, where 
the policy from the point of view of management is that  
                                               
455 The significance of all the above indirect relationships will be further pursued below in a full structural 
equation model with composite scores including also all such control variables visavi particular outcome 
variables in relation to which the controls are strongly significant in the respective regression analyses. 
456 However, as is the case concerning the relationships between 'Strategic fit' and both ''Affective commitment' 
and ‘Organizational citizenship behavior’, Model 31a provides evidence for a significant positive indirect 
relationship between 'Strategic fit' and 'Organization support' (as well as 'Leader support' and 'Coworker support' 
and ‘Organizatinal Citizenship Behavior’). The latter relationships are mediated by 'HRM sophistication' and this 
evidence is consistent in Models 31a-d. It may also be noted that the weakly significant negative relationship 
between ‘Strategic fit’ and ‘Organization support’ in Model 34b would become insignificant (sig.= .27) if we 
would include the likewise insignificant variable ‘Organizational performance: quality’ (sig.= .23) in Model 34b.  
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“having provided employment security, empowered employees to take any problem 
to supervision (and expect to be listened to), provided a safe and equitable working 
environment, given employees individual performance targets and individual pay 
rates - in short, having given employees all the support necessary for them to 
perform at the level required by the company – then, there are ‘no excuses if 
something goes wrong’ (1999, p. 14). 
It is also consistent with this interpretation that in contexts closer to "hard HRM" both 
affective value commitment and the motives for organizational citizenship behavior would be 
less and the motives for personal "survival" perhaps stronger. Some evidence for this is 
provided by the (weakly significant) negative direct relationship between 'Strategic fit' and 
'Affective commitment' (Models 16b, 36-36b) and the strongly significant direct negative 
relationship between 'Strategic fit' and 'Organizational citizenship behavior' in Models 24-30b 
and 38-38b. Finally, the highly tentative evidence in terms of Model 50 (Table 37 and Table 
38) in section 9.4 suggests a weakly significant negative total effect of strategic fit on both 
affective value commitment and affective continuance commitment whereas the total effect of 
strategic fit on organizational citizenship behavior according to that evidence appears negative 
but not significant. This evidence excludes the indirect relationships between strategic fit and 
the above attitudinal variables as mediated through the direct relationship between strategic fit 
and psychological empowerment. Thus, it only reflects the relationship between strategic fit 
and affective value commitment, affective continuance commitment and organizational 
citizenship behavior in terms of direct relationships as well as in terms of mediations by the 
HRM system and the variables related to social support. This evidence seems to be in 
accordance with the above interpretations. 
Thus, based upon the structural equation models as well as the regression models there is 
some evidence of a total positive effect of the “softer” HRM system (i.e. HRM sophistication) 
on most of the intermediate attitudinal variables. However, excluding the direct relationships 
between strategic fit and the sophistication of the HRM system on the one hand, and strategic 
fit and psychological empowerment on the other hand, the evidence interestingly suggests that 
the potential effect on the attitudes of a managerially identified “harder” strategic fit is largely 
negative rather than positive457.  
9.4 HRM, INTERMEDIATE ATTITUDES AND EMPLOYEE / 
ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
Having provided evidence for the above potential mechanisms of the influence of HRM we 
return to the testing of our original hypotheses concerning HRM's (indirect) relationship with 
the performance related outcomes.  
Structural equation analysis. Figure 7 exhibits a "full" structural equation model of the 
relationships postulated by the exploratively extended model to the exclusion of 
organizational citizenship behavior and exogenous controls. Model 39a provides some further 
general support for a structure consistent with the suggested model. 
                                               
457 It is however important to remain cautious here. As opposed to the case with 'Strategic fit', there are likely to 
be effects of common method error in the results with reference to the relations between the support related 
variables, 'HRM sophistication' and our focal intermediate variables. These may account for the differences in 
the structure of relations with reference to 'HRM sophistication' and 'Strategic fit'. In addition, these results 







Figure 7: Model 39a (significant direct
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In congruence with Model 3, Model 39a provides some evidence of a direct 
relationship between HRM sophistication and organizational performance in terms of 
quality thus providing more support for hypothesis 5b. Model 39a also provides 
evidence for a direct relationship between such organizational performance and 
strategic fit and thus support for hypothesis 4b. The latter result may be due to 
common method errors. Further, Model 39a also provides evidence for a significant 
(one-tailed test) indirect relationship between strategic fit and organizational 
performance in terms of quality mediated (only) by HRM sophistication (β = 0.05; t-
value = 1.85 which, utilizing a one-tailed test, here means p ≈ 0.05). This result is (at 
least partly) in line with the general theorizing in section 3.3.2.3. Model 39b 
(exhibited in appendix 6a) provides evidence of the same structure of relationships 
with reference to 'Profitability' and thus, in congruence with Model 4, some support 
for hypotheses 4a and 5a. However, the direct relationship between 'HRM 
sophistication' and 'Profitability' is in Model 39b only weakly significant and so is 
thus also the indirect relationship between 'Strategic fit' and 'Profitability (β = 0.04; t-
value = 1.52 which, utilizing a one-tailed test, here means p ≈ 0.10) as mediated 
(directly) by 'HRM sophistication'.  
The mediating variable in terms of 'HRM sophistication' is at least not involved in 
common method errors in relation to either 'Strategic fit' or the organizational 
performance variables. However, also the relationship between ‘HRM sophistication’ 
and the organizational performance variables may be due to cognitive biases (March 
and Sutton, 1997, pp. 700-701), illusory or spurious correlations due to implicit 
theories and/or reverse causations (Wright and Gardner, 2000, pp. 7-9). These are 
relevant possibilities in particular as, most importantly, these models provide no 
strong support for the role of the suggested mediational framework (section 7.1; 
section 9.3.2) in terms of explaining the direct relationships between HRM and 
organizational performance.  
The indirect (explained) relationship between HRM sophistication and organizational 
performance is at the most only weakly significant (t = 1.37 which, utilizing a one-
tailed test, here means p ≈ 0.10). This is the case with reference to 'Organizational 
performance:quality' in Model 39a. In Model 40a the indirect relationship between 
HRM sophistication and organizational profitability is clearly insignificant (t = 0.53). 
The indirect relationship between HRM sophistication and organizational 
performance in terms of quality is also clearly insignificant (t = 0.86) in Model 39b. 
The indirect relationship between HRM sophistication and organizational 
performance in terms of profitability in fact appears negative (t = 1.67 which, when 
utilizing a one tailed test, here would mean p ≈ 0.05) in Model 40b. In summary thus, 
applying a one-tailed test of significance Model 39a provides some weakly significant 
(partial) support for the overall exploratively extended model in terms of an explained 
relationship between HRM sophistication (but not strategic fit) and organizational 
performance in terms of quality. 
Models 39a and 39b do not provide support for a strongly significant relationship 
between 'Psychological empowerment' or any of the other intermediate attitudinal 
constructs and the variable measuring the quality/efficiency of employee work 
performance and thus no strong support for hypothesis 7a. Applying a one-tailed 
significance test the relationships between 'Psychological empowerment' and 
'Employee performance: quality/efficiency' as well as the indirect relationship 
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between the latter and 'HRM sophistication' are however both weakly significant, in 
Model 39a and b (β = 0.15; t-value = 1.58 and respectively β = 0.07; t-value = 1.57 
which, when utilizing one tailed tests, mean p ≈ 0.10).  
The relationship between 'Employee performance: quality/efficiency' and 
'Organizational performance: quality' is significant in Model 39a. This provides 
support for hypothesis 12b.  
Model 39b provides no support for hypothesis 12a concerning a relationship between 
employee performance in terms of quality/efficiency and organizational profitability. 
Models 40a and 40b (appendix 6b and 6c) which include our employee innovativity 
variable instead of the measure related to the quality/efficiency of employee 
performance offer support for hypothesis 7b concerning a relationship between 
psychological empowerment and such employee performance (β = 0.45; t-value = 
4.04 which, when utilizing a one tailed test, here would mean p ≈ 0.001). Both 
‘Strategic fit’ and ‘HRM sophistication’ exhibit significant indirect relationships with 
employee performance in terms of innovativity in line with our exploratively extended 
model (β = 0.05; t-value = 2.25 and respectively β = 0.18; t-value = 3.71 which, when 
utilizing one tailed tests, here mean p ≈ 0.05 and 0.001 respectively). To the extent 
that we also allow for the direct relationship between 'Strategic fit' and 'Psychological 
empowerment' the indirect relationship between 'Strategic fit' and 'Employee 
performance: innovativity' is more strongly significant (β = 0.11; t-value = 2.56 
which, utilizing a one tailed test, here means p ≈ 0.005). However, there appears to be 
no significant relationship between employee performance in terms of innovativity 
and organizational performance in terms of quality (Model 40a). The relationship 
between the former and organizational profitability appears strongly negative when 
applying a one-tailed test of significance (Model 40b). Thus, these models provide no 
support for hypotheses 12c nor 12d concering the relationship between employee 
performance in terms of innovativity and organizational performance nor do they thus 
explain a positive relationship between HRM and organizational performance. 
Neither do the models 39a, 39b, 40a or 40b provide support for hypotheses 12e or 12f 
concerning the relationships between employee performance and employee retention. 
Further, the above models provide no support for hypotheses 9a-9d concerning the 
relationships between affective value commitment/affective continuance commitment 
and employee work performance. 
Further, in line with Model 5 there is no support for hypotheses 4c or 5c in terms of 
direct relationships between the HRM variables and 'Employee retention'. Models 
39a-b and 40a-b indicate that at least excluding all the controls exogenous to the 
postulated model, affective value commitment in comparison to affective continuance 
commitment does an acceptable job in terms of predicting employee turnover. This 
offers some tentative support for hypotheses 9e but none for 9f. This is in line with 
earlier reviewed research (Mayer and Shoorman, 1992, p. 681; Iverson and Buttigieg, 
1999, p. 325).  
Models 39a-b and 40a-b also provide some evidence of an indirect relationship 
between 'HRM sophistication' and 'Employee retention' as mediated by the whole 
mediational framework in terms of the support related variables, 'Psychological 
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empowerment' and 'Affective commitment'. This evidence is strongest in Model 40b 
(t= 2.28 for the indirect relationship which, utilizing a one tailed test, here means p ≈ 
0.05) and weakest in Model 39b (t= 1.57 which, utilizing a one tailed test, here means 
p ≈ 0.10). There is no evidence for an indirect relationship between 'Strategic fit' and 
'Employee retention'458. 
Further, in general the fit statistics with reference to all of these models are not quite 
satisfactory in terms of the GFI and the Critical N while the RMSEA and CFI (and 
with the exception of Model 39b) the p-value for the χ2 indicate acceptable fit. 
However, as reported we had again to free a fair amount of error correlations in order 
to gain reasonably acceptable fit statistics for the models. In general these analyses 
thus convey the questionable nature of the fit of the models including the discriminant 
validities of the constructs. We should thus remain very cautious in our interpretations 
of it.  
Because of the above fit statistics we also conducted 16 additional analyses where, in 
comparison to models 39a and 39b as well as 40a and 40b, we include ‘Psychological 
empowerment’, ‘Affective commitment’, ‘Continuance commitment’ and 
‘Organizational citizenship behavior' each in turn rather than including several of 
these constructs in the same model. These models exhibit more acceptable fit statistics 
and tell the following story: Essentially these 16 models support the fact that HRM 
may be significantly indirectly and positively related to organizational performance 
only as mediated by employee performance and psychological empowerment. 
However, these analyses indicate that this indirect relationship is insignificant both 
with reference to 'Organizational performance: quality' (β = 0.01; t-value = 1.19) as 
well as 'Organizational performance: profitability' (β = 0.01; t-value = 0.67). Thus 
also the corresponding indirect relationships between 'Strategic fit' and 
organizational performance as mediated by 'HRM sophistication' are insignificant. 
These models further indicate that psychological empowerment, affective value 
commitment , affective continuance commitment and organizational citizenship 
behavior taken separately and without the other control variables all appear to be 
significantly correlated with employee retention. Finally, these models also indicate 
that there is a significant (one-tailed test) indirect relationships between HRM 
sophistication (but not strategic fit) and employee retention as mediated by the "social 
architecture" and each of the focal attitudinal variables when the latter are inlcuded 
in the models separately and without the other control variables. 
In summary, even excluding all the exogenous controls, all the above structural 
equation models at the most provide only some (fairly weakly) significant (and also 
otherwise statistically somewhat questionable459) support (in terms of Model 39a) for 
                                               
458 These results are partly dependent on the insignificant negative indirect relationship that both 'HRM 
sophistication' and Strategic fit' has with 'Employee retention' as mediated by the organizational 
perfomance variables. We will later argue that, based on this data, there is little reason to claim that 
employee retention should influence organizational performance. Our results and interpretations will 
rather support a causal direction as depicted in Model 39a-b and 40a-b.  
459 The fact that most of the structural equation models include a fair amount of free error correlations 
should make us cautious concerning the adequacy of the constructs/models (Eriksson, 1998, p. 34). 
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an explained relationship between HRM sophistication (but not strategic fit) and 
organizational performance in terms of quality but not profitability. These analyses 
are more promising with reference to an explained relationship between HRM 
sophistication and employee retention.  
However, there is still the possibility that more significant indirect explanatory 
relationships between HRM sophistication and organizational performance in terms of 
quality and profitability may be discernible when we include our controls. It is also 
interesting to see what happens when we, in addition to the exogenous controls, also 
include all our intermediate attitudinal constructs in the same regression equations and 
thus use also these as controls for one another. These questions will be pursued below 
through ordinary least squares regression models applying the fit statistics ordinarily 
used in connection to such analyses. 
Regression analyses. When intepreting the following regression analyses we again 
have to remember that we are dealing with marginal or residual relationships. As 
noted in section 9.3.4, it is however the partial (residual) correlations which can be 
brought forward as the most justified cross-sectional empirical evidence of possible 
distinct causal relations. Even to the extent that there are multicollinearity problems 
involved and to the extent that there is no theoretical reason to remove variables the 
analyses at least provide us with evidence about what is possible to claim on the bases 
of a general non-tailor-made sample. Would there be multicollinearity related 
problems we may be in a position where we simply cannot provide convincing 
evidence. Again, however, there seem to be few relationships which are due to 
problems of multicollinearity. In fact, based upon the VIF values no such problems 
appear to exist. In the backward selected models also the Condition indexes (CI) 
appear tolerable and the backward selections do not appear to essentially change any 






Model 41 Model 41b Model 42 Model 42b Model 43 Model 45
Variables
β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF
Constant 1.60 ** .992 - 1.71*** .741 - 3.92** 2.234 - 4.75*** 1.754 - .51 2.756 - 3.92** 1.776 -
Number of earlier employers .089 .085 2.5 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.156 .192 2.5 -.225*** .139 1.4 .091 .236 2.5 ∅ ∅ ∅
Employee age -.008 .069 2.7 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.061 .156 2.7 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.141 .193 2.7 ∅ ∅ ∅
Employee tenure -.016 .070 1.7 ∅ ∅ ∅ .011 .157 1.7 ∅ ∅ ∅ .076 .194 1.7 ∅ ∅ ∅
Prob. of partnership status .084 .034 1.7 .134** .032 1.6 -.002 .077 1.7 ∅ ∅ ∅ .125 .095 1.7 .162** .080 1.3
Perceived job opportunities .002 .064 1.8 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.136* .144 1.8 -.136* .118 1.3 .151* .178 1.8 .163** .140 1.2
Recent job offers .103 * .028 1.4 .092* .024 1.1 .022 .063 1.4 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.191** .078 1.4 -.172** .071 1.3
Workload .091 .077 2.1 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.239** .173 2.1 -.232*** .149 1.7 -.149* .213 2.1 -.143* .169 1.4
Too big demands -.123 * .050 1.6 -.092* .042 1.3 .128* .113 1.6 .115 .104 1.5 .219** .139 1.6 .142* .125 1.4
Rec. rad. improvem in HRM -.142 ** .074 1.8 -.140** .067 1.6 -.184** .168 1.8 -.145* .146 1.5 -.066 .207 1.8 ∅ ∅ ∅
Hierarchy -.084 .040 1.4 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.120* .091 1.4 -.134* .083 1.2 -.014 .112 1.4 ∅ ∅ ∅
Prospects of organiz. perf. .000 .079 1.9 ∅ ∅ ∅ .166* .178 1.9 .184** .157 1.6 .122 .220 1.9 .196** .176 1.3
Organizational image .260 *** .055 1.5 .232*** .051 1.4 .108 .125 1.5 ∅ ∅ ∅ .132* .154 1.5 .165** .137 1.3
Strategy .150 ** .043 1.4 .161*** .039 1.3 .054 .097 1.4 ∅ ∅ ∅ .078 .120 1.4 ∅ ∅ ∅
Competition .337 *** .046 1.2 .330*** .042 1.2 -.113* .103 1.2 -.102 .096 1.2 -.038 .127 1.2 ∅ ∅ ∅
Organization size -.022 .075 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅ .121 .170 1.6 .146** .149 1.4 -.237*** .210 1.6 -.227*** .177 1.2
Interactional justice -.173 * .095 3.0 -.194** .083 2.6 -.085 .214 3.0 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.238** .265 3.0 -.243**** .189 1.7
Procedural justice .068 .074 2.0 ∅ ∅ ∅ .125 .166 2.0 ∅ ∅ ∅ .179* .205 2.0 .191** .176 1.6
Distributive justice .065 .076 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.002 .172 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅ .073 .213 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅
Strategic fit .113 * .076 1.5 .133** .068 1.3 .153* .172 1.5 .152** .152 1.3 .118 .213 1.5 ∅ ∅ ∅
HRM sophistication .283 *** .122 2.9 .261*** .104 2.4 .300*** .274 2.9 .277*** .222 2.1 -.099 .338 2.9 ∅ ∅ ∅
Organization support -.170 * .129 3.4 -.157* .108 2.5 .102 .291 3.4 ∅ ∅ ∅ .080 .359 3.4 ∅ ∅ ∅
Coworker support -.030 .089 2.1 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.177* .201 2.1 -.175** .177 1.8 .010 .247 2.1 ∅ ∅ ∅
Leader support .198 ** .088 2.9 .272*** .078 2.6 -.137 .197 2.9 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.113 .243 2.9 ∅ ∅ ∅
Psych. Empowerment -.244 ** .149 4.2 -.207** .129 3.3 -.070 .336 4.2 ∅ ∅ ∅ .083 .414 4.2 ∅ ∅ ∅
Aff. value commitment .315 *** .138 3.1 .306*** .130 3.0 .242** .310 3.1 .218** .241 2.1 -.022 .382 3.1 ∅ ∅ ∅
Aff. Continuance com. -.107 .059 1.9 -.123* .052 1.6 -.180** .133 1.9 -.178** .112 1.5 .129 .164 1.9 ∅ ∅ ∅
Organizat. Citizenship beh. -.292 *** .130 3.2 -.248*** .112 2.6 -.143 .293 3.2 -.142 .248 2.5 .087 .362 3.2 ∅ ∅ ∅
Empl. perf: quality/efficacy .222 *** .080 1.7 .179*** .070 1.5 .172** .180 1.7 .112* .143 1.2 .063 .222 1.7 ∅ ∅ ∅
Empl. perf: innovativity .099 .057 1.8 .140** .049 1.5 -.052 .127 1.8 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.183** .157 1.8 ∅ ∅ ∅
Organizat. perf: quality ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ -.121* .189 1.2





Employee retention Employee retention
F for R2 / R2  / Adj. R2 / CI♣ 4,3 0,54 0,41 101 7,7 0,53 0,46 70 1,7 0,32 0,13 101 3,0 0,28 0,19 61 1,3 0,27 0,07 100 3,1 0,21 0,14 41
  One-tailed sig. test:*p<.10  /  **p<.05  /  ***p<.01  /  β = stand. coeff.  /  ♣CI = Condition Index  /  ∅ = Variable not included in model
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Employee performance and organizational performance. In line with structural 
equation Model 39a employee performance in terms of quality/efficiency appears to 
be strongly significantly related to organizational performance in terms of quality 
(Model 41 in Table 34). In contrast to structural equation Model 39b such employee 
performance appears to be significantly or weakly significantly related also to 
organizational profitability when all the controls are included and applying a one-
tailed test of significance (Model 42 and Model 42b). This offers further support for 
hypotheses 12b and support for hypothesis 12a. Further, in line with structural 
equation Model 40a, when all the controls are included employee performance in 
terms of internal innovativity is not even weakly significantly related to 
organizational performance in terms of quality even when applying a one-tailed test 
of significance (Model 41). Such employee performance is clearly insignificantly 
related to profitability (Model 42). The latter result is in contrast to Model40b where 
the relationship was strongly significant and negative when applying a one-tailed test 
of significance. These results offer no support for either hypothesis 12d or 12c.  
Employee retention. In distinction to the structural equation Models 39a-b and 40a-b 
(as well as the simplified versions of these models), when all the controls are included 
affective continuance commitment seems to be more correlated with employee 
retention than affective value commitment but is nevertheless not significant (Model 
43). Thus, including all the controls except the organizational performance variables 
our analysis is not strictly congruent with the "key evidence" that, in comparison to 
affective value commitment, (affective) continuance commitment has a "significantly 
stronger relationship with quitting" (Mayer and Schoorman, 1992, p. 681)460. In 
particular, when we add the controls in terms of organizational performance not even 
affective continuance commitment is even close to significantly predicting employee 
retention (Model 44; not shown in this thesis). Thus neither hypothesis 9e (affective 
value commitment) nor 9f (affective continuance commitment) are supported461. 
Neither is hypothesis 11e postulating a relationship between organizational 
citizenship behavior and employee retention supported by Model 43 or Model 44. 
                                               
460 The somewhat different constructs refered to in this citation and the current study should be born in 
mind. 
461 It can be noted that the bivariate correlation between the full BOCS scale (more closely 
corresponding to the OCQ) and employee retention in our study is 0.18 (p < .05). Huselid and Day also 
explicitly used a notion of voluntary employee turnover and the bivariate correlation between 
attitudinal or affective commitment in terms of the OCQ and their measure of employee turnover was -
0.24 (1991, p. 386), and thus more or less in line with the one exhibited in our sample. In addition, it 
can be noted that with the controls included in Huselid and Day they found, in line with our analyses, 
no significant relationship between either attitudinal (or calculative continuance commitment) and 
employee turnover. Allen and Meyer (1996, p. 266) report prior evidence of bivariate correlations of -
0.19 and -0.26 between employee turnover (not identified as voluntary or involuntary or both). As 
noted earlier, much evidence as reported by Meyer and Allen (1996, p. 262) suggests that the ACS and 
the OCQ are closely correlated. Further, the bivariate correlations between our scale of affective value 
commitment and employee retention is 0.13 (Sig. = 0.1), and between affective continuance 
commitment and employee retention 0.16 (Sig. = 0.05). Taken at face value this data is thus in line with 
earlier evidence that continuance commitment (albeit in terms of a scale which judged by the items is 
more explicitly ambiguous between affective and calculative continuance commitment than our scale) 
appears to be more strongly related to (actual) quitting (Mayer and Shoorman, 1992, p. 679) than 
affective value commitment.  
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Finally, also hypotheses 12e and 12f postulating positive relationships between 
employee performance and employee retention have to be rejected based upon this 
evidence. Similarly, also hypotheses 4c (strategic fit) and 5c (HRM sophistication) 
have to be rejected. In fact if anything, Models 43 and 44 indicate that employee 
performance in terms of internal innovativity appears to be negatively rather than 
positively related to employee retention (and thus positively related to voluntary 
employee turnover). 
The general inability of Models 43 (and 44) to explain/predict employee retention is 
reflected in the fact that they are not overall adequately significant. We then applied 
backward selection upon Model 44 until all variables had Sig. ≤ 0.01 (one-tailed test) 
which resulted in Model 45. In distinction to Models 43 and 44, the backward selected 
Model 45 exhibits satisfactory overall significance. None of the support related 
variables or any of the four "original" focal intermediate attitudinal variables are 
significant even when included on their own in turn and do not thus contribute to any 
improvement of the fit of Model 45. In fact, this is the case even if we exclude also 
the justice related variables. Thus, it seems to be the case that given the control 
variables in Model 45, neither strategic fit nor HRM sophistication, nor organization 
support, nor leader support, nor coworker support, nor psychological empowerment, 
nor affective value commitment, nor affective continuance commitment nor 
organizational citizenship behavior is able to explain employee retention462.  
In summary, these results are interestingly in opposition to much earlier theorizing 
and interpretations of the adequacy/relevance of earlier empirical evidence in terms of 
significant relationships between different forms of commitment and employee 
turnover. 
HRM and organizational performance. In line with structural equation Models 39a 
and 40a as well as Model 3 'HRM sophistication' is directly significantly and 
positively related to the 'Organizational performance: quality' (Model 41), thus 
offering further support for hypothesis 5b. Model 42 indicates that, including all 
controls, there is a strongly significant direct relationship also between 'profitability' 
and 'HRM sophistication', thus offering support also for hypothesis 5a. The latter 
result is in some contrast to structural equation Models 39b and 40b but in congruence 
with Model 4.  
                                               
462 It may be noted that there are interesting differences in the relationships between on the one hand 
perceived job opportunities and employee retention, and on the other hand recent job offers and 
employee retention as well as on the one hand workload and employee retention and, on the other hand 
too big demands and employee retention. These are arguably not due to problems of multicollinearity. 
Further, although the above relationships are not impossible to understand, (arguably not even 
implausible somewhat depending on how we interpret the variables), the relationship between 
interactional justice and employee retention seems very difficult indeed to understand, and may well be 
a peculiarity of the present data. The negative relationship between 'Interactional justice' and 'Employee 
retention' is independent of whether we include e.g. 'Procedural justice' or not. It is also clearly distinct 
from the insignificant relationship between leader support and employee retention. The only 
interpretation we can give of this relationship is that interactional justice is not a causally influential 
variable here. This relationship is particularly difficult to understand as interactional justice is also 
negatively related to organizational performance in terms of quality which in turn is also negatively 
related to employee retention. 
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Models 41 and 42 further indicate that there is only a weakly significant direct 
relationship between 'strategic fit' and both 'Organizational performance: quality' 
and 'profitability', thus offering only a weak support for hypothesis 4b and 4a. This is 
in some contrast to structural equation Models 39a-b and 40a-b as well as Models 3 
and 4463.  
It might be argued that organizational performance in terms of quality may lead to 
organizational profitability and/or vice versa and that we should thus control for these 
possibilities in the above models. However, there is no clearly significant relationship 
between these variables when entered into Models 41 or 42 respectively.  
HRM and employee performance. Models 46-49 (Table 35 and Table 36)464 support 
the fact that neither 'HRM sophistication' nor 'Strategic fit' appear to be directly 
related to either of the employee performance variables (even) when we include all 
the exogenous controls. The only significant relationships between these variables is 
the barely weakly significant relationship between 'Strategic fit' and 'Employee 
performance: innovativity' (p = 0.208; two-tailed test) in Model 48b where the 
organizational performance variables are not controlled for.  
 
                                               
463 The fact that a component of 'Strategic fit' arguably is included in 'HRM sophistication (Model 2) 
still leaves room for the possibility that there may be more strongly significant direct relationships 
between strategic fit and the two aspects of organizational performance. However, as noted the 
component of 'Strategic fit' in 'HRM sophistication' appeared to be fairly weak when including all the 
controls.  
464 Model 46b and 48b are the results of applying backward selection to Models 46 and 48 
respectively. Models 47b and 49b are the results of including the organizational performance variables 




Model 46 Model 46b Model 47 Model 47b
Variables
β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF
Constant 4.18*** 1.192 - 3.83*** .845 - 2.52** 1.223 - 2.67*** .898 -
Number of earlier employers -.152 .111 2.4 -.132* .080 1.4 -.138 .106 2.4 -.138* .078 1.4
Employee age .001 .092 2.7 ∅ ∅ ∅ .011 .087 2.7 ∅ ∅ ∅
Employee tenure .153* .090 1.6 .149** .070 1.1 .142* .086 1.6 .150** .068 1.1
Prob. of partnership status .149* .045 1.7 .174** .039 1.4 .100 .043 1.7 .127* .038 1.4
Perceived job opportunities .119 .084 1.7 .119* .069 1.3 .129 .080 1.7 .123* .067 1.3
Recent job offers -.022 .037 1.3 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.044 .035 1.3 ∅ ∅ ∅
Workload -.002 .100 2.0 ∅ ∅ ∅ .017 .096 2.0 ∅ ∅ ∅
Too big demands .069 .066 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅ .077 .064 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅
Rec. rad. improvem in HRM -.065 .097 1.7 ∅ ∅ ∅ .026 .095 1.8 ∅ ∅ ∅
Hierarchy -.134* .052 1.3 -.133** .046 1.1 -.065 .051 1.4 -.096 .045 1.1
Prospects of organiz. perf. -.079 .101 1.7 -.118* .084 1.3 -.069 .098 1.8 -.135* .082 1.3
Organizational image -.095 .072 1.5 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.187** .071 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅
Strategy -.067* .056 1.4 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.110 .054 1.4 ∅ ∅ ∅
Organization size .094 .099 1.6 .141** .082 1.2 .068 .095 1.6 .090 .082 1.3
Interactional justice .058 .125 2.9 ∅ ∅ ∅ .129 .121 3.0 ∅ ∅ ∅
Procedural justice -.099 .097 1.9 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.126 .093 2.0 ∅ ∅ ∅
Distributive justice -.102 .100 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.107 .096 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅
Strategic fit .073 .101 1.5 ∅ ∅ ∅ .008 .098 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅
HRM sophistication .088 .158 2.8 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.074 .160 3.1 ∅ ∅ ∅
Organization support .185 .169 3.3 .196** .116 1.7 .193* .162 3.3 .200** .113 1.7
Coworker support .031 .116 2.1 ∅ ∅ ∅ .068 .112 2.1 ∅ ∅ ∅
Leader support .026 .115 2.9 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.017 .111 3.0 ∅ ∅ ∅
Psych. empowerment .246* .193 4.0 .252** .145 2.5 .301** .184 4.0 .295*** .142 2.5
Aff. value commitment -.172 .178 3.0 -.221** .152 2.4 -.295** .175 3.2 -.291*** .151 2.5
Aff. continuance com. .069 .077 1.9 ∅ ∅ ∅ .119 .075 1.9 ∅ ∅ ∅
Organizat. citizenship beh. -.102 .166 3.0 ∅ ∅ ∅ .011 .162 3.1 ∅ ∅ ∅
Organizat. perf: quality ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ .323*** .105 1.6 .227*** .088 1.2










F for R2 / R2  / Adj. R2 / CI♣ 1,5 0,26 0,09 90 3,7 0,22 0,16 47 2,0 0,34 0,17 95 4,1 0,28 0,21 51




Model 48 Model 48b Model 49 Model 49b
Variables
β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF β s.e. VIF
Constant 2.18* 1.689 - 1.56* 1.184 - .58 1.777 - .47 1.256 -
Number of earlier employers .057 .157 2.4 ∅ ∅ ∅ .050 .155 2.4 ∅ ∅ ∅
Employee age -.009 .130 2.7 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.007 .127 2.7 ∅ ∅ ∅
Employee tenure -.068 .128 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.073 .125 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅
Prob. of partnership status .115 .063 1.7 .137* .057 1.5 .076 .062 1.7 .085 .057 1.6
Perceived job opportunities -.072 .118 1.7 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.076 .116 1.7 ∅ ∅ ∅
Recent job offers -.062 .052 1.3 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.077 .051 1.3 ∅ ∅ ∅
Workload .082 .141 2.0 .118* .116 1.5 .074 .140 2.0 .134* .116 1.5
Too big demands .048 .093 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅ .069 .092 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅
Rec. rad. improvem in HRM .037 .137 1.7 ∅ ∅ ∅ .093 .138 1.8 ∅ ∅ ∅
Hierarchy -.041 .074 1.3 ∅ ∅ ∅ .002 .074 1.4 ∅ ∅ ∅
Prospects of organiz. perf. -.288*** .143 1.7 -.328*** .125 1.5 -.259*** .142 1.8 -.326*** .124 1.5
Organizational image -.132* .102 1.5 -.121* .094 1.4 -.198** .103 1.6 -.168** .095 1.4
Strategy .096 .080 1.4 .112* .069 1.2 .066 .078 1.4 .083 .068 1.2
Organization size .150 .140 1.6 .147** .119 1.2 .142* .137 1.6 .132* .118 1.3
Interactional justice -.010* .178 2.9 ∅ ∅ ∅ .042 .176 3.0 ∅ ∅ ∅
Procedural justice .047 .137 1.9 ∅ ∅ ∅ .036 .135 2.0 ∅ ∅ ∅
Distributive justice -.110 .142 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.115 .139 1.6 ∅ ∅ ∅
Strategic fit .068 .143 1.5 .109* .126 1.3 .032 .142 1.6 .068 .127 1.4
HRM sophistication .097 .224 2.8 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.006 .232 3.1 ∅ ∅ ∅
Organization support .133 .239 3.3 ∅ ∅ ∅ .152* .235 3.3 ∅ ∅ ∅
Coworker support -.145 .165 2.1 -.134* .138 1.6 -.131 .163 2.1 -.124* .136 1.6
Leader support -.162 .162 2.9 ∅ ∅ ∅ -.210 .161 3.0 ∅ ∅ ∅
Psych. empowerment .354*** .273 4.0 .335*** .224 2.9 .395*** .268 4.0 .358*** .222 2.9
Aff. value commitment -.221* .253 3.0 -.215** .225 2.6 -.300** .255 3.2 -.280*** .229 2.7
Aff. continuance com. .142* .110 1.9 .155** .096 1.5 .165* .109 1.9 .176** .096 1.6
Organizat. citizenship beh. .296** .235 3.0 .293*** .212 2.6 .370*** .236 3.1 .328*** .211 2.7
Organizat. perf: quality ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ .266*** .152 1.6 .206*** .134 1.4
Organizat. perf: profitability ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ -.011 .077 1.4 .012 .069 1.2
DEPENDENT VARIABLE Empl. perf: innovativity Empl. Perf: innovativity Empl. Perf: innovativity Empl. perf: innovativity
F for R2 / R2  / Adj. R2 / CI♣ 1,8 0,30 013 90 3,9 0,27 0,20 54 2,0 0,34 0,17 95 3,9 0,30 0,23 59
  One-tailed sig. test:*p<.10  /  **p<.05  /  ***p<.01  /  β = stand. coeff.  /  ♣CI = Condition Index  /  ∅ = Variable not included in model
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The combined evidence of Models 2-49b of the ways HRM may be related to 
employee work performance is presented in Figure 7b. The interpretations which 
indicate the reverse direction of the relationship between affective value commitment 
and employee performance are presented below465. 
 
                                               
465 The thick  lines denote theorized relationships. The whole lines denote relationships with a strong 
support (Sig. ≤ 0.05; one-tailed test). The dashed lines denote relationships with only a weak support 
(Sig. ≤ 0.10; one-tailed test). The dotted lines denote reverse relationships. The sign ‘(-)‘ denotes 
negative relationships. Further:  
(a) In Model 35 only weakly significant;  
(b) In Model 16 only weakly significant;  
(c) The relation between affective value and continuance commitment is insignificant in Model 37b. 
(d) Strongly significant only in the backward selected Model 36b 
(e) With reference to 'Employee performance: quality/efficiency' insignificant in Model 46. With 
reference to 'Employee performance: innovativity' only weakly significant in Model 48.  
(f) With reference to 'Employee performance: quality/efficiency' not significant at all (Models 46-
47b). With reference to 'Employee performance: innovativity' strongly significant in the backward 
selected Models 48b and 49b'. 
(g) With reference to 'Employee performance: quality/efficiency' not significant at all (Models 46-
47b). 
(h) Essentially significant only with reference to 'Employee performance: quality/efficiency' (Models 
46-47b) but not with reference to 'Employee performance: innovativity' (Models 48-49b). 












































Psychological empowerment, employee and organizational performance. Model 
46 also indicates, in line with structural equation Models 39a-b, that there is only a 
weakly significant positive relationship between employee performance in terms of 
quality/efficiency and psychological empowerment thus offering no strong support for 
hypothesis 7a. However, Model 46b offers strong support for hypothesis 7a. 
The correlations between employee performance and at least psychological 
empowerment , affective value commitment and affective continuance commitment 
appear to increase in Model 47 compared to Model 46. Thus, these models together 
may be taken to indicate that there may be different attributional/substantial reverse 
causations from organizational performance (or something that this stands proxy for) 
to employees' psychological empowerment, organizational commitment, 
organizational citizenship behavior and continuance commitment as well as (peer 
evaluations of) employee work performance. Models 46 and 47 may thus be 
interpreted to indicate that when such influences are controlled for, more adequate 
relationships between the attitudes and employee work performance become 
discernible. Below we will suggest different reasons for the adequacy of the 
organizational performance controls somewhat depending upon which of the 
attitudinal constructs we are talking about. Essentially we will argue for reverse 
causational relationships between the focal theoretical attitudes and organizational 
performance466.  
Models 47 and 47b provide strong support for hypothesis 7a concerning a positive 
relationship between psychological empowerment and employee performance in 
terms of quality/efficiency. This result thus differs from the one obtained in structural 
equation Models 39a-b. 
Model 48 (Table 36) shows evidence of a strong direct relationship between 
psychological empowerment and employee work performance in terms of internal 
innovativity. This is in line with structural equation Models 40a-b providing further 
                                               
466 One reason for the relevance of the organizational performance variables as controls could a priori 
be that the evaluations of employee performance might tend to be more critical in well performing 
organizations. However, at least perceptions of employee performance and organizational performance 
tend to correlate positively rather than negatively (Models 41, 41b, 42 and 42b). A better reason for the 
relevance of the controls may be the fact that evaluations may tend to be cognitively biased upwards in 
organizations showing better performance (compare March and Sutton, 1997, pp. 701-702). However, 
neither of the above phenomena would arguably make sense both of the change in significance (in 
Model 47 versus 46 and analoguously in Models 47b versus 46b) of the positive relationship between 
psychological empowerment and employee performance as well as the negative relationship between 
the latter and affective commitment (see below). Therefore we will essentially leave attempts to 
speculate about the validity of the measures of employee performance to these remarks. We might 
nevertheless add that as noted by Settoon et al., “[t]he same factors influencing the quality of the 
leader-member exchange relationship may also affect leader evaluations of subordinate behavior...It 
has been found that leaders are more likely to attribute ineffective performance to internal causes for 
low leader-member exchange subordinates relative to high leader-member exchange subordinates. 
Similarly, leaders tend to make internal attributions for effective performance of high, but not low, 
leader-member exchange subordinates" (1996, p. 225). A number of analoguous biases are evidently 
also possible, e.g. leading to over estimations of any alledged influence of leader support, interactional 
justice, organization support and/or organizational citizenship behavior on employee work 
performance. However, with reference to the focal intermediate variables we have at least some 
controls for such possibilities due to the number and nature of our control variables.  
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strong support for hypothesis 7b. Also this relationship gets even stronger when we 
control for organizational performance (Model 49). This relationship is also 
confirmed in the backward selected Models 48b and 49b. 
Including all controls, there is also evidence for a negative relationship between 
psychological empowerment and organizational performance in terms of quality but 
not profitability (Models 41 and 42). These findings are also confirmed in the 
backward selected Models 41b and 42b. 
These results together seem at least to allow for the interpretation that psychological 
empowerment tends to positively influence employee performance but that 
organizations showing better performance in terms of quality, although also exhibiting 
better employee performance in particular in terms of quality/efficiency (Models 41) 
but arguably also in terms of innovativity (Model 41b), appear to allow less rather 
than more room for psychological empowerment for some reason not detectable in 
our data467.  
Thus, this interpretation argues for a positive causal influence of psychological 
empowerment on employee performance and a reverse and negative (exogenous, 
heterogenous) causation from organizational performance in terms of quality, or from 
something which such organizational performance stands proxy for. Unless controlled 
for, the influence of such (a) heterogenous phenomena (phenomenon) thus arguably 
somewhat bias(es) a positive relationship between psychological empowerment and 
employee performance in terms of quality/efficiency. This is still quite compatible 
with a potentially significant positive indirect influence of psychological 
empowerment (through employee performance) on organizational performance.  
The results of Models 46-49b are at least compatible with prior evidence for 
performance effects of psychological empowerment (Spreitzer, 1995, p. 1460; 
Torbiorn, 1997b, pp. 11-13). However, the analyses also provide interesting counter-
evidence to theorizing/assumptions in terms of the importance of psychological 
empowerment for organizational performance or "successful firms" (Thomas and 
Velthouse, 1990. p. 667), implicit expectations about the impact of psychological 
empowerment on "organizational effectiveness" (Spreitzer, 1995, p. 1462), and/or the 
                                               
467 A reason for this is not easy to conceive of since based on Model 41 organizations showing better 
performance in terms of quality also tend to be less rather than more hierarchical (in terms of benefits 
and compensation) and less rather than more severe in their demands on employees (Models 41 and 
41b). Both of these phenomena would seem to be compatible with psychological empowerment. The 
residual negative relationship between psychological empowerment and organizational performance 
also seem to be somewhat incoherent with what we would expect if we were to argue that 
organizational performance may (psychologically) influence psychological empowerment in line with 
the kind of cognitive biases discussed by e.g. March and Sutton (1997, pp. 701-702). However, a 
possible (and interesting) explanation for the fact that employees in such organizations tend to exhibit 
significantly less of both psychological empowerment and organizational citizenship behavior and 
affective continuance commitment could be more rigorously controlled work-routines in such 
organizations. But how do we then explain the positive relationship between organizational 
performance and affective value commitment? This could be due to a strong tendency of well 
performing organizations to generate affective value commitment (quite) independent of employees' 




assumptions of the importance of something like psychological empowerment 
(Wright and Snell, 198, pp. 765-766). Of course, our results only indicate that 
organizational practice in our sample does not comply with such 
assumptions/normative theorizing. The assumptions/theorizing may still be adequate 
since, after all, psychological empowerment is in the above interpretation significantly 
related to employee performance and appears potentially indirectly also positively 
related to organizational performance468.  
The evidence as interpreted above with reference to the direct relationships between 
HRM, psychological empowerment and employee/organizational performance is 
exhibited in Figure 8469. 
                                               
468 It is not clear how we should interpret these results since 'Psychological empowerment' in the 
additional simpler structural equations parallel to Models 39a-40b but excluding 'Affective 
commitment' and 'Continuance commitment' (the models are not shown in this thesis but discussed 
above) is not negatively related to 'Organizational performance: quality' but rather to 'Organizational 
performance: Profitability'. 
469 The thick  lines denote theorized relationships. The whole lines denote relationships with a strong 
support (Sig. ≤ 0.05; one-tailed test). The dashed lines denote relationships with only a weak support 
(Sig. ≤ 0.10; one-tailed test). The dotted lines denote reverse relationships. The sign ‘(-)‘ denotes 
negative relationships. Further:  
(a) In Model 35 only weakly significant;  
(b) Only weakly significant in Model 46. 
(c) Essentially significant only with reference to 'Employee performance: quality/efficiency' (Models 
46-47b) but not with reference to 'Employee performance: innovativity' (Models 48-49b). 
(d) With reference to 'Employee performance: innovativity' insignificant in Model 41. 
(e) With reference to 'Employee performance: quality/efficiency' only weakly significant in Model 




Affective commitment, employee and organizational performance. Based upon 
Model 46 there is no significant positive relationship between affective value 
commitment and employee performance in terms of quality/efficiency and thus no 
support for hypothesis 9a. Neither does Model 47 provide support for this hypothesis. 
In fact, the relationship tends to be negative already in Model 46. In Model 47 as well 
as the backward selected Models 46b and 47b the negative correlation is strongly 
significant and negative.  
Model 48 indicates a negative relationship also between affective value commitment 
and employee performance in terms of internal innovativity thus offering no support 
for hypothesis 9b. Also this relationship gets strongly significant when we control for 
organizational performance (Model 49). It is also strongly significant both in Model 
48b and 49b.470. 
                                               
470 It must be noted that the bivariate correlations between our notion of affective commitment and our 
employee performance variables deviate from (some) prior evidence of significant positive correlations 
between ACS and some (different) measures of employee performance as reported in Allen and Meyer 
(1996, pp. 268-269). Firstly, however, there is considerable variation in the correlations between 
different measures of employee performance also concerning the evidence which Allen and Meyer 
refer to. Secondly, at least the components of the ACS in Iverson and Buttigieg (1999, p. 319) are more 
comparable exclusively to the dimension of identification in our construct of affective commitment. 
The correlation between this dimension commitment and employee performance in terms of 
quality/efficiency is 0.20 (p = 0.13). This is quite compatible with the findings of significant positive 
corrrelations in some of the research referred to by Allen and Meyer (1996, pp. 268-269). Thus, while 
the most adequate construct(s) of commitment may be debated, our data concerning these aspects 




































These results may seem most compatible with an interpretation of the relationship 
between affective value commitment and employee performance as due to a reverse 
causation from employee performance. It would at least seem conceptually 
problematical to suggest that increased identification and involvement among 
employees lead to lower work performance.  
There is also evidence for a strongly significant positive relationship between 
affective value commitment and organizational performance in terms of quality 
(Models 41 and 41b). The relationship between affective value commitment and 
organizational profitability also appears strongly significant in Model 42b but only 
weakly significant in Model 42. As already noted, there is evidence for a positive 
relationship between employee work performance in terms of quality/efficiency and 
organizational performance both in terms of quality (Model 41 and 41b) and 
profitability (Model 42 and 42b). In Model 41b also employee performance in terms 
of innovativity appears significantly related to organizational performance in terms of 
profitability. Since the relationship between employee performance and affective 
value commitment appears negative it seems likely that the positive correlation 
between affective commitment and organizational performance also reflects a reverse 
causation rather than the other way around.  
It would seem to be conceptually more problematical, but not impossible, to argue 
that affective value commitment leads to lower employee performance but 
nevertheless to higher organizational performance. It would seem similarly more 
problematical, but not impossible, to argue that higher employee performance leads to 
better organizational performance and to lower affective value commitment but that 
higher affective value commitment nevertheless leads to better organizational 
performance. At least such possibilities appear inexplicable with reference to the 
current data.  
Thus, this interpretation suggests that the relationships between affective value 
commitment and employee work performance/organizational performance both 
represent reverse causations. In this interpretation the negative influence of better 
employee performance on affective commitment seems to be partly offset by the 
positive influence of organizational performance due to the correlation between 
employee performance and organizational performance.  
This interpretation goes interestingly against much of the theorizing in the literature 
on organizational commitment and at least some earlier empirical evidence471. While 
being in outright opposition to some earlier evidence when taken at face value, the 
above interpretation of the (residual) negative correlation between 'Affective 
                                               
471 These results are e.g. in opposition to the results in Meyer et al (1989). Already the correlations are 
different. One has to bear in mind that both the performance variables and constructs of affective 
commitment are different as are the sampled contexts and types of respondents. In addition, it is not 
impossible that the "multidimensionality" of Meyer et al.'s employee performance variables may hide 
interesting differences even as the performance measures in their study appear more adequate than in 
the current thesis. Thus, the contexts and the constructs are different in these two studies. In addition, 
the evidence for the negative relationships between 'Affective commitment' and the two employe 
performance variables in the current study only becomes dicernible with certain controls the 
equivalence of which we have not seen in any prior study. 
390 
 
commitment' and the two employee performance variables is only partly 
(in)compatible with the general line of empirical evidence of performance effects of 
organizational commitment which has been argued to indicate that "commitment has 
relatively little direct influence on performance in most instances" (Mathieu and 
Zajac, 1990, p. 184). The above results/interpretations are however more compatible 
with the argument that  
"[a] cogent theory for why identification with and involvement in an 
organization should directly promote job performance has not been 
developed” (Becker et al., 1996, p. 466). 
We might give a psychological interpretation of a negative (reverse) causation 
between affective value commitment and employee work performance. It may be the 
case that better performing employees tend to feel stronger and therefore develop less 
affective value commitment to any one organization (given all the controls in the 
equation). This would be compatible with the interpretation offered for the negative 
relationship between psychological empowerment and affective continuance 
commitment in connection to Model 21. At the same time employees conceivably like 
(to work for) better performing organizations and therefore also on average tend to 
develop more affective value commitment for such organizations472. 
The evidence as interpreted above with reference to the role of affective value 
                                               
472 However, on this interpretation together with some further interpretations below, it may seem 
somewhat difficult to explain why psychological empowerment would positively influence affective 
value commitment (Models 16, 16b, 42 and 42b). We will discuss such problems of the coherence of 
the (interpretations of the) results in more detail below. In fact, below we will find some reason to 










Figure 9: HRM, Affective

































commitment as a mediator of HRM's potential influence on employee and 
organizational performance is exhibited in Figure 9473. 
Organizational citizenship behavior, employee and organizational performance. 
The relationship between organizational citizenship behavior and employee 
performance in terms of quality/efficiency is in Models 46-47b not significant offering 
no support for hypothesis 11b. Thus, while Models 46-47b do not support a positive 
relationship, neither do they, in distinction to Models 27-30b and 38b, support the 
possibility discussed by Podsakoff et al. (1997, p. 263) that an employee's 
organizational citizenship behavior might negatively affect her/his work performance 
in terms of quality/efficiency. It appears that only when we control for employee work 
performance in terms of internal innovativity (Models 27-30b and 38b) can we 
discern such a possible residual negative influence of organizational citizenship 
behavior. This may however, in line with the arguments above concerning affective 
value commitment, also be due to a reverse causation. Thus, the analyses allow for the 
possibility that employees performing with better quality/efficiency, on the margin 
and independent of their innovative behavior, tend to develop less rather than more 
affective value commitment and (partly therefore) tend to engage less rather than 
more in organizational citizenship behavior474.  
                                               
473 The thick  lines denote theorized relationships. The whole lines denote relationships with a strong 
support (Sig. ≤ 0.05; one-tailed test). The dashed lines denote relationships with only a weak support 
(Sig. ≤ 0.10; one-tailed test). The dotted lines denote reverse relationships. The sign ‘(-)‘ denotes 
negative relationships. Further:  
(a) In Model 35 only weakly significant 
(b) In Model 16 only weakly significant;   
(d) Strongly significant only in the backward selected Model 36b 
(e) With reference to 'Employee performance: quality/efficiency' insignificant in Model 46. With 
reference to 'Employee performance: innovativity' only weakly significant in Model 48.  
(h) Essentially significant only with reference to 'Employee performance: quality/efficiency' (Models 
46-47b) but not with reference to 'Employee performance: innovativity' (Models 48-49b). 
(i) Only weakly significant in Model 46. 
(j) With reference to 'Employee performance: innovativity' not significant at all in Model 41. while 
strongly significant in the backward selected Models 41b'. 
(k) With reference to 'Employee performance: innovativity' not significant at all (Models 42-42b). 
474 The following does not appear inconceivable: psychological empowerment (and competence) may 
positively influence both affective value commitment and organizational citizenship behavior (compare 
the argumentation in connection to Model 23 and the evidence in Models 28-30b and 38 and 38b). 
Better employee performance in terms of quality/efficiency may diminish organizational citizenship 
behavior indirectly because better performing individuals tend to develop less affective value 
commitment and/or, on the other hand organizational citizenship behavior may directly diminish 
employee performance in terms of quality/efficency (Podsakoff et al., 1997, p. 263) and/or the effort 
and focus required ofr better employee performance in terms of quality/efficiency may directly 
diminish organizational citizenship behavior. However, since we will find reason below to change our 
interpretation of the relationship between affective commitment and employee performance, also the 
hypothetical explanation of a negative indirect influence of employee performance on organizational 
citizenship behavior, as mediated by affective value commitment, may be inadequate. Below we will 
argue for the possibility of a latent cause which positively influences both affective value commitment 
and organizational citizenship behavior and negatively influences employee performance in terms of 
quality/efficiency. As we shall admit, the problem with this last interpretation is that it may be 
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Models 48 and 48b provides evidence of a strong direct relationship between 
employee performance in terms of internal innovativity and organizational citizenship 
behavior (even when we do not control for employee performance in terms of 
quality/efficiency as in Models 27-30b, 38 and 38b). This result provides further 
evidence for hypothesis 11a but is best interpreted as a plausible non-causal 
correlation (see the arguments in section 7.2.4.3).  
As is the case with psychological empowerment, affective commitment the fact that 
the relationship between employee performance in terms of internal innovativity and 
organizational citizenship behavior also somewhat increases when organizational 
performance is controlled for (Models 49 and 49b respectively), is superficially due to 
the fact that the relationships between organizational citizenship behavior and the 
individual/organizational performance variables appear to be mutually contradictory.  
Model 41 and 41b provide (further) evidence for a significant negative relationship 
between organizational citizenship behavior and organizational performance in terms 
of quality, while the relationship between the latter and organizational profitability 
appears insignificant (Models 42 and 42b). Thus, Models 41-42b provide no support 
for either hypothesis 11c or 11d postulating a positive relationship between 
organizational performance and organizational citizenship behavior. Also here we 
suggest the interpretation that the results of Models 41 and 41b at least partly reflect a 
reverse causation from organizational performance, or something which the variable 
of organizational performance stands proxy for, to organizational citizenship 
behavior.  
We thus suggest that there is something in organizations performing with better 
quality that significantly diminishes both organizational citizenship behavior and 
psychological empowerment (but not employee performance in terms of internal 
innovativity). Whatever the possible explanation for this, at least it may be concluded 
that also the negative relationship between organizational citizenship behavior and 
organizational performance goes interestingly against much normative/theoretical 
management literature concerning organizational citizenship behavior. 
The evidence as interpreted above with reference to the role of organizational 
citizenship behavior as a mediator of the potential influence of HRM on employee and 
organizational performance is exhibited in Figure 10475. 
                                                                                                                                      
inconsistent with the argument that competence is required for organizational citizenship behavior (see 
the argument in connection to Model 23). 
475 The thick  lines denote theorized relationships. The whole lines denote relationships with a strong 
support (Sig. ≤ 0.05; one-tailed test). The dashed lines denote relationships with only a weak support 
(Sig. ≤ 0.10; one-tailed test). The dotted lines denote reverse relationships. The sign ‘(-)‘ denotes 
negative relationships. Further:  
(a) In Model 35 only weakly significant;  
(b) In Model 16 only weakly significant;  
   




Affective continuance commitment, employee and organizational performance. 
Model 46-47b indicate that there is no direct relationship between affective 
continuance commitment and employee performance in terms of quality/efficiency and 
thus no support for hypothesis 9c.  
Model 48 exhibits a weakly significant positive relationship between affective 
continuance commitment and employee performance in terms of internal innovativity. 
Also this relationship gets somewhat stronger when we control for organizational 
performance (Model 49), however, still not strongly significant. In Models 48b and in 
particular 49b this relationship is significant. Thus, Models 48-49b offer some support 
for hypothesis 9d. 
                                                                                                                                      
(e) With reference to 'Employee performance: quality/efficiency' insignificant in Model 46. With 
reference to 'Employee performance: innovativity' only weakly significant in Model 48.  
(g) With reference to 'Employee performance: quality/efficiency' not significant at all (Models 46-
47b). 
(h) Essentially significant only with reference to 'Employee performance: quality/efficiency' (Models 
46-47b) but not with reference to 'Employee performance: innovativity' (Models 48-49b). 
(i) Only weakly significant in Model 46. 
(j) With reference to 'Employee performance: innovativity' not significant at all in Model 41. while 
strongly significant in the backward selected Models 41b'.  
(k) With reference to 'Employee performance: innovativity' not significant at all (Models 42-42b). 

















































Based upon Model 41 and 41b it appears that affective continuance commitment is 
negatively but at the most weakly significantly related to organizational performance 
in terms of quality. However, Models 42 and 42b provide support for a significant 
negative relationship between affective continuance commitment and organizational 
profitability. 
Although the relationships between 'Continuance commitment' and the employee 
performance variables are only partially significant we will pursue the possibility of 
giving a consistent interpretation of the tendences here including the other 
relationships found and interpreted above in order to understand the overall 
compatibility and thus plausibility of the results. 
The interpretation that the relationship between continuance commitment and 
organizational performance is due to an influence from the former to the latter appears 
problematical. Our analyses do support the possibility that at least perceived prospects 
for the organization's future performance may have a positive influence on employees' 
affective continuance commitment (Models 37 and 37b). In addition, also 
organizational image may have such an influence (Model 37). These relationships 
appear in line with the findings in Fenton-O'Creevy et al., 1997, p. 603)476. Fenton-
O'Creevy et al. also found that future prospects of organizational performance may 
have a negative influence on involvement (ibid, p. 603) which in principle could at 
least explain the negative correlation between continuance commitment and 
organizational performance. However, although not shown in the descriptive 
statistics, in our data the zero-order correlation between the component of 
involvement included in the construct of affective value commitment and future 
prospects of organizational performance is simply insignificant (but positive)477. 
Nevertheless, a parallel to the relationship found by Fenton-O'Creevy et al. appears in 
our study as a significant negative relationship between perceived future prospects of 
organizational performance and employee performance both in terms of 
quality/efficiency and innovativity (Models 46b, 47b, 48b and 49b)478. Regardless of 
                                               
476 The differences in the relationships between, on the one hand image/prospects and continuance 
commitment (Models 37 and 37b) and, on the other hand organizational performance and continuance 
commitment (Models 37, 37b and 41-42b) may seem odd. However, employees may e.g. perceive 
future prospects to be good for example due to the prospect of the industry or industry segment or due 
to changes in the circumstances even if the performance of the particular organization during the past 
two years has not been equally good. Such possibilities makes the above noted differences intelligible. 
In fact, at least it appears quite plausible that people may be more affectively continuance commited to 
organizations with good prospects than to organizations performing relatively well or, in particular, 
more committed to organizations whose prospects are good but whose performance has not been 
particularly good than to organizations who actually perform very well. 
477 The positive zero-order correlation between affective value commitment and future prospects of 
organizational performance (Table25b)is largely due to the element of identification included in the
construct of affective value commitment. The higher order correlation between affective value 
commitment and future prospects is significant in Model 36b but not in Model 36. 
478 This relationship is congruent with a generalization of Fenton-O'Creevy et al.'s "instrumental" 
interpretations of their findings in terms of a negative relationship between employees' involvement 
and such prospects. One variation of their argument was that "employees have learned that effort does 
not matter to the company when prices are firm and reserves are sound" (1997, p. 605) i.e. that 
employees' involvement is not as much noticed and thus not needed for reasons of e.g. job security in 
good times (when the company prospects look good) as when times are worse. Athough we do not 
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this there is however a positive (rather than negative) relationship between affective 
continuance commitment and employee performance, even significantly positive with 
reference to employee performance in terms of innovativity (Models 48, 48b, 49 and 
49b). The residual correlation between employee performance iun terms of 
innovativity and organizational performance in terms of quality is also positive rather 
than negative (Models 41 and 41b). These relationships do not thus seem to offer 
explanations of the negative relationship between continuance commitment and 
organizational performance. 
Neither is it on the basis of the current data really plausible to argue that affective 
continuance commitment could negatively (indirectly) influence organizational 
performance through employee retention. 
Although somewhat implausible, it does not seem conceptually nor empirically 
impossible to argue that higher employee retention could tend to lead to lower 
employee performance in terms of internal innovativity (Models 43) as well as lower 
organizational performance (Model 45). It may even be the case that employee 
retention has a negative effect on organizational performance in terms of quality 
through its negative relationship with employee performance in terms of innovativity 
since the latter appears significantly positively related to organizational performance 
in terms of quality (Model 41b). However, since there appears to be no significant 
relationship between affective continuance commitment and employee retention, the 
possibility of such an interpretation does not really lead us further.  
In addition, it does seem conceptually more plausible to argue that if anything 
employee retention might be negatively influenced by both better employee 
performance (Model 43) and better organizational performance (Model 45) rather 
than the other way around. The former possibility would also be more consistent with 
our interpretation of the negative relationship between psychological empowerment 
and affective continuance commitment (Models 21-22b, 36 and 36b) as well as the 
negative relationship between affective value commitment and employee performance 
(Models 46-49b).  
In summary, based on the current data/analysis/interpretations we conclude at least 
that there seem to be no good justification (explanation) for an interpretation in terms 
of a causal influence of affective continuance commitment on organizational 
performance.  
The negative correlation between these variables (Models 41-42b) could instead be 
interpreted to indicate a reverse causation. It could be conceived as plausible that 
employees in general in better performing organizations might tend to feel stronger 
(perhaps due to more opportunities) and thus also on the margin tend to exhibit less 
continuance commitment as well as tend to quit more often. The weak tendency 
towards a positive relationship between affective continuance commitment and 
employee retention (Model 43) could thus be understood, in line with the above, to 
                                                                                                                                      
distinguish between employee involvement and identification, also the relationships between 'Perceived 
prospects of becoming a partner' and both 'Continuance commitment' (Models 37 and 37b) and 




indicate that there is a weak but insignificant overall tendency for affective 
continuance commitment to result in lower employee turnover but high organizational 
performance tends to influence negatively both of the former phenomena (Models 37, 
37b, 41, 41b, 42, 42b and 45).  
Thus it may be the case that better organizational performance on average induces a 
negative (psychological) effect on affective continuance commitment such that it is 
difficult to achieve high organizational performance while also keeping employees 
affectively continuance committed just as organizations tend to have difficulties to 
produce psychologically empowered employees who are also affectively continuance 
committed (Models 21-22b and 37-37b) and high performing employees who are also 
affectively value committed (Models 46, 46b, 47, 47b, 48, 48b, 49 and 49b). This 
would not be incompatible with the possibility that affective continuance 
commitment, independent of organizational performance, might also have some 
positive influence on organizational performance as mediated by employee 
performance in terms of internal innovativity. Such a possibility is at least not 
precluded by Models 48, 48b, 49, 49b as well as 41b.  
However, in addition to the partly weak significances there are problems with this 
reverse causational interpretation also. It may be intelligible and acceptable that better 
organizational performance leads to higher affective value commitment but tends to 
lead to lower affective continuance commitment (Models 41, 41b, 42 and 42b). It also 
seems coherent that affective value commitment, independent of employee and 
organizational performance, may have a positive influence on affective continuance 
commitment (supported by Model 37 but not 37b) while psychological empowerment 
seem to have the opposite direct effect (Models 21-22b, 37 and 37b). However, it is 
more difficult to understand the fact that also better employee performance according 
to our interpretations appears to lead to feelings of strength and independence and 
thus less affective value commitment (Models 47-49b) while affective continuance 
commitment seem to be positively rather than negatively related at least to employee 
performance in terms of (internal) innovativity (Models 48-49b).  
We could make some more sense of these relationships to the extent that we change 
the (psychological ) interpretation of the negative relationship between employee 
performance and affective value commitment. Perhaps this relationship is not due to 
an influence from the former to the latter. It may be that employees who tend to be 
affectively value committed also tend to be weaker performers because of some latent 
common cause and perhaps even for the same reason also exhibit less organizational 
citizenship behavior. This would thus mean changing the earlier interpretation of the 
relationship between affective value commitment and employee performance in terms 
of a reverse causation as well as the interpretation of affective value commitment as 
mediating a negative influence of employee performance on organizational citizenship 
behavior. Depending on the potential latent phenomenon it may also change the 
interpretation, given in connection to Model 23, that competence is required for 
organizational citizenship behavior.  
Even so, how can we understand the fact that psychological empowerment (arguably 
through feelings of strength and independence) seems to be able to reduce affective 
continuance commitment (Models 21-22b; 37-37b) while better employee 
performance does not appear to do so (Models 37, 37b, 46-49b). This could be 
understood since those who perform well do not appear always to be correspondingly 
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psychologically empowered. However, this argumentation would imply that 
psychological empowerment would have to be a stronger determinant than good 
performance of feelings of strength and independence. This does not appear 
psychologically impossible and does not appear contradictory to the interpretation 
given above of the relationships between psychological empowerment, organizational 
citizenship behavior and employee performance. Nevertheless, since psychological 
empowerment appears positively related to affective value commitment also this 
argumentation/interpretation may suggest that we change the interpretation of the 
relationship between affective value commitment and employee work performance in 
terms of a reverse causation. Otherwise it is difficult to hold on to the interpretation 
that psychological empowerment, compared to employee performance, is a stronger 
determinant of feelings of strength and independence. The latter interpretation was 
arguably needed in order to make sense both of the negative relationship between 
psychological empowerment and affective continuance commitment as well as the 
positive relationships between affective continuance commitment and employee 
performance in terms of innovativity. Also here coherence would thus rather suggest a 
potential common factor which has an opposite influence on affective value 
commitment (and perhaps on organizational citizenship behavior) compared to its 
influence on employee work performance.  
However, even if all the above was conceivable, how can we understand the fact that 
better organizational performance tends to negatively influence/be negatively related 
to affective continuance commitment while better employee performance does/is not 
(Models 41, 41b, 42, 42b, as well as 37 and 37b)? In order to preserve the coherence 
of the above interpretations this would seem to imply that also organizational 
performance is a stronger cause of feelings of strength and independence than 
employee performance. This does not appear impossible. However, trying to 
understand the coherence of these results we are already far down the road of ad hoc 
explanations.  
Further, the general interpretation that affective continuance commitment is 
negatively influenced by organizational performance seems to be problematical also 
for other reasons than the partly low significances and incoherences. Neither those 
who express relatively less affective continuance commitment (Model 37-37b), nor 
those who work for organizations doing relatively better (Models 41-42b), score 
strongly significantly higher on 'Perceived job opportunities' or 'Recent job offers'479. 
Thus, the phenomena of job opportunities/job offers do not appear to offer very good 
explanations for a negative influence of better organizational performance on 
continuance commitment nor even for the negative correlation between them. Further, 
both 'Workload' and 'Psychological empowerment' are negatively related to 
'Continuance commitment' (Models 37 and 37b) but not significantly positively 
related to organizational performance. In fact, employees in more profitable 
                                               
479 None of these zero-order correlations are significant (Table25b).In fact, in more profitable 
organizations it appears that employees  tend to perceive less job opportunities rather than more(Model 
42 and 42b). Employees in organizations showing better organizational performance in terms of quality 
do appear to tend to receive more job offers (Models 41 and 41b). However, since affective 
continuance commitment appears less significantly related to organizational performance in terms of 
quality than to profitability, this insignificant evidence appears paradoxical to the extent that it may be 
pereceived as relevant at all.  
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organizations appear to exhibit less rather than more workload (Models 42 and 42b) 
while employees in organizations showing better qualitative performance tend to be 
less psychologically empowered rather than more and confront less rather than more 
(too big) demands (Models 41 and 41b). These phenomena do thus neither appear to 
offer a potential explanation for a negative reverse influence of organizational 
performance on affective continuance commitment nor more generally of the negative 
correlation between them.  
Thus in summary, the tendency towards a negative relation between affective 
continuance commitment and organizational performance (Models 41-42b) seems not 
to be intelligible against the background of these analyses. Neither does the one 
between employee performance in terms of internal innovativity and affective 
continuance commitment (Models 48-49b). The suspension of any judgement about 
these correlations appears justified. Thus, based upon the interpretation of all the 
regression analyses we have arrived at the overall model of HRM's potential influence 
on the theoretical variables exhibited in Figure 11480. 
                                               
480 The thick  lines denote theorized relationships. The whole lines denote relationships with a strong 
support (Sig. ≤ 0.05; one-tailed test). The dashed lines denote relationships with only a weak support 
(Sig. ≤ 0.10; one-tailed test). The dotted lines denote reverse relationships. The sign ‘(-)‘ denotes 
negative relationships. Further:  
(a) In Model 35 only weakly significant;  
(b) In Model 16 only weakly significant;  
(c)  The relation between affective value and continuance commitment is insignificant in Model 37b. 
(d) Strongly significant only in the backward selected Model 36b 
(e) With reference to 'Employee performance: quality/efficiency' insignificant in Model 46. With 
reference to 'Employee performance: innovativity' only weakly significant in Model 48.  
(f) With reference to 'Employee performance: quality/efficiency' not significant at all (Models 46-
47b). With reference to 'Employee performance: innovativity' strongly significant in the backward 
selected Models 48b and 49b'. 
(g) With reference to 'Employee performance: quality/efficiency' not significant at all (Models 46-
47b). 
(h) Essentially significant only with reference to 'Employee performance: quality/efficiency' (Models 
46-47b) but not with reference to 'Employee performance: innovativity' (Models 48-49b). 
(i) Only weakly significant in Model 46. 
(j) With reference to 'Employee performance: innovativity' not significant at all in Model 41. while 
strongly significant in the backward selected Models 41b' 
(k) With reference to 'Employee performance: innovativity' not significant at all (Models 42-42b). 




Significance of indirect and total relationships between the central theoretical 
variables including controls. As a last piece of evidence we provide estimates of 
direct, indirect and total relationships between the focal theoretical variables as 
extended in Figure 4 and exhibited in Figure 11. These estimates in Table 37 and 
Table 38 are based upon a full structural equation Model 50 including only composite 
scores and all those relationships which were found to be significant in the regression 
analyses481.  
 
                                               
481 Apart from the β-coefficients and the sometimes used criteria in terms of χ2/df ≤ 3, this structural 
equation model  does not have acceptable fit statistics. The analysis is used simply to arrive at some 
rough idea of the potential indirect effects of HRM on the postulated theoretical variables while 
including all the (control) relationships that were indicated to be important inthe regression analyses 
(Models 10b, 35b, 16b, 36b, 22b, 37b, 30b, 38b, 46b, 47b, 48b and 49b as well as 41b and 42b). What 
this model at least may indicate is the kind of evidence that we would need, with a larger sample, less 
common method errors and better constructs. Since the model does not exhibit acceptable fit statistics 
and the number of parameters is larger than the total sample size and the estimates thus unreliable these 
estimates are at the most indicative. They are however largely compatible with the more justified 












































































** ∅ -0.04a* -0.07** -0.08 * 0.01a -0.07
HRM sophistication ∅ 0.09*** 0.09*** ∅ 0.03b 0.03 ∅ 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.20 *** 0.08*** 0.28 ***
Organization support 0.18 ** 0.00 0.17** 0.25*** 0.09 ** 0.34*** 0.36*** -0.01 0.35*** ∅ 0.10*** 0.10 ***
Coworker support 0.18 *** 0.04** 0.22*** ∅ 0.16 *** 0.16*** 0.19*** 0.03 0.22*** 0.24 *** 0.02* 0.27 ***
Leader support ∅ 0.04** 0.04** -0.25*** 0.09 *** -0.16*** ∅ 0.05 0.05 ∅ -0.07*** -0.07 ***
Psych. empowerment ∅ -0.01c* -0.01* 0.60*** -0.07 ** 0.53*** -0.37*** 0.08* -0.29*** -0.16d ** 0.19*** 0.03
Aff. value commitment ∅ - - ∅ - - 0.17** - 0.17** 0.40 *** - 0.40 ***
Aff. continuance com. ∅ - - ∅ - - ∅ - - ∅ - -
Organizat. citizenship beh. ∅ - - ∅ - -- ∅ - - ∅ - -
Empl. perf: quality/efficacy ∅ -0.03e* -0.03* -0.03 0.02f -0.01 ∅ -0.04g** -0.04** ∅ -0.05h ** -0.05 **
Empl. perf: innovativity ∅ - - -0.16*** - -0.16*** ∅ -0.03i** -0.03** ∅ -0.06i*** -0.06 ***
Organ. Perf.: quality -0.10 * 0.00 -0.10* 0.16*** -0.05j * 0.11** -0.17*** 0.06k** -0.12** -0.20 *** 0.06k ** -0.14 ***
Organ. perf.: profitability -0.12 ** 0.00 -0.12** -0.01 -0.06j ** -0.07 -0.08* 0.03 k* -0.05 -0.10 ** -0.01k -0.10 **
One-tailed sig. test:
*
p<.10  /  **p<.05  /  ***p<.01      ∅ = (Causal) relationship not included in model
a) These indirect effects have been calculated while excluding the direct relationship between ’Strategic fit’ and ’Psychological empowerment’ and are thus the indirect effects as mediated by
’HRM sophistication’ in line with our theorization.
b) The insignificant  indirect (and total) relationship between ’HRM sophistication’ and ’Affective value commitment’ is apparently due to the negative relationship between ’Leader support’
and ’Affective value commitment’. Thus it may be biased. However, it has no bearing on the relationships between either ’Strategic fit’ or ’HRM sophistication’ and organizational
performance in terms of either quality or profitability.
c) This relationships of Psychological empowerment’ with itself is arguably due to the interpreted reverse causation between organizational performance and psychological empowerment.
d) The direct relationship between ’Psychological empowerment’ and ’Organizational citizenship behavior’ is the only result of Model 50 which is radically different compared to the regression
analyses. We have not been able to find an explanation for this. It should thus be interpreted with particular caution.
e) This relationship is due to the interpreted reverse negative relationship between ’Pyschological empowerment’ and the organizational performance variables.
f) This relationship is due to the interpreted reverse positive relationship between ’Affective value commitment’ and the organizational performance variables.
g) This relationship is due to the interpreted reverse negative relationship between ’Affective continuance commitment’ and the organizational performance variables.
h) This relationship is due to both the interpreted reverse negative relationship between ’Organizational citizenship behavior’ and the organizational performance variables and the interpreted
negative reverse relationhips between ’Affective value commitment’ and the employee performance variables.
i) These relationships are due to the interpreted reverse negative relationships between ’Affective value commitment’ and the employee performance variables.
j) These relationships are due to the interpreted reverse negative relationships between ’Pyschological empowerment’ and the organizational performance variables.












Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total Direct Indirect Total
Strategic fit ∅ 0.00a 0.04 a* ∅ 0.00a 0.04 a* ∅ 0.00a 0.01 a* ∅ 0.00a 0.00 a
HRM sophistication ∅ 0.04*** - ∅ 0.02b - ∅ 0.01** - ∅ 0.00 -
Organization support ∅ 0.07** - ∅ 0.07** ∅ 0.02* ∅ 0.01 0.01
Coworker support ∅ 0.09*** - -0.06 0.09*** 0.04 ∅ 0.02* ∅ 0.01
Leader support ∅ 0.02* - ∅ 0.02* ∅ 0.00* ∅ 0.00
Psych. empowerment 0.40*** -0.01c 0.40*** 0.42*** -0.01 c 0.41*** ∅ 0.09*** 0.09*** ∅ 0.04 0.04
Aff. value commitment ∅ - - ∅ - - ∅ - ∅ - -
Aff. continuance com. ∅ - - ∅ - - - ∅ - -
Organizat. citizenship beh. ∅ - - ∅ - - - ∅ - -
Empl. perf: quality/efficacy ∅ -0.01 c* -0.01 c* ∅ -0.01 c* -0.01 c* 0.23*** 0.00 0.22*** 0.10 0.00 0.10
Empl. perf: innovativity ∅ - - ∅ - - ∅ - - ∅ - -
Organ. Perf.: quality ∅ -0.04 c* -0.04 c* ∅ -0.04 c* -0.04 c* ∅ -0.01c -0.01c ∅ 0.00 0.00
Organ. perf.: profitability ∅ -0.05 c* -0.05 c* ∅ -0.05 c* -0.05 c* ∅ -0.01c* -0.01c* ∅ 0.00 0.00
One-tailed sig. test:
*
p<.10  /  **p<.05  /  ***p<.01        ∅ = Causal relationship not included in model
a) The indirect effects between ’Strategic fit’ and employee/organizational performance variables have been calculated while constraining the direct relationship between ’Stratgeic fit’ and
’Psychological empowerment’ in order to test our theorizing. The total relationships allow for this.
b) We have found no explanation for the insignificance of this indirect relationship. This evidence should thus be interpreted with particular caution.




It may be noted that, according to this highly tentative and statistically questionable 
evidence, HRM sophistication appears to have a significant indirect (explained) 
relationship with employee performance in terms of quality/efficiency as well as 
organizational performance in terms of quality but not in terms of profitability. Both 
of these explanations involve only the intermediate attitude of psychological 
empowerment together with the exploratively postulated social architecture. 
9.5 SUMMARY OF MAJOR EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND 
INTERPRETATIONS 
There is a quite strong support for a direct relationship between HRM sophistication 
and both of the identified forms of organizational performance both excluding focal 
intermediate variables (Models 3 and 4) and including all the controls and 
intermediate variables (Models 41-42b). This is congruent with the earlier evidence as 
reviewed in section 6.2.1. 
Indirect effects. Organizational performance. However, of particular interest from 
the perspective of this thesis and the field of human resource management in general 
is that there are only two statistically somewhat dubious pieces of evidence for an 
explained relationship between HRM sophistication and organizational performance. 
One piece of evidence is the weakly significant indirect relationship in Model 39a, the 
other piece of evidence is the significant (but statistically much more questionnable) 
one in Table 38. Both of these pieces of evidence concern an explained relationship 
between HRM sophistication and organizational performance in terms of quality. 
There is no evidence for an explained relationship between HRM and organizational 
performance in terms of profitability. Of the focal theoretical variables as outlined in 
section 7.1 these pieces of evidence involve only psychological empowerment in 
addition to the social architecture as developed in section 9.3.2 and further discussed 
in section 9.3.4. There is no such evidence of an explained relationship between 
strategic fit and organizational performance as mediated by HRM sophistication in 
accordance with the theorization in sections 3.3.2.3 and 3.4. Model 50, although 
admittingly very tentative primarily due to the ratio of parameters and observations, 
indicates some positive evidence as noted at the end of the last section. 
Employee performance. It is however also interesting that the analyses provide 
evidence of an intelligible mechanism of HRM's influence on employee work 
performance, i.e. as mediated primarily by a social architecture and secondarily by 
psychological empowerment. Evidence for the possibility of such a mechanism is 
provided by the regression analyses both with a large number of control variables as 
well as without them. Evidence of the significance of the influence of HRM on both 
employee performance in terms of quality/efficiency and innovativity as mediated by 
the above mechanism is provided both in Models 39a-40b as well as in the simpler 
versions of these models. Additional evidence for the significance of the indirect 
influence of HRM sophistication (but not strategic fit) on employee performance in 
terms of quality/efficiency is provided by Model 50 as exhibited in Table 38482.  
                                               
482 The evidence in terms of this model that the indirect relationship between HRM sophistication and 
employee performance in terms of innovativity is not significant should be treated with particular 




Intermediate attitudes. The analyses further provide some evidence of the positive 
influence of HRM sophistication on all the focal intermediate attitudes. With the 
exception of a direct significant relationship between HRM sophistication and 
organizational citizenship behavior and a somewhat more ambiguous one between 
HRM sophistication and affective value commitment, the analyses indicate that HRM 
sophistication may have a strongly significant influence on psychologcial 
empowerment, affective value commitment and affective continuance commitment 
only as mediated by what we called a social architecture. The results of the analyses 
with reference to these relationships were discussed in more detail in section 9.3.4. 
Although there appears to be some contradictory lines of influence, the net effect with 
reference to all intermediate attitudes except possibly affective value commitment 
(Model 50, Table 37) appears to be positive. This evidence is thus somewhat different 
although not outrightly contradicting earlier evidence with reference to organizational 
commitment provided by Guest and Hoque (1994) and Ogilvie (1987) as reviewed in 
section 6.2.5. 
Strategic fit. Less in line with our theorization, this thesis also provides some evidence 
a unique negative role of strategic fit with reference to the intermediate attitudinal 
variables which is interpreted and discussed in more detail in section 9.3.5 and also 
evidenced by Model 50 (Table 37). However, the analyses also provide some 
evidence (e.g. in terms of Model 50, Table 38) of a distinct influence of strategic fit 
on employee work performance as mediated directly by psychological empowerment.  
Concerning the apparently contradictory influences our interpretations of the 
regression analyses as well as Model 50 (Tables 37 and 38) including controls 
indicate the existence (or could at least not exclude the existence) of the following 
interesting (contradictory) negative indirect relationships: those between HRM and 
notably affective continuance commitment (through psychological empowerment), 
HRM and affective value commitment (through employee performance and [even] 
more implausibly through leader support). The analyses and interpretations also 
indicate that organizational performance, or arguably rather something which 
organizational performance may stand proxy for, may have some negative influence 
on psychological empowerment, organizational citizenship behavior and more 
ambiguously on affective continuance commitment.  
The evidence and interpretations of the role of and relationships between the focal 
theoretical variables will be briefly recapitulated in the following:  
• Employee retention. None of the theoretical variables appear to be able to 
unequivocally and distinctly explain employee retention (Models 43 and 45) 
whereas included in more simple analyses all of the focal attitudinal variables 
appear to be correlated with employee retention (see the discussion of the 
simplified verison of Models 39a-40b). This evidence constradicts a lot of earlier 
evidence as reviewed in section 7.2.4.2 but is in line with Huselid and Day (1991). 
• Internal relationships between employee attitudes. More psychologically 
empowered employees feel more affective value commitment most likely because 
of both (calculative) exchange theoretical and (less calculative) psychological 
reasons because employees tend to like to feel empowered (Models 16, 16b, 36, 
36b, 39a-40b, and Table 37); both more psychologically empowered and more 




citizenship behavior (Models 30, 30b, 38, 38b and Table 37) perhaps because of 
exchange theoretical reasons and/or reasons of competence; while more 
affectively committed employees do tend, although not unambiguously, to be 
significantly more affectively continuance committed (Models 22, 22b, 37, 37b 
and Table 37). Further, arguably because of "feeling strong and free", more 
psychologically empowered employees tend to feel less affective continuance 
commitment (Models 22, 22b, 37, 37b and Table 37). In addition, the above 
mentioned analyses provide evidence for the fact that organization support 
appears directly positively related to three of the four focal intermediate attitudes, 
the exception being organizational citizenship behavior.  
• Employee attitudes and employee performance. More psychologically 
empowered employees tend to be better performing employees (Models 47-49b 
and Table 38), while employees who are performing better tend to feel less 
affective value commitment perhaps because of "feeling strong and free" (Models 
36-36b, 47-49b, and Table 38). There is also some somewhat ambiguous evidence 
for the fact that employees performing with better quality/efficiency may tend to 
engage less rather than more in organizational citizenship behavior (Model 30, 
30b, 38, 38b, 46-47b). 
• Attitudes and organizational performance. Employees would most likely 
appear to enjoy working for better performing organizations and therefore tend to 
develop more affective value commitment for such organizations (Models 36-36b 
and 41-42b, Table 38), better performing organizations, for some, with reference 
to the current data inexplicable reasons, appear to allow less rather than more 
room for psychological empowerment and organizational citizenship behavior 
(Models 35-35b, 38-38b and 41-42b, Table 38),  
• Employee and organizational performance. Employee performance in terms of 
quality/efficiency but only ambiguously in terms of (internal) innovativity seem at 
least possibly to be able to influence organizational performance (Models 39a-
40b, 41-42b and Table 38). 
We began by offering the interpretation that the lower affective value commitment 
among well performing employees was due to a reverse causation such that well 
performing employees "feel strong and free" and therefore exhibit less affective value 
commitment. But why would better employee performance not also lead to lower 
affective continuance commitment? Further, is it really plausible that psychological 
empowerment would positively influence affective value commitment (because 
employees like to feel empowered) but that better employee performance would 
negatively influence affective value commitment? This seems questionable in 
particular since we argued above that psychological empowerment seem to be a 
stronger determinant of feelings of strength and independence than employee 
performance is.  
Because of the internal relationships between psychological empowerment, affective 
value commitment, affective continuance commitment and employee performance we 
argued that the relationship between affective value commitment and employee 
performance should/could perhaps be understood as being due to a latent common 
cause unaccounted for in this study. This would be something which leads both to a 




performance. In fact, this could be compatible with the residual negative relationship 
between 'Affective commitment' and 'Leader support' (Models 16, 16b, 36 and 36b). If 
some underlying phenomenon leads to both higher affective value commitment and 
lower employee performance, this underlying phenomenon could also explain why 
affectively value committed employees, when controlling for a host of other causes, 
tend to rate leader support as lower. It may be that such employees are in a greater 
need and/or receive less of leader support.  It may equally further be noted that the 
tendency toward a negative relationship between employee performance in terms of 
internal innovativity and both leader support and coworker support (Models 48-49b) 
appears at least logically compatible with such an interpetation. However, this 
interpretation would alter the simple unidirectional interpretation of the relationship 
between leader support and affective value commitment and would thus also in more 
than one way change the interpretation of the overall exploratively suggested model 
(Figure 4). Here is one example of a potential violation of the assumptions of 
unidirectional relationships generally required in regression analyses and most often 
adopted in social scientific research (compare March and Sutton, 1997, p. 701). 
In summary, concerning the relationships between the attitudinal phenomena and 
employee and organizational performance the above seem to involve a blend of 
tautological, ad hoc and incoherent explanations in some contrast to the simple ones 
proposed by either our original or extended theorizing. However, we cannot conceive 
of better interpretations of the results. In the last instance, although partial 
interpretations of our results seem to make sense, the complexity of the relationships 
appears as a lack of overall completely coherent and clearly plausible interpretations, 
in particular if we try to to account also for the weaker tendencies towards significant 
relationships. This bears some witness to potential problems of making too simplistic 
causal interpretations of the individual relationships. Quite plausibly these 
relationships are simply very complex and may in most circumstances involve 
interesting multi-directional causal influences for which there are considerable 
difficulties to provide adequate quantitative empirical evidence (March and Sutton, 
1997, pp. 700-701).  
The fact that results like the ones presented and interpreted above are possible seem to 
reflect certain ambiguities concerning the constructs and/or their relationships, even if 
not necessarily unresolvable/unintelligible contradictions and/or paradoxes. Such 
ambiguities/contradictions/paradoxes can only be pursued by further research. When 
evaluating the indications of such ambiguities we are however clearly also faced with 
questions of the validity and reliability of our measures, constructs and data as well as 
the adequacy of the models. In retrospect, we may say that what else than such 
difficulties and ambiguities could be expected given the current state of theorizing, 
available measurement instruments and the a priori conceivable complexity of 
organizational behavior, its causes and its outcomes. It may be argued that simpler 
analyses where we e.g. analyze the intermediate constructs one at the time give a 
better picture of the relationships with the outcome variables since the intermediate 
attitudes may not be competing phenomena. However, the complexity as outlined 
above indicates that it in many cases appear to be difficult to justify, on the basis of 
such simplified analyses, that a certain variable is really significantly related to 
another in a certain way.We have argued that such more simplified analyses really 




Finally, in addition to the questionable nature of the measures/variables, we have to 
bear in mind that all the relationships concerning the organizational performance 
variables in particular are clearly very tentative and inconclusive, not the least due to 
the methodological problems (e.g. number of observations per organization/levels of 
analyses/appropriateness (and lack!) of controls [see section 7.3, 7.5 and 8.2.6]). 
However, at the same time it is not implausible that the complex and ambiguous 
relationships noted above are what also other research will meet to the extent that it 
pays more attention to potential heterogeneity and simultaneity biases than what 
seems to have been the standard in studies of these phenomena.  
On the whole, the arguments/analyses/results/interpretations in thesis thus also 
function as a challenge to quantitative organizational research in terms of questioning 





10.1 SUMMARY OF THE THESIS 
In section 1.4 we noted the need to synthesize the fragmented conceptual and 
empirical literature on HRM and its relation to organizational performance. As one of 
three more specific aims of the present thesis we stated the attempt to situate HRM 
(research), including our own research, within a larger ongoing ethical-
epistemological-ontological debate. The two further stated aims were to work out a 
conceptualization of a potentially influential and ethically defensible understanding of 
HRM as well as to conduct an explorative empirical test of the developed 
conceptualization of HRM. 
In chapter 2 we took issue with the wideranging debates concerning the larger context 
of HRM and research on organizations in general. Considering the "dramatic 
epistemological turmoil" (McKinley and Mone, 1998, p. 169) facing the 
organizational researcher, we tried not to proceed "blissfully unaware of the post-
empiricist philosophical debates" (Willmott, 1997, p. 322). This involved developing 
an understanding and interpretation of the justifications and implications of the 
complex epistemological and ontological arguments related to the field of 
social/organization science. Thus we tried to justify our quantitative empirical-
analytic study without falling prey to the accusation of showing no "indication of any 
engagement with debates that question the assumptions upon which it rests" (ibid., p. 
336). We tried to explicate an understanding of the pursuit of (empirical) knowledge 
according to which one should not expect the "turmoil" to come to an end, the dust to 
settle, and one correct epistemological point of view to emerge. However, the 
explicated understanding may in the longer run contribute to settling some of the 
epistemological-ontological dust and turmoil, i.e. that arising from the fight over 
universal dualisms, dichotomies and schools of thought. Thus in a sense the 
explicated view may contribute to the "Entzauberung" of the (social) scientific world.  
In arguing for such "Entzauberung" we largely referred to and adopted Rorty’s 
understanding of philosophy and inquiry (sections 2.1 - 2.5). Another recent account 
of such "Entzauberung" in terms of the end of metaphysics can be found in Wheeler 
(2000e, 2000f and 2000g).To be a naturalist as suggested by Rorty means that  
“[w]hat is lost is everything that makes it possible to draw a 
philosophically interesting distinction between explanation and 
understanding, or between explanation and interpretation…The effect is to 
modulate philosophical debate from a methodologico-ontological key into 
an ethico-political key…now one is debating what purposes are worth 
bothering to fulfill, which are more worthwhile than others, rather than 
which purposes the nature of humanity or of reality obliges us to have” 
(Inquiry as Recontextualization, 1991, pp. 109-110).  
In our interpretation this does not concern only philosophy but also science at large. 
We thus argued largely with Rorty for the irrelevance for empirical social science of 
what could be called "philosophy as ornamentations" (Rorty, 1998d, p. 64).  
Somewhat disturbed by the arguments within the debate on incommensurability in 
organization studies, claiming that the fact of incommensurability has serious 




compromise" (Burrelll, 1996, p. 650), we applied the explicated neo-pragmatist 
understanding to the arguments underlying such claims in section 2.6. Our 
conclusions were that meta(physical)-level incommensurability is simply 
ornamentational, and that does not yet seem to be any interesting case of theoretical 
level incommensurability in organization studies, and that there are no overriding 
arguments concerning the simple plea for a broadly hermeneutical and rational 
attitude in organization studies. 
The explicated view also entailed the contingent nature of methodology (section 2.7). 
We argued that the epistemological and ontological justification and evaluation of 
empirical scientific research, including conceptualizations and methodologies, largely 
should be conducted with reference to prior (ethical-political-pragmatical) 
"knowledge" and proposed research goals very specific to the field of research in 
question. We agreed with Rorty who suggests that we move “everything over from 
epistemology and metaphysics to cultural politics” (1998c, p. 57). According to this 
understanding the epistemological and ontological debates should ultimately concern 
the extent to which the results of inquiry (or earlier inquiries) help us cope with 
reality, i.e. help us successfully act and speak in interaction with each other and 
nature. The continuous complexity and openness of social scientific research is 
largely due to the fact that very few types of social inquiries in general have been able 
to more unequivocally enable us to cope with reality, although there certainly in most 
fields of social inquiry have been what some scholars conceive of as " exemplary 
problem solutions" (Hoyningen-Huené, 1993, pp. 159-162). The explicated 
epistemological-ontological understanding thus leaves us with a complicated and open 
debate concerning social inquiry, not only because of the ethico-political dimensions 
of it. An important part of the debate also always concerns the pragmatical "nitty-
gritties" in terms of more specific epistemological norms (e.g. related to statistical or 
interpretational guidelines) by which researchers justify empirical claims to 
knowledge. At least the statistical norms are relatively independent of their ethico-
political aspects.  
We ended by arguing in section 2.8 that the question of how organization studies 
should be understood and conducted, i.e. in a sense the question of "one meaning, 
many meanings or no meaning at all" (Czarniawska, 1995, p. 21) is an open affair.  
Thus in the explicated understanding there is little reason to expect that general 
philosophical insights would have any immediate and universal, and in particular 
necessary, consequences for empirical social science. However, inspiration for the 
development of specific theories and empirical research and a deeper understanding of 
the complexities of (social) scientific research, as well as philosophy itself, can 
arguably be sought in professional philosophical reflections. In particular, we agreed 
with Wallgren (1997) that philosophical reflection can (and should) promote the 
"Socratic ideal" (ibid., p. 46) understood loosely as the ideal of "discursive 
accountability" (ibid., p. 129). Facing tremendous complexities and thus both more 
legitimate needs and less legitimate temptations to simplify, this ideal is arguably a 
continuous challenge also for the organizational research community483. 
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After the excursion into the landscapes of philosophy, we continued to reflect both 
upon possibilities and obstacles concerning research on HRM. We began chapter 3 by 
briefly considering the history of thinking about employee management and the 
relationship between HRM and its "ancestor" personnel administration. In chapter 3 
we also reflected upon earlier theorizations of HRM´s influence. We considered 
arguments about the more detailed complexity, role and possible mechanisms of 
HRM´s influence, including the debates on the distinction between the universalistic 
view of HRM (i.e. HRM as "best practice") and the point of view of strategic fit (i.e. 
the more instrumentalist contingency perspective). On the basis of epistemological, 
theoretical and ethical considerations we developed a general understanding of these 
perspectives arguably allowing us to study their compatibility and potential synthesis 
in terms of what we have called strategic soft HRM. This understanding entailed some 
specific implications for the operationalization of the HRM system construct. In 
summary, we argued (in section 8.3.2.3) that our (operationalization of the) HRM 
system should (1) capture HRM at both the levels of individual practices and the 
common system, (2) account for variation at the level of implementation, (3) 
incorporate perceived relevant forms of embeddedness in the management 
infrastructure including the potential influence of internal/external fit, (4) take into 
consideration the point of view of employees, (5) and thus capture the levels and 
dimensions where causality of strategic soft HRM ultimately should reside. Thus, we 
argue that our HRM system variable should show some, albeit undifferentiated, 
sensitivity to all the different levels of HRM practices identified by Becker and 
Gerhardt in terms of system architecture, policy alternatives and practice process 
(1996, p. 786). 
In chapter 4 we considered the currently popular theoretical framework in terms of the 
resource-based view and concluded that with certain revisions it may function at the 
most as a suggestive background theory. We argued for the need of much more 
specific HRM theorizing. 
Subsequently, in chapter 5 we considered the fairly intensive debate on ethical aspects 
of HRM, i.e. the values incorporated in the "HRM" movement. We tried to situate 
mainstream HRM research, in particular our own conceptualization/study, by 
acknowledging and reflecting upon many open questions with reference to the nature 
of HRM and its larger societal context. At the same time as we found many of these 
debates important, some of the value based critique seemed to be involved in at least 
similar simplifying rhetorics as the HRM enthusiasts engage in. We argued that our 
conceptualization of the role of HRM could at least begin to incorporate some of the 
more specific intra-organizational ethical aspects of HRM.  
As an arguably regressive and fairly widely acknowledged development of the 
(largely global) societal context of HRM, we noted the (renewed) "division of labour" 
between core employees and lower skilled employees with diminishing legal rights 
(section 5.1.1). Hancock called the former group a "neo-feudal version of the (male) 
vassal class" (1997, p. 104). However, this question is, we argued, somewhat although 
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discursive accountability in any form which depends on foundations but rather on a general and 




not completely separate from the question of what organizational influences strategic 
soft HRM might have.  
In section 5.2 we argued that the most severe critique of HRM may arise from 
evidence of what HRM does to human beings and societies. Already this is a 
complicated question but even if it could be agreed upon there are no easy answers 
basically since there are no easily determinable optimal trade offs in face of probably 
unavoidable dilemmas such as those identifiable by the theorizings of Marx, Foucault 
and Weber:  
“Just as, for Marx, capital alienates while it produces, organizes life within 
the workplace and atomizes life in civil society, so, for Foucault, 
power[/knowledge] simultaneously empowers and represses, and, for 
Weber, rationalization simultaneously increases efficiency and 
dehumanizes” (Marsden and Townley, 1996, p. 671). 
Our general conclusion was that already because of the complicated ethical aspects 
surrounding HRM there is nothing like a normal scientific language which researchers 
in HRM can unproblematically adopt (section 5.3). 
In chapter 6 we then reviewed earlier empirical studies of HRM´s influence and found 
these to leave many questions open with reference to the conceptual arguments found 
in the literature. We established the general fragmented nature of this research and the 
more concrete difficulties in interpreting its results. In particular, we justified a need 
for empirical studies incorporating the employee perspective and potential 
mechanisms of HRM´s influence. 
On the bases of all these considerations we ended up, in chapter 7, with what we 
argued to be a largely defensible and a priori plausible conceptualization of HRM´s 
potential influence enabling tentative quantitative empirical testing. The general 
structure of this conceptualization is largely consistent with the one suggested by 
Guest (1997). In chapter 7 we also developed our explicit hypotheses. This involved 
reviews of the more specific literature on the different intermediate and ultimate 
elements of our conceptualization. We defined these elements and tried to justify their 
potential causal role in the proposed theorization. In sections 7.3-7.5 we also related 
our conceptualization to some more specific theoretical-methodological complexities 
and critical arguments. 
In chapter 8 we presented the sample for the empirical study. We summarized the 
reasons for conducting the empirical study with reference to a set of "knowledge 
intensive" organizations within the consulting industry. In this chapter we also 
developed the control variables based upon reviews of the partly complex previous 
literature concerning the outcomes postulated by our model. We presented the 
measurement instruments and tried to specify the nature of the more complex 
constructs related to the suggested model. In chapter 8 we also conducted some 
validation analyses the results of which we interpreted to reflect a more general 
problem of valid constructs in organization science. Nevertheless, we also argued that 
the validation analyses indicated a relatively satisfactory validity of our constructs.  
In chapter 9 we finally set out to analyze, present and interpret our empirical data with 
reference to the hypothesized relationships. The empirical findings with reference to 




attitudinal constructs were summarized and discussed in sections 9.3.1 and 9.3.4. The 
unique relationships between strategic fit and the intermediate attitudes were 
summarized and discussed in section 9.3.5. Section 9.5 summarized the findings 
concerning the relationships between HRM, the attitudinal constructs and both 
employee and organizational performance variables.  
Throughout the thesis we have tried to convey the tremendous complexities and many 
open questions with reference to this empirical research project. Thus we have 
specifically tried to understand the multitude of "issues of inference ambiguity" 
(March and Sutton, 1997, p. 704) and to walk the fine and arduous line in terms of 
balancing "[t]he simultaneous embrace of the possibility of knowledge and the 
difficulty of achieving it " (ibid, 1997, p. 704). 
10.2 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
In organization studies it is often arguably at least as difficult to find proper empirical 
evidence for conceptual arguments as it is to develop the arguments themselves, 
perhaps even more diffcult. The main motivation in this thesis has been concerned 
with the former project. However, this project necessitated an attempt to review and 
(largely) synthesize current/prior theorizing and empirical research. This turned out to 
be a very complex project in itself. 
We have tried to further theorizing in the field by arguing for some possible causal 
logics of the relationships between (strategic soft) HRM and organizational 
performance. We have also tried to test this theorization empirically while at the same 
time being attentive to the problems on the road to such a test (cf. Guest, 2001). We 
fully agree with the problem and have essentially answered no to the question of  
“whether the theory is sufficiently precise to point to the kind of empirical 
testing that results in convincing support or refutation” (ibid., p. 1094). 
In any case, the suggested model of HRM and its outcomes and the empirical test of it 
in this thesis appear to incorporate certain crucial elements that have been absent in 
most earlier research. Our HRM concept is arguably conceptually more sensitive to 
many of the complex (critical) debates around the phenomenon of HRM. Compared to 
most prior research the connections in our model are arguably conceptually tighter 
due to the inclusion of the postulated mechanisms of HRM's influence. 
Methodologically the connections are more discriminative than much earlier research 
also in terms of the included control variables. We have also been able to exclude 
common method errors concerning at least some of our focal theoretical variables. 
Finally, we have provided some initial statistical tests of the possible indirect effects 
of HRM. 
While having acknowledged and situated many assumptions upon which our 
empirical-analytic study rests, in the empirical part of this thesis we have thus 
attempted to test a model which on the whole seems in line with many (implicit and 
explicit) arguments in the field. In particular, both through the theorization and the 
choice of sample, we have tried to be sensitive to what has (implicitly or explicitly) 
been conceived as some “fundamental principles” in the literature. Boxall and Purcell 




“When we stand back and consider the broad tradition of research on 
employment relations, there is no doubt that, ceteribus paribus, all firms 
are better off when they pursue certain principles...The most fundamental 
principle in labour management is the ongoing need to align management 
and worker interests in firms, at least at the level of a contract that meets 
the base-line requirements of both parties...In any context where workers 
have some labour market choice...this principle becomes more 
apparent...[W]e can be confident that organizational processes that build 
trust between management and labour will ultimately deliver better 
outcomes for both parties...And it is always helpful if management delivers 
on its promises: any major gap between HR policy and HR practice will 
eventually demoralize if not antagonize, the workforce” (1999b, p. 192).  
The claims made by Boxall and Purcell may be true although "base-line 
requirements" and "better outcomes" are not particularly precise expressions. Our 
study has tried to test whether we, while paying attention to certain manifestations of 
these principles, can find empirical evidence, not only for HRM's general role in 
“delivering better outcomes for both parties”, but also for HRM´s claimed central 
importance for competitive advantage, i.e. better organizational performance. The 
latter is a somewhat different question but arguably the one most often put forward in 
the HRM discourse. 
According to Boxall and Purcell, the above principles imply that  
“management must nurture resources and processes that bring about high 
mutuality with talented workers and must similarly invest in employee and 
team development” (1999, p. 196).  
Our study has tried to be sensitive to this corollary of the above mentioned principles 
and the arguable fact that what should give rise to such mutuality, if anything in terms 
of HRM, would seem to be practices which are appreciated by employees. An 
additional general argument which this study has tried to be sensitive to is that, partly 
based upon the resource based view, “top management´s codified policy positions are 
unlikely sources of advantage because of their public visibility” (Boxall and Purcell, 
1999, p. 196). They are also unlikely sources of advantage because policies are not 
enough. They arguably have to be adequately implemented in some such way as 
discussed in chapter 3.  
Thus, our conceptualization and operationalizations have tried to be sensitive to the 
arguments that, despite the fact that HRM principles may be universal, we need to 
assess the adequacy of the design and implementation of the practices by their 
contextual (idiosyncratic) adequacy. This point is also noted by e.g. Wood (1999, p. 
378). We consider the fact that the data on the HRM practices were collected from 
general employees, and that it thus should reflect these employees’ perceptions of the 
implemented aspects of the practices, as an important methodological element of our 
study. In comparison to managers responsible for HRM, general employees ought at 
least to have more limited psychological biases in terms of providing too positive a 
view of the organizational HRM system where it could be so rationalized due to good 
organizational performance.  
Finally, we have assumed that better outcomes for employees as well as for 




empowerment, and/or affective (organizational) value commitment and/or affective 
(organizational) continuance commitment and/or organizational citizenship behavior. 
The results of our analyses are in line with earlier research in so far as we could find 
evidence for a fairly strong direct relationship between both strategic fit and 
organizational performance as well as a more universalistic notion of HRM and 
organizational performance. In general, the results of the present study are in line with 
Guest’s argument that  
“[a]s we move on through the remaining stages in the model, we would 
expect the impact of HRM to be progressively smaller” (Guest, 1997, p. 
269). 
We have found some indicative evidence of HRM´s influence on the above mentioned 
originally postulated intermediate attitudes and thus on HRM´s ability to deliver what 
we assume to be better outcomes for employees. However, the results indicate that we 
cannot understand HRM as a clearly sufficient direct cause of the postulated attitudes, 
with the exception of organizational citizenship behavior. Rather, we found evidence 
for a possible mediational role of social support related phenomena or what could be 
called a social architecture of organizations. This appears consistent with Guest 
(1999). 
Nevertheless, the degree to which differences in HRM can explain variation in 
organizational performance in particular seems still to remain a somewhat speculative 
hypothesis. These results appear rather consistent with Ramsay et al. (2000). Despite 
relatively weak controls for alternative explanations of variation in organizational 
performance as well as the potentially serious common method errors between HRM 
sophistication and the intermediate variables as well as the employee and 
organizational performance variables this study produced only some weakly 
significant and statistically ambiguous evidence of an explained indirect relationship 
between HRM sophistication and organizational performance. This weak evidence 
should clearly be corroborated in particular with more controls for other influences on 
organizational performance and less common method errors before too much energy 
is invested in it. 
Our analyses provide some indicative evidence in line with the suspicions that the 
often reported significant positive relationships between different forms of HRM and 
organizational performance are best understood as either spurious relations and/or 
effects of reverse causations. The study indicates that such spurious relations and/or 
reverse causations may explain at least an overwhelming part of the often found 
positive correlations between HRM and organizational performance. However, our 
analyses cannot distinguish between the corroborated direct relation(s) between HRM 
and organizational performance understood as a result of spurious correlation, as an 
effect of reverse causation, as due to some unidentified but isolable mechanisms484, or 
as "being a result of emergent powers arising from the combination of other objects 
but irreducible to their respective powers" (Sayer, 1992, p. 235). In any case, our 
results indicate a considerable (continued) challenge to HRM researchers in terms of 
                                               
484 Although we were unaware of this at the time of writing this study, an alternative theorization has 




finding a theorization/population which would provide evidence for an explained 
distinctive relationship between HRM and organizational performance. The challenge 
is to provide convincing evidence of some form of mechanism(s) of HRM as a 
sufficient cause. Arguably, only by meeting this challenge can researchers 
convincingly empirically establish HRM as an important cause of superior 
organizational performance.  
Keenoy has argued that “what we see also varies according to where we, quite 
literally, stand” (Keenoy, 1999, p. 11). However, one purpose of science is arguably 
to make it more likely that, whereas what we try to see might depend on where “we 
stand”, what we can continue to see / where we can continue to stand, does not. But 
of course, in the absence both of a priori solutions to methodological/epistemological 
problems and "crucial tests" or the possibilities of simple falsifications, pursuing this 
purpose is not clearcut and straightforward. Nevertheless, this study has mainly served 
a critical function in that it seems to confirm the need for theoretical and conceptual 
development. It also renders some of the rhetorics in the field rather suspect. At the 
same time, the study was arguably able to “exploratively confirm” some of the ideas 
of current theorizing in particular with reference to some significant lower level 
outcomes of HRM485.  
Limitations of the study. The explicit results of this study must be taken with 
considerable caution because of the many uncertaintes already discussed throughout 
this thesis. In summary, perhaps the main uncertainties relate to the sample which 
may include less than desirable variation in many variables (although arguably in line 
with much earlier research), the low number of observations per organization, the 
exploratory measures and potential unaccounted measurement errors, the exploratory 
constructs and the theorization itself. As already noted, the theorization has been 
motivated by an effort to take into account at least the basic arguments presented so 
far among researchers. However, it is liable to all the open questions with reference to 
the nature of the HRM practices, business strategy, HR strategy, the HRM system and 
relevant intermediate and ultimate outcomes. It is important to notice the explorative 
nature of this study. We introduce new conceptualizations and operationalizations of 
HRM practices, of internal/external fit as well as parts of the whole theoretical 
framework of the (potential) mechanisms of the (potential) influences of HRM on 
organizational performance.  
An obvious and important limitation of this study was already alluded to, i.e. that 
there might be other mechanisms (e.g. more industry and/or organization specific 
mechanisms) than psychological empowerment, affective value commitment and 
affective continuance commitment, organizational citizenship behavior and/or the 
general quality/efficiency and/or innovativity of individual employee performance 
which might account for HRM’s correlation with organizational performance. The 
results of this study in no way rule out such possibilities. However, one great 
                                               
485 The results of the tentative analyses (not shown in the thesis) where we adjusted for common 
method errors were not promising with reference to these relationships either. The method we used to 
adjust for the common method errors, described in section 7.5, would however require more 




difficulty in theorizing about and testing such mechanisms is the lack of validated 
intermediate constructs and measurement instruments.  
Another reason for caution in interpreting the results of this study is due to the fact 
that although we by our choice of sample could ameliorate certain methodological 
problems concerning levels of analysis involved in much earlier research (see section 
7.5 above), the data are based on organizations of a fairly small average size. It may 
be that the real challenge and potential influence of HRM becomes (more) apparent 
only in larger organizations. Finally, as so often, readers should be reminded of the 
fact that the empirical study was a cross-sectional one and that any causal conclusions 
thus are particularly tentative even as we included several mediating as well as control 
variables. 
Future research. Researchers should be able to exclude the possibility that there are 
some exogenous phenomena which might account for any postulated relationships. In 
the case of research on HRM-firm performance links this may in the last instance 
imply models of great complexity. But if so, then it seems the only way to go if we 
are serious about studying the phenomena with any quantitative scientific aspirations. 
Simplistic quantitative social research misses one of the crucial elements of scientific 
activity, i.e. that of putting hypotheses to critical tests (Putnam, 1974/1991, pp. 123-
127). Thus we agree with Boxall and Purcell, with reference to their critique of much 
quantitative research on HRM and performance that  
“[a]t the end of the day, snap-shot surveys of single respondents which 
produce sophisticated statistics – but only by glossing over the 
....complexity of management processes in firms – have to be treated very 
circumspectively” (1999b, p. 192).  
In fact, such studies arguably represent empirical science only as ornamentation. 
Continued simplistic quantitative approaches would imply that quantitative research 
would incorporate little which would positively and much which would negatively 
differentiate it from “story-telling” (Czarniawska, 1995, 1997, 1999)486.  
                                               
486 In line with what we have argued earlier, the difference between careful story-telling based on 
qualitative data and carefully conducted quantitative research employing validated measurement 
instruments and adequate control variables is not that only the latter allows us to successfully mirror the 
objective order of the (social) world (see chapter 2 above). These two broad forms of inquiry simply 
represent different methods of trying to come to a more general agreement on a fruitful understanding 
of social phenomena where the quantitative approaches usually more explicitly (and more 
problematically) aim for empirical findings of a more generalizable nature. With reference to 
qualitative studies it very seldom happens that independent researchers use the same data as another 
researcher in order to see if the interpretations/results of the latter can be "replicated"/questioned. 
Rarely do we even see two or more independent qualitative studies which explicitly try to corroborate 
the findings of another. Although, as noted earlier, there is much room for improvement, this can at 
least in principle be more easily done with quantitative approaches. Thus, more straightforward 
agreement or disagreement is at least in principle somewhat easier achieved by using quantitative 
research approaches since these approaches more easily allow for independent researchers to carry out 
the "same" study in the "same" or some other setting. With quantitative hypothetico deductive 
approaches there is simply somewhat less room for subjective interpretations/ad hoc uses of data and 
they are easier to expose even if the tested theorizations would not be capable of very longterm 
predictions. Thus, if possible on the basis of a believed "familiarity" (Rorty, 1980, p. 321) with the 
research object, quantitative approaches always seem recommendable in order to explore the 




There are clearly limits to simplifying quantitative models. We have tried to point to 
such limits both by conceptual arguments and reviews of earlier empirical evidence 
concerning the elements in our model. There are however also limits to "a reductionist 
regress" and/or an "interactionist regress" (Sayer, 1992, p. 183). In any case we do 
agree with Boxall and Purcell, who with reference to the contingency based research 
on HRM, argue that  
“[w]hile we should try to avoid contingency models that are ´too thick´ - 
throwing in everything plus the kitchen sink – we do need to evolve 
models that explain most of the important connections” ( 1999, p. 188). 
The problem is to decide upon what is thick enough to convince not to mention the 
problem that researchers may have inadequate a priori conceptions of “the important 
connections”. In general we do not deny the many problems with quantitative social 
science discussed e.g. by Sayer (ibid., pp. 175-203). However, in distinction to Sayer 
we have in this thesis tried to argue more integratively that research should involve 
both idiographic and quantitative approaches, in so far as it is possible for each and 
every research topic. We have tried to argue against critiques, such as e.g. Sayer's, 
that quantitative research "implies" the assumptions of "the universality of closed 
systems, a regularity theory of causation [at least in any simplistic form; added], an 
atomistic ontology (theory of what exists) and an equivalence of explanation and 
prediction" (ibid., p. 199). Nevertheless, we have also acknowledged that quantitative 
social science at least concerning many of the more complex organizational 
relationships may be a futile activity simply because of the dynamic complexity of 
social phenomena. 
As is the case in particular with quantitative "snap-shot surveys" (Boxall and Purcell, 
1999, p. 192), we argue that also any more idiographic (even longitudinal) studies, 
perhaps based on interviews on the opinions and/or observations of a lot of 
stakeholders within and outside organizations (for an example, see e.g. Boxall, 1999a) 
have to be treated with at least similar circumspection. However we clearly do need 
more hermeneutical studies such as the latter in order to further our understanding of 
what people management in fact may accomplish and how such accomplishments 
might take place. Such hermeneutical studies should also focus on interpretational 
difficulties that quantitative studies may be argued to give rise to. More hermeneutical 
studies may e.g. critically (empirically) probe (generalizing) assumptions of 
quantitative inquiries and thus open up avenues for more sophisticated forms of 
quantitative research to the extent that it indeed is possible487.  
                                                                                                                                      
possible. Research on such topics will thus always have a harder time to convince. At the same time 
narratives of more or less unique historical events or processes difficult to tap with quantitative 
methods can offer what at least is believed to be much intuitive insight and thus at least provide 
inspiration and generate discussion. In this sense at least, narratives may be seen as more relevant than 
most quantitative research efforts. Further, to the extent that several researchers would study and 
interpret more or less the same unique events/data in more or less the same way, as is arguably at least 
sometimes the case for example in studies of history, purely idiographic research could also gain 
considerably in epistemic credibility. 
487 In our opinion, for social scientific studies, including organization and management studies, to be 
convincing we would thus need both adequate qualitative and quantitative evidence from many 




Based on this study we can fully agree with Boxall and Purcell that in terms of any 
potentially substantial significance of (some sort of) HRM, detectable among the 
noice of other relevant influences, considerable theoretical development is still 
needed. Boxall and Purcell argue that  
“Rather than a narrow focus on a limited set of tired constructs from 
personnel psychology, we need a broad conception of HR strategy which 
embraces the full implications of work and employment systems. HR 
strategy must be linked to other key dimensions of management and be 
understood dynamically” (Boxall and Purcell, 1999, p. 198). 
Also Evans argues that “[t]here is increasing agreement that a narrow functional 
concept of HRM focused on competitive advantage has become stale” (1999, p. 335) 
488. However, we remain sceptical of continued definitions of HRM as including 
“anything and everything associated with the management of employment relations in 
the firm” (Boxall and Purcell, 1999, p. 184). This seems to us an effective block 
towards progress in this field of research. At least conceptions of this " anything and 
everything " are far from developed to a degree which would enable them to be 
quantitatively seriously empirically testable. In any case, the development of fruitful 
models of HRM is no easy task since  
“the results of two decades of studies are disappointing. Wright and 
Sherman (1998) summarize well the reasons: the lack of good theory, 
inconsistent or unspecified models of fit, the absence of theory on what is 
´strategy´and ´HRM´, the inability to develop good constructs or to 
measure them, inconsistencies in the measurement of performance, 
temporal influences that mean that the process of ´matching´may be too 
iterative and complex to be captured by crude study and theory” (Evans, 
1999, p. 327).  
We have acknowledged and reflected upon these problems and nevertheless tried to 
design a study which would overcome at least some of them. While keeping to a 
rather narrow definition of the immediate domain of HRM (much in line with earlier 
research), we have tried to move away from the straightforward “tired constructs from 
personnel management” and open them up to (loose) interpretations in terms of their 
“architectural” embeddedness in the organizational (management) infrastructure. 
What we have thus also tried to do in this study is to use loosely defined measures of 
HRM practices which in a non-normative way should be sensitive to how 
organizations deal with at least some aspects of a host of the “dualistic forces” 
connected to HRM489. We have thus tried to test something which approaches a 
                                                                                                                                      
that we should keep a general sceptical attitude towards any type of research related to them. In the 
social sciences the sceptical attitude should be even more prevalent and present than what can be 
considered appropriate for the scientific enterprise in general (Giddens, 1991, p. 21). 
488 Mueller is critical towards the whole idea of understanding HRM as a sufficient cause and argues 
that researchers should instead look for evidence of HRM as a necessary condition for relative superior 
performance (1996, p. 777). This is however a very rigorous condition. At least quantitative research is 
only suitable for finding evidence for sufficient causes of variation in dependent variables. 
489 Evans argues, largely echoing Legge (1995) and Noon (1992), that HRM confronts dualistic forces 
in the form of “centralization and decentralization, team-work and individual accountability, the need 
for change and the need for continuity, long-term vision and short-term performance management” 




conceptualization closer to the recent arguments within the HRM (related) research 
community. Despite this we were only somewhat ambiguously able to explain a small 
part of the apparent direct relation between HRM and organizational performance. 
The indicative evidence of this direct relationship being explicable (at least in one 
context) in terms of the influence that HRM sophistication may have on psychological 
empowerment and this in turn on employee performance in terms of quality/efficiency 
may be seen as an indication of some promising aspects of the theorization pursued in 
this thesis. In addition to more straightforward replication studies it would also seem 
of interest to test (something like) the developed conceptualization and 
operationalization of the HRM system and the rest of the model in settings less 
favorable for strategic soft HRM approaches (Legge, 1995a, p. 67). 
However, despite some promising results this study mainly raises (and confirms) a 
number of critical questions for future research. First, as has been noted also in earlier 
publications, there is a lot of work to do in terms of specifying/validating constructs 
and measurement instruments. There is also clearly a need of further theorizations and 
studies on the relations between HRM and intermediate constructs which could 
explain HRM's organizational influence. It would seem to be of particular interest to 
try to find better/more relevant intermediate variables tapping the work performance 
of employees as well as better organizational performance variables than the ones 
used in this thesis. In the current study these variables are arguably the weakest links 
both conceptually and operationally.  
The current study may also be taken to indicate that it may be more fruitful for future 
research to postulate models where HRM is understood as a sufficient cause only of 
some assumed organizational prerequisites of superior organizational performance 
rather than either a sufficient or a necessary cause of the latter itself. On this 
interpretation the current thesis, both in terms of the reviews of earlier conceptual and 
empirical research as well as in terms of the empirical study itself, would indicate that 
the research community simply does not seem to manifest the knowledge required for 
claiming (or even fruitfully studying) organizational performance effects of HRM. In 
addition, as already alluded to, it may be that any potential influence that HRM 
nevertheless may have on organizational performance takes such a multitude of routes 
that isolating any distinct variables will always turn out as insufficient manifestations 
of such an influence.  
"[W]e must always be alert to the possibility of the event being a result of 
emergent powers arising from the combination of other objects but 
irreducible to their respective powers; in such cases, the method of causal 
disaggregation will not work" (Sayer, 1992, p. 235). 
Concluding remarks. The sad fact seems to be that so many if not most of the more 
complex specific empirical research attempts which generate some larger interest 
among researchers in organization science seem to tend to become stale (compare 
Evans, 1999, p. 335) rather than progress in any more substantial and cumulative 
fashion. Perhaps this is as it should be. Science can in this way in the long run at least 
fulfill its critical/questioning function. But the difficulties in achieving corroborated 





When a more specific theme becomes stale in organization science it is usually a 
combined result of the fact simply that new more “exiting” (more or less) speculative 
themes emerge, and/or organizational processes have moved on and/or the fact that 
despite promises and early enthusiasm research has been unable to convincingly (and 
fairly quickly in a scientific perspective) show evidence which would back up the 
early enthusiasm. And so the organizational “scientific” dance tends to continue on 
many of its fronts by everybody (perhaps too fast) abandoning apparently sinking 
ships. This perhaps concerns in particular research related to such complex questions 
as organizational performance. As Evans argues, “[t]he field of human resource 
management needs to proactively get on the edge...” (1999, p. 336). We only have a 
slight worry about where this edge is going. It almost seems to be so afraid of cutting 
itself that it is constantly escaping (itself). The more consultancy related research in 
this field becomes, it may also return to itself by adopting new forms of emperor’s 
cloths, thus following the principles of “guru theory” laid out by Huczynski (1993). 
March and Sutton argue that  
"Researchers secure compensation and attention as consultants to 
organizations, as lecturers to organizational audiences, or as authors of 
popular books on improving organizational performance. These occasions 
and constituences provide funding and legitimacy to organizational 
researchers. They encourage researchers to create and espouse speculations 
about predicting and controllling organizational performance outcomes. 
And their enthusiasm for speculation about performance differences seems 
largely unaffected by a long history of the continuous overturning of old 
enthusiasms with new ones. In such a climate, it is not overly surprising 
that organizational researchers become courtiers of the naked emperor" 
(1997, p. 703).  
The reference to “overturning” here should not be understood as anything along the 
lines of (naive) Popperian falsification because there arguably are no such 
overturnings even in principle (Putnam, 1974/1991, pp. 123-127). More plausibly 
overturning should be understood as the historically notorious inability to provide 
convincing evidence for such enthusiasms and, based on this, abandonment of old 
ideas. Notwithstanding the fact that there might often be good reasons for such 
abandonings, it is difficult to determine whether the “dance” may not also be 
enhanced by the lack of commitment to certain basic “enthusiasms” (Kuhn, 1991, p. 
144; see the concluding section in chapter 5 above) and/or the “collective 
preoccupation with theoretical novelty” (DiMaggio, 1995, p. 393). In any case, HRM 
theorizing seems forced to develop and in certain senses “get on the edge” and maybe 
reduce its ambitions with reference to the explanandums. It is however quite plausible 
that any more or less cumulative stream of empirical quantitative research in social 
science, including HRM research (even with reduced ambitions), will always 
ultimately have to surrender to the pure (dynamic) complexity of social phenomena 
and/or the lack of (temporally extended) valid constructs necessary for more holistic 
quantitative (corroborative) research. 
Organization science, as perhaps most of social science, seems "in fact" to be best 
equipped for either providing temporally and spatially fairly limited descriptive rather 
than explanatory evidence and/or making interesting but fairly abstract arguments 
based directly upon conceptual reflection/reasoning/experience/intuition only. The 
latter arguments are of a kind which are not very likely to lead to any general 




inspiration and generating further research and discussion. Excellent examples of such 
reasoning would perhaps be the arguments for a dilemma between exploitation 
(efficiency) and exploration (adaptiveness) (March, 1994, pp. 51-55). Another could 
be the problem of differentiation and integration (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). The 
above mentioned "fact" can perhaps be understood as a partial cause of  one of the 
dangers for organizational science identified by March and Sutton as "the terrors of 
claiming unjustifiable knowledge" (1997, p. 704). However, it may not be “terror” but 
rather the share difficulty of arriving at justified and fruitful knowledge backed up by 
convincing empirical evidence which "drives [many organizational scholars] from 
empirical discourse into the relatively safe activities of providing theorems, 
contemplating conundrums and writing poetry" (ibid., p. 704). In line with this, Snell 
et al. argue that 
“[p]roviding a blueprint for integrative [organizational] research is a far 
less difficult task than dealing with the operational and logistical hurdles 
that such an area of investigation inevitably involves” (1996, p. 84). 
In any case, it is evident that the “full” complexity of phenomena are impossible to 
take into consideration in organization (or any other) science. Therefore researchers 
always confront a need to argue for a legitimate reduction of this complexity. Such 
arguments are difficult and particularly difficult in social science. They are arguably 
always ethical-political-pragmatical.  
We have tried to explicate an understanding according to which any results of such 
reductions should not be viewed as necessarily "illusory" or as "only constructed". 
The use of the word 'mythology' seems to take e.g. Edwards close to the latter kind of 
view: 
"[R]epresentation, or fact-stating is dependent upon...the mythology of a 
culture [which is] taken for granted. However much the descriptions of a 
cultures mythology may appear to be representational, i.e. to be testable 
empirical propositions, they are not" (1985, pp. 176-177). 
As explicated in chapter 2, we agree with the claim that fact-stating is dependent on 
many things which have to be taken for granted while stating facts. In fact, a central 
aim of this thesis has been not only to claim and argue for this at an abstract level but 
also to show it more explicitly. However, we agree with Edwards on the claim about 
testability only to the extent that he, in the above citation, refers to unproblematically 
testable propositions, i.e. testable by an objective correspondence. In distinction to 
reaching such correspondence it is arguably always the case that 
"[g]iving grounds,...justifying the evidence, comes to an end; - but the end 
is not certain propositions striking us immediately as true, i.e., it is not a 
kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting which lies at the bottom of the 
language game" (Wittgenstein, 1953, sec. 204)490. 
Whatever lies at ”the bottom” of a language game (or regardless of whether there is 
such a bottom), as empirical research on HRM-performance links indicate, 
                                               
490 In fact, it may however be argued that Wittgenstein was not able to exclude the possibility that 




propositions about (causal) relations between social actions/phenomena even within a 
language game more or less "taken for granted" are hardly in a position to simply 
”strike us as true”. This is the case even if we understand 'true' (only) in the sense of 
any such propositions being scientifically justified, i.e. scientifically recommendable 
or endorsable (Rorty, 1991h, p. 128) and even after considerable attempts to justify 
them. In this perspective then, future research cannot but continuously try to face the 
challenge to simultaneously "embrace...the possibility of knowledge and the difficulty 
of achieving it" (March and Sutton, 1997, p. 704).   
We have, with Rorty, tried to to suggest that we should drop the whole issue of 
representation and instead look at language and scientific theories as tools either ”for 
acting” or ”for understanding”. Clealry, any kind of ”acting” within a language game, 
may always be of importance even if convincing scientific empirical evidence for the 
fruitfulness of it has not been produced. For all we know, such acting, in the form of 
some sort of HRM just as in the form of some sort of organization science may belong 
to what March and Sutton call "vital elements of community" (1997, p. 704) sustained 
by something else than such evidence.  
In any case, what forms HRM (research) ought to take seems to remain an open 
question due to a number of ethical, political and pragmatical reasons discussed 
throughout this thesis. We conclude that even if it may not be true that "[t]o explain 
[HRM] is to destroy it” (Keenoy and Anthony, 1992, p. 238), claims about 
organizational performance consequences of HRM largely seem, so far at least, to be 
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         Appendix 1 
 




SUPERIOR'S QUESTIONNAIRE  
    
 
Remember, your responses will be kept absolutely confidential. 
No information about your personal responses will be revealed 
to your subordinates, other colleagues or outside parties ! 
 
In case you would have any problems in answering any one of the questions, I 
would greatly appreciate it if you would call me (Mats Ehrnrooth) at ("out of your 
country"+) 358 400 456 940. 
 
Your name: __________________________ 
   
Your company: _______________________ 
 
The first section of this questionnaire concerns 
your evaluation of the performance of the three 
consultants you have chosen to participate in 
this research project. I need at least e.g. a first name in 




First consultant's name: ___________________ 
 
The above named consultant 
 
 
• often comes up with innovative suggestions 
for improving your company's products and 
services 
 
• is very efficient in his/her work  
 
• always produces high quality work 
 
• is very innovative in producing solutions to 
clients' problems 
 
• always meets or beats deadlines for 
completing work 
 
• performs his/her duties with unusually few 
errors  
 
• often comes up with innovative solutions to 
general organizational problems 
 
• never receives customer complaints of 
his/her work  
 
Using the scale listed below, 
please indicate, by circling a 
number,  the extent to which you  
DO NOT AGREE AT ALL (1) or  
STRONGLY AGREE (7)  
with how each statement describes 
the employee whose name is listed 
above 
 
Do not                                               Strongly 









1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 
1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 
1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 
1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 
1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 




Second consultant's name: ________________ 
 
The above named consultant 
 
 
• often comes up with innovative suggestions 
for improving your company's products and 
services 
 
• is very efficient in his/her work  
 
• always produces high quality work 
 
• is very innovative in producing solutions to 
clients' problems 
 
• always meets or beats deadlines for 
completing work 
 
• performs his/her duties with unusually few 
errors  
 
• often comes up with innovative solutions to 
general organizational problems 
 
• never receives customer complaints of 
his/her work  
 
 
Third consultant's name: _________________ 
 
The above named consultant 
 
• often comes up with innovative suggestions 
for improving your company's products and 
services 
 
• is very efficient in his/her work  
 
• always produces high quality work 
 
• is very innovative in producing solutions to 
clients' problems 
 
• always meets or beats deadlines for 
completing work 
 
• performs his/her duties with unusually few 
errors  
 
• often comes up with innovative solutions to 
general organizational problems 
 
• never receives customer complaints of 





Do not                                               Strongly 









1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 
1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 
1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 
1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 









1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 
1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 
1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 
1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 
1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 
1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 
     1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
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1. Think about the kind of employee behavior, 
competences and attitudes the company 
considers important for the achievement of its 
strategic business goals. The following 
practices in your company support these kinds 
of employee characteristica: 
 
• The kind of training and development 
programs the company provides 
consultants 
 
• The way the company involves its 
consultants in more general planning and 
decision making concerning internal 
company issues 
 
• The criteria for determining the 
consultant's bonus pay (or other additions 
to their base pay) 
 
• The content of the consultants' selection 
processes  
 
• The way the company allows its consultants 
autonomy in doing their job 
 
• The content of the consultants' 
performance appraisals 
 
• The content of company internal 
communication and information sharing 
 
• The content of the consultants' 







2. Think about the above mentioned practices as 
they are implemented in your company. They 
are well integrated in that they coherently 
support each other  
 
3. To your knowledge, the above mentioned 
practices in your company have been 
intentionally developed to support company 
strategy 
 
4. To your knowledge, the above mentioned 
practices in your company have been 
intentionally developed to re-enforce each 







The following does NOT concern the 




Do not                                               Strongly 
agree at all                           Agree 
                             
 













1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 
1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 




1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 
1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 
Do not                                               Strongly 














1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
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5. Your company has during at least 5 years had 
one or more HRM professionals, within or 
outside this company unit,  who:  
 
• exhibit leadership for the HR function and 
corporation 
 
• define and communicates HR vision for the 
future 
 
• educate and influences superiors of core 
employees on HR issues 
 
• have broad knowledge of many HR 
practices 
 
• are knowledgeable about competitors' HR 
practices 
 
• focus on the quality of HR services 
 
• have experience in key business areas 
which your company is involved in 
 
6. In your consulting market, your company's 
reputation for quality surpasses major 
competitors 
 
7. In your consulting market, your company's 
reputation for innovation surpasses major 
competitors 
 
8. Your company offers lower priced consulting 
products and services compared to your 
competitors 
 
9. On the whole, your consulting company 
operates in very competitive market segments  
 
10. During the last two years your consulting 
company's (if national subsidiary, then that unit) 
profitability  has been excellent 
 
11. During the last two years your consulting 
company's (if national subsidiary, then that unit) 
customers have in general been very satisfied 
 
12. During the last two years many good 
consultants have voluntarily left your 
company (if national subsidiary, then that unit) to 
join other employers  
 
13. During the last two years your consulting 
company (if national subsidiary, then that unit) has 







Do not                                               Strongly






1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 
1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 
1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 
1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 
1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 
1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 
1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 












1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 



















14. Number of consultants in the consulting 
company (if national subisidary, then that 
unit):_________  
 
15. Number of total staff in the consulting company 
(if national subisidary, then that unit):_________ 
 
 
16. During at least five years your company has 
made continuous efforts to sustain or develop 
the quality of: 
 
• the criteria for determining consultants' 
bonus pay (or other additions to their base 
pay) 
 
• the way it allows consultants autonomy in 
doing their job 
 
• the training and development programs it 
provides consultants 
 
• its socialization process for new 
consultants 
 
• its internal communication and 
information sharing 
 
• the performance appraisals for 
consultants 
 
• the way it involves consultants in general 
planning and decision making concerning 
internal company issues 
 






Thank You Very Much for Contributing to our Business Research ! 
 
Please return this questionnaire directly to us in 
the attached prepaid envelope! 
 
 




Do not                                               Strongly 
agree at all                           Agree 
 




1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 
1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 
1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 
1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 
1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 
1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 





          Appendix 2 
 




CONSULTANT'S QUESTIONNAIRE  
    
 
Remember, your responses will be kept absolutely confidential. No 
information about your personal responses will be revealed to your 
superiors, colleagues or outside parties ! 
 
All answers should be based on your own judgement.  
Please return this questionnaire directly to us in the attached prepaid envelope!  
In case you would have any problems in answering any one of the questions, I would greatly 
appreciate it if you would call Mats Ehrnrooth at ("out of your country"+) 358 400 456 940.  
 
 
1. Name of company: ________________(throughout the questionnaire, 
"company" should refer to the national subsidiary if you work for a multinational 
company) 
 
2. Your name:_________________(I need at least e.g. a first name in order 
to match your answers with some of the answers by your superior. Your name will 
not show up anywhere!) 
 
3. Your age:______years  
 
4. Your gender:   1  male       2  female 
 
5. Number of earlier employers:_____(do not include "summer jobs") 
 
6. You have been employed by this company ______years  
 
 
7. Your selection1 process included a great variety of selection 
techniques (such as interviews with many persons, references, work simulation, 
personality tests, problem solving, etc) 
 
8. Your selection process was of high quality 
 
9. Compared to your colleagues, you think your level of pay is fair 
 
10. You have considerable opportunity for independence and 
freedom in how you do your job 
 
11. The organization tries to make your job as interesting as 
possible 
 
12. Many dimensions of your work situation at the company are 
discussed during your performance appraisals2  (dimensions such 
as feedback, goalsetting, training and development needs, career prospects etc) 
 
13. You defend the organization when other employees critisize it 
 
14. You receive good support from your colleagues when things 
get complicated 
Using the scale listed below, please 
indicate, by circling a number, the 
extent to which you  
DO NOT AGREE AT ALL (1) or 
STRONGLY AGREE (7)  
with how each statement describes 
your experience at the company.  
 
 
Do not                                               Strongly 
agree at all                           Agree 
 
 
         




1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 
1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 
 




1     2      3      4      5       6      7 
 






15. During the last year the company has radically improved its 
pay policy in a way which affects you 
 
16. Compared to your colleagues, you consider your work load to 
be quite fair 
 
17. You are allowed to challenge or appeal job decisions made by 
your superiors 
 
18. Too big demands are put on your performance at work 
 
19. Among professionals in your field of business, the image of 
your company is superior compared to competitors 
 
20. The prospects for your company's successful performance are 
very good 
 
21. Your personality has been of high relevance for your ability to 
work and function effectively within the company 
 
22. During a socialization3 process at the beginning of your 
employment you were given a lot of information about the 
company, its history and its employees 
 
23. Your individual work performance has a significant direct 
influence on your level of pay 
 
24. Differences in hierarchy per se among consultants (excluding 
partners) have a large impact on their level of pay and other 
benefits  
 
25. You often motivate others in the company to express their 
ideas and opinions 
 
26. During the last year the company has radically improved its 
performance appraisals in a way which affects you 
 
27. During the last year the company has radically improved its 
policy on employment security in a way which affects you  
 
28. You are quite proud to tell people that you work for this 
organization 
 
29. Compared to your colleagues, overall the (monetary and non-
monetary) rewards you receive are quite fair 
 
30. Your employer has made very clear to you specific company 
objectives of involving employees in general planning and 
decision making concerning internal company issues 
 
31. The training and development programs the company has 
provided you are very meaningful to you 
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32. The company considers human resource management to be of 
strategic importance 
 
33. The organization is willing to help you when you need a 
personal favor 
 
34. When decisions are made about your job, your superiors are 
sensitive to your personal needs 
 
35. The company's top management is actively involved in 
emphasizing the importance of human resource management 
 
36. You often have difficulties to cooperate with your colleagues on 
projects 
 
37. You emphasize to people outside the organization the positive 
aspects of working for the organization 
 
38. Your impact on what happens in your department is large 
 
39. During the last year you have been offered another equally 
good or better job position at another organization 
 
40. During the last year your employer has radically improved the 
way it involves you in general planning and decision making 
concerning internal company issues 
 
41. You have significant autonomy in determining how you do your 
job 
 
42. During several years the company has emphasized the 
importance of continuous training and development 
 
43. You never complain about changes in the organization 
 
44. It often happens that you have to work under great time 
pressure 
 
45. The organization disregards your best interests when it makes 
decisions that affect you 
 
46. Your average level of pay is very satisfactory 
 
47. You sometimes feel like leaving this employment for good 
 
48. The organization takes pride in your accomplishments at work 
 
49. Your possibilities to receive a similar or better job position at 
another organization are very good 
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51. Compared to your colleagues, you feel that your job 
responsibilties are fair 
 
52. For issues that may have serious consequences for the 
company, you express your opinion honestly even when others 
may disagree 
 
53. The organization would understand a long absence due to your 
illness 
 
54. If you decide to quit, the organization would try to persuade you 
to stay 
 
55. Your employer involves you in a large amount of general 
planning and decision making concerning internal company 
issues 
 
56. You encourage others to try new and more effective ways of 
doing their job 
 
57. You often have too much to do at work 
 
58. The company has well communicated and well understood 
principles which describe its attitude to employee management 
 
59. The organization would fail to understand your absence due to 
a personal problem 
 
60. You avoid extra duties and responsibilities at work 
 
61. The training and development programs the company has 
provided you are of high quality  
 
62. During the last year the company has radically improved the 
way it allows you autonomy in doing your job 
 
63. The company puts great emphasis on developing consultants 
 
 
64. You frequently make creative suggestions to co-workers 
 
65. During several years the company has continued to emphasize 
the importance of allowing you autonomy in doing your job 
 
66. The company has provided you with a large amount of training 
and development programs  
 
67. The general benefits and services offered to you are of high 
quality  
 
68. At the beginning of your employment your employer made 
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69. You have a great trust in the commitment of the organization to 
continuosly invest in developing your knowledge and skills 
 
70. You are always willing to listen to co-workers' problems and 
worries 
 
71. You feel physically exhausted after a days work 
 
72. You consider your employment security at the company to be 
very high 
 
73. You go out of your way to help co-workers with work-related 
problems 
 
74. Job decisions are made by your superiors in an unbiased 
manner 
 
75. During the last year the company has radically improved its 
internal communication and information sharing in a way which 
affects you 
 
76. In your work you like to feel you are making some effort not just 
for yourself but for the organization as well 
 
77. You enjoy working with your colleagues 
 
78. Your job design allows for great autonomy and responsibility for 
you in deciding how you do your job 
 
79. The autonomy the company currently allows you in doing your 
job is very meaningful for you 
 
80. It would take only a small decrease in your performance for the 
organization to want to replace you 
 
81. If the organization could hire someone to replace you at a lower 
salary it would do so 
 
82. You receive a large amount of information through company 
internal communication and information sharing  
 
83. Your superiors make sure that all employee concerns are heard 
before job decisions are made 
 
84. The organization would forgive an honest mistake on your part 
 
85. You feel yourself to be part of the organization 
 
86. You make considerable efforts to keep well informed on 
matters where your opinion might benefit the organization 
 
87. Even if your organization were not doing too well financially, 
you would be reluctant to change to another employer  
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88. The organization cares about your opinions 
 
89. Your job activities are personally important to you 
 
90. During several years the company has continued to emphasize 
the importance of company internal communication and 
information sharing 
 
91. You encourage hesitant or quiet co-workers to voice their 
opinions when they otherwise might not speak-up 
 
92. You are confident about your ability to do your job 
 
93. Your superiors give you enough personal support 
 
94. During several years the company has continued to emphasize 
the importance of the criteria for determining your bonus pay 
(or other additions to your base pay) 
 
95. The company has an explicitly communicated intention to 
employ a highly motivated and competent core workforce 
 
96. The company philosophy embodies a strong belief that it is 
the competence and motivation of the employees which gives 
competitive advantage 
 
97. During the last year the company has radically improved its 
training and development policy in a way which affects you 
 
98. The work performance of your team or your department has a 
significant direct influence on your level of pay  
 
99. At the beginning of your employment your employer made 
very clear to you specific company objectives of its 
socialization process 
 
100.The company offers you a large amount of general benefits 
and services 
 
101.Your employer has made very clear to you specific company 
objectives of its reward system  
 
102.During several years your employer has continued to 
emphasize the importance of involving you in general 
planning and decision making concerning internal company 
issues  
 
103.The organization strongly considers your goals and values 
 
104.The performance of the company has a significant direct 
influence on your level of pay 
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105.Your superiors offer adequate justification for decisions made 
about your job 
 
106.Your superiors support you in your job in a constructive way 
 
107.During the last year the company has radically improved its 
policy on general benefits and services in a way which affects 
you 
 
108.Your employer has made very clear to you specific company 
objectives of its performance appraisal process  
 
109.Your superiors show great understanding for and considers 
your requests, needs and conditions 
 
110.Your employer has made very clear to you specific company 
objectives of its training and development policy  
 
111.The customer image of your company is superior compared to 
competitors 
 
112.The image of your company among professionals in your field 
of business is to a large extent due to its superior people 
management 
 
113.The general benefits and services the company currently 
provides you are very meaningful to you 
 
114.Your employer has made very clear to you specific company 
objectives of its internal communication and information 
sharing policy  
 
115.During several years the company has continued to 
emphasize the importance of the selection process 
 
116.You defend the organization when outsiders criticize it 
 
117.There are many attractive job positions which you could 
seriously apply for at other organizations 
 
118.Your acquisition of additional competencies through training 
and development programs has a significant direct influence 
on your level of pay 
 
119.To know that your own work had made a contribution to the 
good of your organization would please you 
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121.The way your employer currently involves you in general 
planning and decision making concerning internal company 
issues is very meaningful to you 
 
122.During several years the company has continued to 
emphasize the importance of the socialization process for 
new employees 
 
123.The professional workgroups to which you belong perform 
effectively 
 
124.Your employer has made very clear to you specific company 
objectives of the way the company allows employees 
autonomy in doing their job  
 
125.The criteria by which your bonus pay (or other additions to 
your base pay) is currently determined at the company are very 
meaningful for you 
 
126.You can talk to your superiors when you have difficulties at 
work 
 
127.Your performance appraisals are of high quality  
 
128.You are self-assured about your capabilities to perform your 
work activities 
 
129.Your socialization process at the beginning of your 
employment was of high quality  
 
130.The employment security the company currently provides you 
is very meaningful for you 
 
131.The information you currently receive through company 
internal communication and information sharing is of high 
relevance for you 
 
132.You have good chances to become a partner in the 
organization 
 
133.Your socialization process at the beginning of your 
employment was very relevant in enabling you to get to know 
the company, its values and norms as well as its core people 
 
134.The criteria by which your bonus pay (or other additions to 
your base pay) is determined are very clearly designed and 
followed in practice 
 
135.Your specific competencies aquired before your current 
employment have been of high relevance for your ability to 
work and function effectively within the company 
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136.The company seriously aims to create and sustain good 
cooperation and teamwork 
 
137.Think about your company's general attitude to employee 
management, the kind of employee behavior, competence 
and attitudes the company demands or desires of you. Please 
indicate the degree to which the following practices support 
this approach. 
 
• The quality of training and development programs the 
company provides you 
 
• The way the company involves you in general 
planning and decision making concerning internal 
company issues 
 
• The quality of the criteria for determining your bonus 
pay (or other additions to your base pay) 
 
• The quality of your selection process 
 
• The way the company allows you autonomy in doing 
your job 
 
• The quality of your performance appraisals 
 
• The quality of company internal communication and 
information sharing 
 
• The quality of your socialization process at the 





138.You frequently communicate to co-workers suggestions on 
how the group can improve 
 
139.Your current performance appraisals at the company are very 
meaningful to you 
 
140.You voluntarily help new employees settle into the job 
 
141.The information you receive through company internal 
communication and information sharing is of high quality  
 
142.Help is available from the organization when you have a 
problem 
 
143.Your company seriously tries to encourage and facilitate 
autonomous and responsible employee behavior, not regulate it 
with detailed company rules 
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144.During several years the company has continued to 
emphasize the importance of the performance appraisals 
 
145.You and your colleagues help each other and support one 
another 
 
146.During the last year the company has radically reduced the 
degree to which the level of pay and other benefits among 




147.The general planning and decision making concerning 
internal company issues which your employer involves you in 
is generally very important for the company 
 
148.It is difficult to get information from your superiors about 
issues which are important for doing your job 
 
149.When decisions are made about your job, your superiors treat 
you with respect and dignity 
 
150.The work you do is very meaningful to you 
 
151.Your superiors clarify decisions and provide additional 
information when requested by you 
 
152.During the last two years, your company's customers have in 
general been very satisfied with your company's services 
 
 









                                               
1 By selection process we mean the process by which the company chose you for employment. 
2 By performance appraisals we mean formal personal discussions you have once, twice or three (etc) times a year 
with your superior or someone else in the company concerning your performance and/or development needs etc. In 
case you do not have such formal meetings, please indicate the degree to which you have such informal discussions 
(and where asked, their quality, meaningfulness etc). 
3 By socialization process we mean the way, at the beginning of your employment,  you were introduced to the 
company, its values, norms, its history, its employees etc. 
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 HRM AND FOCAL INTERMEDIATE VARIABLES






General schema of perceptual variables and items used in this study. All left side items measured by perceptions
of core employees, all right side items measured by perceptions of superiors. The schema does not include the
”non-perceptual” items of employee age, tenure, number of earlier employees and organizations size.
Including the latter, the number of variables is 32 compared to 34 in the correlation table (Table 25b). The
difference is due to the fact that we, based on the validation analyses, divided in two the constructs of
















































































































*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.001 
(two-tailed)
N= 125




CN = 126 
All R2 ‘s are above 0.20 except 




















Positive: Meaning/Competenc; Meaning/Q145; 
               Meaning/Q87



































CN = 119 
All R2 ‘s are above 0.20 except 






















































CN = 133 
All R2 ‘s are above 0.20 except 






















Appendix 6a: Model 39b ( direct relationships
between Strategic fit (=significant) / HRM












































0.53 0.47*** 0.85*** 0.49***




















*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.001 (two-tailed) 
N= 125




CN = 108 
All R2 ‘s are above 0.20 except 
              Forgi = 0.18
Error correlations:
Positive: Mean/Comp; Involv/Mean; Involv/Comp; SQ0E/Imp;
               Mean/Q145; Q14/SQ0C; Q47/Ident; Q87/Mean; Q87/Ident; Q87/SQ0C; Q87/Q145




Appendix 6b: Model 40a (direct significant
relationships between Strategic fit / HRM sophistication











































0.62 0.44*** 0.92*** 0.49***


















*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.001  (two-tailed)
N= 125




CN = 107 
All R2 ‘s are above 0.20 except 
              Forgi = 0.18
Error correlations:
Positive: Mean/Comp; Involv/Mean; Involv/Comp; SQ0E/Imp; SQ6/Ident; SQ11/Involv
               Mean/Q145; Q87/Mean; Q87/SQ0G
Negative: Mean/Imp; Ident/Imp; Toleran/Mean; Q87/Q106; Q47/Q145
Crossloadings: Organizational perf.: Quality-Ident (0.19***); Employee perf.-Ident (-26**); Aff.cont.com-Ident
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